Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Stanton v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2018] QCAT 271

Stanton v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2018] QCAT 271

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Stanton v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QCAT 271

PARTIES:

NOEL EDWARD STANTON

(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

GAR121-17

MATTER TYPE:

Building matters

DELIVERED ON:

14 August 2018

HEARING DATE:

16 May 2018

HEARD AT:

Mackay

DECISION OF:

Member Milburn

ORDERS:

  1. The tribunal sets aside the decision of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission made on 10 April 2017 that Sean Keith Cook (owner) validly terminated a residential building contract between the applicant and the owner dated 12 May 2015 for the construction of a dwelling at 1 Jonathan Court Alligator Creek.
  2. The tribunal substitutes its own decision and wholly disallows a claim by Sean Keith Cook (owner) for non-completion under the statutory scheme regarding a residential building contract between the applicant and the owner dated 12 May 2015 for the construction of a dwelling at 1 Jonathan Court Alligator Creek.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – General Administrative Review – application by building contractor to review a decision by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QBCC) to allow a claim by building owner – whether the building owner validly terminated a building contract – where the building contractor also purported to terminate the contract – the rights of the building contractor and the building owner under contract and at law – where the tribunal reviews the decision of the QBCC about valid termination of the contract by the building owner and allowing a claim under the statutory scheme in favour of the building owner

Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), s 3, s 86, s 87

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 6, s 17, s 20, s 24, s 102

Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council & Anor v Sanpine Pty Ltd & Anor (2007) 233 CLR 115

Goldfield Projects Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCAT 362

Kuhn v QBSA and Trackson [2004] QCCTB 159

J & K Homes Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCAT 269

Cowen & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2017] QCAT 416

Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620

MacDonald v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 158

Holland v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409

Fontain v Queensland Building Services Authority [2004] QCCTB 163

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

 

Applicant:

Mr Scott McLennan of counsel instructed by Kelly Legal

Respondent:

Mr Chad Hill (solicitor), in-house lawyer, Queensland Building and Construction Commission

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

  1. [1]
    Noel Stanton is a builder, trading as NES Constructions. On or about 12 May 2015, he contracted (the contract) with Shaun Cook, to build a house (the house) for Mr Cook on land owned by Mr Cook at Alligator Creek (the property).
  2. [2]
    The contract required Mr Stanton to construct a low set dwelling, carport, patio and porch on the property (the works).
  3. [3]
    Nearing completion of the works, Mr Stanton and Mr Cook fell into dispute. Alleging misconduct by Mr Cook, Mr Stanton stopped work on the construction site (the site) and purported to terminate the contract. Mr Cook alleged that Mr Stanton had no right to terminate the contract and that Mr Stanton’s termination amounted to a repudiation, which Mr Cook purported to accept, and he too purported to terminate the contract.
  4. [4]
    So, both parties claim to have validly terminated the contract, due to the repudiation of it by the other party.
  5. [5]
    Mr Cook complained to the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (the QBCC). At first, the QBCC turned its attention to the complainant (Mr Cook) regarding work performed by him on the site. Following the investigation, the QBCC determined that Mr Cook had conducted unlicensed work on the site and issued an infringement notice against Mr Cook.[1] However, since then Mr Cook has elected court determination.[2] The QBCC then turned its attention to the dispute between Mr Cook and Mr Stanton and determined that Mr Cook had validly terminated the contract. To arrive at that conclusion, QBCC formed the view that Mr Stanton had not lawfully terminated the contract.
  6. [6]
    Mr Stanton requested an internal review of the initial QBCC decision, which resulted in the same conclusion. Mr Stanton requested an external review before this tribunal. This external review takes the form of a merits review. In short, Mr Stanton urges the tribunal to set aside the decision of the QBCC. Mr Stanton says the tribunal would come to that conclusion if it finds that he, and not Mr Cook, had lawfully terminated the contract.

Insurance claim by Mr Cook

  1. [7]
    Mr Cook supplemented his complaint with an insurance claim, which the QBCC approved. The QBCC advised Mr Stanton that it had approved the statutory insurance claim by Mr Cook under the Queensland Home Warranty Scheme, pursuant to the insurance provisions of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) (the QBCC Act).
  2. [8]
    Before the tribunal, representatives for both Mr Stanton and the QBCC argued that the case is based on issues to do with the termination of the contract.
  3. [9]
    Mr Stanton says that if the tribunal finds that he lawfully terminated the contract, the tribunal should set aside the decision of the QBCC made on 10 April 2017 and wholly disallow the claim by Mr Cook for non-completion under the statutory scheme.
  4. [10]
    The QBCC says that if the tribunal confirms its decision that Mr Cook validly terminated the contract, then it should confirm the decision to allow the claim under the statutory scheme.

Purported termination by Mr Stanton

  1. [11]
    In this case, the central question for consideration by the tribunal is whether Mr Cook or Mr Stanton breached the contract and if so, whether that was enough to justify termination of the contract by the other. To answer that question, the tribunal must consider the terms of the contract within the context of the common law.
  2. [12]
    Mr Stanton did send an email letter to Mr Cook on 3 June 2016, purporting to terminate the contract. At the tribunal hearing, Mr Stanton did not rely upon that letter as the basis upon which he terminated the contract. On 10 June 2016, Mr Stanton’s lawyers gave notice to Mr Cook of alleged breaches by Mr Cook and they required rectification of those breaches within 10 business days. On 27 June 2016, Mr Stanton’s lawyers gave notice to Mr Cook of Mr Stanton’s decision to terminate the contract. On 15 June 2016, lawyers for Mr Cook gave notice to Mr Stanton of alleged breaches by Mr Stanton and they required rectification of those breaches within 10 business days. On 14 July 2016, Mr Cook’s lawyers disputed that Mr Stanton had validly terminated the contract, but nevertheless accepted his termination of the contract.
  3. [13]
    Mr Stanton purported to terminate the contract first in time. To consider whether that purported termination was effective at law, the tribunal must consider:
    1. (i)
      Whether Mr Cook did breach the contract; and
    2. (ii)
      Whether the purported breach related to an essential term of the contract; or
    3. (iii)
      Whether Mr Cook’s conduct was sufficiently repudiatory to warrant termination, even if it did not relate to an essential term of the contract.

