SS v Assistant Commissioner Marty Mickelson
[2021] QCAT 73
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- Unreported Judgment
- SS v Assistant Commissioner Marty Mickelson[2021] QCAT 73
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SS v Assistant Commissioner Marty Mickelson[2021] QCAT 73
SS v Assistant Commissioner Marty Mickelson[2021] QCAT 73
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: | SS v Assistant Commissioner Marty Mickelson [2021] QCAT 73 |
PARTIES: | SS |
(applicant) | |
v | |
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER Marty mickelson | |
APPLICATION NO/S: | OCR009-20 |
MATTER TYPE: | Occupational regulation matters |
DELIVERED ON: | 23 February 2021 |
HEARING DATE: | 29 January 2021 |
HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
DECISION OF: | Member Kent |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | POLICE – INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION – DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL FOR MISCONDUCT – QUEENSLAND – whether behaviour amounts to misconduct – breach of domestic violence order – finding of guilt by magistrate Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 219O, Schedule 1 Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s 1.4, s 7.4 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 17, s 18, s 19, s 20, s 24(1)(b), s 32 Murray v Deputy Commissioner Stewart [2011] QCAT 583 Austin v Deputy Commissioner Peter Martin [2018] QCAT 120 Shauer v Banham (Misconduct Tribunal) 24 February 1997 Orme v Atkinson (Misconduct Tribunal) 17 September 1999 Scott v Assistant Commissioner Peter Martin [2015] QCAT 423 Rohweder v Acting Assistant Commissioner Keating [2016] QCAT 347 Christopher Lee Wallis v Acting Deputy Commissioner D A (Tony) Wright & Anor (No 2) [2020] QCAT 426 O'Brien v Assistant Commissioner Stephen Gollschewski, Qld Police Service [2014] QCATA 148 Assistant Commissioner Stephen Hollands v Tolsher [2016] QCATA 123 Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Dark [2012] QCA 228 Aldrich v Ross [2001] 2 Qd R 235 |
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: | |
Applicant: | Mr Calvin Gnech |
Respondent: | Ms Rachel Berry for the Respondent |
REASONS FOR DECISION
- [1]The applicant, SS, is a Sergeant of the Queensland Police Service (QPS). On 9 December 2019, following disciplinary proceedings, there was a finding of misconduct against him made by the Respondent, the particulars of which are summarised as:
That on 24 May 2017, SS’ conduct did not meet the standard expected of a member of the Queensland Police Service in that he contravened a domestic violence order.
- [2]The particulars of that disciplinary charge were as follows:
- (a)The applicant was respondent to a domestic violence order naming GG as the aggrieved spouse;
- (b)Condition 5 of that order stated that the applicant was prohibited from following or approaching within 200 meters of GG;
- (c)On 24 May 2017, the applicant was being treated as an inpatient at the Caloundra Hospital;
- (d)He saw GG in the foyer of the hospital and approached within 200 meters of them and spoke their name twice.
- (a)
- [3]On 11 April 2018, after a summary trial in the Caloundra Magistrates Court, the applicant was found guilty of the offence of breaching the domestic violence order. By way of sentence Magistrate Tonkin ordered that the applicant be released absolutely.
- [4]On 31 October 2019, the applicant indicated, through his legal representative, that he accepted the factual content of the particulars of the charge. It was submitted that pursuant to QPS Policy disciplinary proceedings were not warranted and that the conduct did not amount to a disciplinary breach and the charge should be dismissed.
- [5]On 9 December 2019, the respondent decided the disciplinary charge against the applicant was substantiated on the ground that his conduct amounted to misconduct. The respondent found his conduct was misconduct because it failed to meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer.
- [6]On 6 January 2020, the Applicant filed a review in the Tribunal seeking that the finding substantiating misconduct be set aside. The sanction was not contested in these proceedings.
Applicant’s Submissions
- [7]The Applicant submitted that his conduct did not warrant the stigma attached to a finding of substantiation of a disciplinary proceeding. It was accepted that in normal course of events the breaching of a domestic violence order warranted a charge of misconduct. However, it was argued that this was an exceptional case with exceptional circumstances that did not warrant the stigma attached to a substantiation of the charge.
