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Castle v Queensland Law Society[2021] QCAT 300

Castle v Queensland Law Society[2021] QCAT 300

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Castle v Queensland Law Society [2021] QCAT 300

PARTIES:

DAVIN MARK CASTLE

(applicant)

V

qUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR082-20

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

22 September 2021

HEARING DATE:

23 October 2020

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Daubney, President

ORDERS:

The application to review a decision filed on 26 March 2020 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – PRACTISING CERTIFICATES – CANCELLATION AND SUSPENSION – where applicant was a legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice – where applicant submitted an external examiner’s report late – where external examiner’s report revealed trust account anomalies that were unexplained by applicant – where applicant failed to respond to requests for information from respondent regarding trust account breaches – where applicant failed to obtain a final examiner’s report – where applicant practised without a practising certificate – where applicant practised without holding professional indemnity insurance – where applicant’s communications with respondent inappropriate and unprofessional – where applicant failed to keep client documents and trust records secured – where respondent did not renew applicant’s practising certificate – where applicant seeks a review of that decision – where applicant’s affidavit material contained untrue statements – where applicant has shown little insight into seriousness of conduct – whether respondent made the correct and preferable decision – whether applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate 

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 3(a), s 6(1), s 9, s 24(1), s 46, s 51, s 116, s 120(2)(b), s 121, s 236, s 244, s 245, s 263, s 268, s 274, s 276, s 353, s 418

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 20

Purdie v Queensland Law Society [2021] QCAT 291

APPEARANCES &

REPRESENTATION:

 

Applicant: D Castle (self-represented)

Respondent: N J Pearce (counsel) i/b Queensland Law Society

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    The Applicant, Davin Mark Castle, was admitted as a legal practitioner in Queensland on 12 July 2007.  He held the following practising certificates issued by the Queensland Law Society (“QLS”) in accordance with the requirements of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (“LPA”):
    1. (a)
      restricted practising certificate: 12 July 2007 – 29 October 2009;
    2. (b)
      unrestricted employee practising certificate:
      1. 30 October 2009 – 12 April 2011;
      2. 1 July 2012 – 3 March 2016;
    3. (c)
      principal practising certificate:
      1. 13 April 2011 – 30 June 2012;
      2. 4 March 2016 – 30 June 2016 (this practising certificate expired on 30 June 2016 due to non-renewal by the Applicant);
      3. 23 September 2016 – 30 June 2017 (this practising certificate also expired on 30 June 2017 due to non-renewal by the Applicant); and
      4. 19 July 2017 – 30 June 2019.
  2. [2]
    The Applicant was the legal practitioner director[1] of an incorporated legal practice,[2] DMC Legal Services Pty Ltd trading as Brereton Lawyers (“Brereton Lawyers”).  According to QLS records, Brereton Lawyers operated from 4 March 2016 to 13 April 2018.
  3. [3]
    The Applicant was the sole principal of Brereton Lawyers but, as is apparent from the chronology of the Applicant’s practising certificates, he did not hold a practising certificate because of his failure to renew during the following periods:
    1. (a)
      1 July 2016 – 22 September 2016; and
    2. (b)
      1 July 2017 – 18 July 2017.
  4. [4]
    On 24 May 2019, the Applicant applied to the QLS for renewal of his practising certificate as an employee rather than as a principal.
  5. [5]
    On 15 November 2019, the QLS wrote to the Applicant setting out its concerns that he may not be a fit and proper person to hold an unrestricted employee practising certificate and asking him to respond (“the Show Cause Letter”).
  6. [6]
    The Applicant provided a number of written responses to the Show Cause Letter, on 15, 16 and 17 November 2019.
  7. [7]
    On 20 February 2020, the Executive Committee of the Council of the QLS determined that the Applicant was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and decided not to renew the Applicant’s practising certificate (“the Refusal Decision”).
  8. [8]
    The QLS gave its reasons for the Refusal Decision in an information notice dated 23 March 2020 (“the Refusal Reasons”).
  9. [9]
    By an application to review a decision filed in this Tribunal on 26 March 2020, the Applicant has applied under s 51(9) of the LPA for a review of the Refusal Decision.
  10. [10]
    Section 20 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”) provides that:
    1. (a)
      the purpose of this review is to produce the correct and preferable decision; and
    2. (b)
      this review must be heard and decided by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.
  11. [11]
    One of the main purposes of the LPA is to provide for the regulation of legal practice in Queensland “in the interests of the administration of justice and for the protection of consumers of the services of the legal profession and the public generally”.[3]  Accordingly, the LPA contains a general prohibition, subject to stated exceptions, on engaging in legal practice “unless the person is an Australian Legal Practitioner”.[4]  That calls for a person to hold either a current local practising certificate or a current interstate practising certificate.[5]
  12. [12]
    As noted above, the Applicant had applied for renewal of his practising certificate, albeit at the employee level.  It is the QLS decision not to renew his practising certificate which is the subject of this review.
  13. [13]
    The QLS’s power to refuse to renew the practising certificate was sourced in s 51 of the LPA, which relevantly provides:
  1. (1)
    A regulatory authority must consider an application that has been made to it for the grant or renewal of a local practising certificate and may—
  1. (a)
    grant or refuse to grant the certificate; or
  1. (b)
    renew or refuse to renew the certificate.

