Eco-Builder Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission
[2018] QCAT 59
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- Unreported Judgment
- Eco-Builder Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2018] QCAT 59
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Eco-Builder Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2018] QCAT 59
Eco-Builder Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2018] QCAT 59
CITATION: | Eco-Builder Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QCAT 59 |
PARTIES: | Eco-Builder Pty Ltd (Applicant) |
| v |
| Queensland Building and Construction Commission (Respondent) |
APPLICATION NUMBER: | GAR205-17 |
MATTER TYPE: | General administrative review matters |
HEARING DATE: | 9 November 2017 |
HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
DECISION OF: | Member Traves |
DELIVERED ON: | 2 March 2018 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
ORDERS MADE: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COMMENCING PROCEEDINGS – OTHER MATTERS – where s 33 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) requires “substantial compliance” with the Queensland Civil and Administrative Rules 2009 (Qld) – where r 7 of Queensland Civil and Administrative Rules 2009 (Qld) provides approved form must be used – whether letter to QCAT “in a form substantially complying with the rules” within s 33 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) – where subsequent application made in the approved form out of time in circumstances where decision no longer reviewable – whether application for review properly made PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – OTHER MATTERS – whether extension of time to file application for review can be granted under s 61 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) – whether extension of time in enabling Act can be granted – effect of s 86F(1)(b) of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) – whether Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the matter Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 2, s 3, s 4, s 17, s 18, s 33, s 61, s 241, s 277A Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), r 7 Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), s 86F, s 87 Bal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 69 ALD 634 Creaser v Savannah Associates Limited [2003] ACTCA 26 Crowley v Templeton (1914) 17 CLR 457 Hamilton v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 48 FCR 20 MZAIC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 237 FCR 156 Onea v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 80 FCR 254 QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41 Smith v Queensland Building Services Authority Sunup Solar Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 435 SZJDS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 201 FCR 1 Wu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 245 |
APPEARANCES: |
|
APPLICANT: | Lajos Csiki-Bege for Eco-Builder Pty Ltd |
RESPONDENT: | Navina Thirumoorthui for Queensland Building and Construction Commission |
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
- [1]This matter concerns whether Eco-Builder Pty Ltd (Eco-Builder) has made a proper application for review of the decision by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QBCC) to issue it with a direction to rectify. It is arguable that Eco-Builder made two attempts to apply for review: one within time but not using the approved form (“the letter to QCAT”), and one out of time using the approved form (“the out of time application”).
- [2]Eco-Builder has applied for an extension of time in respect of the out of time application. The QBCC has responded by seeking to have the application for review dismissed on the basis the decision was, at the time it was filed, non-reviewable.
- [3]For reasons below, it is the letter to QCAT which assumes significance. The issue is whether the letter to QCAT constituted a validly made application for review. This is an important question for the Tribunal, which receives more than 30 000 applications a year. It is also important for Eco-Builder in circumstances where by the time the out of time application was filed, the decision was no longer reviewable.
- [4]The answer lies in the construction of s 33 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) and in the application of s 33 to the letter to QCAT.
Background to the matter
- [5]On 15 February 2017, the QBCC issued a direction to rectify to Eco-Builder in respect of defective work relating to the installation of decking around a swimming pool. This decision was confirmed on internal review on 6 June 2017. Pursuant to s 33(3) of the QCAT Act, Eco-Builder had 28 days from the date it was notified of the internal review decision to apply for review. At best, this meant Eco-Builder had 28 days from 12 June 2017, that is, by 10 July 2017, to apply for review. On both occasions when Eco-Builder was notified of the QBCC’s decision (that is, on 15 February and 6 June 2017) Eco-Builder was advised that it had 28 days within which to apply for review.
- [6]On 5 July 2017, within time in respect of the internal review decision, Eco-Builder emailed a two-page letter with supporting documentation, including the Decision Notice from the QBCC, to QCAT (the letter to QCAT). The QBCC was not provided with a copy of this correspondence until 4 August 2017. The letter stated, relevantly:
Dear QCAT
I need your assistance and support to solve a case, which one was reviewed by QBCC. The decision of the review received on 12 June, apparently is very superficial and didn’t give answers and solutions to close the case.