- [8]The applicant was a patient in a non-metropolitan hospital for period of eight days when GG attended the hospital for their own purposes. SS had been smoking outside of the hospital and had returned via the foyer where he saw GG. He then went back into the ward and came back out again. When he returned GG was still in the foyer and he spoke to them saying “GG, oh GG”. Neither party disagreed that when this occurred the applicant was within 200 metres of GG and this was in breach of the domestic violence order.
- [9]It was submitted that the applicant discharged himself from hospital the next morning and it was his version of events that he did so to avoid any possible further inadvertent contact with GG.
- [10]Submissions were made about the new police discipline system as it was referred to. It was noted that legislation was enacted on 30 October 2019. This legislation fortified the principles that were introduced on 1 July 2018. It was submitted that this was a philosophy shift towards the administration of discipline within the QPS and it set out basic principles. In essence the submission stated that a disciplinary proceeding was said to be commenced when a subject member’s conduct is serious or ongoing and requires a sanction to be imposed to achieve the purposes of discipline. As a general rule disciplinary proceedings should not be commenced where the subject member’s conduct can be addressed through managerial or remedial action.[1] It was submitted that SS’s circumstances were such that this issue could have been dealt with in a way other than disciplinary conduct.
- [11]Time delay was also flagged as a relevant factor for the Tribunal to consider. It was submitted that the facts of this case could not be any lower on the scale of seriousness. It was noted that it was appropriate for the disciplinary matters to be delayed until after the Magistrates Court decision on 11 April 2018. However, it was noted that the applicant contacted the respondent on 18 April 2018 requesting a finding. Ultimately there was an interview held on 5 September 2018, however the disciplinary notice was not issued until 13 September 2019. Therefore, it was a period of approximately two years and four months after the incident had occurred. It was submitted that if discipline was warranted then action should have been taken at an earlier date. The Tribunal was referred to the decision of Austin v Deputy Commissioner Peter Martin[2] in this context as a relevant case to consider.
- [12]The applicant's mental health was referred to; however it was clearly stated by the applicant that he in no way was seeking to rely on his mental health condition at the time of the incident as demonstrating a lack of capacity. The Tribunal was again referred to the decision of Austin v Deputy Commissioner Peter Martin[3] in the context of mental health and it was submitted that the principles in that case are accepted by the applicant e.g. any moral culpability is reduced to a point it should be eliminated in circumstances of mental illness and in this case the incident occurred while the applicant was an inpatient in the psychiatric ward of a hospital.
- [13]It was submitted that the crux of the matter was that the conduct does not warrant the stigma attached to having a disciplinary finding against SS. It was submitted that rather than be disciplined the applicant should be commended for the way in which he dealt with the situation including what was described as putting his own health at risk by checking out of the hospital the next morning in order to avoid any further contact with GG.
- [14]The definition of misconduct in section 1.4 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) was referred to in the case of Shauer v Banham.[4] This case was in turn referred to in the decision of Orme v Atkinson.[5] This case adopted the reasoning in Shauer v Banham. Paraphrasing these cases it was submitted that it did not follow that every breach of discipline amounted to misconduct and that there needed to be some nexus or extra factor that raised the conduct to another level and that this factor was absent in the circumstances of this case.
- [15]Submissions were made in relation to the case of O'Brien v Assistant Commissioner Stephen Gollschewski and Queensland Police Service.[6] It was stated that caution should be used to avoid overreacting to the involvement of domestic violence in proceedings. The applicant accepted that in normal circumstances a breach of a domestic violence order would routinely amount to a finding of misconduct, however this case should be classed as unique.[7]
- [16]The applicant referred to the decision of Assistant Commission Stephen Hollands v Tolsher.[8] This case discussed the need to take a nuanced approach to police discipline and noted that police are imperfect like the rest of society. It was submitted that this was certainly something to be aware of in SS’ case. The following question was posed for the Tribunal – Was there any imperfection in the applicant’s conduct? The applicant accepted that he was unwise to return back to the foyer of the hospital when his ex-partner was still there and it was accepted that he did go within 200 metres of them, thus breaching his domestic violence order, however he had retreated after saying their name. The Tribunal was asked to accept that the applicant discharged himself from the hospital ward the next morning and that this was a significant factor. It was submitted that this discharge demonstrated the responsibility the applicant took having realised that he had breached the domestic violence order by going within 200 metres of his ex-partner. It was suggested that he felt that by discharging himself the next day he would be able to avoid a situation where he may see his ex-partner again and where he would breach the order again.