…

  1. (5)
    The regulatory authority must not renew a local practising certificate if it is satisfied that the applicant—
  1. (a)
    was not eligible to apply for the renewal of the certificate when the application was made; or
  1. (b)
    is not a fit and proper person to continue to hold the certificate.

Note—

See section 46 (Suitability to hold local practising certificate).

  1. [14]
    It is clear from the terms of the Refusal Decision and the Refusal Reasons that the Refusal Decision was founded on a determination by the QLS that the Applicant was not a fit and proper person to continue to hold a practising certificate.
  2. [15]
    Section 46 of the LPA enumerates a range of matters relevant to the question of whether or not a person is a fit and proper person to continue to hold a local practising certificate.  These expressly include the “suitability matters” set out in s 9 of the LPA, including whether a person is “currently of good fame and character”.
  3. [16]
    In the recent decision of this Tribunal in Purdie v Queensland Law Society (“Purdie”),[6] I set out a number of propositions relevant to the circumstances of that case, several of which are presently apt, namely:
    1. (a)
      the relevant question is whether the QLS would be justified in holding out the Applicant as a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of a solicitor; and
    2. (b)
      whether a person is of “good fame and character” involves, amongst other things, the acceptance of high standards of conduct and acting in accordance with them under pressure.
  4. [17]
    I would also repeat the following observations made in Purdie (omitting footnotes and citations):

[20] To that list, I would add the observation by Mahoney JA in Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman, that a person’s character “is tested not by what one does in good times but in bad”.  Lawyers are often busy and very often under stress, but that does not excuse them from observance of their professional obligations or maintenance of their professional standards.

[21] It should also be accepted that there is a distinction between current and permanent unfitness to practice.  The present review is not concerned with whether the Applicant’s name ought be struck from the Roll.  In such a case, the test is one of probable permanent unfitness.   Rather, the Tribunal’s present task is to consider whether, in all the relevant circumstances, the Applicant has shown that he is currently a fit and proper person to be granted a practising certificate.

