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CITE

Unreported Judgment

Whitman v White King Wollongong Pty Ltd t/a Illawarra Toyota[2021] QCAT 290Adjudicator Lember
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Whitman v White King Wollongong Pty Ltd t/a Illawarra Toyota[2021] QCAT 290

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:	Whitman v White King Wollongong Pty Ltd t/a Illawarra Toyota [2021] QCAT 290
PARTIES:	CLINT WHITMAN (applicant) v WHITE KING WOLLONGONG PTY LTD T/A ILLAWARrA TOYOTA (respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S:	MCD-O00897/20
MATTER TYPE:	Other minor civil dispute matters
DELIVERED ON:	5 August 2021
HEARING DATE:	30 July 2021
HEARD AT:	Brisbane
DECISION OF:	Adjudicator Lember
ORDERS:	The respondent must pay the applicant the sum of $4,660.10 by 20 September 2021.
CATCHWORDS:	TRADE AND COMMERCE – COMPETITION, FAIR TRADING AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION – CONSUMER PROTECTION – GUARANTEES, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES IN CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS – GUARANTEES, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES – whether motor vehicle of acceptable quality – whether failure to comply with consumer guarantee a major failure or minor failure – whether consumer entitled to damages for misdescription Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 54(1), s 54(2), s 54(3), s 260, s 267(4), schedule 2 Motor Dealers and Repairers Act 2013 (NSW) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 11, s 102, schedule 3 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] Q.B. 256 Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 184 Cox v J & M Phelan trading as Carrara Carmart [2020] QCAT 190 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2004] 218 CLR 483 Hartley v Bennette [2014] QCAT 091 Hielbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 Hochster v De la Tour (1853) 2 E & B 678 Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310 Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325 Van den Esschert v Chappell [1960] WAR 114
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:
Applicant:	Self-represented
Respondent:	Self-represented

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]
Mr Whitman, who lives in Central Queensland, purchased a second-hand Toyota Prado from Illawarra Toyota, based in New South Wales, which he says was delivered to him in a condition that did not match how the vehicle was described to him during the sale process.
[2]
By an application for a minor civil dispute – consumer dispute filed 22 July 2020, Mr Whitman seeks an order that the respondent pay him $5,701.10 as compensation for costs to restore the vehicle to its represented condition, plus his filing fee of $123.20.
[3]
The respondent is prepared to pay for the reasonable costs of having the vehicle detailed, but otherwise asks the tribunal to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant purchased the vehicle in an “as is” condition.
[4]
Mr and Mrs Whitman appeared in person at the hearing. Most of the applicant’s dealings with the respondent were conducted by Mrs Whitman on his behalf.
[5]
Mr Lal, the Dealer Principal, represented the respondent by telephone at the hearing, and Ms Terris, the respondent’s Guest Experience Manager, also gave evidence.
[6]
Crucial to the applicant’s case was the content of a video sent to him by Mr Pike, a salesperson in the employ of the respondent that took the place of an in-person pre-purchase inspection of the vehicle. At the time of the hearing, I was not able to view the video as it was on a disc that hearing room facilities could not accommodate. For that reason, I reserved my decision until after I could view the video contained on the disc, which I have now done, and therefore I give my decision with reasons as follows.

