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Perkins v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2018] QCAT 15

Perkins v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2018] QCAT 15

CITATION:

Perkins & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2018] QCAT 15

PARTIES:

Ian Perkins

Kylie Perkins 

(Applicants)

v

Queensland Building and Construction Commission  

(First Respondent)

Platinum Construction Solutions Pty Ltd

(Second Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

GAR043-16

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters 

HEARING DATE:

On the papers 

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Traves

DELIVERED ON:

23 January 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS MADE:

  1. The application for costs is dismissed.
  2. Each party bear their own costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – construction of s 100 and s 102 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) and rule 86 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) – discretion to award costs in administrative review matters to a successful applicant – whether usual position in s 100 should be displaced – whether the interests of justice require a costs order to be made – Calderbank offer – indemnity costs

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A

Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), s 71, s 72, s 86, s 87

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 74, s 100, s 102, s 105, s 106

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), rule 86

Ascot v Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia [2010] QCAT 364

Coral Homes Qld Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 510

Jones & Anor v Millward & Anor [2005] QCA 76

McEwen v Barker Builders Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 49

Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412 Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135

Tamawood Limited v Paans [2005] QCA 111

REPRESENTATIVES:

 

APPLICANTS:

Mr Peter Somers, Counsel for Ian and Kylie Perkins

FIRST RESPONDENT:

Mr Earl Tan, Senior principal lawyer, Queensland Building and Construction Commission

SECOND RESPONDENT:

Mr Jim Feehely, Jim Feehely Project Law, for Platinum Construction Solutions

APPEARANCES:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QCAT Act).

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

  1. [1]
    On 21 August 2017 the tribunal made orders setting aside the decision of the QBCC to disallow the Perkins’ claim under the statutory insurance scheme and declaring the contract between the Perkins and Platinum Construction Solutions Pty Ltd (PCS) “properly terminated” in accordance with clause 27 of the scheme policy. A further order was made permitting the parties to make submissions with respect to costs.
  2. [2]
    The Perkins and the QBCC made submissions as to costs but PCS did not. The QBCC’s submissions were received out of time. The solicitors for the Perkins have objected to the submissions on the basis they were filed approximately two months late. It appears the QBCC were waiting for further directions from the tribunal. I have decided to accept the submissions, particularly in view of the fact that none were received from PCS and that the Perkins will not suffer any prejudice from my doing so.
  3. [3]
    The Perkins have applied for costs incurred by them in bringing the review proceedings in the sum of $51,605.34 or, in the alternative, for fixed costs in the sum of $43,058.44. The QBCC submit that this is not a case where the applicants can overcome the strong contra-indication against costs orders in s 100 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) and, accordingly, that the application for costs should be dismissed.

The background to the dispute

  1. [4]
    Ian and Kylie Perkins entered into a domestic building contract with PCS on 17 February 2015 for the renovation of their home at Camp Hill. The contracted works were not completed and on 27 November 2015 the Perkins lodged a complaint with the QBCC.
  2. [5]
    The Perkins purported to terminate the contract on 23 November 2015.
  3. [6]
    The QBCC treated the complaint as a claim on the Queensland Home Warranty Insurance Scheme and forwarded it to its Insurance Department for assessment. The claim was, however, rejected on 19 January 2016.
  4. [7]
    The Perkins brought an application in the Tribunal to review the decision by the QBCC to refuse their claim under the scheme. This is a reviewable decision pursuant to s 86(1)(h) of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) (QBCC Act).
  5. [8]
    The reason the claim was refused was because the QBCC took the view that the contract entered into between the Perkins and PCS had not been “properly terminated” by the Perkins and that this was a pre-condition to recovery under the scheme.
  6. [9]
    If the contract had been properly terminated and the claim allowed, the QBCC would be entitled to recover the amount paid pursuant to the scheme as a debt from PCS.[1] As a consequence, PCS had been joined to the proceedings prior to the Hearing as a person whose “interests may be affected” by the Decision.[2]
  7. [10]
    The Perkins were ultimately successful before the Tribunal, having established they had “properly terminated” the contract with PCS and were therefore, prima facie, entitled to claim under the insurance scheme.