  1. [18]
    The Refusal Reasons set out in comprehensive detail the factual matters on which the QLS relied in reaching its conclusion that the Applicant was not a fit and proper person to continue to hold a practising certificate.  There was, in the evidence put before this Tribunal, no effective rebuttal by the Applicant of any of those factual matters.  Indeed, when giving oral evidence before the Tribunal, the Applicant effectively conceded those facts.  As will appear, his argument concerned whether the QLS was nevertheless justified in refusing to renew his practising certificate.
  2. [19]
    In those circumstances, a summary of the factual foundation for the Refusal Decision will suffice.
  3. [20]
    As noted above, the Applicant was the legal practitioner director and sole principal of Brereton Lawyers.
  4. [21]
    Brereton Lawyers held a trust account in respect of which compliance with Part 3.3 of the LPA was mandatory.  By s 236 of the LPA, the main purposes of Part 3.3 are:
  1. (a)
    to ensure trust money is held by law practices in a way that protects the interests of persons for whom money is held, both inside and outside this jurisdiction;
  1. (b)
    to minimise compliance requirements for law practices that provide legal services within and outside this jurisdiction;
  1. (c)
    to ensure the law society can work effectively with corresponding authorities in other jurisdictions in relation to the regulation of trust money and trust accounts.
  1. [22]
    The Applicant, as principal of Brereton Lawyers, was under the same obligations as were imposed on the law practice by Part 3.3 while the law practice was engaging in legal practice and after it ceased engaging in legal practice.[7]  Moreover, as the sole legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice, the professional obligations on the Applicant applied as if he were a sole practitioner.[8]
  2. [23]
    A number of obligations imposed under the LPA and the relevant subordinate legislation were relevant in this case:
    1. (a)
      While a law practice is operating, it is required to:
      1. have its trust account records externally examined for each year ending 31 March;[9] and
      2. provide a copy of the external examiner’s report to the QLS within 60 days after 31 March.[10]
    2. (b)
      When a law practice closes a trust account, it must:
      1. obtain a final examiner’s report;[11]
      2. give the QLS a bank statement confirming closure of the account (required as part of the final examination process); and
      3. give the QLS a copy of the final examiner’s report and a statutory declaration in the approved form within 60 days of ceasing to hold trust money.[12]
    3. (c)
      When a law practice ceases to engage in legal practice, it must:
      1. appoint an external examiner to examine the practice’s trust records for the period since the last external examination was conducted;[13]
      2. give a copy of the external examiner’s report to the QLS within 60 days of the period to which it relates;[14]
      3. give the QLS notice in the approved form of the corporation ceasing practice as an incorporated legal practice within 14 days;[15] and
      4. give the QLS a statutory declaration of cessation of holding trust money within 60 days.[16]
    4. (d)
      Neither a solicitor nor an incorporated legal practice may engage in legal practice without professional indemnity insurance.[17]
    5. (e)
      A solicitor must not engage in legal practice without a current practising certificate.
  3. [24]
    The QLS Refusal Reasons identified a range of circumstances which demonstrated repeated failures by the Applicant to observe these obligations, including the following:
    1. (a)
      The external examiner’s report for the year ending 31 March 2017 was not given to the QLS until 29 November 2017, which was well beyond the prescribed 60-day period.
    2. (b)
      In late 2017, the QLS wrote twice to the Applicant seeking an explanation for a trust account anomaly of $15,916 which had been identified in the external examiner’s report.  The Applicant failed to respond to those requests for information.  I note in passing that this failure to respond to the QLS was itself a contravention of r 43.2 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012, which were binding on the Applicant by reason of the provisions of part 3.2 of the LPA.  Ultimately, in response to the Show Cause Letter, the Applicant asserted that he had thrown away the computer server containing the software for the Brereton Lawyers Trust Account.  He also asserted to the QLS that the supposed anomaly was a mistake by the QLS trust account investigator.  That assertion was palpably wrong – the anomaly had in fact been identified in the external examiner’s report supplied by the application to the QLS.  He also baldly asserted that the sum in question was “simply ludicrous on any level” and had to be a software or accounting error.  Despite this bluster, the Applicant never explained the anomaly.  Now it can never be explained because:
      1. the Applicant failed to obtain a final examiner’s report; and
      2. he threw away the server on which the firm’s trust account records were stored.
    3. (c)
      In early 2016, Brereton Lawyers closed a trust account it had held with Bank of Queensland, but the Applicant:
      1. failed to provide the QLS with the requisite bank statement showing closure or the external examiner’s report; and
      2. failed to respond to three emails from the QLS seeking those documents.
    4. (d)
      DMC Legal Services Pty Ltd was deregistered by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission on 13 April 2018.  The Applicant sent the QLS an undated letter, received on 26 April 2018, advising that the company had been deregistered and that Brereton Lawyers would cease trading at the close of 27 April 2018.  Then, on 14 June 2018, the Applicant wrote to the QLS advising that Brereton Lawyers had ceased practising on 13 April 2018 and enclosed the Notice of Cessation of Legal Practice.  This was well outside the prescribed 14-day period.  At no time did the Applicant give to the QLS the requisite final examiner’s report and statutory declaration as to ceasing to hold trust money.
    5. (e)
      On 3 July 2017, the QLS conducted a trust account examination (compliance review) into Brereton Lawyers pursuant to s 263 of the LPA.  That investigation revealed a number of trust account breaches.  The QLS provided the Applicant with a copy of the examiner’s report and asked the Applicant to:
      1. furnish a trust account reconciliation for the period under examination within seven days;
      2. investigate the reported discrepancies; and
      3. report these discrepancies to the QLS. 

