Legal Services Commissioner v McLeod
[2020] QCAT 371
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- Unreported Judgment
- Legal Services Commissioner v McLeod[2020] QCAT 371
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Legal Services Commissioner v McLeod[2020] QCAT 371
Legal Services Commissioner v McLeod[2020] QCAT 371
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: | Legal Services Commissioner v McLeod [2020] QCAT 371 |
PARTIES: | Legal Services Commissioner (applicant) v Cameron Stuart McLeod (respondent) |
APPLICATION NO/S: | OCR216-18 |
MATTER TYPE: | Occupational regulation matters |
DELIVERED ON: | 30 October 2020 |
HEARING DATE: | On the papers |
HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
DECISION OF: | Hon Peter Lyons QC, Judicial Member Assisted by: Dr John de Groot, Legal Panel Member Ms Patrice McKay, Lay Panel Member |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AND UNSATISFACTORY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT – OTHER MATTERS – where the respondent conducted several litigation matters on behalf of an insurer for insured defendants – where the respondent failed to inform the insurer of certain events in the proceedings, caused his legal practice to make untrue and dishonest representations to the insurer, settled matters without instructions to do so, made false representations about when matters were settled, falsely informed the insurer that Counsel has been briefed to provide advice, failed to inform the insurer of a trial date listing, dishonestly represented that the plaintiff’s solicitors were delaying certain matters, dishonestly represented to the plaintiff’s solicitors that steps had been taken to pay settlement funds when the insurer had not been informed of the settlement, and failed to comply with the insurer’s instructions on a number of occasions – where the respondent also failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a notice issued by the applicant under s 443(3) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) – whether the respondent’s conduct would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable, or violate or fall short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency – whether the conduct warrants characterisation as professional misconduct PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – ORDERS – where the respondent has shown remorse and did not act for the purpose of personal gain – where the respondent has sought treatment for certain mental health issues, including a depressive disorder – where the respondent requires further treatment – where the applicant accepts that there is a sufficient causal connexion between the depressive disorder and the misconduct – where the parties have agreed on the orders to be made – whether this is a circumstance in which the probability is that the practitioner is permanently unfit for practice – whether the Tribunal should depart from the agreed position of the parties Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 218, s 219, s 418, s 419, s 443 Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498 Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750 Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner; Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate & Ords (2015) 258 CLR 482 Legal Services Commissioner v Manz [2019] QCAT 147 Legal Services Commissioner v XBV [2018] QCAT 332 Lucke v Cleary (2011) 111 SASR 134 Medical Board of Australia v Martin [2013] QCAT 376 NW Frozen Foods v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 Pavlovic v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 313 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P [2003] NSWCA 320 R v Tsiaris [1996] 1 VR 398 R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269 R v Yarwood (2011) 220 A Crim R 497 Victorian Legal Services Commissioner v Harriss [2020] VCAT 689 Victorian Legal Services Commissioner v Hyatt [2018] VCAT 1498 Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224 |
REPRESENTATION: |
|
Applicant: | D A Holliday, instructed by the Legal Services Commission |
Respondent: | M T Hickey, by direct brief |
APPEARANCES: | This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) |
REASONS FOR DECISION
- [1]The discipline application for this proceeding has alleged that in relation to five litigation matters, the respondent engaged in conduct which should be characterised as professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct; and that he has failed without reasonable excuse to comply with a notice issued under s 443(3) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (“LP Act”), to be characterised as professional misconduct. The respondent has, in his response to the discipline application, admitted the factual substratum of the charges. The parties have produced a Statement of Agreed Facts (“SOAF”). It is necessary for the Tribunal to consider whether it should make the orders which the parties have agreed upon, or whether it should take some other course.
