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Peauril v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (No. 2)[2022] QCAT 171

Peauril v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (No. 2)[2022] QCAT 171

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Peauril & Ors v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (No. 2) [2022] QCAT 171

PARTIES:

damian peauril

phillip higson

warren cavanagh

(applicants)

V

chief EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING

(first respondent)

WALTER NIELSEN

DAVID JUDGE

MALCOLM KARL HUGHSON

DAVID GIBBS

(second respondents)

APPLICATION NO:

GAR366-19

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

13 May 2022

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Lember

ORDERS:

  1. The application for review is dismissed pursuant to section 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
  2. The application for miscellaneous matters filed by the second respondents on 4 March 2022 is dismissed. 

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – administrative review – incorporated association – whether to dismiss proceedings – whether application for review lacks substance

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – OTHER MATTERS – whether proceedings should be dismissed under s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 24AA

Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld), s 16, s 21, s 27, s 58, s 71, s 72, s 73, s 109, s 112, s 121A

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 9(1), s 17(1), s 20, s 21, s 29, s 47

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552

Allan Brian Baldwin v The Sporting Shooters’ Association of Australia (Qld) Inc IA 00100 No. 7247 of 2019

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (in liq) (recs and mgrs apptd) (controllers appointed) v Woolridge [2013] VSC 154

Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman [2011] QCATA 226

Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] 78 CLR 62

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Markan v Bar Association of Queensland [2013] QSC 146

Peauril & Ors v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 413

Platinum United II Pty Ltd & Anor v Secured Mortgage Management Ltd (in liq) [2011] QCA 162

Saxby v Saxby & Ors [2018] QSC 314

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118

Yeo v Brisbane Polo Club Inc [2013] QCAT 261

APPEARANCES &

REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).

REASONS FOR DECISION

What is this application about?

  1. [1]
    Gliding is a high-risk activity.  According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau[1] the rates (per million hours flown) of accidents involving gliders and recreational aircraft increased significantly between 2008 and 2017, with 72 accidents and 11 fatalities involving gliders having occurred during that period. 
  2. [2]
    The Canungra Hang Gliding Club (“the Club”) is a membership-based organisation that conducts gliding activities and competitions in the Gold Coast Hinterland. Its constitutionally enshrined purpose is to “promote the sport of hang gliding”.
  3. [3]
    The Club is an incorporated association. This means it is a legal entity separate from its individual members, formed under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) (“the AIA”), regulated by the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) and governed by the AIA and the Club’s constitution.  An incorporated association can sue and be sued[2] as a separate entity and the liability of its members, including its management committee is usually limited to their membership subscriptions.[3]  
  4. [4]
    On the other hand, unincorporated associations are not recognised as a separate legal entity to the members associated with it; it is an informal group of people who act together as an informal organisation.[4]  Its members are not protected from the risk of and individual liability for civil suits arising from association activities. 
  5. [5]
    The management committee of incorporated associations are required under the AIA to lodge annual returns with the OFT. The Club did not lodge returns on time, triggering a Show Cause notice from the OFT inviting submissions as to why the Club should not be wound up.
  6. [6]
    The applicants, as members of the Club, say that this precarious situation – given the high-risk nature of gliding – posed an unacceptable and grievous risk to the Club, its members, and its participants of losing the benefit of public liability insurance together with the protections that come with incorporation under the AIA.  They had additional complaints about the financial and operations management of the Club, and  also say that para-gliders have been permitted to “take over and destroy the place for their own unjust enrichment”.[5]
  7. [7]
    Therefore, the applicants acted against the second respondents, being the then current management committee to “remedy” the situation the Club had found itself in.  Their chosen method of remedy – the holding of an AGM by themselves only, and registering forms with the OFT that recorded the installation of the applicants as the Club’s new management committee – is the subject of these proceedings, namely, a review of a decision of the OFT on 26 September 2019 to amend the Register to rescind the recording of the forms the applicants lodged.
  8. [8]
    When considering prior interlocutory applications for production of documents, the very narrow scope of the decision under review was apparent. The application for review appeared to focus on complaints against the first and second respondents that seemed to fall well outside the scope of that review. Acting on Tribunal initiative,[6] I directed the parties to file submissions as to whether the proceedings lacked substance and should therefore be struck out under section 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”).
  9. [9]
    The parties have made submissions and I have decided to dismiss the application for review for the reasons that follow.
  10. [10]
    The second respondents in the meantime lodged an application for miscellaneous matters objecting to the applicants’ late filing of submissions. As I have dismissed the application for review, the application for miscellaneous matters filed 4 March 2022 is superfluous and therefore also dismissed.