The circumstances leading up to the sale

[7]
On or around 9 October 2019 the respondent, a Toyota dealership, secured a 2018 Toyota Prado with 22,783 kilometres on the odometer and advertised it for sale online. A copy of the advertisement was not made available in evidence at the hearing.
[8]
Mrs Whitman responded to the advertisement on the applicant’s behalf and a call took place between Mrs Whitman and Mr Pike following which Mr Pike recorded a ninety-second video inspection of the vehicle, describing it as he went, and then sent the video to Mrs Whitman.
[9]
The content of the video includes the following (my emphasis added):
1. (a)
  it opens with Mr Pike addressing Mrs Whitman and introducing himself as representing Illawarra Toyota;
2. (b)
  at 00.07 Mr Pike says “the vehicle has turned up this morning after our conversation”;
3. (c)
  at 00.14 “the car was a [sic] ex Toyota car so it presents like brand new”;
4. (d)
  From 00.30 Mr Pike videos the interior of the rear of the vehicle and as the door opens and the sun hits the door, a scuff mark is evident on the rear door, however the rest of the interior is in shadow;
5. (e)
  at 00.32 he says “the car will be detailed pre delivery”;
6. (f)
  at 01:12 he says the car comes with “log-books and two sets of keys”;
7. (g)
  at 01:15 he says whilst panning the front interior “not a mark on it really”; and
8. (h)
  at 01:24 he says whilst panning the middle interior “you’d be very happy with this one”.
[10]
Following delivery of the video the following text messages were exchanged:
1. (a)
  Mrs Whitman asks “could you please send a pic of the scuffs on the inside back door you spoke earlier about. If happy with pics my husband said he is happy to go ahead if you can approve $58,000 delivered”; and
2. (b)
  Mr Pike replies “The video shows them. Just pause it when I open the tail gate. Very minor. I can’t do better than what was offered sorry”.
[11]
Mrs Whitman also says that Mr Pike assured her that logbooks were “correct and up to date”.
[12]
Curiously, Mr Lal denies all of the representations attributed to Mr Pike, saying in the hearing that “we don’t know what he said”. When directly questioned about the video evidence he said that he hadn’t seen the video and then adjusted his evidence to say that he had not looked at it for a long time.
[13]
Mr Lal then also stated in the hearing that Mr Pike:
1. (a)
  was “legally blind” and that his impairment was managed in the workplace by the use of “special magnified glasses” and special computer screens;
2. (b)
  was a specialist used car salesperson; and
3. (c)
  did not have a driver’s licence and cycled to work.
[14]
It is not clear what the purpose of giving this evidence was, but there is certainly no basis for suggesting, if in fact Mr Lal was vision-impaired, that vision impairment would negate liability for misrepresentation unless the fact of that impairment was disclosed to the applicant.
[15]
A contract was prepared on 10 October 2019 and a $500 deposit paid by the applicant, with the balance price of $57,950 being paid on 15 October 2019, according to Receipts No VDE11966 and 26V680 issued by the respondent.
[16]
There are no express terms in the contract that refer to the condition of the vehicle or that encompass representations made by Mr Pike. The terms did include:
1. (a)
  a consumer acknowledgement that the vehicle did not come with a dealer guarantee under the Motor Dealers and Repairers Act 2013 (NSW);
2. (b)
  a statement that the vehicle did come with guarantees that cannot be excluded under the Australian Consumer Laws and that the customer is entitled to have the goods repaired or replaced if the goods fail to be of acceptable quality and the failure does not amount to a major failure; and
3. (c)
  in very fine print in clause 7(7) that the customer prior to taking delivery, must thoroughly inspect or cause the vehicle to be inspected and if the vehicle does not comply with the description elect to accept the vehicle and waive all remedies or give the seller a reasonable opportunity to obtain and supply a substitute vehicle that does comply with the description.
[17]
Immediately upon delivery, it was obvious to the applicant that the vehicle had not been detailed, as the interior was quite unclean, and further, that the interior was considerably damaged, marked and scuffed.
[18]
It was not contested that the vehicle was in an excellent condition on the exterior and that there were no mechanical defects.
[19]
Nor was it contested that the respondent intended, but failed, to have the vehicle detailed prior to delivery. To the extent the applicant’s evidence relates to cleanliness, which is not disputed, it has not been necessary to comment further on it.
[20]
Mrs Whitman immediately called the respondent and spoke with a representative of the respondent, asking that the delivery truck return and collect the vehicle as it was not in the condition that was represented to the applicant. Mrs Whitman sent pictures by text message to Ms Terris.
[21]
Mrs Whitman also spoke with Mr Lal who, she says, offered to have the vehicle repaired to new condition as advertised. He suggested that the applicant have Ian Weigh Toyota, their closest Toyota dealer, examine the vehicle and quote to have the vehicle detailed and repaired to the represented condition. Mr Lal disputes this and says that Ian Weigh Toyota were always engaged by and acting for the applicant.