- [17]It is common ground that this matter was dealt with in the Magistrates Court as a breach of the domestic violence order. It was accepted that there was a finding of guilt made. It was submitted that the Magistrates Court proceedings were conducted in an entirely different jurisdiction to that of the Tribunal. There had been a finding of guilt in that the applicant had breached the order and there had been an absolute discharge as a sanction.
- [18]It was submitted that the Magistrate’s finding of a breach of a domestic violence order was not relevant to the disciplinary proceedings and this behaviour did not amount to behaviour that should be disciplined within the meaning of the QPS disciplinary regime.
Respondent’s Submissions
- [19]The Tribunal was reminded that the central issue for the Tribunal to decide was whether a disciplinary action had been substantiated. This was the only question for the Tribunal. Reference was made to the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) (CC Act) section 219O (Reviewable Decisions) and Schedule 1. Schedule 1 of the CC Act sets out the definition of reviewable decisions. It was submitted that the length of time the respondent took before it commenced action against the applicant is not a decision that there is right of review for. Delay is not a decision included in the Schedule that defines reviewable decisions. Therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider delay in a case such as this one i.e. where the issue to be decided is whether a disciplinary charge has been proved. It was submitted that any cases referred to by the applicant that discussed delay did so in the area of sanction. They were not authorities for delay being a reviewable decision or a relevant consideration in a case such as the present one where the issue relates to substantiation only.
- [20]It was submitted that based on the particulars of the grounds on which the charge was framed, misconduct was substantiated in this case. The question for the Tribunal was whether the applicant's conduct did not meet the standard of conduct reasonably expected of a police officer. The QPS’s Disciplinary System Policy and guidelines are now enshrined in legislation. Where conduct is of a sufficiently serious nature it is dealt with under this system. It was noted that disciplinary action as referred to in Part 7, Division 4 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) is protective of the community.
- [21]In this case the circumstances resulted in a court proceeding and, although that was not the only deciding factor for disciplinary action, it is appropriate that someone be disciplined in these circumstances. What is required here is consideration of the promotion of the community’s confidence and respect in the police service. The respondent submitted that the Tribunal should reject the argument that these were unique circumstances; all cases turn on their own merits.
- [22]Further, the mere fact that there is a breach of a domestic violence order does not mean it will be automatically a disciplinary proceeding. The respondent referred to Shauer v Banham [9] and Orme v Atkinson[10] on the point of whether something “extra” needs to set the behaviour apart to require disciplinary proceedings. It was submitted that the exact facts of each case must be assessed against the statutory regime. Here there has been a breach of a domestic violence order and this breach had been the subject of a finding of guilt in the Magistrates Court.
- [23]It was submitted that the disciplinary charge had been proved and satisfied and the particulars proved and the ground substantiated. Therefore, what the Tribunal must be satisfied of is that the applicant did not meet the standard of a police officer reasonably expected by the public. There is no test set out; this is a matter of consideration for the Tribunal.
- [24]It was acknowledged that the criminal proceedings in the Magistrates Court were in fact a completely different jurisdiction to that of the Tribunal. It was accepted an absolute discharge was the penalty imposed. However, it was submitted that the Magistrate's views were relevant. Those views must be viewed through the lens of a different statutory regime and that the sentencing aspect of the Magistrate’s decision has an entirely different function to that of disciplinary proceedings. It was accepted that the sentence certainly did not reflect a high degree of criminality. As a criminal proceeding a higher standard of proof was required and it was accepted that it was not a high degree of criminality in these circumstances. However, it was submitted that the conduct fell short of the standard reasonably expected of a police officer by the community in the fact that it was criminal at all. It was submitted that this slightly bolsters the argument that SS did not meet the standards of the police expected by the public. The QPS has many functions within the community and one of those is to enforce orders including domestic violence orders similar to the one SS was placed upon. The trust the community places in a police officer and the need for confidence in the standard to be met by police officers in carrying out their duties is fundamentally different to a criminal proceeding. It was submitted that it would impact on public confidence and respect for the police service, particularly in matters such as domestic violence, if it were to be known that the police officer seeking to enforce a domestic violence order against another had not himself or herself complied with their own order.