Factual background to the decision under review

  1. [11]
    My interlocutory decision in Peauril & Ors v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 413 (“Peauril No.1”) detailed the factual background to the dispute at paragraphs [12] to [31].  I repeat only some of it here, for chronological context:
    1. (a)
      The Show Cause notice was issued by the OFT on 26 June 2019. 
    2. (b)
      The Club was to have conducted an AGM on 10 August 2019 but, according to the second respondents, this was rescheduled to 7 September 2019 on adequate notice (by email) to Club members. The applicants dispute that any notice of the rescheduled AGM was given, however, as only Mr Peauril attended the meeting in person on 10 August 2019, and given that Mr Peauril attended the adjourned meeting along with thirty-five other Club members, an inference can be drawn that notice of the adjournment was given. It is implausible that, if notice of the adjournment was not given, no Club members other than Mr Peauril attended on 10 August 2019, yet thirty-six attended on the rescheduled date.
    3. (c)
      On 10 August 2019 Mr Peauril purported to conduct an AGM with only himself present in person but holding the proxies of eight other Club members. 
    4. (d)
      The applicants convened a meeting of their new management committee on 23 August 2019 and on 27 August 2019[7] Mr Peauril filed four Forms 10a notifying the OFT of the replacement of Club’s existing management committee (the second respondents) with a new committee (the applicants).
    5. (e)
      The OFT acted upon the Forms 10a and recorded the notified changes in the Register on 2 September 2019. 
    6. (f)
      The adjourned AGM proceeded at 8.10am[8] on 7 September 2019, with thirty-six[9] Club members, including Mr Peauril, in attendance who said, as the meeting opened:[10]

…I just want to object to your assumption that the meeting is valid.  I would like that to be recorded and thank you for your time.

  1. (g)
    When pressed, Mr Peauril would not identify the basis of his objection, saying:[11]

..there is a bunch of issues, and I just simply made a simple point, and I don’t want to waste everyone’s time in going into great details about things… But I just wanted to raise an objection and that’s it.

  1. (h)
    He was again pressed to explain the objection but did not do so and the AGM proceeded. 
  2. (i)
    Hours later, Mr Peauril filed with the OFT a Form 12-1 to which Mr Peauril attached the Audited Financial Report for the year ended 30 June 2019.
  3. (j)
    On 11 September 2019 Mr Peauril acting as “Secretary on behalf of the current 2019-2020 Management Committee” of the Club wrote to the second respondents saying among other things:

Please be advised that in regards to the gathering of lost souls on the ship of fools on 7 September 2019 you are hereby given notice of the following:

Firstly, the premise that the four persons masquerading as the management committee had legal standing to conduct any general meeting or Annual General Meeting of the Association was false.  The persons conducting the gathering had no standing to convene and hold any such meeting.

Secondly, the gathering was not a lawful and valid general meeting of Annual General Meeting of the Association.  All proceedings and appointments resulting from this meeting are illegal and invalid.

…

Thanks to a team of dedicated persons who have worked tirelessly to navigate a legal nightmare the club has been saved and now continues to exist because of a new Management Committee by order of a determination made with the authority of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Office of Fair Trading.