- [2]In view of the position taken by the parties, the Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to conduct the hearing of the proceeding entirely on the basis of documents, without the parties, their legal representatives, or witnesses appearing at a hearing, under s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
Background
- [3]The respondent was an Australian legal practitioner for a period of 20 years. He was admitted to practice as a solicitor in Queensland in February 1997. He was employed as a solicitor, then as a senior associate, and later as special counsel, with a prominent firm in Brisbane over a period of 14 years. From 30 June 2012, he became a one-third equity partner in another firm. An important client of the firm was an insurer. The charges all relate to the conduct of matters by the respondent on behalf of the insurer, for insured defendants, during his time with this firm. The respondent retired from the firm on 30 April 2017. Later in 2017, he took a position with another firm for three months (though it is not clear that he acted in that position). He allowed his practising certificate to lapse at some point in 2017.
- [4]The details of the respondent’s conduct are set out in the discipline application, and are admitted by the respondent. It is not necessary to repeat them in full. It is sufficient to give a brief outline of what occurred.
- [5]Generally, the conduct relates to the respondent’s failure to conduct proceedings in a timely fashion, in accordance with the standards set by the insurer. On occasion, that had the consequence that a plaintiff would apply (successfully) to dispense with a defendant’s signature for a certificate of readiness, and have the matter listed for trial, without the respondent informing the insurer of these facts. In a number of matters, he caused the legal practice to make untrue and dishonest representations to the insurer about offers and counter-offers to settle matters, and related communications; settled matters when he did not have instructions to do so; and made false representations about when matters had been settled. Tax invoices to the insurer were based on the false representations. In one matter, the respondent falsely informed the insurer that Counsel had been briefed to provide advice, when that had not occurred; and he signed a request for a trial date without informing the insurer or obtaining its instructions to do so. In another matter, the respondent failed to inform the insurer that the proceeding had been listed for trial, he dishonestly represented that the plaintiff’s solicitors were delaying the resolution of the issue of costs, and he did not inform the insurer that a costs certificate had been filed and that the Court had ordered a specific amount of costs to be paid. In yet another matter, the respondent dishonestly represented to the solicitor for the plaintiff that the insurer had taken steps to pay settlement funds, when the insurer had not been informed that the matter had settled.
- [6]The terms on which the firm was engaged by the insurer required it to obtain the insurer’s instructions before certain steps were taken in relation to the conduct of proceedings. On a number of occasions, the respondent failed to comply with these terms. The respondent failed to make an offer to settle on one occasion, having been instructed to do so.
- [7]This conduct occurred in the period from late 2014 to April 2017 (though the dishonest misconduct appears to have commenced in March 2015).
- [8]The respondent also failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a written notice issued by the applicant in December 2017 under s 443(3) of the LP Act, requiring an explanation of his conduct.
- [9]Some other things should be mentioned. The insurer has reviewed the files which the respondent conducted, and there has not been any suggestion of misconduct, except in the five matters identified in the discipline application. The settlements which the respondent agreed to without instructions were within parameters acceptable to the insurer. However, the insurer suffered loss as a result of the respondent’s actions. It would appear that these primarily related to the incurring of excess costs, apparently on the basis that matters might have been resolved earlier, or because of delay in informing the insurer of a settlement. The loss was reimbursed to the insurer, either directly by the respondent, or by the firm and in turn reimbursed by the respondent. The amount is said in the SOAF to be in excess of $100,000, though the respondent’s unchallenged evidence is that it was almost $156,000.
Characterisation of the respondent’s conduct
- [10]The definitions of unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct found in ss 418 and 419 of the LP Act both make reference to failures (to different degrees) to achieve standards of competence and diligence. Although the conduct alleged against the respondent may be able to be traced back to failures of this kind (a matter unnecessary to decide), it in truth relates to other matters. That is not determinative, as the definitions are inclusive. More broadly, in Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc,[1] Thomas J said the following of professional misconduct:
The test to be applied is whether the conduct violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency.[2]
- [11]It has also been accepted that professional misconduct includes conduct that would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by the lawyer’s professional colleagues of good repute and competency.[3]
- [12]It is convenient to commence with a consideration of the conduct which is the subject of Charges 1 to 5. In this context, the applicant’s submissions draw attention to rr 4, 5 and 8 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 (“ASCR”). The respondent has not been specifically charged with breaches of the ASCR. That being said, there has been no objection to the applicant’s reference to them; and they provide some context for the assessment of the respondent’s conduct.
