Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
- Unreported Judgment
- Simpson Racing Pty Ltd v Blunsdon[2022] QCAT 173
- Add to List
Simpson Racing Pty Ltd v Blunsdon[2022] QCAT 173
Simpson Racing Pty Ltd v Blunsdon[2022] QCAT 173
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: | Simpson Racing Pty Ltd v Blunsdon & Anor [2022] QCAT 173 |
PARTIES: | SIMPSON RACING PTY LTD |
(applicant) | |
V | |
JOHN BLUNSDON | |
(first respondent) AND ROUDI BLUNSDON (second respondent) | |
APPLICATION NO/S: | MCDQ107-21 |
MATTER TYPE: | Other minor civil dispute matters |
DELIVERED ON: | 26 April 2022 |
HEARING DATE: | 29 March 2022 |
HEARD AT: | Caboolture |
DECISION OF: | Adjudicator Lember |
ORDERS: | By 31 May 2022, John Blunsdon and Roudi Blunsdon must pay Simpson Racing Pty Ltd the sum of $3,279.91 comprising:
|
CATCHWORDS: | ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – minor civil dispute – agistment and training of horses – whether horses sold – whether first respondent had ostensible authority to bind second respondent Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 3, s 4, s 13, s 102, schedule 3 Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1955) 93 CLR 546 Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 184 Cox v J & M Phelan trading as Carrara Carmart [2020] QCAT 190 Hashfield v Gold Coast City Council [2020] QCATA 36 Right v Burrett [2020] QCATA 71 Saxer v Hume [2022] QCATA 25 |
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: | |
Applicant: | Self-represented |
Respondent: | Self-represented |
REASONS FOR DECISION
What is this application about?
- [1]
- [2]The first respondent, John Blunsdon, and the second respondent, Roudi Blunsdon, are father and son who, between them owned approximately fifty horses, of which approximately forty horses were owned by John, and the remaining ten by Roudi, including Ruckus. The applicant says they variously trained, agisted and purchased some of these horses as a consequence of their dealings with the respondents.
- [3]By an application for a minor civil dispute filed 11 November 2021 Simpson Racing Pty Ltd seeks an order against the respondents for the payment of $6,512.70 comprising:
- (a)Invoice SR-110-00372-1 dated 24 October 2021 for:
- (i)Training/agistment and ancillary fees $ 2,881.20
- (ii)Horse Transport fee $ 2,700.00
- (iii)Legal and debt collection fees $ 584.00
- (iv)Wasted Bloodstock Auctions listing fee $ 220.00; and
- (i)
- (b)Filing fee $ 127.50.
- (a)
- [4]The applicants also seek declarations as to the ownership of horses they say they purchased from respondents: Dixie Prospect x Trialling (“Dixie Prospect”), Cluster x Kissed Again (“Cluster”) and Top Echelon v Aqua Modern (also known as “Ruckus”).
- [5]The application was filed on a “consumer dispute” form but it is clear that it is a “minor debt” and I have considered it on that basis. The application was served pursuant to a substituted service order, and the detailed “Submissions of the Respondent” filed 10 March 2022 are in the nature of a Response.
- [6]John Blunsdon did not participate in these proceedings. Attempts were made to contact him both at the first hearing on 15 March 2022 and again for the adjourned hearing on 29 March 2022. Satisfied that he was given notice of the hearings, pursuant to section 93 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”), I heard the matter in his absence.
- [7]Roudi produced evidence of his payments to originally purchase the disputed horses and says he has been dragged into a situation of John's creation and that:
- (a)the sale of his horses without his consent is a criminal matter – he says he never entered into any “official style agreements” with any party involved nor did he “consent officially” for any sale to take place;[2] and
- (b)the matter of the outstanding invoice is a civil matter between John Blunsdon, and Grandgaits Group Pty Ltd as the only two parties that have “the only agreement officially signed”.
- (a)
- [8]He seeks to have the application dismissed as against himself, saying that all dealings and agreements were made between John and the applicant, to the exclusion of Roudi.
Background to the dispute – the parties’ dealings
- [9]Roudi says[3] that when he and John received notice in early 2021 that they needed to relocate from the property they were living on, John and Roudi agreed that Roudi’s “main priority was to find myself and my children adequate housing” and that John would “manage the movements of the horses at his cost”.
- [10]Roudi said he moved from the property in the beginning of June at which time John assured him that “everything would be fine”.
- [11]Shortly afterwards, family and friends of the respondents advertised the horses for rehoming on Facebook.