The Applicant did none of these things.

  1. (f)
    The QLS then conducted another trust account examination pursuant to s 263 of the LPA, which resulted in a report dated 30 January 2018.  That report also revealed trust account breaches and defaults relating to cost disclosures.  The Applicant was provided with a copy of that report on 2 February 2018 and was asked to respond to the QLS by 13 February 2018.  He did not do so.  Nor did he respond to follow up emails from the QLS in late February and early March 2018.  On 4 April 2018, the Applicant sent a letter to the QLS in reply to a further follow up letter.  His reply, however, provided no response to the queries, but belligerently queried the power of the QLS to conduct the investigation.
  2. (g)
    During the period 1 July 2017 – 18 July 2017, the Applicant did not hold a practising certificate, nor did Brereton Lawyers hold professional indemnity insurance.  On 19 July 2017, the Applicant communicated with the QLS, confirming that Brereton Lawyers was still trading and had not ceased, submitted his application form and fee for the grant of a practising certificate, and paid the professional indemnity insurance levy for Brereton Lawyers. 
  1. [25]
    The Refusal Reasons also identified several other periods during which it can clearly be inferred, on the basis of his own advice to the QLS, that the Applicant practised without a practising certificate and without holding the necessary professional indemnity insurance.
  2. [26]
    The QLS also identified, in its Refusal Reasons, numerous instances of communications by the Applicant to QLS officers which were inappropriate, insulting, and frankly, unprofessional.
  3. [27]
    It is convenient to record here that, at the hearing of this review application, the QLS relied on three further circumstances which had come to light since it gave the Refusal Reasons.  Those matters were the subject of further evidence adduced before the Tribunal. There was no factual contest about any of these matters.
  4. [28]
    The first concerns what can only be described as the Applicant’s breathtakingly cavalier attitude to Brereton Lawyers’ safe custody documents.  After Brereton Lawyers closed, the QLS conveyed a number of queries to the Applicant seeking the location of original Wills which had been held by his firm in safe custody.  In respect of one of the queries, the Applicant responded that it was not his problem.  In relation to another query, he responded that he had searched his files from Brereton Lawyers but he did not possess any of the Wills.  In fact, these, and many of the safe custody documents from Brereton Lawyers, were sitting in boxes in an unsecured storage cage in the basement car park of an apartment complex where the Applicant’s father lived.  A search of that storage cage, as described in the evidence, revealed that there were several boxes containing some 86 safe custody packets containing, amongst other things, original Wills and Certificates of Title.  The boxes did not have lids, were infested with cockroaches, and were situated under a fire sprinkler.  At least one of the Wills which the Applicant had claimed was not in his possession was found in one of the boxes.
  5. [29]
    Despite being on notice of this matter being relied on by the QLS, the Applicant’s affidavits did no more than baldly assert that the firm’s client files and trust account records were stored in this basement garage, and that the Applicant did not have access to them.  He was cross-examined about these matters, during which he conceded that he had placed these safe custody documents in the storage cage, that he knew other people had access to the cage, and that he knew, as a solicitor, that this was not an appropriate repository for safe custody documents.  He frankly admitted ignorance of the availability of depositing the documents with the QLS upon closure of the practice.
  6. [30]
    The second circumstance relied on by the QLS was the fact that on 27 July 2020, the QLS appointed receivers of regulated property to Brereton Lawyers on the basis, amongst other things, that the firm had ceased to engage in legal practice without properly dealing with trust money or trust property – namely, the safe custody documents.
  7. [31]
    The third matter was an assertion by the QLS that the Applicant had sworn affidavits in this proceeding which contained untrue statements.  It is sufficient in that regard to say that the Applicant on several occasions in his affidavits made generalised bald statements about having held a practising certificate during periods when he patently did not.
  8. [32]
    The Applicant swore three affidavits in this proceeding.  His affidavits comprehensively failed to deal with, or explain, any of the matters relied on by the QLS in making the Refusal Decision and otherwise advanced by the QLS before this Tribunal, in support of the finding that the Applicant was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  The closest he came to a relevant deposition was in his affidavit sworn on 6 April 2020, in which he referred to closing the Bank of Queensland trust account “as a result of various trust account issues and [the] investigation report prepared by the QLS by way of acceptance it was beyond my current expertise and capability”. 