- [13]Rule 4 requires a solicitor (amongst other things) to act in the best interests of the client in all matters in which the solicitor represents the client; and to be honest in all dealings in the course of legal practice. The rule also requires a solicitor to avoid any compromise to the solicitor’s integrity. Rule 5 requires a solicitor not to engage in conduct which demonstrates that the solicitor is not a fit and proper person to practise law, or which is likely, to a material degree, to bring the profession into disrepute. Rule 8 requires a solicitor to follow a client’s lawful, proper and competent instructions.
- [14]The applicant has submitted that the respondent, contrary to r 4, has failed to be honest in all dealings in the course of legal practice. That is apparent from the admitted allegations in the discipline application, as well as the SOAF and the summary set out earlier in these reasons. The dishonesty was extensive, involving tax invoices, emails and messages; and extending in one case to putting an incorrect date on a deed of settlement, to hide the true date of the settlement.
- [15]The applicant has also submitted that, contrary to r 8, on numerous occasions the respondent did not follow the client’s lawful, proper and competent instructions. That submission should also be accepted.
- [16]The applicant has submitted that the respondent’s conduct was likely, to a material degree, to bring the legal profession into disrepute, contrary to r 5. The respondent’s dishonesty is likely to have that effect. Honesty on the part of lawyers in their dealings with their clients is a fundamental feature of our legal system, and is of importance to the administration of justice generally.[4] The respondent’s dishonesty is of considerable importance in the characterisation of his conduct.
- [17]In some cases, a failure to follow an instruction may be a matter of little moment. That is not the case here. The insurer’s instructions appear to be designed to ensure that the litigation which was conducted on behalf of those who were insured by it was managed properly and efficiently. This aspect of the respondent’s conduct is also a matter of some seriousness.
- [18]There is one other aspect of the respondent’s conduct which warrants consideration. That is his making of offers and settling litigation without instructions from the insurer to do so. It has been accepted that a solicitor has ostensible authority to compromise litigation.[5] A solicitor’s conduct may result in a client becoming subject to a liability, when the choice to do so is the client’s choice. Ordinarily, it will be seriously wrong for a solicitor to engage in such conduct. Were it to occur more frequently, it could undermine the confidence of clients in their legal representatives, and have adverse effects on the achievement of the desirable end of early settlements of litigation.
- [19]The matters so far discussed all have the capacity to bring the legal profession into disrepute. Dishonesty, in particular, is likely, to a material degree, to have that effect. So are persistent failures to comply with proper instructions. The question is less clear in relation to settling matters without instructions, only because the conduct is so unusual that it may well be regarded as one individual’s aberration, rather than a matter affecting the reputation of the legal profession generally.
- [20]It is unnecessary to consider this question further. Nor is it necessary to consider the other submissions of the applicant as to contraventions of the ASCR. The contraventions of those rules which have been accepted are sufficient to support a finding that the conduct of the respondent would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by the respondent’s professional colleagues of good repute and competency. The same finding should also be made with respect to the settlement of matters by the respondent, particularly as this formed part of his scheme for concealing from the insurer his failure to comply with its instructions and to meet its expectations in relation to the conduct of these proceedings.
- [21]Charge 6 is based on the respondent’s admitted failure, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a written notice issued under s 443(3) of the LP Act. The finding of such a failure, by force of the section, carries with it a finding that the respondent has committed professional misconduct, unless he has a reasonable excuse for the non-compliance.[6] The respondent has not contended that he has such an excuse.
- [22]Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the conduct of the respondent which is the subject of the charges in the discipline application should be characterised as professional misconduct.