- [25]On the issue of delay, it was submitted that whilst the lengthy delay was regrettable the only way in which a delay was relevant to the Tribunal would be regarding the issue of sanction. Here the sanction was not an issue. The decision regarding sanction is not a decision under review nor is the decision under review about delay. Therefore, delay was not relevant to whether the applicant's conduct was misconduct.
- [26]On the issue of mental health, the Tribunal was referred to the decision of Austin v Deputy Commissioner Peter Martin.[11] Whilst it was submitted that the respondent accepted those principles, they were principles formulated regarding sanction and the measure of culpability that would assist in coming to a sanction relating to behaviour where mental illness was present. It was submitted that the principles were not relevant in this case as it was not an issue of sanction. The decision of Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Dark[12] was referred to i.e. it was a case concerning stress and not a diagnosed mental illness and therefore the applicability of a case that dealt with the issue of stress as opposed to mental illness was not highly relevant to this case. In the matter of Dark the Court of Appeal stated that the applicant in that decision was suffering from stress and this led to an understanding of the impact that stress might have had on the conduct. In that case it was considered that personal circumstances could be taken into account on sanction, but they did not excuse misconduct and therefore were not relevant in relation to whether or not misconduct had taken place or had been substantiated. Reference was made to another case, Scott v Assistant Commissioner Peter Martin.[13] This case stated that sometimes mitigating factors could include stressors and this was used to assist in deciding sanction only. This view was adopted in Rohweder v Acting Assistant Commissioner Keating.[14]
- [27]It was submitted that the nexus discussed in the case of Orme that was required to take conduct over the line into misconduct existed in the current case. The status and authority of a police officer is diminished if they themselves are the subject of proceedings such as a breach of domestic violence order. In the case of Dark the extra element was also discussed. In that case it was held that a breach of criminal law (in this case the criminal act is a breach of a domestic violence order) that does not attract a disciplinary proceeding and finding by the QPS amounts to a double standard. This in turn impacts on the police officer’s status and authority to do their job. In this case there has been a finding by a Magistrate that there has been a breach of a domestic violence order. Knowledge of such a finding may affect others’ views of their own need to comply with a domestic violence order. SS’ breach of his own domestic violence order has the likelihood of substantially weakening the confidence and respect he may be held in by members of the public. Breaches of the criminal law by police officers have been known to affect the public’s confidence in the police service.
- [28]It was submitted that what is significant here are these factors i.e. the extent to which the public confidence would be eroded by conduct such as the applicant’s going unremarked by the police service. Public expectations are high with respect to domestic violence prevention; this is given a priority. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the public to expect that accountability and compliance with orders is required, particularly in the case of police officers. It was submitted that the Tribunal should confirm the finding that the behaviour of the applicant was substantiated as misconduct.
Applicant’s Submissions in reply
- [29]There was no evidence of why the delay had taken place or attempt to explain the delay and no valid reason given for the delay. As time passed without any charge for the original conduct there was no ongoing misconduct that is alleged. In the case of Rohweder the principles in Austin were referred to. It was agreed that in the current case the sanction is not in issue and here it is a different issue of mental health and not stress. It is relevant to the facts here that the order was breached. It was stated that some of the respondent’s submissions were wrong. It was agreed that a high standard was expected of police and police service members were expected not to breach the trust placed in them. Similarly it was agreed that protection of the community and public confidence in the service were the goals of the disciplinary regime.
- [30]However, the applicant submitted they were yet to hear why the behaviour was one that should amount to misconduct. It was not in contention that the applicant was within 200 metres of the aggrieved in breach of the domestic violence order. In this case it's a different scenario to other cases referred to. His breach was described as a technical one by the applicant’s legal representative. It was submitted that he had done something spontaneously and then acted the next morning, perhaps to his own detriment, to avoid seeing the person again at the hospital. This was an exceptional set of circumstances and any usual expectations around domestic violence orders and their compliance should not apply to these exceptional circumstances. An example was given – if a police officer had been caught speeding could they never enforce any traffic offences? The case of Assistant Commissioner Stephen Hollands v Tolsher[15] was referred to.
- [31]It was submitted in the circumstances it was appropriate for the Tribunal to be able to find that the misconduct was not substantiated.