  1. (k)
    Mr Judge (representing the second respondents) complained to the OFT, and after investigating and reconciling the information supplied by the applicants and by the second respondents, the OFT made the decision under review.
  2. (l)
    On 5 October 2019 the Club held a special general meeting, attended by 45 members, in which the members present “re-proposed the motion that the full elected committee from 7 Sep AGM are reinstated”.[12]
  3. (m)
    On 14 October 2019 an internal review decision of the OFT (“the decision”) confirmed the original decision to restore the particulars of the Club recorded on the Register to what they were prior to the recording of the applicants’ Forms 10a.

Legislative framework

Pertaining to the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction

  1. [12]
    The Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with matters if empowered to do so by the QCAT Act or by an enabling Act[13] and its review jurisdiction is the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the enabling Act to “review a decision made or taken to have been made by another entity under that Act”.[14] 
  2. [13]
    The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear this review pursuant to sections 109 and 112 of the AIA.
  3. [14]
    The Tribunal’s role is to review the circumstances afresh and to produce the correct and preferable decision.[15]   The Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the original decision-maker.  Therefore, in this case, the Tribunal can only, at most, decide to amend the Register. 
  4. [15]
    The role of the OFT is to assist the Tribunal in making that decision,[16] rather than to take an adversarial role or to defend the decision under review.

Pertaining to the decision under review

  1. [16]
    Again, my decision in Peauril No.1 detailed at paragraphs [6] to [10] the requirements of the AIA with respect to the Club.  Summarily: 
    1. (a)
      Section 16 of the AIA requires the OFT to keep a register of incorporated associations (“the Register”). The Delegate is authorised at law to amend or “correct” the Register.[17]
    2. (b)
      As a “Level 1” incorporated association[18] the Club’s management committee had to prepare a financial statement for each reportable financial year, have it audited and present the statement and the audit report to the Club’s annual general meeting (“AGM”) for adoption by Club members.
    3. (c)
      Within one month after the AGM, the statements and reports had to be lodged with the OFT, typically with the Club’s Annual Return (Form 12-1). 
    4. (d)
      A Form 10a is used to update the OFT’s records of details relating to an incorporated association and must be lodged within one month of the change taking place. 
    5. (e)
      The OFT use the information contained in Forms 10a and 12-1 to update the Register.  

Pertaining to complaints about the conduct of incorporated associations

  1. [17]
    The constitution of the Club constitutes a contract between its members from time to time.[19] Members can pursue complaints against recalcitrant or negligent management committees and can challenge the validity of actions taken by the Club in the Supreme Court.[20]
  2. [18]
    The powers of the Supreme Court on such an application are set out in section 72 of the AIA as follows (my emphasis added):
  1. (1)
    The Supreme Court may, on the application of an incorporated association, or of a member thereof, make orders, including interim orders—
  1. (a)
    giving directions for the performance and observance of the rules of such incorporated association by any person who is under an obligation to perform or observe those rules; or
  1. (b)
    declaring and enforcing the rights and obligations of members of such incorporated association between themselves, and the rights and obligations between such incorporated association and any member or members thereof.
  1. [19]
    Section 73 of the AIA further empowers the Supreme Court to grant such relief as is appropriate in the circumstances.
  2. [20]
    In other words, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over litigated disputes and complaints between members or between the Club and its members, although the Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance to “interfere in the contentions or quarrels… or, indeed, in the internal affairs of any voluntary association, society or club”[21] and has found in a similar case that “the workings of the Club are a matter for its members… the membership should have the opportunity to decide who is to operate this Club”.[22]

Striking out

  1. [21]
    The Tribunal is mandated[23] to deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick, and must also:
    1. (a)
      encourage the early and economical resolution of disputes before the Tribunal;[24] and
    2. (b)
      ensure proceedings are conducted in an informal way that minimises costs to the parties and is as quick as is consistent with achieving justice.[25]
  2. [22]
    The Tribunal must be mindful that their resources serve the public, not just the parties to the proceedings, Justice Wilson noting in Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman[26] that:

The statutory regime under which QCAT operates places obligations upon parties themselves to take care in their dealings with Tribunal matters, and to act in their own best interests. QCAT’s resources for the resolution of disputes are in high demand and serve, as the High Court has recently observed in relation to court resources, “… the public as a whole, not merely the parties to the proceedings”.[27]  Finality in litigation is highly desirable, because any further action beyond the hearing can be costly and unnecessarily burdensome on the parties.[28]