In the case we have three parties involved: Customer who ordered the work and also managed the communication between two subcontractors engaged on building the pool and pool building.
Notices related to the case:
- The deck and coping as it is now is not safe and acceptable to be used, represents safety hazard and need to be rectified. This fact was out of question from the first day.
- In this mismanaged case will need your help to name the responsible party for the cause of this hazard and decide who is in charge to cover the costs of the rectification.
…
- [7]The letter then outlined a chronology of sorts and concluded as follows:
- The case unfolded with a second QBCC approach, and we consider that even the second report and the internal review became formal and superficial and didn’t get a solution to have rectification acceptable professionally and financially as well.
- At this stage we still consider that would be the most economical solution even with slight compromises to reinstall the coping which any case needs a reinstall as in the width is uneven on the two sides and if deck is levelled, still will have gaps without reinstalling quote.
- If your office decides to see the deck levelled also – the question is who need to pay for this mismanaged case considering the circumstances.
- [8]The letter had 38 pages of attachments which included the QBCC’s original decision and internal review decision.
- [9]QCAT returned the letter to Eco-Builder and advised that it needed to complete the approved form (Form 23) to make a proper application for review.
- [10]Eco-Builder filed a Form 23 Application for Review and paid the relevant filing fee, but not until 25 July 2017 (the out of time application). This was outside the 28-day time limit and, more importantly, was filed after an Infringement Notice had been issued for failure to comply with the relevant Direction.[1]
- [11]The Form identified the decision to be reviewed as the decision by the Internal Review Officer of the QBCC of 6 June 2017. Given that this application was out of time, Eco-Builder also filed an Application to Extend Time.[2]
- [12]Earlier, on 21 July 2017, the QBCC had accepted the property owner’s claim and issued a Scope of Works. Eco-Builder was advised by covering letter that this decision was separate to the decision dated 6 June 2017 and that Eco-Builder could apply to QCAT to review the Scope of Works decision. On 5 September 2017, the QBCC again informed Eco-Builder of its right to seek review of the Scope of Works decision and that it should also seek an extension of time as the deadline had passed. This advice was repeated for the third time in an email from the QBCC Legal Branch to Eco-Builder dated 11 September 2017.
- [13]The QBCC have filed an application to dismiss the out of time application filed on 25 July 2017 on the basis it seeks review of a non-reviewable decision pursuant to s 86F(1)(b) of the Queensland Building and Commission Act 1991 (Qld) (QBCC Act). If that application is successful, it will be necessary to consider whether a valid application for review was made by the letter to QCAT on 5 July 2017.
- [14]The issues for the Tribunal are therefore:
- whether the out of time application in the approved form of 25 July 2017 seeks review of a non-reviewable decision and should therefore be dismissed; and
- whether a valid application for review was made by the letter to QCAT received on 10 July 2017.
The out of time application
- [15]Section 86F(1) of the QBCC Act sets out what decisions are not reviewable. It provides:
86F Decisions that are not reviewable decisions
- (1)The following decisions of the commission under this Act are not reviewable decisions under this subdivision—
- (a)a decision to recover an amount under section 71;
- (b)a decision to give a person a direction to rectify or remedy, and any finding by the commission in arriving at the decision if—
- (i)28 days have elapsed from the date the direction was served on a person and the person has not, within that time, applied to the tribunal for a review of the decision; and
- (ii)the commission has—
- (a)started a disciplinary proceeding against the person under part 6A; or
- (b)served a notice on the person advising a claim under the statutory insurance scheme has been approved in relation to the building work relevant to the direction; or
- (c)started a prosecution, or served an infringement notice, for an offence against section 73 in relation to the direction;
- (c)a decision about the scope of works to be undertaken under the statutory insurance scheme to rectify or complete tribunal work if 28 days have elapsed since the decision was served on the building contractor and the contractor has not, within that time, applied to the tribunal for a review of the decision.
- (2)Also, a decision of the commissioner to issue an infringement notice for an offence against this Act, the Building Act 1975 or the Plumbing and Drainage Act 2002 is not a reviewable decision under this subdivision.