The power to award costs under the QCAT Act

  1. [11]
    In Tamawood Limited v Paans,[3] Keane JA said:

…it is clear that the power of a court or tribunal to award costs to a party is now the creature of statute.[4] The nature and extent of that power can only be discerned by close consideration of the terms of the statute which creates the power and prescribes the occasions for, and conditions of, its exercise.[5]

  1. [12]
    In review proceedings under the QBCC Act, the relevant costs provisions are those in Chapter 2, Division 6 of the QCAT Act.
  2. [13]
    The Tribunal may award costs after the proceeding has ended.[6]
  3. [14]
    The statutory power to award costs is defined by s 100 and s 102 of the QCAT Act. Those provisions are as follows:

100 Each party usually bears own costs

Other than as provided under this Act or an enabling Act, each party to a proceeding must bear the party's own costs for the proceeding.

102 Costs against party in interests of justice

  1. (1)
    The Tribunal may make an order requiring a party to a proceeding to pay all or a stated part of the costs of another party to the proceeding if the Tribunal considers the interests of justice require it to make the order.
  1. (2)
    However, the only costs the Tribunal may award under subsection (1) against a party to a proceeding for a minor civil dispute are the costs stated in the rules as costs that may be awarded for minor civil disputes under this section.
  1. (3)
    In deciding whether to award costs under subsection (1) or (2) the Tribunal may have regard to the following--
  1. (a)
    whether a party to a proceeding is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceeding, including as mentioned in section 48(1)(a) to (g);
  1. (b)
    the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding;
  1. (c)
    the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties to the proceeding;
  1. (d)
    for a proceeding for the review of a reviewable decision--
  1. (i)
    whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the decision; and
  1. (ii)
    whether the applicant genuinely attempted to enable and help the decision-maker to make the decision on the merits;
  1. (e)
    the financial circumstances of the parties to the proceeding;
  1. (f)
    anything else the Tribunal considers relevant.
  1. [15]
    It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the provisions of an Act must be construed as a whole and in a manner which is consistent with their purpose and with the objects of the Act.[7] It is important, when applying s 102, to have regard to its statutory context and to the objects of the QCAT Act which, relevantly, are to establish a way for resolving proceedings that is informal and cost-effective.[8] This approach is consistent with s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld).
  2. [16]
    When this approach to statutory construction is applied it is clear the prima facie position is that parties are to bear their own costs. Indeed, the heading to s 100 expressly states this to be the “usual position”. Reading s 100 and s 102 together, the usual position is that costs are not to be awarded but that this may be departed from when the tribunal considers the “interests of justice” requires otherwise.
  3. [17]
    Costs in the tribunal do not, therefore, simply follow the event. The purpose of the cost provisions is to deny costs even to a successful party unless considerations apply which make such an order necessary in the interests of justice.
  4. [18]
    This approach to the costs provisions in the QCAT Act was applied recently by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Medical Board of Australia v Wong[9] when, in the context of an occupational regulatory matter, McMurdo J referred to the “starting position” as “that prescribed by s 100”.[10] It is also the approach consistently applied by the tribunal.[11]
  5. [19]
    The phrase “in the interests of justice” is not defined but should be construed in accordance with its ordinary and plain meaning. It has been said to confer a broad discretionary power on the decision-maker.[12] In making a decision whether the interests of justice require a costs order to be made, the tribunal may have regard to the factors in s 102(3) which include anything the tribunal considers relevant.[13]
  6. [20]
    The Perkins submit that it is in the interests of justice that the respondents pay their costs or that their reasonable costs incurred after the rejection of their offers to settle should be paid pursuant to rule 86 of the QCAT Rules.

When does the interests of justice require a costs order to be made?

  1. [21]
    The requirement of the “interests of justice” appears in many statutory contexts. In respect of comparable costs provisions in legislation governing the District Court, it has been held:

…it is ‘obvious that the primary import of s 42G(2) of the District Court Act is to do away with the ordinary rule that costs follow the event’.8 The practice of the Court essentially requires the emergence of an unusual or out of the ordinary feature of the contest justifying an award for costs in the interests of justice under this section.[14]

  1. [22]
    In my view, requiring an unusual or out of the ordinary feature before awarding costs is to place a gloss on the words of s 100 and s 102. All that needs to be shown is something sufficient to justify the exercise of the costs discretion against the ordinary position.
  2. [23]
    Clearly a party has to show something more than that their arguments were ultimately successful. If this was sufficient, costs would follow the event which is not the case.
  3. [24]
    In assessing whether an order for costs is required in the interests of justice, the tribunal may apply the factors in s 102(3). These factors are not grounds for awarding costs but matters the tribunal may consider in deciding whether, in a particular case, the interests of justice require the tribunal to make a costs order.[15]
  4. [25]
    The factors are designed to apply to a broad range of proceedings. Some, namely s 102(3)(b) and s 102(3)(d), apply only to review proceedings. Those factors are, respectively, whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker; and whether the applicant genuinely attempted to help the decision-maker make the decision on the merits.
  5. [26]
    In terms of the approach to the application of those factors, the Appeal Tribunal in Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[16] held:

Those considerations are largely in the nature of what may be regarded as ‘entitling’ or ‘disentitling’ factors. In the exercise of the discretion to award costs, it is necessary to weigh relevant factors against the starting position that each party bear their own costs. In view of the legislated shift in the starting position to that stated in section 100, the weight of such factors must be compelling for the starting position to be overcome.[17]

  1. [27]
    I will now consider the factors in s 102(3) which include anything the tribunal considers relevant, to determine whether the interests of justice require a costs award. I will consider each respondent in turn.

Should the QBCC pay costs?

  1. [28]
    Considering the factors in s 102(3) where relevant, is this a situation where it is in the interests of justice to require the QBCC to pay costs given that in the ordinary course, parties are to bear their own.

The nature of review proceedings and the role of the QBCC[18]

  1. [29]
    Review proceedings are fundamentally different from commercial litigation. They are, by their very nature, not adversarial. This is reflected in the different costs regime that applies to building disputes. The tribunal has a broader and more general discretion to award costs in a building dispute owing to s 77 of the QBCC Act which confers on the tribunal an express, unqualified power to award costs. Unlike the position with respect to review proceedings, there is no general rule that parties are to bear their own costs.
  2. [30]
    The role of the QBCC once the review proceedings had commenced was to act as a model litigant and, pursuant to s 21(1) of the QCAT Act, to use its “best endeavours to help the Tribunal so that it can make its decision on the review”.[19] In exercising the review jurisdiction, the proceeding must be decided by the tribunal in accordance with the QCAT Act and the enabling Act under which the reviewable decision was made.[20] This may explain why the factors in s 102(3) relevant to review proceedings[21] are directed to the conduct of the original decision-maker[22] before the original decision was made.
  3. [31]
    Further, the role of the QBCC as regulator is, in my view, a relevant factor to be taken into account. In this respect the QBCC submitted:

In a Tribunal “established as a no costs jurisdiction” the Commission’s approach to its statutory task should not be “weighed in nice scales”. As the regulator, the Commission is routinely called upon to reconcile assertion and counter-assertion in disputes in which the Commission has had no direct original involvement and no real way of determining the truth or otherwise of the various assertions. The Commission’s officers should not be judged too harshly in treading carefully in carrying out the difficult task of assessing the representations made to it in such circumstances, given the consequences for the contracted parties.[23]

  1. [32]
    In this case, the QBCC’s statutory task was to determine whether the Perkins had made a valid claim under the policy governing the statutory scheme. While the QBCC must ensure that homeowners who come within the terms of the policy governing the scheme are indemnified, in making that decision it must exercise reasonable care in view of the fact it is administering a public fund and of the potential consequences to the builder if a claim is made.[24]
  2. [33]
    The conduct of the QBCC was consistent with the performance of its statutory functions and with its obligations to the tribunal.

Whether a party acts in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party.[25]

  1. [34]
    The Perkins assert that “in or about August 2016 the QBCC sought to join PCS to the proceedings and simply take a passive position allowing the parties to the contract to fight in relation to bases on which the QBCC rejected the applicants’ claim under the policy.”[26]
  2. [35]
    The QBCC made lengthy submissions to the tribunal outlining its reasons for seeking the joinder of PCS to the action. These reasons were accepted by the tribunal and an order was made on 26 August 2016 joining PCS to the action.
  3. [36]
    The conduct of the QBCC in seeking to join PCS when it was the party to the underlying dispute with intimate knowledge of the facts upon which the decision as to repudiation would be based and for whom the consequences of the decision could be significant, was an entirely reasonable course to take. At that point, the Perkins and PCS both had very different positions regarding the validity of the termination by the Perkins. In my view, the QBCC could not have been satisfied to a sufficient degree to make a decision favourable to the Perkins without joining PCS and giving it an opportunity to fully argue its case.
  4. [37]
    Further, once the Perkins filed the application for review, the tribunal became seized of the matter and it was for the tribunal, standing in the shoes of the QBCC, to arrive at the correct and preferable decision.