[22]
The applicant then took the vehicle to Ian Weigh Toyota who took photographs of the interior and produced a report that stated, among other things:
1. (a)
  marks on side of right-hand front seat cover caused by side of seat cover getting caught on seat trim;
2. (b)
  marks across speaker cover to right-hand front door speaker, if detail does not remove new right-hand front door trim required;
3. (c)
  marks on right-hand front door trim under arm rest, if detail does not remove new armrest needed;
4. (d)
  marks on side of centre console lid, will require replacing as marks can be felt in lid;
5. (e)
  marks on back of centre console trim, can see if marks go with detail but not confident;
6. (f)
  top cover and hard cover of left-hand and centre middle row, as well as to hard cover in right hand middle row seats will need replacing to fix;
7. (g)
  marks in hood lining should clean as part of detail;
8. (h)
  marks and scratches on right hand rear back trim, some are deep and unable to be repaired, only option is replacement of trim;
9. (i)
  left-hand back rear trim similar marks to right hand;
10. (j)
  marks on left-hand rear door opening rubber;
11. (k)
  marks on back door trim expected to come out with a detail;
12. (l)
  scratch left-hand door trim; and
13. (m)
  scratches in trim above glove box will require replacing.
[23]
An email from Mr Applewaite from Ian Weigh Toyota to Mr Lal on 5 November 2019 confirmed that Mr Applewaite was recommending a “full detail of the vehicle and then a reinspect to determine what remains to be repaired”. He did say that “the rear side trims and backs of the middle row seats cannot be repaired and will require replacement”.
[24]
Ms Terris replied to that email the following day stating: “Are you able to get me a quote on the below works, ie detail and rear side trims and middle row seats”.
[25]
Ian Weigh Toyota prepared an estimate on 7 November 2019 to have the items that required repair as set out in their report addressed.
[26]
The total cost of doing so, including having the vehicle detailed for $650.00, was $4,420.10. This did not include repairing any marks to the rear door, which was the only scuff mark identified by Mr Pike and accepted by the applicant prior to purchase.
[27]
As this point, it would seem the respondent declined to contribute anything towards the cost of repairs.
[28]
Mr Lal also objected to the cost of the detailing, however, the applicant ultimately proceeded with it on 11 December 2019, following which another report was prepared by Ian Weigh Toyota dated 18 December 2019 that noted the following was not able to be remedied by the detailing:
1. (a)
  right-hand front seat cover with marks still evident;
2. (b)
  mark in rear of centre console;
3. (c)
  middle row left-hand and middle seat in second row showing no improvement;
4. (d)
  right-hand trim with marks remaining; and
5. (e)
  rear left-hand cargo area with marks in trim.
[29]
The logbook that came with the vehicle contained a signed entry dated 30 September 2019 that confirmed a 20,000 km service had been carried out by the respondent.
[30]
However, the applicant was informed by Ian Weigh Toyota that the 20,000 km service entry in the logbook was falsified and that the 20,000 km service had not been carried out. A printout from the Toyota system confirmed this. Mrs Whitman also said that Mr Applewaite had confirmed directly with the respondent’s service manager that the service had not been undertaken, although this is hearsay.
[31]
In the hearing Mr Lal disputed that the service had not taken place. He suggested that the respondent had simply failed to update the Toyota software. However, I am not inclined to believe this for a few reasons:
1. (a)
  the logbook entry is dated 30 September 2019 however, Mr Pike’s video taken on 9 October 2019 refers to the vehicle as having “just arrived” to the respondent; and
2. (b)
  Mr Lal gave evidence that it would be immediately obvious to a mechanic whether a vehicle had received its 20,000 km service, regardless of any software entry and, on that basis, I prefer the evidence of Ian Weigh Toyota as to whether or not the vehicle required servicing; and
3. (c)
  Mr Lal could have produced service records (timesheets and similar) and declined to do so.
[32]
As the vehicle was at 22,783 km the applicant would have lost the “capped price service” as part of the original warranty if the vehicle did not receive its 20,000 km service within ten days. The applicant therefore arranged for Ian Weigh to service the vehicle with the detailing and also seeks that cost of $240 be reimbursed to him.
[33]
As for the detailing, Mr Lal gave evidence that all usual processes were followed in the sale, which included cleaning of the vehicle. This was clearly not the case as the vehicle was very unclean upon delivery to the applicant.
[34]
Nonetheless, as stated, the respondent denies liability for any further payment other than the reasonable costs of having the vehicle detailed on the grounds that as a second-hand vehicle, the vehicle was purchased in an “as is” condition. The applicant’s costs of the detailing were $650.00. The respondent says up to $170 would be reasonable.