  1. [23]
    The Tribunal can act on its own initiative[29] under section 47 of the QCAT Act to strike out or dismiss a proceeding if the Tribunal considers a proceeding is:
    1. (a)
      frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or
    2. (b)
      lacking in substance; or
    3. (c)
      otherwise an abuse of process.
  2. [24]
    However, the power to strike out ought only to be exercised “sparingly” and “when a claim is groundless or futile”.[30] 
  3. [25]
    According to Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners,[31] in considering a strike out application, the evidence should be weighed to reach a conclusion about whether the applicant has an arguable case.   A lack of any cause of action must be very clear.[32]   The Tribunal ought to be satisfied to a “high degree of certainty about the outcome” to strike the proceeding out.[33]
  4. [26]
    Summary dismissal should not be granted simply because it appears an applicant is unlikely to succeed on an issue of fact, in circumstances where there are factual issues in dispute and capable of dispute.[34]

Submissions

The First Respondents

  1. [27]
    The OFT suggest that there are two controversies the subject of the proceedings:
    1. (a)
      the keeping of the Register; and
    2. (b)
      the internal Club dispute.
  2. [28]
    They correctly submit that each controversy elicits a different jurisdiction in the AIA. The keeping of the Register is an administrative function solely within the responsibilities of the OFT, subject to review by the Tribunal, whereas resolving an internal dispute is a judicial function exercised solely by the Supreme Court.
  3. [29]
    Under section 19(c) of the QCAT Act the Tribunal standing in the shoes of the chief executive can only assess the review in the limited context of an administrative decision to keep the Register.
  4. [30]
    To the extent that the applicants want the Tribunal to determine matters well outside of the narrow scope of the keeping of the Register, and to, in effect, make the case a defacto Supreme Court determination of the internal Club dispute, the respondents say the application is well outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and usurps the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. They say that this is contrary to the provisions of the AIA and on jurisdictional grounds alone the application should be dismissed.

The Second Respondents

  1. [31]
    Essentially, the second respondents dispute wrongdoing, deny that the notice of adjournment was not sent to members and in fact say that that Mr Peauril attended the Clubhouse on 10 August 2019 with proxies sufficient to form a quorum knowing that the AGM had been adjourned and that there would be no others in attendance.
  2. [32]
    They otherwise adopt the submissions of the first respondents on questions of law.

The Applicants

  1. [33]
    The applicants’ submissions on striking out are contained within an Affidavit sworn by Mr Peauril on 4 March 2022 (the filing of which the Second Applicant’s object to on the ground that it was filed out of time). They do not appear to address the issues and concerns raised by the Tribunal regarding the utility of the application for review and the very narrow issue of the keeping of the Register. 
  2. [34]
    In summary the applicants’ submissions continue to focus upon:
    1. (a)
      The actions they took on 10 August 2019, including:
      1. detailed evidence regarding the happenings on 10 August 2019 when Mr Peauril purported to hold an AGM with only himself personally in attendance; and
      2. photographs of the locked clubhouse doors taken, according to the applicants’ evidence at 8.18am on 10 August 2019, posed with a dated copy of “The Australian” newspaper;
    2. (b)
      Allegations of mismanagement of the Club and wrongdoing by the second respondents, including:
      1. As I previously noted in Peauril No.1, the concerns summarised in the applicants’ “Report on the Standard of Governance of the Canungra Hang Gliding Club Incorporated from its 2018 Annual General Meeting held on 4 August 2018 until January 2020” prepared by Ms Houston; 
      2. further evidence regarding Ms Houston’s involvement in what transpired, describing her as:[35]

A forensic accountant so enraged by corruption of dodgy accounting in non for profit incorporated associations. About three months later she offering to be Applicant Representative, to right the wrongs.