The nature and complexity of the dispute[27]

  1. [38]
    I accept that this is a factor in favour of an award of costs but that it is not determinative.[28] The proceedings involved complex legal principles and complex questions of fact concerning repudiation which warranted legal representation.
  2. [39]
    In Tamawood Limited v Paans,[29] although the costs provisions in question were different, Keane JA considered whether costs should be awarded in the interests of justice when legal representation was reasonably necessary due to the complexity of the matter:

In the absence of countervailing considerations, where a party has reasonably incurred the cost of legal representation, and has been successful before the Tribunal, it could not rationally be said to be in the interests of justice to allow that success to be eroded by requiring that party to bear the costs of the representation which was reasonably necessary to achieve that outcome.[30]

  1. [40]
    All parties were given leave to be legally represented. Under s 43 of the QCAT Act, parties are to represent themselves unless the interests of justice require otherwise. This does not necessarily mean however that it is in the interests of justice for the costs of that representation to be borne by another party.

The relative strengths of the claims[31]

  1. [41]
    I am not satisfied this is a factor in favour of an award of costs.
  2. [42]
    Although the Perkins were ultimately successful the outcome was not one which was readily apparent from reading the material. There were complex legal and factual questions involved and the positions of the parties were diametrically opposed.
  3. [43]
    The Perkins submit that the QBCC should have arrived at a conclusion favourable to the Perkins well before the trial.[32] In response the QBCC submitted:

The submission does not in any realistic way come to grips with the Commission’s position as a statutory body charged with making administrative decisions based upon representations made to it. Nor does the submission acknowledge in any fair or accurate way that the evidence bearing on this question was not fully provided or tested until the review proceedings occurred.

By way of example, the Applicants comprehensively outlined its position in relation to the purported termination by submissions to the Commission made under cover of letter dated 8 August 2016.

Considered from the perspective of the Commission, the content of this letter rested in the realm of assertion and counter-assertion in a dispute in respect of which the Commission had no direct involvement and no means of reliable knowledge. That is, the Commission was not in a position reliably to assess the veracity of the assertions made by the Applicant.

These matters were resolved by the Tribunal not on the basis that the outcome was a forgone conclusion, but by consideration of the conflicting evidence put on by both the Applicants and the Second Respondent, and by making findings of credit.[33]

  1. [44]
    I accept the submissions of the QBCC on this aspect. The issues could only be resolved by a close analysis of the facts and these facts were not fully identifiable prior to the trial. The evidence relevant to the questions of fact could not be properly tested until the hearing and took two full days to cover.
  2. [45]
    Further, as I observed in my decision, a finding of repudiation of a contract is a serious matter, not to be lightly found or inferred.[34]

Whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker[35]

  1. [46]
    The Perkins argue they were not afforded natural justice by the QBCC because they were not provided with an opportunity to reply to the submission of the builder prior to the QBCC making its decision to deny the claim.
  2. [47]
    While the Perkins were not given an opportunity to reply, the Perkins were granted the same opportunity as PCS to provide details of their position about the termination. This, in my view, is sufficient to satisfy the QBCC’s obligations in relation to affording natural justice to claimants within the context of the statutory framework of the statutory scheme provisions.
  3. [48]
    Further, it is not clear that the QBCC would have changed their position based on that response. Indeed, the Perkins had the opportunity to provide further submissions after the decision regarding their position, which they did, to no avail.
  4. [49]
    I am not satisfied that, had the Perkins been given an opportunity to reply to the submission by PCS prior to the QBCC making its decision, that the review proceeding could have been avoided or costs reduced.

Whether the applicant genuinely attempted to enable and help the decision-maker to make the decision on the merits[36]

  1. [50]
    I am satisfied, based on the material filed by the Perkins, that they genuinely attempted to enable and help the QBCC to make the decision on the merits.

The financial circumstances of the parties[37]

  1. [51]
    The Perkins submit:

In this instance the applicants are individuals. The first respondent is a statutory body…

….

The second respondent is a building company who, it has been established, took substantial amounts of money from the applicants and then held the applicants to ransom with an uninhabitable house for money that it was not entitled to claim.