The laws applying to the dispute

[35]
The tribunal has jurisdiction to hear minor civil disputes^[1].
[36]
In terms of territorial limits to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, in Hartley v Bennette^[2] it was decided that, provided that a respondent can validly be served with the application that is before the tribunal, then the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear it. This was based on the same common law rule which applies to the High Court and was described in Laurie v Carroll^[3].
[37]
In Hartley, the only connection with Queensland was the applicant lived there but since the respondent lived in NSW and could be served with the application under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), it was held that the tribunal did have jurisdiction.
[38]
Given the applicant lives in Queensland, the contract was entered into by them electronically from Queensland and the vehicle was delivered in Queensland, further, that the respondent has been validly served with the application, there is no question in my view that the tribunal has territorial jurisdiction to hear this dispute.
[39]
Claims arising out of a contract between a consumer and a trader are minor civil disputes.^[4]
[40]
A “consumer”^[5] is an individual for whom services are supplied for fee other than in a trade or business carried on by the individual.
[41]
A “trader”^[6] is a person who in trade or commerce carries on a business of supplying services other than when acting in the exercise of a discipline that is not ordinarily regarded as within the field of trade or commerce.
[42]
I am satisfied that at all material times the applicant was a consumer and the respondent was a trader for the purpose of the Australian Consumer Law.
[43]
Consumers can seek refunds or damages from traders under the Australian Consumer Law, contained in schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (“Australian Consumer Law”).
[44]
Section 54(1) of the Australian Consumer Law provides that, where a person supplies goods in trade or commerce, the goods are guaranteed to be of ‘acceptable quality’.
[45]
The time at which goods are to be of acceptable quality is the time at which the goods are supplied to the consumer.^[7]
[46]
Under section 54(2), goods are of acceptable quality if they are, among other things:
1. (a)
  acceptable in appearance and finish; and
2. (b)
  free from defects;

as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods (including any hidden defects of the goods), would regard as acceptable having regard to the matters in section 54(3).

[47]
Section 54(3) provides that matters to have regard to in applying section 54(2) are:
1. (a)
  the nature of the goods; and
2. (b)
  the price of the goods (if relevant); and
3. (c)
  any representation made about the goods by the supplier or manufacturer of the goods; and
4. (d)
  any other relevant circumstances relating to the supply of the goods.
[48]
The remedy available to a consumer against a supplier depends in the first instance on whether the failure is a ‘minor failure’ or a ‘major failure’. The term ‘major failure’ is defined in s 260 of the Australian Consumer Law to relevantly mean (emphasis added):

(a)
the goods would not have been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the failure; or

(b)
the goods depart in one or more significantrespects: or

(i)
if they were supplied by description—from that description;.