  1. (iii)
    Insistence that the Tribunal appoint a “public administrator” to clean up “the corruption of the second respondents and supports”.[36]
  1. (c)
    Allegations of perjury by the second respondents and their witnesses;[37]
  2. (d)
    Allegations of wrongdoing by the first respondent in the course of conducting their investigation leading up to the making of the decision under review; and
  3. (e)
    Allegations of wrongdoing by the Tribunal in interlocutory proceedings.
  1. [35]
    The applicants made additional, non-sensical submissions as follows:

105. Corrupt hillbillies enabled and replying upon the laziness of Office of do nothing unfair trading that allows corruption to flourish and condones a failure to comply with the law.

106. The applicants have already suggested a public administrator appointed to fix the corruption.

107. The respondents have committed perjury, a conviction supported by two or more corroborated witnesses including photographic evidence will stop the laws specify the respondents on conviction face a mandatory 14 years jail.

108. Fighting corruption is a war.

109. Some wars can never be one.

110. Persons are accountable for their actions. No one is above the lower.

111. Karma always knows where to find you.

112. Murphy's law. Anything that can go wrong will go wrong. When you least expect it.

Discussion and findings

  1. [36]
    I find that the applicants’ allegations against the first respondent of “lazy, crucially flawed, unjust and unprofessional investigation” and various other ills are not relevant to the decision under review because it involves a fresh decision on the merits.[38] In any event, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to investigate or punish misconduct complaints against the first respondent.
  2. [37]
    As regards misconduct complaints against the second respondents, I reiterate that it is understandable, given the high-risk nature of gliding activities and the necessity to protect the management committee, members and event-participants from personal liability and any lapse in insurance cover, that the applicants were gravely concerned to hear that the Club was on notice to show cause as to why it should not be wound up, and therefore, at risk of ceasing to enjoy the benefits of incorporation under the AIA.  The applicants held (and still hold) additional concerns of and allege serious financial and operational misconduct by the second respondents, breaches of the AIA and of the rules that, again, are concerning, if true. The OFT also acknowledge that the applicants’ concerns about financial management of the Club may be “both live and topical within the Club, and of great importance to the applicants”.[39]
  3. [38]
    However, there is no question that member complaints about the actions of the management committee or other members and misconduct complaints pertain to the internal affairs of the Club that fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to sections 71, 72 and 73 of the AIA. None of the concerns or allegations raised by the applicants are relevant to what can be considered in making the decision under review, which is about the exercise of a basic and narrow administrative function of the keeping of the Register. 
  4. [39]
    The Tribunal simply does not have jurisdiction in these proceedings to examine, to critique or to punish the second respondents for wrongdoing, because only the Supreme Court can do that and yet that is what the applicants ask the Tribunal to do.
  5. [40]
    In an earlier interlocutory decision in this matter,[40] then Member Hughes said (my emphasis added):

[4] The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to make orders about the rules of the association and enforcing the rights and obligations of its members.[41]  But the Tribunal is limited to exercising the same function as the Chief Executive.[42]  That function is confined to the narrow administrative jurisdiction of keeping the Register.  It does not extend to examining internal disputes about financial mismanagement, governance or annual returns.[43]