Did Mr Cook breach the contract?

  1. [14]
    It was common ground that during construction, Mr Cook was to provide some assistance to Mr Stanton. Mr Stanton says that although Mr Cook was a builder, he was, at least at the relevant time, unlicenced. Mr Stanton says that Mr Cook was interfering with his building site by engaging in unlicensed building work, which included coordinating his own contractors. Mr Stanton says that he could not continue to work for Mr Cook with this level of interference. The relationship broke down badly. Mr Stanton also accused Mr Cook of threatening to assault him.
  2. [15]
    Mr Stanton says that Mr Cook did work without his supervision or the supervision of another licensed contractor. By not doing so, Mr Stanton said that Mr Cook was acting as an unlicensed builder and in an unauthorised manner. To that extent, by prosecuting Mr Cook the QBCC agreed with Mr Stanton.
  3. [16]
    The contract did allow for Mr Cook to provide some degree of assistance to Mr Stanton, however the extent to which he could so remained in dispute at the hearing.

Mr Stanton’s position

  1. [17]
    Mr Stanton argued that the contract contained terms to the effect that Mr Cook would not obstruct, interfere with or hinder him while he completed the works (among other terms that are included in the contract).
  2. [18]
    At the tribunal hearing, Mr Stanton said that as per the terms of his agreement with Mr Cook, he would allow Mr Cook to choose his preferred tiling and painting contractors. Then, Mr Cook could provide personal assistance for, and under the supervision of, those licensed contractors once Mr Stanton formally engaged them as subcontractors. Mr Stanton gave evidence that Mr Cook did not abide by that arrangement and conducted work unsupervised on the site. That is, Mr Cook was undertaking unlicensed building work.
  3. [19]
    Mr Stanton formed the view that he was unable to provide certification of some works.
  4. [20]
    Mr Stanton said that during the completion of the works, Mr Cook:
    1. (i)
      refused to sign variation agreements which he presented to him, including variation agreements documenting requests made by Mr Cook;
    2. (ii)
      lived on the property in a shed;
    3. (iii)
      ignored instructions given to him by Mr Stanton, and without authority hired and instructed plumbers to install a mount frame for a hot water solar panel without prior engineering approval, and in the incorrect zone of the roof (in a high wind area approximately 1.5 m above the roof);
    4. (iv)
      installed, or arranged to be installed, glass panels and shower screens when he was not licensed to do so;
    5. (v)
      failed to provide appropriate certifications for various owner supplied goods;
    6. (vi)
      backfilled topsoil against the building which prevented Mr Stanton from obtaining final certification;
    7. (vii)
      had keys to the works and took over the works by giving instructions directly to contractors; and
    8. (viii)
      took possession of the site.
  5. [21]
    Mr Stanton considered Mr Cook’s actions to be a breach of the contract, as he was instructing contractors, and interfering with and hindering him while completing the works. Mr Stanton also considered Mr Cook’s actions to be a breach of the contract because:
  1. Mr Stanton would breach his obligations as a builder under the QBCC Act, if he were to certify works undertaken by Mr Cook which were not supervised by a licensed builder. He was of the view that he could not warrant the works as required to do under Part 4 the QBCC Act. Mr Cook’s actions in providing instructions directly to third parties, who essentially performed work under his direction, and the failure by Mr Cook to arrange the correct installation of the hot water solar panel mount frame meant that Mr Stanton would not be able to warrant that the works on the property were:
  1. carried out in accordance with all relevant laws and legal requirements;
  2. carried out with the necessary reasonable care and skill; and
  3. to result in a dwelling suitable for occupation.
  1. Pursuant to clause 11.10 the contract, if Mr Cook was to supply materials, they were to be good and suitable. Mr Cook’s failure to comply with this clause meant that:
  1. proper certification may not have been able to be obtained;
  1. Mr Stanton may have been at risk under the relevant insurance policy; and
  2. Mr Stanton may have been held liable for any damage or injury caused to persons entering the building site.
  1. Pursuant to clause 11.12(b), Mr Cook was required to comply with the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld). He failed to do so and his failure to do so meant that:
  1. Mr Stanton may have been at risk under relevant insurance policy; and
  1. Mr Stanton may have been held liable for any damage or injury caused to persons entering the building site.
  1. [22]
    Mr Stanton said that because of Mr Cook’s actions, his site was compromised, and he was unable to provide certification, with a flow-on effect in terms of the inability to appropriately undertake rectification work, should that become necessary. Mr Stanton also expressed concerns about the possibility of being subject to directions or sanctions from the QBCC.
  2. [23]
    Mr Stanton expressed his frustrations and concerns in several ways. Mr Cook ignored Mr Stanton’s requests. On 3 June 2016, Mr Stanton sent a letter by email to Mr Cook purporting to terminate the contract.
  3. [24]
    In a further email on 8 June 2016, Mr Stanton expressed his frustration at the actions of Mr Cook. He said that Mr Cook was in serious breach of his obligations and asked him to take anger and emotions out of the subject. He identified concerns and called upon Mr Cook to rectify the situation. The following passage is pertinent:

At this stage of final inspection cannot happen until I receive what I asked for ages ago from u (sic) e.g. certification of meetings aus (sic) standards for shower screens, mirrors, glass panels, loft ladder, need to address ensuite door issue [needs to be obscure] and smoke alarms from electrician and harry (sic) needs to see render/exterior paint down to footing all around base, as laws have just been changed extra downpipes to gutters. There is no leeway the laws I do not make but I have to comply to gain certification. Also I firmly believe positioning hot water on frame creates windbreak in high wind area will also need to provide certification of compliance and I am not happy to be held responsible for. You have to realise it is nearly 6 mths (sic) since fixing payment and now which for anyone hard to fathom especially qbcc (sic) in regard to building contracts and costs carried by builder.