The Tribunal’s role on review
- [32]I refer to the comments of the decision maker in Acting Senior Constable Christopher Lee Wallis v Acting Deputy Commissioner D A (Tony) Wright & Anor (No 2):[16]
The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the decision-maker or in this matter the respondent, Acting Deputy Commissioner, exercising the same powers as the decision-maker under the enabling act to produce the correct and preferable decision.[17] The review proceeds before the Tribunal as a rehearing on the evidence that was before the decision-maker commonly referred to as the ‘section 21 material’.[18] It is appropriate to give ‘considerable weight’ to the findings of the decision-maker on the basis that the decision-maker might be thought to have ‘particular expertise in the managerial requirements of the police force’.[19] The Tribunal does, however, have a duty to bring the public perspective to bear and is bound to make its own decision on the evidence before it.[20] I adopt the observations made by the Tribunal in Murray v Deputy Commissioner Stewart:[21]
Considerable respect is paid in this Tribunal to the views of the original decision maker [see Aldrich v Ross [2001] 2 Qd R 235], but when the Tribunal clearly reaches a different view its duty is to act in accordance with its own views. Aldrich v Ross (at p 257) recognises that the independent review tribunal is the only vehicle by which a public perspective is brought to bear in police disciplinary matters, and accordingly there will be cases where it will be appropriate and necessary to depart from the views of the original decision maker.[22]
- [33]In assessing the evidence, the Tribunal applies the common law standard of proof being ‘on the balance of probabilities’.[23] Further, the Tribunal must be satisfied and find accordingly that the conduct complained of is police misconduct. ‘Misconduct’ is conduct that, if proven, is disgraceful, improper or unbecoming an officer; or shows unfitness to be or continue as an officer; or does not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer.[24]
Consideration
- [34]I accept that the circumstances of the applicant’s hospitalisation and the unexpected sighting of his ex-partner (aggrieved in the domestic violence order) was not a pre-planned event on behalf of the applicant. However I do not accept the submission made by the applicant that this was a technical breach. No relevant definition was given of the term technical so I have relied on the decision of Magistrate Tonkin in relation to this matter where at page 6 paragraph14 of her decision she stated “having regard to the whole of the evidence I’m satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that SS contravened the order by placing himself within 200 metres of (GG) on the 24th of May 2017 in the foyer of the Caloundra private hospital. And accordingly, I find him guilty”. There is no mention of this being a technical breach. I accept the Magistrate’s finding.
- [35]The Tribunal is not an appellate body for the decision of Magistrate Tonkin and I accept as a matter of record that SS has been duly convicted by her of a breach of the domestic violence order by placing himself within 200 metres of GG on 24 May 2017. The decision I must make in this review of a disciplinary proceeding is whether I think this behaviour which attracted a criminal finding of guilt in the Magistrates Court is a matter that amounts to misconduct within the meaning of the QPS disciplinary regime.
- [36]The words of Magistrate Tonkin found at lines 25 and 26 of page 6 of her sentencing remarks state “I can indicate that I have a good deal of sympathy for the position that your client found himself in”. This may be a reasonable sentiment however such sympathy expressed by a Magistrate in criminal proceedings does not translate to the Tribunal acting of a belief that behaviour such as the applicant’s should be considered as anything other than a disciplinary breach. I think this standard set by SS falls far below what would be expected by the community of the QPS in the circumstances. I do not accept the submission made to me by the applicant that I should regard these circumstances as unique. All cases, particularly those involving relationships and one where domestic violence orders have been made, turn on their own facts and all no doubt have some factors that the parties involved consider to be unique. Members of the community do not get to pick and choose the circumstances of their compliance with domestic violence orders and it is reasonable that police officers should also not be able to pick and choose when to comply with their own orders. It is not disputed that there has been a finding of guilt by a Magistrate relating to a breach of a domestic violence order. To my knowledge this finding was not appealed and that finding remains. Whilst I fully accept the proposition that not all breaches of the criminal law or findings of guilt will amount to misconduct, in these circumstances, I think this is certainly a case where such a finding of guilt should lead to a finding of misconduct being substantiated.