Respondent’s mental health and treatment
- [23]Shortly after his departure from the relevant firm in April 2017, the respondent engaged LawCare for a number of appointments. He saw Dr Thomas Moore, a psychiatrist, on 8 June 2017, and on subsequent occasions. He moved (with his family) to northern New South Wales in the latter part of 2017, and undertook psychological therapy with Ms Sara Goldie, a clinical psychologist. This therapy was the result of a mental health plan prepared by the respondent’s general practitioner. Ms Goldie saw the respondent on 10 occasions up to February 2018.
- [24]The respondent states that his mental health had improved with professional help in 2017, but that he lost the gains he had made when he learnt of the insurer’s complaint, and subsequently of these proceedings. He suffered what he describes as a significant relapse in August 2019, resulting in his return to Dr Moore for treatment, and his admission to Belmont Private Hospital (“Belmont”) from 9 to 21 September 2019. Dr Moore recommended that the respondent undertake a course of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (“TMS”) and other cognitive behavioural therapy programmes. The respondent was an inpatient at Belmont for this treatment from 3 to 30 November 2019. He was admitted to Belmont for a further course of TMS on 10 February 2020, expecting to be discharged in early March.
- [25]Dr Moore’s initial diagnosis, made in June 2017, was of a Major Depressive Disorder, of moderate to severe intensity. The respondent’s symptoms were said to have been present since December 2015. In his report of 10 February 2020, Dr Moore says that this condition has remitted and recurred. He also said that an alternative explanation could be the depressive disorder, in treated remission, together with an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Features of Mood and Anxiety in the setting of the ongoing consequences of the complaint resolution process.
- [26]Ms Goldie’s report, dated 23 February 2018, records treating him from October 2017. Ms Goldie was aware of the diagnosis by Dr Moore of a Major Depressive Disorder, but her testing and observations indicated sub-clinical levels of depression and anxiety. She recorded the setting of the respondent’s conduct in somewhat similar terms to Dr Moore in his reports. She also recorded that the respondent had expressed strong motivation to address issues, no doubt related to his conduct.
- [27]In his 2018 report, Dr Moore associated the diagnosed condition with ongoing grief at the death of his mother, and a complicated financial situation that became apparent during the resolution of her estate. He referred to tensions which the respondent experienced at the firm, associated with the demands and expectations of the majority partner. Dr Moore thought the respondent’s diagnosed condition was likely to have been relevant to his mood, reduced problem-solving abilities, and avoidance of conflict resolution within the firm. He also associated the respondent’s sense of shame, at one point described as acute, with withdrawal and avoidance.
- [28]When addressing the question of whether the respondent’s condition might provide an explanation for his conduct, Dr Moore in his report of February 2020 referred to the fact that his only source of information was the respondent whom he was treating, and that within that limitation it is often difficult to ascribe causation; but said that nevertheless he could outline events described to him in a temporal manner. He went on to repeat that the respondent’s condition was likely to have been relevant to his mood, reduced problem-solving abilities, and avoidance of conflict resolution within the firm. He referred to the respondent’s underlying sensitivity to bullying, being belittled or denigrated, and his long term trait of avoiding confrontation in personal conflicts as apparently having reduced or impaired his capacity to access reasonable solutions to the pressures he was experiencing at work. Dr Moore considered the respondent’s prognosis to be fair; and that at that time he needed further treatment. He was likely to experience dread and suicidal angst, and lethargy; with the goal of treatment being to manage symptoms and avoid negative consequences. He was unlikely to resume the level of responsibility which he previously held; but was likely to engage in a work environment. He would require ongoing psychological or psychiatric treatment for the foreseeable future.
- [29]Dr Moore provided a further brief report dated 26 May 2020. It confirmed that the respondent undertook treatment at Belmont in February 2020. Dr Moore stated that the respondent described ongoing distress in the setting of a persisting Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Features of Mood and Anxiety. He also commenced treatment with an antidepressant. He was discharged with a documented improvement in mood and outlook. A further admission was likely to occur later in the year.