  1. [25]
    By letter to Mr Cook dated 10 June 2016, lawyers appointed by Mr Stanton confirmed the effect of his earlier direct email but formalised the position of Mr Stanton by calling upon Mr Cook to rectify breaches of clauses 11.12 and 17.9 and gave formal notice to that effect with a requirement of rectification within 10 business days. Identifying the issues raised by Mr Stanton himself, his lawyers said that Mr Cook had engaged and instructed tradesmen and purported to take possession of the house. Mr Stanton’s lawyers identified relevance of clause 17.9 and said that Mr Cook had breached that provision by purporting to take possession of the work site when not entitled to do so. Mr Stanton’s position at that time was that he was exercising his right to suspend the works (pursuant to clause 16.1) pending rectification of the breaches.
  2. [26]
    Mr Cook did not comply with Mr Stanton’s request to remedy the breaches. Mr Stanton’s argument is that due to the very serious concerns that he had, he had no option but to terminate the contract.
  3. [27]
    By letter dated 27 June 2016, lawyers for Mr Stanton wrote to Mr Cook and terminated the contract. In the letter dated 27 June 2016, Mr Stanton’s lawyers stated that:
    1. (i)
      Mr Cook proposed variations to the contract of his own accord and Mr Stanton had received invoices for those variations.
    2. (ii)
      Mr Cook had wrongfully taken possession of the site and had been instructing contractors to carry out construction work.
    3. (iii)
      Mr Cook was residing on site.
    4. (iv)
      In relation to wind loadings certification requirements, the work on the roof undertaken by or arranged by Mr Cook was non-compliant.
    5. (v)
      The soil placed against the building by Mr Cook did not comply with building approval as it needs to be at least 270 mm below the floor height (and it is not).
    6. (vi)
      Mr Cook took control of certain aspects of the work without Mr Stanton’s consent, particularly in relation to glazing and joinery and waterproofing of wet areas.
    7. (vii)
      Mr Cook was in breach of clauses 11.10 and 14.3. Mr Cook owed Mr Stanton the sum of $35,856.15. That total included the practical completion costs as per the contract (and reflected in invoice number 39) in the sum of $12,749.62. The balance included costs associated with variations, contractors’ and builder’s margins, and interest. In addition to terminating the contract, which it did by that letter, the lawyers for Mr Stanton requested payment of the outstanding sum in seven days and indicated Mr Stanton’s intention to take legal action if there is failure to do so.
  4. [28]
    In response, Mr Cook’s lawyers disputed several matters, including the allegation by Mr Stanton that Mr Cook lived on the property. In that regard, the tribunal notes an affidavit sworn by Mr Cook on 28 July 2016 where he states that he resides on the property in a shed and has done so since March 2015. Mr Cook’s lawyers dispute that Mr Stanton had complied with time limitations nominated in the contract for raising complaints, that if Mr Cook had breached the contract the breaches were not substantial, and that Mr Stanton had not requested copies of certifications for goods supplied by Mr Cook.
  5. [29]
    The tribunal determines that Mr Cook failed to raise any issues of substance or properly address the legitimate concerns raised by Mr Stanton. The tribunal accepts the evidence of Mr Stanton that Mr Cook was undertaking unlicensed building work on the site beyond any authority conferred upon him under the contract. Mr Cook was undertaking work without the supervision of Mr Stanton or a licensed person. Mr Cook was coordinating trades beyond the authority conferred to him under the contract, which amounts to building work, for which he was unlicensed.
  6. [30]
    In response to sanctions imposed by the QBCC, Mr Stanton provided QBCC with various documents and information. Mr Stanton argued that:
    1. (a)
      Mr Cook’s action made further compliance by Mr Stanton impossible;
    1. b)
      Mr Cook spread soil about the edge of the property and therefore impeded Mr Stanton’s ability to inspect;
    2. c)
      Mr Cook was engaging in unlicensed building work, and engaging others to undertake unlicensed building work;
    3. d)
      Mr Cook threatened Mr Stanton with physical violence;
      1. (a)
        Mr Stanton validly terminated the contract;
      2. (b)
        Any purported subsequent termination by Mr Cook was void and of no effect;
      3. (c)
        Mr Cook did not properly terminate the contract;
      4. (d)
        Pursuant to the terms of the Home Warranty Insurance Scheme, Mr Cook was not lawfully entitled to make any claim for incomplete work.
  7. [31]
    Mr Cook spread soil about the edge of the property and therefore impeded Mr Stanton’s ability to inspect;
  8. [32]
    Mr Stanton argues that the QBCC erred by approving Mr Cook’s claim and approving an amount of $16,332.44 under the QBCC Claim.
  9. [33]
    On 20 October 2016, Mr Stanton initiated proceedings against Mr Cook in the Magistrates Court of Queensland for the alleged breach of contract by Mr Cook.