[49]
The test of whether there is a major failure for the purposes of section 260 and the test for whether goods are of acceptable quality for the purposes of section 54 both adopt a ‘reasonable consumer’ benchmark.
[50]
If the failure can be remedied and is not a major failure, the consumer is limited to:
1. (a)
  requiring the supplier to remedy the failure within a reasonable time; or
2. (b)
  if the supplier cannot remedy the failure within a reasonable time, having the failure remedied by someone other than the supplier and seeking compensation from the supplier, or rejecting the goods.
[51]
It is not necessary for me to determine whether the failure alleged by the applicant was a major failure because the remedy he seeks is not a refund.
[52]
In terms of descriptions and representations, salespersons are given some leeway to use “puff” in the sales process, namely, hype or hyperbole that plainly exaggerates a product’s virtues and are not intended to be taken seriously. Representations or statement that are “mere puff” in the sales process have no contractual effect or legal consequence^[8]. However, unlike mere puff, a representation intended to induce a person to enter into a contract will have legal consequences.
[53]
Distinguishing puff from representations requires the tribunal to apply an objective approach to assess the intention of the parties from the totality of the evidence^[9].
[54]
In weighing up the effect of an oral representation prior to contract relevant considerations include:
1. (a)
  whether an intelligent bystander would reasonably infer that the truth about a statement was guaranteed ^[10];
2. (b)
  where the oral statements are in conflict with the subsequent written contract whether the oral statements would reasonably have been included in the written contract if they were intended to have formed part of the contract^[11];
3. (c)
  the timing of the statement in terms of how proximate it was to when the contract was formed^[12]; and
4. (d)
  whether the content of the statement was material to one party’s decision to enter into the contract^[13].

Findings

[55]
It is without question that – knowing the applicant was relying upon the respondent’s inspection of the vehicle on their behalf as they could not do so in person – the representations made to the applicant by Mr Pike in the video he sent, namely his description of the vehicle as “like brand new” and “not a mark on it” and the subsequent text messages that referred to a mark as “very minor”, were false and were relied upon by and induced the applicant to enter into the contract because:
1. (a)
  The video was not prepared by the respondent for public consumption or as an advertisement of the vehicle – it was specifically addressed to the applicant and prepared for the applicant as their pre-purchase inspection of the vehicle;
2. (b)
  The respondent knew the applicant was relying, solely, upon the respondent’s inspection of the vehicle for them as they could not do so in person, for the purpose of the applicant making an informed decision to purchase the vehicle;
3. (c)
  The respondent knew because the applicant made it clear that, as part of his decision to buy and at what price, he was particular about whether there were marks on the vehicle and if so the extent and nature of the marks – this was evident from the questions asked about the one mark that was evident in the inspection that followed it by text message; and
4. (d)
  The one mark identified by the respondent was downplayed by the respondent as “very minor” when this was not true.
[56]
But for those representations, I am satisfied that the applicant would not have made his decision to buy at the price he did. He entered into the contract almost immediately after receiving the video and the accompanying text message clarifying the one “very minor” mark on the vehicle.
[57]
By an oversight, the detailing of the vehicle was forgotten by the respondent and this too formed part of the promises made by the respondent that induced the applicant to enter into the contract at the price he did.
[58]
The extent to which the interior damage could not be addressed by detailing the vehicle is reflected in the Ian Weigh Toyota report, and the repair estimate is not insignificant.
[59]
Whilst on the one hand, the interior condition of the vehicle is cosmetic only, the test of a “major failure” under section 260 of the Australian Consumer Law is whether the goods, if supplied by description, depart in one or more significant respects from that description. This vehicle did so depart and in my view met the test of a major failure. As the relief sought pertains to a minor failure, I am well satisfied that the applicant should be given that relief.