- [16]In this case, 28 days had elapsed from the date the direction was served on Eco-Builder and it had not, within that time, applied to the tribunal for review. The QBCC had also served an infringement notice on Eco-Builder for an offence under s 73 of the QBCC Act.[3] The offence date was given as 13 July 2017 for failure to comply with a direction to rectify. The penalty imposed was $2,523.00.
- [17]It is clear that when the out of time application was filed on 25 July 2017, the decision of 6 June 2017 was not reviewable.
- [18]Although there is scope by s 61 of the QCAT Act for the Tribunal to provide relief from procedural requirements, including time limits set by enabling statutes,[4] it is settled that it cannot be applied to extend the 28-day time limit provided for by s 86F of the QBCC Act. This is because s 86F of the QBCC Act is a mandatory substantive rule of law which defines and limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.[5]
The letter to QCAT
- [19]Section 33 of the QCAT Act sets out the requirements for making an application.
- [20]Section 33(2) provides:
The application must-
- (a)be in a form substantially complying with the rules; and
- (b)state the reasons for the application; and
- (c)be filed in the registry.
- [21]The application must be “filed” in the registry.[6] The principal registrar may refuse to file a document if it does not comply with the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Rules) or cannot otherwise be filed. The mechanism for filing is not unilateral but transactional in the sense that it requires some action by the party receiving the relevant document. This is reflected in the QCAT Rules, which provide that a document is filed when the principal registrar records the document and stamps the Tribunal’s seal on it.[7] In this case, the Tribunal rejected the letter to QCAT because it was not made using the approved form. The letter to QCAT was returned to Eco-Builder.[8]
- [22]In Smith v Queensland Building Services Authority,[9] it was held that an application was not properly filed for the purposes of s 33 if the tribunal seal was not stamped on the document. However, there the Tribunal exercised its power under s 61(1)(c) of the QCAT Act to waive this procedural requirement in circumstances where, although the application had been lodged and accepted, the filing fee had not been paid.
- [23]In Sunup Solar Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[10] the Tribunal applied s 61 to excuse a failure to comply with r 31 where the application was not recorded or stamped. In that case it was held that although the Tribunal had purported to reject the application by sending it back it was not a situation where the Tribunal was entitled to reject an application. The only grounds for rejecting an application are set out in s 35(3). They included, relevantly, where the application did not otherwise comply with the QCAT Act, an enabling Act or the QCAT Rules.[11]
- [24]The issue then is whether the letter to QCAT complied with the QCAT Act, the QCAT Rules and with the QBCC Act. If it did not, the Tribunal was entitled to reject it. If it was properly rejected, it was not filed in accordance with s 33(2) and therefore the application for review was not made.
- [25]I turn now to consider whether the letter to QCAT complied with the QCAT Act and the QCAT Rules.
Did the letter to QCAT comply with the QCAT Act and the QCAT Rules?
- [26]Section 33(2) of the QCAT Act requires that the application be “in a form that substantially complies with the rules”.
- [27]Rules 7 and 10 deal with the form that an application should take. Rule 7 deals with the situation where an approved form has been prescribed and Rule 10 where there is no approved form.
- [28]It is, therefore, unnecessary here to consider Rule 10.
- [29]Rule 7 provides:
7 Form of application
- (1)An application to the tribunal to deal with a matter must be made--
- (a)in the approved form; or
- (b)if there is no approved form for the matter--in the way stated in rule 10.
Note--
Under section 33 of the Act, the application must state the reasons for the application and be filed.
- (2)The approved form for subrule (1)(a) must provide for the inclusion of the applicant's statement of address for service.
- [30]“Approved form” is defined to mean “A form approved under section 241 or s 277A of the Act.”[12] Here, s 277A is relevant.
- [31]Section 277A provides that the chief executive may, during the prescribed period, approve forms for use under the QCAT Act. The prescribed period was the period starting on the day s 277A commenced and ending 3 months after the day s 241 commenced.[13] Section 277A commenced on 19 November 2009, the day of assent of the State Penalties Enforcement and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Qld).[14] Section 241 commenced on 1 December 2009. Accordingly, under s 277A, the chief executive had the ability to approve forms from 19 November 2009 to 1 March 2010.