QBCC’s position

  1. [33]
    The QBCC called Mr Cook to give evidence. At the hearing, Mr Cook appeared by telephone. He had previously successfully sought leave to do so for reasons that were not evident to the tribunal at the date of hearing. In any event, Mr Cook did provide some evidence which assisted the tribunal in this matter. Initially, Mr Cook said that he did not ‘organise the trades’, but soon contradicted himself. Mr Cook was equivocal in his evidence, suggesting that he could not recall the name of a contractor, whom he paid in cash, without paperwork. Mr Cook then accepted that he did engage contractors without reference to Mr Stanton. Mr Cook conceded that he engaged a painter, a glazier and an electrician.
  2. [34]
    The tribunal found Mr Cook to be an unconvincing witness. He was evasive and vague.
  3. [35]
    The tribunal also considered the evidence presented to it by Nicola White and Casey Zarb.
  4. [36]
    The QBCC argues that it arrived at the correct legal conclusions by finding that:
    1. (a)
      Mr Cook validly terminated the contract;
    2. (b)
      Mr Stanton did not validly terminate the contract;
    3. (c)
      Mr Cook could terminate the contract based on Mr Stanton’s repudiation of it; and
    4. (d)
      Mr Cook could successfully claim under the Insurance Scheme.
  5. [37]
    The QBCC argues that it is incumbent upon Mr Stanton to persuade the tribunal that he validly terminated the contract.
  6. [38]
    The argument advanced by the QBCC is that Mr Stanton had breached his contractual and professional obligations in this case. In this matter, Mr Stanton proceeded to undertake work, which was the subject of unsigned variations. Clause 13.1 of the building contract reflects the statutory requirements that variations must be in writing and signed by the parties. The QBCC says that Mr Stanton committed an offence by undertaking such work, which was not reflected in a written and signed variation document. It says Mr Stanton's failure to proceed in accordance with his obligations under the Act, and the contract, mean that he had committed a substantial breach of his contractual and professional obligations. So much so that, in those circumstances, he was not entitled to terminate the contract.
  7. [39]
    The tribunal accepts that is likely the case that Mr Stanton undertook work by variation which was not recorded in a variation document. However, the tribunal is not of the view that that is a matter that then precludes Mr Stanton from exercising contractual or common law entitlements to terminate the contract. To that extent, the tribunal rejects the reasoning and decision of the QBCC.
  8. [40]
    The QBCC argues that Mr Stanton consented to Mr Cook undertaking work on the site, and to that extent, must accept the consequences of allowing him to do so. It opined that if Mr Stanton did not directly agree for Mr Cook to engage contractors, at least he acquiesced in this action. The QBCC says that Mr Stanton did not give notice to Mr Cook to stop his actions. The QBCC says that Mr Stanton should have given Mr Cook a notice to terminate that complied with the contractual time limits. The QBCC concedes that Mr Stanton did first raise concerns formally in an email by him dated 3 June 2017.
  9. [41]
    The QBCC says that the evidence before the tribunal demonstrates that the agreement between Mr Stanton and Mr Cook was that Mr Stanton would adjust his invoices to properly reflect the work done by Mr Cook personally, that Mr Stanton knew that Mr Cook was unlicensed and did nothing about that until 6 June.
  10. [42]
    The QBCC also argues that Mr Stanton has not produced corroborative evidence to the tribunal that Mr Cook's actions prevented him from completing the work under the contract.
  11. [43]
    The QBCC express a view that based on High Court authority, if a party to a contract is unwilling to complete the contract such action may be regarded as a repudiation. The QBCC says that Mr Cook tried to salvage the contract and the attempts made by Mr Cook to negotiate a resolution were ignored by Mr Stanton, which left Mr Cook at a disadvantage. The tribunal rejects the reasoning and decision of the QBCC in this regard.
  12. [44]
    The QBCC says that the alleged breaches of the contract by Mr Cook, if found, are insufficient to warrant termination by Mr Stanton under common law. In part, that is because Mr Stanton did consent for Mr Cook to carry out works which effectively creates a waiver of any entitlement that Mr Stanton might otherwise have under the contract. The tribunal rejects the reasoning and decision of the QBCC in this regard.
  13. [45]
    The QBCC argue that Mr Stanton was in breach of the contract and therefore he was not entitled to terminate the contract. The tribunal rejects the reasoning and decision of the QBCC in this regard. The tribunal determines that Mr Cook had acted outside the terms of any arrangement between himself and Mr Stanton. Mr Cook was acting inappropriately and engaging in conduct that made it impossible for Mr Stanton to fulfil his contractual obligations.
  14. [46]
    The QBCC further argues that any alleged breaches of the contract by Mr Cook were insufficient to warrant termination under the common law. The QBCC argues that Mr Stanton waived any entitlement that he might have by consenting to Mr Cook to carry out some of the works. The tribunal rejects the reasoning and decision of the QBCC in this regard.
  15. [47]
    The QBCC argue that Mr Stanton should have ‘put a stop’ to Mr Cook undertaking any unauthorised works on the site and should have given notice to terminate the contract in accordance with its terms. The tribunal determines that Mr Stanton did act to stop Mr Cook undertaking unauthorised works on the site and did give notice of termination of the contract to Mr Cook. The notice was sufficiently clear to make up for any procedural irregularities that might have existed in the provision of the notice.
  16. [48]
    The tribunal rejects the arguments of the QBCC. The actions of Mr Cook were substantial and in direct breach of his obligations under the contract. The tribunal is of the view that Mr Cook made it impossible for Mr Stanton to perform his obligations under the contract in a lawful manner.