Damages

[60]
Under section 267(4) of the Australian Consumer Law, the consumer may recover damages for any loss or damage suffered by the consumer because of the failure to comply with the guarantee if it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure.
[61]
The evidence of Ian Weigh Toyota is, in my view, an independent assessment of the damages suffered by the applicant. The respondent did not offer any alternate assessment of damage, even though it was armed with the video it authored and extensive notes and comments from the Ian Weigh Toyota reports.
[62]
The respondent says that if the repairs are ordered the applicant will receive a “new” vehicle which is not what they contracted for. I do not agree with this submission.
[63]
The applicant contracted for a “like brand new” vehicle with “not a mark on it”. That is not what they received, and the only way for them to achieve it is for Ian Weigh Toyota to carry out the quoted repairs at the respondent’s cost.
[64]
There is an obligation on the party claiming to have suffered loss to mitigate its loss.^[14] I am satisfied that the applicant has mitigated by first attempting to remedy the marks with detailing, which did not solve the problem.
[65]
I am satisfied, further, that the applicant was promised up to date and correct logbooks and they did not receive that either, incurring the cost of $240.00 to have the vehicle serviced. The respondent is also responsible for these costs.
[66]
I assess the applicant’s damages as $4,660.10, calculated as follows:
1. (a)
  Service costs $240.00; plus
2. (b)
  Detailing $650.00; plus
3. (c)
  Repairs (less cost of detailing already undertaken) $3,770.10.

Costs

[67]
As the applicant has been wholly successful, it is appropriate that he be recompensed for the filing fee pursuant to section 102 of the QCAT Act.
[68]
I decline to award the applicant his legal costs incurred as I do not have jurisdiction to do so.

Orders

[69]
For the reasons given, I order the respondent to pay the applicant the sum of $4,660.10 by 20 September 2021.

Footnotes

[1] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”), section 11.

[2] [2014] QCAT 091.

[3] (1858) 98 CLR 310.

[4] QCAT Act, Schedule 3 (definition of ‘minor civil dispute’).

[5] Schedule 3, QCAT Act.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney (2003) 130 FCR 182, [64] and [70].

[8] Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] Q.B. 256.

[9] Hielbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30.

[10] Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 All ER 325.

[11] Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2004] 218 CLR 483

[12] Van den Esschert v Chappell [1960] WAR 114.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Cox v J & M Phelan trading as Carrara Carmart [2020] QCAT 190, [34].

Editorial Notes

Published Case Name:
Whitman v White King Wollongong Pty Ltd t/a Illawarra Toyota
Shortened Case Name:
Whitman v White King Wollongong Pty Ltd t/a Illawarra Toyota
MNC:
[2021] QCAT 290
Court:
QCAT
Judge(s):
Adjudicator Lember
Date:
05 Aug 2021

Appeal Status

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Cases Cited List of Cases Cited by this judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company	View on:ICLRUK[1893] QB 256	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1893] QB 256 Cite 2 - [1893] QB 256
Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd	View on:JADE[2012] NSWCA 184	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2012] NSWCA 184
Cox v J & M Phelan trading as Carrara Carmart	[2020] QCAT 190	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2020] QCAT 190 Cite 2 - [2020] QCAT 190
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd	View on:JADE[2004] 218 CLR 483	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2004] 218 CLR 483 Cite 2 - [2004] 218 CLR 483
Hartley v Bennette	[2014] QCAT 91	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2014] QCAT 91 Cite 2 - [2014] QCAT 91
Hochster v De La Tour	(1853) 2 E & B 678	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1853) 2 E & B 678
Laurie v Carroll	View on:JADE(1958) 98 CLR 310	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1958) 98 CLR 310
Laurie v Carroll	View on:JADE(1858) 98 CLR 310	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1858) 98 CLR 310
Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney	(2003) 130 FCR 182	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (2003) 130 FCR 182
Oscar Chess Limited v Williams	[1957] 1 All E.R. 325	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1957] 1 All E.R. 325 Cite 2 - [1957] 1 All E.R. 325
Symons & Co. v Buckleton	View on:ICLRUK(1913) AC 30	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1913) AC 30 Cite 2 - (1913) AC 30
Van den Esschert v Chappell	[1960] WAR 114	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1960] WAR 114 Cite 2 - [1960] WAR 114

Cases Citing List of cases on Queensland Judgments citing this Judgment

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

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Whitman v White King Wollongong Pty Ltd t/a Illawarra Toyota[2021] QCAT 290