- [32]The chief executive under the QCAT Act is the Director-General of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General (DJAG).[15] On 16 September 2009 the then Director-General signed an Instrument of Delegation giving the Assistant Director-General, Strategic Policy, Legal and Executive Services, the power to approve forms under Acts administered by DJAG. On 25 November 2009, the then Assistant Director-General approved a series of forms, including Form 23.
- [33]The approval of Form 23 was then notified in the Queensland Government Gazette on 27 November 2009.[16]
- [34]Thus, r 7 required the Form 23, being the approved form, be used. It was not used.
- [35]Was the letter to QCAT nevertheless in accordance with s 33 of the QCAT Act, “in a form that substantially complies with the rules”?
- [36]It has been held in a different statutory context that it is not possible to “substantially comply” with a requirement to use a nominated form: either you use the right form or you don’t.[17] Those cases, mostly in the immigration area, draw a distinction between the act of completing the form (when the notion of substantial compliance could potentially apply) and not using the correct form at all (when there was no scope for substantial compliance to apply).[18] In SZJDS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[19] for instance, the appellant was not within the class of applicant for review contemplated by the form he used because he was not in immigration detention. In that context, the majority held:
[26] Two different scenarios can arise where legislation requires a specific form to be used to make an application. The first arises where a specific form is required to be used to make an application. In this instance, it is essential that the specified form be used. Here, there is no scope for partial or substantial compliance with the requirement to use the particular form. Either an applicant uses the correct form, or the applicant does not. If the applicant does not use the correct form, the attempt to make an application using the wrong form will be invalid.
[27] The second scenario arises where an applicant uses the prescribed form, but fails in some respect to complete it accurately or fully. In this instance, the failure does not necessarily result in an invalid application. That is because of the operation of s 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act which provides that where “an Act prescribes a form, then unless the contrary intention appears, strict compliance with the form is not required and substantial compliance is sufficient”.
[28] The distinction between the first and second scenarios is that a person cannot partially or substantially comply with the requirement to use the specific form; the application will be valid only if he or she uses the specific form, otherwise the application is invalid. On the other hand, if the person substantially complies with the directions on that specific form, depending on the circumstances, a partial failure to complete it in accordance with its stated directions may not affect its validity.
- [37]SZJDS was considered in MZAIC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[20] In that case, s 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (which provides that substantial compliance with a prescribed form is sufficient) was held to apply where the applicant had completed a superseded form. It was held:
Read out of context, what was said in SZJDS at [26] may suggest that in all cases s 25C is not addressed to the form of the form. That was the construction adopted by the Tribunal and by the primary judge. We do not criticise the Tribunal or the primary judge for following SZJDS however, in our opinion, outside the perhaps special circumstances in SZJDS, that is not the correct construction of the section. That construction is inconsistent with the Explanatory Memorandum which we have set out at [13] above. In our opinion, s 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act, subject to a contrary intention, applies both to the arrangement of the material (the form) and to the content of the material.[21]
- [38]The concept of substantial compliance has been applied in other statutory contexts. For example, in QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd,[22] the Court of Appeal held that although a superseded form for the appointment of a real estate agent was used, there had nonetheless been substantial compliance. The court took into account that the apparent purposes of requiring the appointment be made in the approved form had all been fulfilled and any other conclusion would have been a triumph of form over substance and one completely inconsistent with the objects of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld).
- [39]The strict view adopted of like provisions in cases such as Hamilton v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs,[23] Wu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,[24] Onea v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs[25] and SZJDS[26] is not consistent, in my view, with cases such as MZAIC[27] and QUYD Pty Ltd[28] nor with the objects of the QCAT Act which, inter alia, by s 3(b) include “to have the tribunal deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick.” I note also s 4 of the QCAT Act. However, to so find does not remove the need to assess the letter to QCAT against the requirements of the QCAT Rules to determine whether there has been “substantial compliance”. In determining that issue, whether the correct form has been used, or any form, are very relevant considerations, as is the content of the putative application.
- [40]The Full Federal Court said in MZAIC, “The present appeal is not a case of no form at all being used, or a form which the appellant was expressly or impliedly prohibited from using.”[29]
- [41]In MZAIC[30] and QUYD Pty Ltd[31] the issue was whether there had been substantial compliance in circumstances where a superseded form, almost identical to the current approved form, had been used and properly completed.[32] In this case the letter to QCAT and accompanying documents provided to the Registry was not in any form recognised by the QCAT Rules. In my view, this is significant.