Further findings the tribunal

  1. [49]
    The tribunal finds that Mr Cook undertook unlicensed building work on the site. Mr Stanton was able to supervise some of work undertaken by Mr Cook, but not all the work. That was not the fault of Mr Stanton. Mr Cook took it upon himself to engage contractors and undertake work. Mr Cook did work without the supervision of a licensed contractor.
  2. [50]
    Mr Cook argued that he was engaged as a builder’s labourer and assistant on the job. He said that entitled him to engage and organise his own tradesmen. The tribunal does not accept that to be the role of the builder’s labourer and assistant. To that extent, it is clear to the tribunal that Mr Cook exceeded the bounds of any arrangement he had with Mr Stanton.
  3. [51]
    Mr Cook engaged a bobcat contractor to spread soil against the building. Mr Cook should not have done that. He frustrated Mr Stanton’s attempts to complete the project and to obtain necessary inspections and approvals.
  4. [52]
    In the contract, plastering was not excluded work, however it was included as a provisional sum. I accept the evidence of Mr Stanton that Mr Cook had the approval to choose, but not engage, a plasterer who would work on a subcontract basis under Mr Stanton. I accept that on or about 23 December 2015, Mr Cook dismissed the plasterer he had initially selected. I accept the evidence of Mr Stanton that because of this dismissal it meant that Mr Stanton was required to finish the works which would otherwise have been performed by the plasterer. That created delay and additional cost to Mr Stanton.
  5. [53]
    Kitchen work was not excluded work under the contract, however it was included as a provisional sum. I accept that on 24 March 2016, Mr Cook advised Mr Stanton of a change to the kitchen paint colours. Six days later Mr Cook changed the colours a second time and these changes occurred without the knowledge or permission of Mr Stanton. I accept the evidence of Mr Stanton that this resulted in a delay of 28 days until delivery of the kitchen.[3] Mr Cook’s actions in dealing directly with the kitchen contractor was a breach of the contract. Mr Cook had an obligation not to interfere with the carrying out of the works.
  6. [54]
    The tribunal accepts the evidence of Mr Stanton that on or about 23 May 2016, Mr Cook had installed, or caused to be installed, a mount frame for a hot water system, without the permission or knowledge of Mr Stanton. The tribunal accepts that Mr Cook did not obtain engineering approval for the installation of the mount frame.[4] The tribunal accepts the evidence of Mr Stanton that he contacted the manufacturer of the hot water system and received advice that the frame installation was non-compliant with the necessary standards.
  7. [55]
    Mr Cook caused delays to the completion of the contract. Mr Stanton was unable to properly certify works or obtain certification for the works, Mr Stanton was unable to obtain a final certificate for the house and he was unable to warrant that works were completed to the required standard.
  8. [56]
    The tribunal accepts that Mr Stanton and Mr Cook did agree that Mr Cook would be responsible for the painting of the interior to the home, but this was on the basis that he allow Mr Stanton to engage properly qualified persons to do so. The tribunal determines that Mr Cook took over the works himself and undertook the works as an unlicensed contractor. Mr Cook has not provided Mr Stanton with certification for shower screens, mirrors, glass panels, and the loft ladder.
  9. [57]
    Mr Cook acted to compromise Mr Stanton in his obligations to comply with the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld). Mr Cook was obliged under that act to comply with the instructions given to him for workplace health and safety by Mr Stanton. To fulfil the obligations of the principal contractor pursuant to the terms of the Act, Mr Cook was entitled to only attend the designated construction area under the supervision of the building contractor. Mr Cook’s failure to do so meant that Mr Stanton may have been at risk under relevant insurance policies and may have been held liable for any damage or injury caused to persons entering the building site.
  10. [58]
    The tribunal determines that Mr Cook was directly engaging with and instructing tradespeople without the authority or knowledge of Mr Stanton.
  11. [59]
    Mr Cook undertook deficient work, to the point where Mr Stanton could not obtain appropriate certification. In that regard, Mr Cook did not fulfil his obligations as per the terms of the contract. It is clear to the tribunal that Mr Cook was not willing to complete his obligations under the contract. In short, Mr Cook had substantially breached the contract.
  12. [60]
    In those circumstances, Mr Stanton could not supervise the work. He did not have complete control of the site. Mr Cook was going behind his back and engaging contractors. Those contractors were coming on site and doing work which may or may not have been completed appropriately. In some ways, that is irrelevant. What is relevant is the request made by Mr Cook of Mr Stanton to certify the work done by others, engaged by Mr Cook. Put simply, could Mr Stanton put his name and stamp of approval upon the work done by Mr Cook or those Mr Cook engaged? Mr Stanton said he could not and that is part of the reason he purported to terminate the contract and walk away from the site.
  13. [61]
    Under the terms of the contract, Mr Stanton was primarily responsible for engaging subcontractors and accepting responsibility for the work of the subcontractors. Mr Cook undermined Mr Stanton's role substantially. The tribunal accepts the position of Mr Stanton that he was placed in an untenable situation.
  14. [62]
    The evidence to the tribunal is that Mr Cook was likely engaging, at least to some extent, unlicensed workers and this resulted, in part, to the completion of demonstratively defective work. At one stage, Mr Cook commissioned the placement of a hot water system on the roof of the house. The evidence to the tribunal was that an engineer had indicated to Mr Stanton that this had not been done appropriately and amounted to defective work.
  15. [63]
    Mr Cook conceded that it was Mr Stanton who held the responsibility to obtain appropriate certification from subcontractors. That is, because under the contract it was Mr Stanton who remained responsible for work on site. The tribunal accepts that although once friends, the fallout between Mr Cook and Mr Stanton was substantial. The tribunal received evidence of threats of assault and hostility between the parties.
  16. [64]
    For the QBCC to maintain its position, it must accept that Mr Stanton abandoned the site without lawful authority to do so. However, what was Mr Stanton to do in the circumstances? Certify work not commissioned by him, which was in his view not acceptable? The tribunal finds that Mr Stanton was in an untenable position and he was justified in terminating the contract.
  17. [65]
    Central to Mr Stanton’s responsibility is to ensure all building work carried out on the site complies with the Building Code of Australia and all relevant standards.[5] By his actions, Mr Cook made it impossible for Mr Stanton to fulfil his responsibilities. By engaging contractors directly, Mr Cook created a situation where Mr Stanton had to decide whether he could fulfil his health and safety obligations appropriately to matters beyond his direct control.
  18. [66]
    Mr Cook breached essential terms of the contract. Through Mr Cook’s actions, Mr Stanton lost control of the site and in those circumstances could not lawfully certify the work undertaken in full. Mr Cook was in breach of clause 11.12 of the contract. His repeated interference with carrying out the works included engaging an unlicensed painter to perform work, performing unlicensed work himself and failing to provide appropriate certifications for various owner supplied goods including shower screens, glass panels, mirrors, a loft ladder and an ensuite door and the installation of hot water system in a high wind area approximately 1.5 m above his roof. Mr Cook breached the contract by directly engaging a bobcat contractor to spread soil against the building which made it impossible for a certifier to inspect the render and paint went all the way down to the footings. Mr Cook had clearly purported to take possession of the house and site and was instructing and engaging contractors. As correctly identified by Mr Stanton’s lawyers, that placed Mr Cook in a position where he breached clause 17.9 of the contract. In addition, Mr Cook breached clauses 11.10 and 11.12 of the contract.