  1. [41]
    In Peauril No.1 I reiterated this to the applicants, reminding them that the narrow issue for the Tribunal to decide in these proceedings is whether the correct and preferable decision is to confirm or set aside the OFT’s decision to amend the Register to what it was prior to the recording of the applicants’ Forms 10a.  
  2. [42]
    The applicants in their submissions accuse the Tribunal of “plagiarism” for adopting the OFT’s concerns in this regard and for the Tribunal’s repeated attempts to explain these concerns to the applicants, rather than recognising what became a concerted effort by the Tribunal to afford them the guidance required by section 29(1)(a) of the QCAT Act.
  3. [43]
    The decision under review is the OFT’s decision to restore the particulars of the Club recorded on the Register to what they were prior to the recording of the applicants’ Forms 10a based upon the events of 10 August 2019. 
  4. [44]
    Whilst many things are disputed, it is not disputed that:
    1. (a)
      Mr Peauril physically attended the Clubhouse on 10 August 2019 holding proxies, did not gain entry to the Clubhouse but did have open access to its grounds.
    2. (b)
      Mr Higson and Mr Cavanagh, the co-applicants, were not physically present at on that day, neither were the second respondents (being the then current management committee), nor were the Club membership at large.  This is highly irregular for genuine an annual general meeting.
    3. (c)
      Even if on that day an AGM process occurred validly under the Club’s constitution and the AIA (which is disputed), that process was undertaken by Mr Peauril solely, on the strength of his proxies, without the knowledge, consent or participation of the Club’s management committee, of its membership at large and, except by way of proxy, in the absence of two of the applicants.
    4. (d)
      On that day, financial statements and an audited financial report were not presented to the membership (neither to the attending membership comprising Mr Peauril and his proxies, nor to the membership at large who weren’t present at all), but were passed by the membership in a subsequent meeting on 7 September 2019 and adopted by Mr Peauril in his subsequent lodgements with the OFT, despite his later denial of the validity of the 7 September meeting.
    5. (e)
      Neither the second respondents, nor the Club members were informed that a meeting had been conducted by Mr Peauril on 10 August 2019 when the second respondents held with their rescheduled AGM at 8.10am[44] on 7 September 2019, with 36[45] Club members in attendance, including Mr Peauril. 
    6. (f)
      Neither Mr Peauril, nor any other member of his “management committee” saw fit to notify the assembled members of the association at the 7 September 2019 AGM of:
      1. their concerns about misconduct and mismanagement of the Club;
      2. that a new “management committee” had been appointed; or
      3. that a “management committee meeting” had occurred on 23 August.

Again, this silence is highly irregular from persons who say they are the duly appointed/elected president and management committee of an association.

  1. (g)
    The Annual Return filed by Mr Peauril in the hours following the 7 September 2019 meeting relied upon the presentation and acceptance of the financial statements by members of the Club at that meeting as an AGM in order to lodge those statements, it being a specific requirement of section 59(3) of the AIA that those reports are presented to members at the Club’s AGM.  Mr Peauril’s conduct in lodging the Form 12-1 is an admission on his part that the 10 September 2019 meeting was the Club’s true AGM.  Otherwise, he could and would have lodged the Annual Return without relying on that meeting.
  1. [45]
    Mr Peauril stated to the Tribunal in the hearing on 15 November 2021 that the applicants had, in bringing their review application, achieved what they had set out to do, which was to save the Club from de-registration.
  2. [46]
    The Club has also moved on with the passage of time since the decision under review was made. Updating the Register to keep the changes made by the Forms 10 lodged on 10 August 2019 will not impact subsequent entries or the current constituency of the Club.  It is a pointless and futile exercise.
  3. [47]
    Finally, Mr Peauril stated, more than once, on 15 November 2021, that his application for review is a “waste of time”. I agree. There is no utility in this application for review proceeding in all the circumstances and it should be brought to an early end as the Tribunal cannot provide the relief being sought: namely the installation of the applicants as the management committee of the Club, determinations of wrongdoing and censure of the first and second respondents, and resolution, in the applicants’ favour, of an internal Club dispute and member complaints that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear.
  4. [48]
    Allowing the application to proceed to a hearing would be to waste the Tribunal’s time and limited resources, as well as those of all parties to these proceedings, including the applicants.  It is dismissed pursuant to section 47 of the QCAT Act on that basis.

Footnotes

[1]  Aviation Occurrence Statistics 2008-2017: Aviation Occurrence Statistics 2008 to 2017 (atsb.gov.au).

[2]  Section 21(c) of the AIA.

[3]  Section 27, ibid.

[4]  Australian Tax Office; Overview of legal structures | Australian Taxation Office (ato.gov.au).

[5]  Paragraph 105 of Mr Peauril’s Affidavit sworn 4 March 2022

[6]  Section 47(3) of the QCAT Act.

[7]  A typographical error on the form records the signature date as “27 October 2019”.