  9. [33]
    The Applicant was cross-examined before the Tribunal about a number of issues.  It was clear from his cross-examination that he considered that he was being unfairly chased by the QLS, and that this then led to his belligerent responses to various QLS officers.  Unfortunately, it was equally clear from his answers under cross-examination that he had little idea of the nature and seriousness of a solicitor’s obligations concerning the integrity of trust accounts and trust property.  Paradoxically, he had insight into his ignorance of these matters, and described himself, for example, as having been “recklessly or wilfully neglectful” in relation to the preservation of the electronic trust account records.[18]
  10. [34]
    In his oral evidence, the Applicant said, in terms, that he recognised that he was not cut out to be the principal of a legal practice.  He also conceded that, in the course of preparing for this hearing, he had been studying the well-known texts on legal ethics.  He said that he had found the proceedings “cathartic and helpful”, that in studying these texts he had found out “lots of stuff I didn’t know” and “a lot of stuff on the LPA I didn’t know”, and that he had not realised “how serious the Court takes some of this stuff”.[19]
  11. [35]
    In his written submissions to this Tribunal, the Applicant conceded that:
    1. (a)
      the totality of his conduct could be described as “unsatisfactory professional conduct”;[20]
    2. (b)
      he was “sloppy, negligent, tardy and not competent in completing the client trust account records for his former legal firm of Brereton Lawyers via updating the installed LEAP recording software, and there may be an associated failure of the duty to account”; and
    3. (c)
      to that extent, his actions and omissions “may have led to breaches of Queensland Legal Profession Trust Account Regulations and Guidelines”. 
  12. [36]
    He asserted, however, that there were no trust account defalcations, nor was there any fraudulent or dishonest conduct at Brereton Lawyers during his time at that firm.  Notwithstanding this submission, I note in passing that nowhere in the Applicant’s submissions did he address the $16,000 trust account anomaly which had been identified by his external examiner, noting again that this issue cannot now be resolved because the Applicant threw out the computer server.
  13. [37]
    Beyond that, however, the Applicant’s submissions:
    1. (a)
      proceeded on a fundamentally incorrect premise;
    2. (b)
      addressed matters which were largely, if not completely, irrelevant to the present application; and
    3. (c)
      failed to address, or in any meaningful way deal with, the catalogue of matters on which the QLS relied in contending that he was not, and is not, a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. 
  14. [38]
    The Applicant’s submissions were advanced on the fundamental theory that, as he had not been charged by the Legal Services Commissioner and thereafter found to have engaged in professional misconduct, it could not now be said that he is not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  He said that such a finding or charge “was a condition precedent or a necessitating factor” to a conclusion that the Applicant is not of good fame and character, and therefore not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  He expressly invited the Tribunal to treat this matter as an application to “if not formally ‘strike off’ the Applicant from the Roll, an indefinite suspension which has the same analogous effect without the requisite finding or charge of ‘professional misconduct’.”
  15. [39]
    These submissions by the Applicant, and indeed the arguments underpinning his primary submissions and submissions in reply, simply misapprehend the nature of the present application and the relevant legislative scheme in that:
    1. (a)
      The Applicant applied for a renewal of his practising certificate.
    2. (b)
      Section 51(5) prohibits the QLS from renewing a practising certificate if it is satisfied that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to continue to hold a practising certificate.
    3. (c)
      The legislation does not require that this consideration of fitness to continue holding a practising certificate be preceded by disciplinary charges brought by the Legal Services Commissioner by way of a discipline application under the LPA.
    4. (d)
      This is not an application to strike the Applicant’s name from the Roll.  On such an application, the relevant question is whether the Tribunal has been persuaded to the requisite standard that the practitioner is probably permanently unfit to practice.  That is quite different from making a determination as to present fitness to hold a practising certificate.
  16. [40]
    As a consequence of his misconception of the legal basis for determining the present application, the Applicant’s reliance on a raft of authorities which dealt with the question of unfitness in a striking off context was completely misplaced.