  19. [67]
    Mr Cook had engaged others to undertake work or supply goods with a request that they invoice Mr Stanton. He was doing so without Mr Stanton’s specific authority and direction. When Mr Stanton attempted to regulate the situation through variations, Mr Cook refused to sign the variation documentation. Mr Cook changed the locks and thereby denied Mr Stanton and his contractors with access to the site. During this time, while Mr Cook was engaging his own contractors, he requested Mr Stanton provide certification for their work.
  20. [68]
    The tribunal determines as a finding of fact that Mr Cook did take control of the site. The tribunal accepts the evidence of Mr Stanton that during the time he had suspended works on-site, Mr Cook took control of the site and was responsible for opening the front door of the house and allowing access to the home to the electrician. The electrician went inside the residence and carried out building activities for approximately 1.5 hours. During the time of suspension, work not initiated by or sanctioned by Mr Stanton was conducted on site, in relation to the installation of beams to columns on patios and installation of beams to carport.[6]
  21. [69]
    I am satisfied that Mr Cook clearly demonstrated an unwillingness to substantially perform his obligations under the contract. Mr Cook acted in a way that was substantially inconsistent with his obligations under the contract. Mr Cook’s conduct evidenced an unwillingness to be bound by the contract. The actions of Mr Cook were such that he evidenced an intention to no longer be bound by the contract or to fulfil it in a manner substantially inconsistent with his obligations.[7]
  22. [70]
    I do not accept Mr Cook’s position that Mr Stanton was precluded from relying upon clause 11.12 of the contract. Whilst the clause does provide for the giving of notice within five days of becoming aware of the obstruction, interference or hindrance, that is an evidentiary rather than a prescriptive requirement.
  23. [71]
    In my view, Mr Cook did fail to remedy the alleged breaches pursuant to the letter provided by Mr Stanton’s lawyers dated 10 June 2016.
  24. [72]
    The QBCC did issue an infringement notice against Mr Cook alleging that he carried out building work at the property and he was unlicensed at that time. The work included arranging contractors to undertake work. By the infringement notice dated 30 May 2017, the QBCC imposed a penalty amount of $2438 against Mr Cook. The tribunal finds that Mr Cook did undertake unauthorised and unlawful building work contrary to legislation and contrary to the terms of the contract. Section 42 of the QBCC Act provides that a person must not carry out, or undertake to carry out, building work unless the person holds a contractor’s licence of the appropriate class under the Act. That placed Mr Stanton in a difficult position, given that section 51A(1) of the QBCC Act provides that a licensed contractor must not help another person to carry out building work if the licensed contractor knows, or ought reasonably to know, that in carrying out the building work the other person is committing an offence against section 42.
  25. [73]
    Accordingly, Mr Stanton had every right to ensure that any work undertaken on the site was done in accordance with legislation by appropriately licensed contractors. Mr Cook’s failure to provide appropriate evidence of certification by licensed contractors for that work which he engaged directly, left Mr Stanton with little choice but to stop work.
  26. [74]
    I accept that Mr Cook installed, or arranged to install, glass panels and shower screens without permission or knowledge of Mr Stanton. I accept the evidence of Mr Stanton that the shower screen installation was non-compliant because the waterproofing was pierced. I accept that Mr Cook failed to provide Mr Stanton with an appropriate certification from a licensed glazier regarding the shower screen installation. It is clear from the evidence that Mr Cook did engage contractors. Mr Cook has not produced evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal that in doing so he engaged licensed contractors who provided appropriate certification for the work undertaken. This includes his failure to supply a waterproofing certificate for paint work.
  27. [75]
    At law, Mr Cook had no ability to give formal notice of his intention to terminate the contract in accordance with clause 20.1. He was in breach of the contract and could not rely upon his own breaches to force a termination of the agreement. To that extent, the tribunal finds that Mr Cook’s attempt to terminate the contract based on his notice of termination was invalid and of no effect at law.
  28. [76]
    The tribunal rejects the submission of the QBCC that any breach by Mr Cook if it occurred was not substantial, or waived by Mr Stanton, or easily accommodated through co-operation. The tribunal determines that Mr Cook did breach the contract. His breach was substantial. The tribunal does consider the definition of a ‘substantial breach’ as it appears in the contract as meaning a contracting party’s failure or refusal to perform a substantial obligation under the contract. Mr Stanton did not waive any entitlement that he held under the contract or under the common law. There was no obligation upon Mr Stanton to go beyond what he did in terms of accommodating the unlawful requests of Mr Cook.
  29. [77]
    The conduct of Mr Cook was such that a reasonable person, in the position of Mr Stanton would believe that Mr Cook’s actions conveyed his unwillingness or inability to perform his obligations.
  30. [78]
    In those circumstances, Mr Cook was not entitled at law to terminate the contract. His view that Mr Stanton had repudiated the contract was incorrect. Mr Cook had made it clear that he refused to perform the contract. Mr Cook made it clear that he no longer intended to be bound by the contract.
  31. [79]
    This is not a case involving waiver in accordance with principles established in Peter Turnbull & Co Pty Ltd v Mundus Trading Co (A/asia) Pty Ltd (1954) 90 CLR 235, at 246-7 per Dixon CJ. Mr Stanton did not acquiesce in the actions of Mr Cook.
  32. [80]
    I am satisfied that Mr Cook did threaten Mr Stanton, however in my view little turns on that fact. In evidence, Mr Stanton conceded that he did not take any threat by Mr Cook seriously.
  33. [81]
    Repudiation requires a clear indication of the absence of readiness and willingness to perform the contract.[8] The tribunal determines that Mr Cook repudiated the contract. As result of his repudiation, the tribunal is satisfied that Mr Stanton did act within his legal right to accept the repudiation and elect to terminate the building contract.
  34. [82]
    The tribunal is satisfied that Mr Stanton did validly terminate the contract based on acceptance of the repudiation of it by Mr Cook. The tribunal concludes that, by his lawyers, Mr Stanton validly terminated the contract on 27 June 2016. Mr Stanton did provide notice of his election to terminate under the contract but even if he did not, his election was made perfectly clear through his words and conduct. Mr Stanton did not do anything that would amount to an election to continue to perform the contract following his termination of it. As the repudiating party, Mr Cook did not retract or attempt to retract his repudiation before acceptance of the repudiation by Mr Stanton.
  35. [83]
    In my view, Mr Cook was in substantial breach of the contract. The definition of ‘substantial breach’ in the contract is wide and means ‘a contracting party’s failure or refusal to perform a substantial obligation under the contract’.[9] The contract does not define ‘substantial obligation’. In my view, a substantial breach is one, amongst other things, that would effectively prevent the other party from completing the contractual terms in accordance with that party’s obligations. In this instance, Mr Cook did prevent Mr Stanton from completing the contract in accordance with his obligations.
  36. [84]
    I adopt the approach of Acting Senior Member Browne (as the Senior Member then was) in Cowen & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission in that regard, [2017] QCAT 416 at [35] and [36]:

It is settled law that if there is conduct by one party which evinces an unwillingness or an inability to render substantial performance of the contract, such conduct may be described as repudiatory breach of contract. An innocent party is entitled to accept the repudiation and terminate the contract [Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620, 625-626]. 

In Koompahtoo’s case the High Court said that repudiatory conduct may be described as conduct of a party which ‘evinces an intention no longer to be bound by the contract or to fulfil it only in a manner substantially inconsistent with the party’s obligations’ [Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Limited (2007) 233 CLR 115, 44]. The High Court said the test is whether the conduct of one party is such as to convey to a reasonable person, in the situation of the other party, renunciation either of the contract as a whole or of a fundamental obligation under it. In Koompahtoo’s case the High Court said there may be cases where a failure to perform, even if not a breach of an essential term, manifests unwillingness or inability to perform.34 

  1. [85]
    As noted by Member Howard (as the senior member then was) in MacDonald v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 158, the courts have considered the common law right to terminate a contract is only excluded when the contract contains a clear intention to exclude it.[10] In the contract, there is no specific exclusion of the common law right to terminate the contract. Clause 22 of the contract provides that the builder may, without prejudice to any other rights or remedies, terminate the contract by further written notice to the owner. In the matter of McDonald, Member Howard noted that the use of the words ‘or exercise any other right or remedy’ indicated an intention to preserve the operation of common law rights in addition to contractual rights. I respectfully adopt that approach. Therefore, as a matter of contractual construction, the contract did not exclude either party from exercising any common law right to terminate.
  2. [86]
    It is common ground that Mr Cook has not paid the full amount due and owing under the contract. The tribunal notes that Mr Stanton has initiated proceedings in the Magistrates Court for recovery of the outstanding debt. Although it is highly undesirable to agitate matters involving the same contract in different jurisdictions, the role of the tribunal in this case is to determine issues only about the notice given by the QBCC. This litigation does not involve debt issues between Mr Stanton and Mr Cook directly. Accordingly, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to make any monetary orders as between Mr Stanton and Mr Cook.[11]
  3. [87]
    The tribunal has power to conduct a merits review. Section 17 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (QCAT Act) provides:

(1) The tribunal's review jurisdiction is the jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal by an enabling Act to review a decision made or taken to have been made by another entity under that Act.

(2) For this Act, a decision mentioned in subsection (1) is a reviewable decision and the entity that made or is taken to have made the decision is the decision-maker for the reviewable decision.

  1. [88]
    Section 6 of the QCAT Act, deals with the relationship between this Act and enabling Acts generally. An ‘enabling Act’ is an Act that confers original, review or appeal jurisdiction on the tribunal; or subordinate legislation, other than subordinate legislation under this Act, that confers review jurisdiction on the tribunal.
  2. [89]
    The QBCC Act provides for reviewable decisions.[12] For the purposes of the tribunal’s review, the QBCC Act is an enabling Act.
  3. [90]
    The tribunal’s review jurisdiction is such that it has power only to the extent of dealing with the precise decision under review.
  4. [91]
    The QBCC statutory scheme is governed by schedule 2C of the QBCC Regulation 2003, which deals with the terms of cover for statutory insurance scheme. The consumer is entitled to claim assistance for the reasonable cost of completing the residential construction work.[13]
  5. [92]
    Section 24 of the QCAT Act sets out the functions of the tribunal on review. The tribunal may confirm or amend the QBCC decision, set aside the decision and substitute its own, or set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision-maker with directions if appropriate [s 24 (1)].
  6. [93]
    The purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision and is heard and determined by fresh hearing on the merits.[14] The tribunal does not examine the merits of the original decision-making process. In its review, the tribunal considers all the facts presented to it at the time of hearing the review, which includes those matters that have materialised since the making of the original decision. The decision-maker must assist the tribunal to make the correct and preferable decision. This includes providing to the tribunal all relevant documents.[15]
  7. [94]
    In Goldfield Projects Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCAT 362, Member Traves, in a merits review matter, had to make the ‘correct and preferable decision’. That is, a review of a decision by the QBCC to issue a direction to rectify work. In that case, the tribunal found at [13][16] that the Rectification of Building Work Policy (which sets out when it may be unfair or unreasonable to issue a direction) is a statutory instrument that must be applied by the Tribunal in reaching its decision. I adopt that approach.

Should the direction to rectify remain?