- [42]In Creaser v Savannah Associates Limited,[33] the Court of the Appeal held that applications for permits to use dangerous goods were properly rejected because they did not “substantially comply” with the format or content of the prescribed form. There, the applicant did not use a form at all but supplied to the Chief Inspector 12 bundles of documents, comprising some 400 pages. It was the respondents’ case that it was the duty of the Chief Inspector to determine which documents in the mass should be accepted as constituting the applicants’ various applications. As the Court of Appeal held, “The proposition is unacceptable. This was not the Chief Inspector’s responsibility.”[34]
- [43]The test of “substantial compliance” in s 33 in the context of rule 7 applies both to the structure, presentation and layout of material on a form (whether the approved form or not) and to its content. This was the view taken recently by the Full Federal Court in MZAIC where it was held that s 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (which imports an equivalent test of “substantial compliance”) applies both to the arrangement of the material on a form, and also to the content of that material.[35]
- [44]The import of the use of a form was considered by the High Court in Crowley v Templeton[36] in the context of the Transfer of Land Act 1890 (Vic). There it was held by Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ that there is a distinction between the substance of the transaction or bargain and the form in which the transaction is embodied. While the former was left to the parties, the form in which the transaction was embodied was not. The form was “insisted on by the legislature as one of the conditions of statutory operation.” Of the form, their Honours said:
Slavish adherence to the forms is not demanded. Technical and immaterial departures from them do not deprive the dealing of efficacy. Substantial compliance is sufficient. But a document offered for registration must show at least substantial compliance on its face. The Act requires it to be in writing, and the writing does not comply with the requirements of the Statute unless those it affects or who are to act upon it, including the Registrar of Titles, whose duty it is to register it, can see from the document itself, when fairly read, that it is an instrument made in pursuance of the Act. Any other rule would introduce endless confusion and risk.[37]
- [45]Their Honours reviewed the instrument with the form set out in the Schedule and found the variations to be of substance so that the Registrar had been correct in refusing to register it.
- [46]Griffith CJ came to the same conclusion saying:
In my opinion the work of the Registrar is intended to be to a great extent, I will not say mechanical, but automatic. The instruments which the Registrar is to be called upon to register are to be such as not to involve difficult questions of law or interpretation of documents, except so far as to record bargains made by the parties which they have a right to make. But it was intended that the document sought to be registered should state distinctly what the parties mean. Having regard to all these matters together, I think the Registrar was justified in refusing to register this document ... because all the variations together amount to a variation in matter of substance. Although perhaps one, or two, or three of them might be trivial, yet if the document as a whole departs so widely as this does from the only form authorized, the variation is one in matter of substance. I think, therefore, that this document is one which the Court should not order to be registered.[38]
- [47]I am conscious of the self-evident need for formality in documents concerning registration of title. Nonetheless, Crowley’s case is instructive because it demonstrates why the use of a prescribed form is important. Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ referred to the need for those persons required to act on the document to be able to see, from the document itself, that it was an instrument pursuant to the Act in question. Such was necessary to avoid confusion and risk. Griffith CJ referred to the task of the Registrar to register instruments; and that such documents should not be such as to involve difficult questions of law or interpretation. If a document departed so widely from the intended form, the variation became one of substance.
- [48]Of course, in the context of the QBCC Act, there are significant processes which apply once a Direction to Rectify is issued. For instance the builder has 28 days within which to comply with the Direction to Rectify or file an application for a review of that decision. If the builder does neither of these things, a Notice of Failure to Rectify is issued, followed by an Infringement Notice and Scope of Works decision. These statutory steps in the process are set in train by the Direction to Rectify and, unless an application for a review is properly made, continue to advance to the point when, under the statute, the decision is no longer reviewable. The interdependency of these statutory steps demonstrates why substantial compliance with the form is necessary.
- [49]In the context of an application under the QCAT Act, the use of an official approved form, whether current or not, carries with it an air of formality that is ordinarily associated with the institution of legal proceedings. The appearance of formality is of importance to the Registry, to persons upon whom the document might be served and indeed to the Tribunal. It is unlikely to have been the legislative intent that Registry staff be required to interpret letters and other documents which depart widely from the approved form, to ascertain the relief sought and the nature of the application made. The process of acceptance of applications would become unworkable and undermine the efficiency of the Tribunal.