- [12]Ms Jennifer Torrisi (former partner of Roudi) and Ms Jacinta Milne posted the following:
POSTING FOR OWNER
Ruckus – 2 year old TB colt
…If you’re after more info please message me and I can pass on the owners number, thanks
- [13]Ms Amanda Vella posted:
Very URGENT and sad situation… The owner of these horses is devastated so please no nasty comments.
He had 40 odd horses to rehome and has been pretty successful except for these colts and stallions:
2 year old colt
11 year-old stallion
19-year-old stallion
2 x 22 year old stallions
All registered thoroughbreds.
The owner needs them rehomed by Wednesday. I took old mares (I’ll post details later) and a friend took 15 but neither of us can house stallions at the moment.
Can anyone help? Please be kind as this is very hard for the owner
Call John directly [mobile number supplied].
- [14]Roudi denied having any knowledge of the Facebook advertisements and posts, although I find this unlikely given his connection to two of the three women who shared the advertisements on social media.
- [15]Adam Simpson of the applicant was interested in viewing “Ruckus” with a view to purchasing him and attended the property to that end on 28 June 2021, where he met with John. After viewing, Mr Simpson paid John Blunsdon $550 in cash for the colt and received a signed receipt for $550 dated 28 June 2021 for the sale.
- [16]At the time Mr Simpson says he was requested by John Blunsdon to view other horses on the property, which he did. The parties reached an agreement whereby Mr Simpson would agist and train several identified horses and would try to sell them for agreed prices.
- [17]An agreement to sell with time payment was signed and dated 28 June 2021 for “1 x Rig x Dixie Prospect 5 year old $1000” and “1 x filly Cluster v Kissed Again 3 year old $3000”.
- [18]However, Mr Simpson did not take the horses on the spot because he had not brought with him a trailer big enough, having intended only to look at Ruckus, so an agreement was reached whereby he would return with a bigger trailer to collect the remaining horses.
- [19]Mr Simpson sent a text message to John Blunsdon on 28 June 2021 quoting his training levies at “$68 per day pre training” and “$78 per day race training”, plus GST.
- [20]John accepted the quote and Mr Simpson returned to collect the horses, which were taken to be spelled at the Grand Gaits property to be trained by the applicant.
- [21]By 31 July 2021, significant fees had been incurred for agisting, training, worming, dentistry and other expenses related to the horses and invoices were issued to John Blunsdon for those costs.
- [22]At the beginning of August 2021, John and Roudi travelled to Grand Gaits to view the horses, at which time Roudi says John provided him all the paperwork including the invoices, the Service Agreement signed by John with Grand Gaits, the receipt for the sale of Ruckus and the agreement to sell with time payment.
- [23]Roudi said “along the drive up I expressed my disagreement with his decisions” and from that time, Roudi, rather than John, handled all discussions and negotiations with the applicant.
- [24]The applicant recorded various conversations with Roudi after Roudi took over discussions with the applicant and they were produced to the tribunal together with transcripts of the conversations. The respondents did not object to the production of these recordings and transcripts.
- [25]In conversations with Mr Simpson, Roudi makes the following statements:
- (a)In relation to Cluster, Roudi says “we can honour the receipt”;
- (b)In relation to the outstanding invoices, Roudi says “the easiest way for me would be to say keep the horse and take the three k off the bill”.
- (c)“Make sure that when you do the new invoice up, you write that you are crediting me for that, so that I’ve got that, so that record is there for you as well, I want to be fair about it all, I don’t want to leave you short at the same time”.
- (a)
- [26]On 12 August 2021, a sum of $2000 was paid to the applicant and receipted to John Blunsdon, although the payment was made from an account in the name of “A Harvey” and Roudi said he is the one who came to the agreement to pay that sum[4].
- [27]Allison Harvey is the aunt of Roudi, and the sister of John.
- [28]On the same day, the applicant sent an adjusted invoice to the respondents at Ms Harvey’s email address, crediting $1000 for the purchase of Dixie Prospect and $3000 for the purchase of Cluster. An amended invoice from John Blunsdon – from Ms Harvey’s email address - was sent the applicants by return email, confirming the sale of the two horses for the total sum of $4,000.
- [29]Ms Harvey’s email address is the address to which Roudi was served all notices and communications for these proceedings, including between the first hearing and the adjourned hearing. That Roudi has access to Ms Harvey’s email address, whether directly or by instructing Ms Harvey, is clear. That email address documented the sale of horses immediately following a conversation about that sale between the applicant and Roudi, and payment of $2,000 at the direction if not by Roudi towards invoices that, on his argument, he was never responsible for. This evidence is vastly incompatible with the situation described by Roudi – that his horses were stolen and that any money matters are a civil matter between the applicant and John.