  1. [95]
    It is the builder’s responsibility to ensure all building work complies with appropriate standards. The builder is responsible for the building site and all building work performed on the site. That is, whether it properly fell within the scope of the contract works or not. The QBCC notice to rectify assists building owners in appropriate circumstances. This is not an appropriate circumstance. Mr Cook is himself a builder, albeit unlicensed, and he ought to have known better. He cannot avail himself of regulatory assistance in circumstances where he has caused the untenable situation upon the building contractor.
  2. [96]
    It is patiently unfair and unreasonable to exercise a discretion to direct Mr Stanton to rectify building work in these circumstances. In coming to its decision to deal with the issue of the direction to rectify, the tribunal must consider the competing interests of the parties involved.
  3. [97]
    Given my finding that Mr Cook breached the contract to the point where he repudiated the contract, which was accepted by Mr Stanton, I need not consider whether Mr Cook breached an ‘essential term’ of the contract.[17] By finding that Mr Cook committed multiple breaches of the contract, which were sufficient under the contract and at common law to provide appropriate grounds for termination. Those breaches of the contract by Mr Cook were serious enough to impede the builder and to deny the builder the capacity to perform his obligations. In Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council & Anor v Sanpine Pty Ltd & Anor[18] (2007) 233 CLR 115 the High Court dealt with the entitlement of a party when faced with a breach or breaches of a non-essential term justifying termination. Applying that law to the current case I am satisfied that there have been sufficient serious breaches of (at least) non-essential terms justifying termination by Mr Stanton. These breaches ‘go to the root of the contract’. The breaches by Mr Cook have deprived Mr Stanton of a substantial part of the benefit for which he was contracted.
  4. [98]
    I accept that one of the objects of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 is to provide remedies for defective building work.[19] But, another object is to regulate domestic building contracts to achieve a reasonable balance between the interests of building contractors and building owners.[20] This is not a case where the consumer protection provisions of the QBCC Act should come to the aid of the building owner.
  5. [99]
    The QBCC Insurance Policy Conditions Edition 8 applies to the contract between Mr Stanton and Mr Cook.[21]
  6. [100]
    I do not accept the position of the QBCC that the show cause notice provided by the lawyers for Mr Stanton dated 10 June 2016 was deficient in that it failed to specifically state Mr Stanton’s entitlement to terminate the contract unless the breaches identified in that notice were remedied within 10 days. Clause 22.1 of the contract does not mandate such a requirement. By the usual rules of contractual interpretation, the tribunal notes that the words ‘must’ or ‘shall’, which usually provide an initiator as to the mandatory nature of the requirement, are absent. The notice of intention to terminate and the timeframe to remedy the breach by 10 days are not mandatory issues to be included in a notice under section 22.2 of the contract. The formal process of termination under the contract is not an exclusive means of termination and common law rights exist in parallel with the process set out in the contract.[22]
  7. [101]
    Mr Stanton had not unlawfully suspended the carrying out of the works. Mr Cook has not at any stage remedied his breaches of the contract and the contractor is not obliged by law to recommence the carrying out of the works in those circumstances.
  8. [102]
    Given the finding that Mr Cook (as the insured) did not properly terminate the contract with Mr Stanton (as the contractor) the availability of the benefit of the insurance coverage for Mr Cook is not available. Clause 1.2 of the policy[23] provides that:

The QBCC is only liable to pay for loss under this Part when the contract is for a fixed price and the Insured has properly terminated the contract with the contractor.

  1. [103]
    The tribunal concludes that Mr Stanton, through his lawyer, did comply with the termination provisions in the contract and validly terminated the contract. Alternatively, the tribunal is of the view that the Mr Stanton, through his lawyer, validly terminated the contract based on his common law right to do so. Through his actions, Mr Cook caused substantial loss of benefit to Mr Stanton.
  2. [104]
    The tribunal determines a finding of fact that Mr Cook has both substantially breached the terms of the contract and unequivocally demonstrated that he was no longer bound by the terms of the contract.
  3. [105]
    The tribunal sets aside the decision of the QBCC and substitutes its own decision that the whole of the insurance claim be disallowed.
  4. [106]
    In this jurisdiction, costs are generally not awarded. The tribunal will only grant costs if the interests of justice require it to do so.[24] The legislation provides a strong indication against awarding costs. While the tribunal does have a broad discretion to award costs, it need not do so. I accept that this was a complex matter warranting legal representation. However, the approach adopted by the QBCC was not unreasonable and was not without merit. I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to make any form of costs order.

Footnotes

[1] QBCC infringement notice number 20580 dated 30 May 2017 issued against Mr Shaun Keith Cook for the alleged offence of unlicensed contracting on the site contrary to section 42 (1) of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), imposing a penalty amount of $2438.

[2] According to a memorandum prepared internally by a representative of the QBCC, the prosecution brief was completed and forwarded to Legal Section in November 2017. The memorandum is marked annexure A to an affidavit of Kacey Maree Zarb sworn or affirmed on 14 May 2018.

[3] Supplementary Statement of Evidence of Noel Edward Stanton dated 28 September 2017.

[4] Report by Beck Crozier Engineers addressed to Noel Stanton dated 10 November 2016.

[5] Fontain v Queensland Building Services Authority [2004] QCCTB 163.

[6] Further Supplementary Statement of Evidence of Noel Edward Stanton dated 11 October 2017.

[7] Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council & Anor v Sanpine Pty Ltd & Anor (2007) 233 CLR 115.

[8] Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620

[9] Clause 1 of the General Conditions of the Residential Building Contract RBC October 2012 (used by the parties in this case).

[10] Holland v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409.

[11] See Kuhn v QBSA and Trackson [2004] QCCTB 159 which was adopted in J & K Homes Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCAT 269.

[12] Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), s 86 and s 87.

[13] Queensland Building and Construction Commission Regulation 2003, Schedule 2C section 7(1).

[14] Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 s 20.

[15] Ibid s 21(2).

[16] Refer to footnote 7.

[17] Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council & Anor v Sanpine Pty Ltd & Anor (2007) 233 CLR 115.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991, s 3(b).

[20] Ibid, s 3(d).

[21] Applicable to contracts signed between 1 July 2009 and 27 October 2016.

[22] Adopting the terminology used by the QBCC decision-maker upon internal review dated 10 April 2017 at page 3 of 5.

[23] Reflecting the terms of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Regulation 2003, Schedule 2C.

[24] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 102.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Stanton v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Stanton v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

  • MNC:

    [2018] QCAT 271

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Member Milburn

  • Date:

    14 Aug 2018

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Cowen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCAT 416
2 citations
Fontain v Queensland Building Services Authority [2004] QCCTB 163
2 citations
Goldfield Projects Pty. Ltd. v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCAT 362
2 citations
Holland v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409
2 citations
J & K Homes Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCAT 269
2 citations
Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115
5 citations
Kuhn v QBSA and Trackson [2004] QCCTB 159
2 citations
MacDonald v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 158
2 citations
Peter Turnbull & Co Pty Ltd v Mundus Trading Co (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1954) 90 CLR 235
1 citation
Shevill v Builders' Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620
3 citations

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Health Ombudsman v JLK [2020] QCAT 4872 citations
Hopper v Queensland Building and Construction Commission (No. 2) [2019] QCAT 2121 citation
Stanton v Electrics Downunder [2020] QCATA 1422 citations
Stanton v Electrics Downunder Pty Ltd [2019] QCAT 1582 citations
1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.