Function of disciplinary proceedings and appropriate orders
- [30]It is well established that the main purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect members of the public from misconduct by lawyers.[7] Associated with this is the need to safeguard the reputation of the legal profession. General deterrence is, in this context, a matter of some importance.[8] However, it has been recognised that this consideration may be “sensibly moderated” where mental disorder has contributed to a lawyer’s misconduct.[9] In Watts v Legal Services Commissioner,[10] the Court accepted the proposition from Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P[11] that an order for the removal of a practitioner’s name from the roll should only be made when the probability is that the practitioner is permanently unfit to practice.
- [31]In Legal Services Commissioner v Manz[12] this Tribunal, as presently constituted, questioned the applicability of the proposition that, in determining civil penalty, a tribunal should not depart from the position taken by both parties in relation to the orders to be made, based on NW Frozen Foods v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,[13] Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate & Ors,[14] and Legal Services Commissioner v XBV.[15] In the present case, the applicant referred to a statement by Vice President Judge Hampel in Victorian Legal Services Commissioner v Hyatt:[16]
24. The High Court in Commonwealth v Director Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate, set out the following principles which are applicable here
a. there is an important public policy benefit in receiving, and if appropriate, accepting agreed penalty submissions;
b. the decision of the High Court in Barbaro and Zirilli v The Queen, as to the inadmissibility of prosecution, or agreed penalty provisions in criminal proceedings has had no application to cases of this kind;
c. upon persuasion of the accuracy of the parties’ agreement as to facts and consequences, and that the penalty the parties propose is an appropriate one, it is a highly desirable practice for the Court to accept the parties’ proposal.
25. It is clear that it is my duty to determine the level of conduct alleged, and to impose sanctions. No agreement between a regulator and a regulated practitioner such as Mr Hyatt can supplant that duty. Subject to that overriding responsibility, it is appropriate for parties to put an agreed position before the Tribunal. If satisfied the agreed penalty is an appropriate one, it follows I should not lightly depart from that agreed position.
- [32]The Tribunal accepts that, if satisfied of the accuracy of the agreement of the parties as to the facts and their consequences, it should not lightly depart from the agreed position. That inevitably requires some consideration of the relevant facts, in the light of the principles relating to the Tribunal’s powers to make orders on the determination of a discipline application.
- [33]One of the factual matters accepted by the applicant is that there is a sufficient causal connexion between the respondent’s depressive disorder and the respondent’s misconduct. Notwithstanding the cautious approach to this question taken by Dr Moore, the Tribunal is prepared to accept this view. It finds some support in the respondent’s previous good conduct. There is also support in Dr Moore’s observation that the respondent’s condition was likely to have been relevant to his mood, reduced problem-solving abilities, and avoidance of conflict resolution within the firm.
- [34]The fact that the respondent, notwithstanding the treatment he has undertaken to date, requires further treatment, remains a matter of concern. It indicates a remaining risk that the respondent’s mental health might deteriorate, with a risk of some form of misconduct. However, at an early stage, Dr Moore stated that he did not have any particular concerns about the respondent’s capabilities when performing the duties of a solicitor, though he recommended mentoring, supervision, and mental health-based support; and he did not think there was a significant chance of a mental health-related event leading to a repeat of the respondent’s conduct. Although not more recently asked to comment on these matters, there is nothing to suggest that Dr Moore no longer holds those views. It is apparent from the material that, in addition to the respondent’s own sensitivity to criticism, a significant factor in the respondent’s conduct has been the personality of the majority partner in the firm, with whom he experienced great difficulty in dealing. It seems quite unlikely that the respondent would enter into such a situation again. Moreover, the proposed orders would provide some protection against the risk of a recurrence of misconduct by the respondent as a result of a mental health issue. In the circumstances, the Tribunal accepts that this is not a case calling for the removal of the respondent’s name from the local roll. It is not satisfied that the probability is that the respondent is permanently unfit to practice.