[8]  There seems to be a suggestion that the meeting in fact proceeded at 7am but nothing in this decision turns on that point.

[9]  According to the minutes of the meeting dated 7 September 2021.

[10]  Applicants’ transcript of the recorded meeting.

[11]  Ibid.

[12]  Minutes of Meeting, First Respondent’s folder of evidence, at pages 244-245.

[13]  Section 9(1) of the QCAT Act.

[14]  Section 17(1), ibid.

[15]  Section 20, ibid.

[16]  Section 21, ibid.

[17]  Section 24AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld).

[18]  Section 58 of the AIA.

[19]  Section 71(1), ibid.

[20]  Section 71(2), ibid.

[21]Allan Brian Baldwin v The Sporting Shooters’ Association of Australia (Qld) Inc IA 00100 No. 7247 of 2019, judgment of Dalton J (transcript).

[22]Saxby v Saxby & Ors [2018] QCS 314 at [9].

[23]  Section 3(b) of the QCAT Act.

[24]  Section 4(b), ibid.

[25]  Section 4(c), ibid.

[26]  [2011] QCATA 226 at paragraph [13].

[27]Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 217.

[28]Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Gummow JJ.

[29]  Section 47(3) of the QCAT Act.

[30]Yeo v Brisbane Polo Club Inc [2013] QCAT 261, [5]-[7] citing Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] 78 CLR 62.

[31]  [1949] 78 CLR 62.

[32]General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125.

[33]Yeo, ibid at [6], citing Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; Platinum United II Pty Ltd & Anor v Secured Mortgage Management Ltd (in liq) [2011] QCA 162; Markan v Bar Association of Queensland [2013] QSC 146.

[34]Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118.

[35]  Paragraph 3 of Mr Peauril’s Affidavit sworn 4 March 2022.

[36]  Paragraph 8 of Mr Peauril’s Affidavit, ibid.

[37]  For example, paragraphs 13-17 and paragraph 101 of Mr Peauril’s Affidavit, ibid.

[38]  Section 20, QCAT Act.

[39]  OFT submissions dated 8 December 2021 at [9].

[40]  Unpublished written reasons for an interlocutory decision made in this matter on 19 July 2021.

[41]  Sections 71-73 of the AIA.

[42]  Section 19 of the QCAT Act.

[43]Saxby v Saxby & Ors [2018] QSC 314.

[44]  There seems to be a suggestion that the meeting in fact proceeded at 7am but nothing in this decision turns on that point.

[45]  According to the minutes of the meeting dated 7 September 2021.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Peauril & Ors v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (No. 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Peauril v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (No. 2)

  • MNC:

    [2022] QCAT 171

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Member Lember

  • Date:

    13 May 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 201 CLR 552
Cite 2 - (2000) 201 CLR 552
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2009) 239 CLR 175
Cite 2 - (2009) 239 CLR 175
Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (in liq) (recs and mgrs apptd) (controllers appointed) v Woolridge [2013] VSC 154
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] VSC 154
Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman [2011] QCATA 226
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCATA 226
Cite 2 - [2011] QCATA 226
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1949) 78 CLR 62
Cite 2 - (1949) 78 CLR 62
Cite 3 - (1949) 78 CLR 62
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Cite 2 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
Cite 2 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
Markan v Bar Association of Queensland [2013] QSC 146
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QSC 146
Cite 2 - [2013] QSC 146
Peauril v Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 413
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QCAT 413
Cite 2 - [2021] QCAT 413
Platinum United II Pty Ltd v Secured Mortgage Management Ltd (in liq) [2011] QCA 162
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCA 162
Cite 2 - [2011] QCA 162
Saxby v Saxby [2018] QSC 314
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QSC 314
Cite 2 - [2018] QSC 314
Cite 3 - [2018] QSC 314
Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2010) 241 CLR 118
Cite 2 - (2010) 241 CLR 118
Yeo v Brisbane Polo Club Inc [2013] QCAT 261
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCAT 261
Cite 2 - [2013] QCAT 261
Cite 3 - [2013] QCAT 261

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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