- [37]The standard expected by the community is that police officers must, at the very least, meet the same standard that they do regarding compliance with domestic violence orders. In these circumstances I think it does diminish the reputation of the officer individually and the respect, belief in and confidence the community may have in such an officer properly carrying out their duties particularly those in relation to domestic violence. I think it also is a protective factor and meets the required standards of the community for members of the community to be aware that police officers cannot behave in a way that breaches domestic violence orders. Even taking into account the facts in this case it is clear that without there being anything in the way of reprimand from the QPS the community could only stand to be disappointed by what appears to be a double standard i.e. one standard for the wider community and one standard for police officers.
- [38]What sanction has been applied in this matter is not an issue for me. The issue before me is whether this charge of misconduct has been substantiated and I find that it has. If a police officer such as SS is able to breach a domestic violence order and have a finding of guilt from a Magistrate in relation to this and suffer no disciplinary proceedings then it can only diminish the need or the perceived need to comply with domestic violence orders for the wider community.
- [39]It has been urged upon me that SS does not deserve the stigma that attaches to a disciplinary proceeding. What this stigma is and what effect it would have on him and his working life was not expanded upon. However, I do note that orders are made by courts, in particular domestic violence orders, are for the protection of individuals. Breaches of these orders can potentially place individuals in the way of not only physical but also psychological harm. The domestic violence order was that SS was not to go within 200 metres of GG. This order did not have conditions on it that it did not apply if they found themselves in the same building such as in a hospital. While the order was in place or until it was varied in some way it was up to SS to comply with it. He contravened this order and there is no argument from either side that this is not the case.
- [40]In these circumstances I believe that a finding of guilt such as the one that Magistrate Tonkin made in relation to SS does in fact warrant a disciplinary proceeding and taking all of the information into account I accept that the correct and preferable decision is to confirm the decision of the respondent that the disciplinary charge against the applicant is substantiated on the ground that his conduct amounted to misconduct.
- [41]On the issue of delay, I accept the submission of the respondent that the issue of delay is not a reviewable decision within the statutory regime. I also accept, based on the case references provided to me, that delay may well be an issue that can be considered on sanction however it is not an issue I may consider as a reviewable decision in this matter.
- [42]SS’ mental health was raised. In response to a question from me his legal representative clearly stated that there was no question of his capacity at the time of his breach. As previously noted, he was convicted by Magistrate Tonkin and he was not considered to lack capacity. While it was an overall aspect of the factual matrix and may well be relevant if I were deciding the sanction aspect of the proceedings I am only considering the substantiation of the charge and I accept that based on all the material before me it is properly substantiated.
- [43]After considering the conduct of SS, the nature of what he did, and the material before the Tribunal, I am satisfied that the disciplinary charge has been substantiated. Therefore, I accept that it is appropriate to confirm the decision.
Orders
- The disciplinary charge against the applicant is substantiated on the ground that his conduct amounted to misconduct.
- Pursuant to section 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the Tribunal prohibits the publication of the name of the person named in the domestic violence order as the aggrieved person. The applicant is similarly de-identified They are respectively referred to as GG and SS in this decision and accompanying reasons.
Footnotes
[1]Applicant’s submissions 29 July 2020.
[2][2018] QCAT 120.
[3][2018] QCAT 120.
[4](Misconduct Tribunal) 24 February 1997.
[5](Misconduct Tribunal) 17 September 1999.
[6][2014] QCATA 148.
[7]Applicant’s submissions 29 July 2020, paragraph 15.
[8][2016] QCATA 123, [47].
[9](Misconduct Tribunal ) 24 February 1997.
[10](Misconduct Tribunal ) 17 September 1999.
[11][2018] QCAT 120, [33]-[38].
[12][2012] QCA 228.
[13][2015] QCAT 423, [46].
[14][2016] QCAT 347, [24].
[15][2016] QCATA 123.
[16][2020] QCAT 426, [11]-[12].
[17]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19 (‘QCAT Act’) and see the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 452 (‘CC Act’).
[18]Material filed by the respondent in accordance with s 21(2) of the QCAT Act (‘section 21 material’). See CC Act, s 219H.
[19]Aldrich v Ross [2001] 2 Qd R 235, 257-258 (Thomas JA).
[20]Murray v Deputy Commissioner Stewart [2011] QCAT 583, [40] (Hon JB Thomas).
[21]Ibid.
[22]Ibid.
[23]Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.
[24]Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s 1.4 (definition of ‘misconduct’).