In this instance it is clear that the applicants were in a more vulnerable financial position than either of the respondents and yet have been put to the task and expense of proving facts which were readily identifiable well before a trial in these proceedings.[38]

  1. [52]
    I accept that the Perkins were in a vulnerable position financially due to the review proceedings. The QBCC is a statutory body funded from fees paid by licensees. While it may have a better net asset position than the Perkins it does not have unlimited funds, is subject to budgetary constraints and has many demands on its resources.[39]
  2. [53]
    I am not satisfied that a comparison of the financial circumstances of a statutory body and an individual is a matter upon which I can place much weight.
  3. [54]
    In view of the factors above, on balance, I do not find this to be a case where it is in the interests of justice to require the QBCC to pay any of the Perkins’ costs. While the position advanced by the QBCC was not ultimately adopted by the tribunal, its position was not plainly untenable or unreasonable such that it demonstrated that it was in the interests of justice to award costs against the ordinary position that each party bear their own.

Should PCS pay costs?

  1. [55]
    In relation to the issue of whether PCS should pay all or part of the Perkins’ costs I have come to the conclusion that the interests of justice do not, in this case, justify a departure from the usual position, that each party is to bear their own costs.
  2. [56]
    In arriving at this conclusion I have considered the factors in s 102(3) where relevant.
  3. [57]
    I do not find that the conduct of PCS unnecessarily disadvantaged the Perkins in the way contemplated by s 102(3) and including in the ways outlined in s 48(a) to s 48(g). PCS has not, for example, conducted the proceeding in a vexatious manner or in a way that has unnecessarily disadvantaged the Perkins other than by persisting in its position, which it was entitled to do.[40]
  4. [58]
    While it is true PCS was ultimately unsuccessful in relation to the issue of repudiation, this was an important issue for PCS in terms of the consequences that could flow from such a finding and PCS took a stance which was not so unreasonable as to justify a costs order under s 102.
  5. [59]
    I find that the case was of a nature and complexity that warranted both sides obtaining legal representation. While in some cases this may be a factor in justifying an award of costs, in this case, I find that not to be the case. The dispute was complex, involving difficult questions of law which in turn depended upon a close analysis of the facts. There were arguments both ways as to whether and by whom repudiation had occurred. There were many alternative grounds for repudiation relied upon by each party and the result was not entirely clear from a reading of the submissions and other material. The parties had very different views regarding key issues and the parties were each entitled to test those views in the review proceeding.
  6. [60]
    I also do not find that the relative strength of the claim by the Perkins was so much stronger than the claim by PCS as to justify a finding of costs.
  7. [61]
    There was evidence during the Hearing which suggested PCS was not in a strong financial position. I accept on the other hand that the Perkins would have been under significant financial strain due to the state of their uninhabitable home and the legal costs associated with pursuing the review. I find, on balance, that, given the financial circumstances of both parties, that this factor does not point to an award of costs in favour of one in the interests of justice.

Should costs incurred after the offers be paid?

  1. [62]
    Section 105 authorises the tribunal to make rules permitting costs awards in other circumstances. The tribunal has done this by rule 86. Rule 86 applies when:
    1. a)
      one party makes another a written offer to settle;
    2. b)
      the other party does not accept it; and
    3. c)
      the decision of the tribunal was not better than the offer.
  2. [63]
    In that situation, the tribunal may award the party who made the offer all reasonable costs incurred by that party after the offer was made.[41] The power to award costs pursuant to rule 86 is still discretionary.
  3. [64]
    The Perkins refer to an offer made by them at the compulsory conference on 27 September 2016. Anything said at a compulsory conference, including any offers, is not admissible at any stage of the proceeding.[42] I am therefore not able to take this into consideration.
  4. [65]
    An offer was made by letter from the applicant’s solicitor on 8 February 2017. That offer was for QBCC to reconsider its decision and for there to be no order as to costs.
  5. [66]
    In my view, an offer made in the context of review proceedings, for the decision-maker to reconsider its decision, is not the kind of offer contemplated by rule 86. An “offer” that the QBCC reconsider its decision will not necessarily result in a different decision. An offer to a decision-maker to take such a step does not necessarily resolve the matter and so, in my view, is not an offer to settle within the meaning of rule 86.
  6. [67]
    Further, even if it was implied that the offer was to reconsider the decision and accept the Perkins claim this would not be an offer to settle within the meaning of the rule because there is no element of compromise by the Perkins, which, in my view, is intrinsic to the concept of “offer” in the context of a rule as to costs.[43]  Further, given my decision as to costs, the offer, was, in any event, not more favourable than the decision.