- [50]The authorities discussed above do not support the proposition that a putative application may “substantially comply” with a requirement to use an approved form where a person has not used any version of the approved form, whether current or not. It is not for me to consider here whether to use no form at all could, conceivably, amount to substantial compliance. It is necessary only that I determine whether the letter to QCAT, not an application made on any Form, current or superseded, substantially complies with the QCAT Rules. For the reasons set out below, I find that it does not.
- [51]I turn then to the contents of the letter, seen against the requirements of the relevant Form, and make the following observations.
- [52]Form 23 has 3 parts: Part A for the applicant’s and respondent’s details, Part B for details of the decision to be reviewed including the date and details of the decision and date it was received and Part C for details of what the applicant seeks from the Tribunal including details of the decision-maker and a brief statement as to why the decision is, in the opinion of the applicant, wrong or not properly made.
- [53]The applicant’s letter, as noted, was not in the approved form. This is, in itself, a significant reason why it is not in substantial compliance with the QCAT Rules. Further, the content of the letter does not fulfil the content requirements of the Form. In particular it does not seek particular relief, but rather, seeks the “assistance and support” of the Tribunal. It does not identify in any meaningful way why the decision is wrong or not properly made. The letter, when read as a whole, is more concerned with a request that the Tribunal identify which entity is responsible for the defective work.
- [54]For the reasons above, the letter to QCAT, in my opinion, does not substantially comply with the QCAT Rules and was, accordingly, properly rejected.
- [55]Accordingly, I make the following orders:
- The letter from Eco-Builder Pty Ltd to the Tribunal dated 5 July 2017 did not “substantially comply” with the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) and was properly rejected.
- The application for an extension of time in relation to the application for review made on 25 July 2017 is dismissed.
- The application for review made on 25 July 2017 is struck out on the basis the decision sought to be reviewed is no longer reviewable.
Footnotes
[1] Infringement Notice No 20760, issued 19 July 2017.
[2] Application to extend or shorten a time limit or for waiver of compliance with procedural requirement dated 25 July 2017.
[3] Infringement Notice no 20760 sent 19 July 2017.
[4] QCAT Act, s 61(1)(b).
[5] Sunup Solar Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 435, [61]; Queensland Building and Construction Commission v Watkins [2014] QCA 172, [16].
[6] QCAT Act, s 33(2).
[7] QCAT Rules, r 31.
[8] In accordance with r 32; Application to extend or shorten a time limit or for waiver of compliance with procedural requirement, 25 July 2017, at 3.
[9] [2010] QCAT 448, [13].
[10] [2015] QCAT 435.
[11] QCAT Act, s 35(3).
[12] QCAT Rules, Dictionary.
[13] QCAT Act, s 277A(3).
[14] QCAT Act, s 2(2).
[15] Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 33(11)(b), Schedule 1.
[16] As required by s 58 of the Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld).
[17] Hamilton v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 48 FCR 20.
[18] Wu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 245, 279; Bal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 69 ALD 634; Onea v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs(1997) 80 FCR 254; SZJDS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 201 FCR 1, [26]-[28].
[19] (2012) 201 FCR 1, [26]-[28].
[20] [2016] FCAFC 25.
[21] Ibid, [30].
[22] [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[23] (1993) 48 FCR 20.
[24] (1996) 64 FCR 245, 279.
[25] (1997) 80 FCR 254.
[26] SZJDS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 201 FCR 1.
[27] MZAIC Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 25.
[28] QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[29] MZAIC Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 25, [48].
[30] MZAIC Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 25.
[31] QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[32] See MZAIC at [50] where it was held “…such is the similarity of the forms that those not versed in the identification system in very small print at the foot of each page would be hard pressed to tell whether or not the form currently approved was being used.”
[33] [2003] ACTCA 26, [42].
[34] Ibid, [42].
[35] Ibid, [30]; SZUGL v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCCA 419, [47].
[36] (1914) 17 CLR 457; [1914] HCA 6.
[37] Ibid, 466.
[38] Ibid, 465.