- [35]The serious nature of the respondent’s conduct has already been discussed. There are, however, some other factors which are relevant to the orders to be made, either because they support the view that further misconduct is unlikely to occur, or because they otherwise warrant mitigation of a punitive order. They are that the respondent moved early to get treatment, and has maintained a commitment to treatment at a significant level for a number of years now; his deep sense of shame (as reported by Dr Moore), and his accepted remorse; the fact that the respondent did not act for the purpose of personal gain; the settlements he entered into were at least consistent with the insurer’s approach to settling matters, and are not said to have disadvantaged it; and the respondent has made good the losses resulting from his conduct.
- [36]The respondent’s failure to comply with the notice from the applicant issued under s 443(3) of the LP Act is also a serious matter. It does not, however, alter the Tribunal’s view as to the appropriate orders to be made.
- [37]The Tribunal is content to make orders generally consistent with the orders proposed by the parties. However, the panel members have raised some matters designed to give clarity and provide somewhat better protection to the public than would be achieved by the orders proposed by the parties. A revised draft of the orders has been circulated to the parties, and they do not object to the changes. The orders will accordingly be those in the revised draft.
Orders
- [38]The following orders are made:
- The respondent is publicly reprimanded;
- The respondent may not apply for or obtain an employee level practising certificate until his application is accompanied by:
- (a)a copy of these reasons (“the Reasons”); and
- (b)a report on his mental condition and its effect on his ability to engage in legal practice, prepared by an independent practising psychiatrist who has been provided with a copy of the Reasons, with such report to be prepared no earlier than 12 months from the date of this Order, and within six months before the date upon which the respondent makes any such application;
- (a)
- Upon his being granted an employee level practising certificate, the respondent must undertake the next available ethics course facilitated by the Queensland Law Society;
- The respondent may not apply for or obtain a certificate to practise as a principal until he has practised as an employed solicitor for five years. His first application for a certificate to practise as a principal must be accompanied by a report on his mental condition and its effect on his ability to engage in legal practice, prepared by an independent practising psychiatrist who has been provided with a copy of the Reasons, with such report to be prepared within six months before the date upon which the respondent makes the application;
- On the third occasion the respondent applies for a certificate to practise as a principal (i.e. for the period next after he has held such certificate for two years), his application must be accompanied by a report on his mental condition and its effect on his ability to engage in legal practice, prepared by an independent practising psychiatrist who has been provided with a copy of the Reasons, with such report to be prepared within six months before the date upon which the respondent makes the application; and
- The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis as if this were a proceeding before the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Footnotes
[1] [1990] 1 Qd R 498 (“Adamson”).
[2]Adamson, 507.
[3] See Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750. See also the discussion in Gino E Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2017) 762 [23.85] (“Dal Pont”).
[4] Dal Pont, 766 [23.100], text at n 125.
[5]Lucke v Cleary (2011) 111 SASR 134, [60]–[62]; Pavlovic v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 313, [150] (Beazley P, Bathurst CJ agreeing at [21], Meagher JA agreeing at [160]).
[6] See LP Act s 443(3), (4)(a).
[7] See Dal Pont, 752 [23.25], text at n 31.
[8] See Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner; Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66, [54]–[55].
[9] See Dal Pont, 753 [23.25], text at n 39. In the criminal sphere, it has been recognised that a person suffering from a serious psychiatric illness is not an appropriate vehicle for general deterrence: see, eg, R v Tsiaris [1996] 1 VR 398, 400 and R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269, [32]; cited with approval in R v Yarwood (2011) 220 A Crim R 497, [23]–[26]. Also note the significance attributed to the lawyer’s mental health in Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224 (“Watts”).
[10]Watts, [46].
[11] [2003] NSWCA 320.
[12] [2019] QCAT 147, [41]–[52].
[13] (1996) 71 FCR 285.
[14] (2015) 258 CLR 482.
[15] [2018] QCAT 332. In the present case, the applicant also referred to Medical Board of Australia v Martin [2013] QCAT 376, [91]–[93].
[16] [2018] VCAT 1498, [24]–[25], and omitting citations; adopted in Victorian Legal Services Commissioner v Harriss [2020] VCAT 689, [34].