Conclusion 

  1. [68]
    Each party is to bear its own costs.

Footnotes

[1] QBCC Act, s 71(1), s 71(3). See also clause 8.4 Subrogation of the statutory policy.

[2] Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act), s 42(1).

[3] [2005] QCA 111.

[4] Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178, 193; Forest Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd & Ors (1991) 4 ACSR 107, 111-113.

[5] Ibid, [23].

[6] QCAT Act, s 106.

[7] Tamawood Ltd v Paans [2005] QCA 111, [2].

[8] QCAT Act, s 3(b).

[9] [2017] QCA 42, [37].

[10] Ibid, [37].

[11] Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412; McEwen v Barker Builders Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 49; Coral Homes Qld Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 510; Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135.

[12] Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412, [4] cited in Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135, [9].

[13] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(f).

[14] Marksman Training Systems Pty Ltd v Registrar of Firearms (No 5) [2017] SADC 15, [8].

[15] Ascot v Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia [2010] QCAT 364, [9], Deputy President Kingham.

[16] [2016] QCATA 135.

[17] Ibid, [18].

[18] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(f).

[19] QCAT, s 21(1).

[20] QCAT Act, s 19.

[21] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(b)(d).

[22] Defined in Schedule 3 of the QCAT Act by reference to s 17(2) to mean the entity that made the reviewable decision.

[23] First Respondent’s Submissions on costs filed 15 November 2017, [30].

[24] QBCC Act, s 71; clause 8.4 of the Policy.

[25] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(a).

[26] Applicants’ Submissions on Costs filed 8 September 2017, [3(k)].

[27] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(b).

[28] Fuge v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 383, [21].

[29] [2005] QCA 111.

[30] Ibid, [33].

[31] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(c).

[32] Applicants’ Submissions on Costs filed 8 September 2017, [8].

[33] First Respondent’s Submissions on costs filed 15 November 2017, [26] - [29].

[34] Decision, [15].

[35] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(d)(i).

[36] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(d)(ii).

[37] QCAT Act, s 102(3)(e).

[38] Applicants’ Submissions on Costs filed 8 September 2017, [5] - [8].

[39] Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135, [56].

[40] 24 Hour Fitness Pty Ltd v W & B Investment Group Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 216.

[41] QCAT Rules, rule 86(2).

[42] QCAT Act, s 74.

[43] Jones & Anor v Millward & Anor [2005] QCA 76, 3, Holmes J citing Mitchell v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 179.

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Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Perkins & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Perkins v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

  • MNC:

    [2018] QCAT 15

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Member Traves

  • Date:

    23 Jan 2018

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ascot v Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia [2010] QCAT 364
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCAT 364
Cite 2 - [2010] QCAT 364
Coral Homes Qld Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 510
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCAT 510
Cite 2 - [2013] QCAT 510
Forrest Pty Ltd v Keen Bay Pty Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 107
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 4 ACSR 107
Fuge v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 383
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCAT 383
Hour Fitness Pty Ltd v W & B Investment Group Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 216
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] VSCA 216
Jones v Millward[2005] 1 Qd R 498; [2005] QCA 76
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 76
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 76
Knight v F. P. Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 174 CLR 178
Marksman Training Systems Pty Ltd v Registrar of Firearms (No 5) [2017] SADC 15
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] SADC 15
McEwen v Barker Builders Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 49
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCATA 49
Cite 2 - [2010] QCATA 49
Medical Board of Australia v Wong [2017] QCA 42
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QCA 42
Cite 2 - [2017] QCA 42
Mitchell v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 179
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QSC 179
Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCAT 412
Cite 2 - [2010] QCAT 412
Cite 3 - [2010] QCAT 412
Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCATA 135
Cite 2 - [2016] QCATA 135
Cite 3 - [2016] QCATA 135
Cite 4 - [2016] QCATA 135
Cite 5 - [2016] QCATA 135
Cite 6 - [2016] QCATA 135
Tamawood Ltd v Paans[2005] 2 Qd R 101; [2005] QCA 111
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 111
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 111
Cite 3 - [2005] QCA 111
Cite 4 - [2005] QCA 111
Cite 5 - [2005] QCA 111

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
AK Group Qld Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission No 2 [2021] QCAT 1262 citations
Cowen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] QCATA 1032 citations
Hopper v Queensland Building and Construction Commission (No. 2) [2019] QCAT 2122 citations
1

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