  17. [41]
    Otherwise, the Applicant’s submissions consisted largely of unsupported collateral attacks on the QLS and its officers, seeking to impugn their motives for determining that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  He asserted, for example, that he had been caught up as a “pawn” in an ongoing investigation being conducted by the regulatory authorities into the law firm for which he worked after closing Brereton Lawyers.  Similarly, he critically questioned the competence of the QLS staff who investigated his trust account without, in any way, actually identifying what he claimed were errors or mistakes in the way they conducted their investigations.
  18. [42]
    Both in his evidence and in his submissions, the Applicant portrayed little insight into the seriousness of the conduct which had led to the QLS forming its opinion as to his lack of fitness to hold a practising certificate.  At its highest, he concedes of the possibility that the conduct may have amounted to “unsatisfactory professional conduct” but says, in effect, that even if such a finding were made he is nevertheless a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. 
  19. [43]
    The Applicant simply did not address the further issues of concern raised by the QLS before this Tribunal.  Given that this is a fresh hearing on the merits, the Tribunal can certainly have regard to those matters when producing the correct and preferable decision. 
  20. [44]
    In respect of those further matters, it is sufficient to say that the Applicant’s treatment of the firm’s safe custody documents bespeaks an attitude of complete indifference to the best interests of his former clients.  His conduct in that instance alone is an indictment on his character.  A person who can act with such disregard for the best interests of clients is not a person in whom the Courts, the profession, and the public, can have confidence in as a legal professional. 
  21. [45]
    Otherwise, it is sufficient to say that, having reviewed afresh the matters which were relied on by the QLS, this Tribunal is satisfied that the decision it reached was the correct and preferable decision in the circumstances.  One need look no further in that regard than to the Applicant’s admittedly careless approach to the proper maintenance of his firm’s trust account.  The LPA imposes a strict regime for the maintenance of trust accounts in order to reinforce the ethical obligations on solicitors to treat trust money and property entrusted to them with absolute probity.  The Applicant’s conduct was not merely cavalier in terms of non-compliance with regulatory requirements.  It demonstrated a real and concerning lack of insight into the professional purpose and rationale for those requirements.  Again, those considerations point to a character which is not presently suited for practice in the legal profession.
  22. [46]
    The circumstances considered by the QLS are described at length above.  In my opinion, the conclusion by the QLS on those grounds that the Applicant was not then a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate was not only open, but was self-evidently correct.  On my fresh review of that material, I have reached the same conclusion. 
  23. [47]
    It follows that the Refusal Decision made by the QLS on 20 February 2020 was the correct and preferable decision.  The application to review that decision will, accordingly, be dismissed. 
  24. [48]
    In his reply submissions, the Applicant submitted that if this Tribunal was not minded to make a decision to renew his practising certificate, then it ought “grant an ancillary order” that the QLS refund the fees which the Applicant had paid to the QLS.  The Applicant, however, did not identify the source of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or power to make such an “ancillary order”.  No such order will be made in the present case.

Footnotes

[1]  LPA, s 110.

[2]  LPA, s 111.

[3]  LPA, s 3(a).

[4]  LPA, s 24(1).

[5]  LPA, s 6(1).

[6]  [2021] QCAT 291.

[7]  LPA, ss 244-5.

[8]  LPA, s 120(2)(b).

[9]  LPA, s 268.

[10]  LPA, s 274.

[11]  LPA, s 276.

[12]  LPA, s 276.

[13]  LPA, s 276.

[14]  LPA, s 276.

[15]  LPA, s 116.

[16]  LPA, s 276.

[17]  LPA, ss 121, 353.

[18]  Transcript of hearing on 23 October 2020, T1-19.

[19]  Ibid, T1-66-67.

[20]  As that term is defined in the LPA, s 418.

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Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Castle v Queensland Law Society

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Castle v Queensland Law Society

  • MNC:

    [2021] QCAT 300

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Justice Daubney, President

  • Date:

    22 Sep 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Purdie v Queensland Law Society [2021] QCAT 291
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QCAT 291
Cite 2 - [2021] QCAT 291

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
McCormick v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2021] QCAT 3432 citations
1

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