- [30]In a letter dated 19 November 2021 solicitors for Roudi wrote to the applicants asserting ownership of Cluster, Ruckus and Dixie Prospect, saying that he'd been the sole owner of the horses since May 2019 and saying that on 28 June 2021 the agreement entered into with John Blunsdon to sell the horses was not made with the knowledge of Roudi.
What is the legislative framework?
The QCAT Act
- [31]The objects of the QCAT Act[5] include to have the Tribunal deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick, and, to that end, section 4 of the Act requires the Tribunal, among other things, to:
- (a)
- (b)ensure proceedings are conducted in an informal way that minimises costs to the parties and is as quick as is consistent with achieving justice.[7]
- [32]The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear minor civil disputes, which are defined in Schedule 3 of the QCAT Act as, amongst other things, “a claim to recover a debt or liquidated demand of money of up to the prescribed amount”, which is currently $25,000.00.
- [33]Whilst I am satisfied that the applicant’s claim for payment of their outstanding invoice is a matter over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, the same cannot be said for the orders sought regarding ownership of the horses.
- [34]The Tribunal does not have the power in the minor civil dispute jurisdiction over:
- (a)a claim for specific performance which does not fall within the orders which may be made by the Tribunal under s 13(2) as limited by s 13(3); or
- (b)a claim for a declaration.
- (a)
- [35]In Saxer v Hume[8], the appellant sought an order declaring her to be the owner of horse and orders for the respondents to provide a signed transfer of a horse’s registration and it was held that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to grant this relief. This mirrors the situation in the decision of the Appeal Tribunal in Right v Burrett[9], supported by the decision in Hashfield v Gold Coast City Council[10].
Contract law
- [36]A legally enforceable agreement (contract) requires an offer, acceptance of that offer, consideration for the promises made and an intention to create legal relations.[11] The terms must be certain, and the parties must have capacity to contract. A contract does not have to be in writing and can be made verbally or by conduct or by a combination of both.
- [37]To vary a contract the parties to it must both agree to the variation (unless the contract expressly permits a unilateral variation and even then, such clauses can be problematic).
Agency
- [38]An agency exists where one person is accepted by the law to represent another, the principal, in such a way as to be able to affect the principal’s legal position with respect to others.
- [39]In true agency, the principal gives authority to the agent to bind the principal in transactions with others. The authority can be implied from the conduct of the principal and the agent making it reasonable to infer that authority has been given.
- [40]No formality is required to give such authority
- [41]Agency may also arise through the doctrine of estoppel to prevent a principal from denying an agent’s authority to bind the principal. By this doctrine the agent has ostensible or apparent authority to bind the principal, and this occurs when the principal by words or conduct represents to another that the agent has authority to bind the principal and the other relies on that representation in dealing with the agent.
- [42]Generally, only the principal will be liable on contracts made through agents, but if the agent fails to disclose either the existence or the name of the principal then the agent will be personally liable on the contract as a direct contracting party.
- [43]If the agent discloses the existence but not the name of the principal, then the question whether the agent is a direct contracting party will depend on all the circumstances as to what the objective intention of the parties was.
- [44]An agent may also be liable under the doctrine of breach of warranty of authority, where an agent makes a contract on behalf of the principal but has no authority to do so. If the other contracting party suffers loss because of this misrepresentation of warranty of authority, this can be claimed from the agent.
- [45]Ostensible authority operates to prevent a person from reneging on an agreement instituted by someone who appeared to have authority to act for them, where it would be unconscionable to a third party to do so.
Discussion and findings
- [46]I am satisfied on the evidence before the tribunal in these proceedings that John Blunsdon had ostensible authority to deal with third parties, including the applicant, with respect to the sale, agistment and training of horses owned by Roudi Blunsdon for a number of reasons:
- (a)The “rehoming” of John’s horses and of Roudi’s horses – collectively - was promoted on social media by several people connected to Roudi, including at least two Facebook connections, one of whom was his former partner and the mother of his children. The ordinary meaning of the word “rehome” is to find a new home for, which encompasses the agistment, sale and the giving away of horses.
- (b)At no stage did Roudi take any steps to stop the advertisement of his horses on social media, knowing that third parties may respond to the advertisements by contacting John in relation to them, nor to distinguish ownership of his horses from those owned by John.
- (c)Roudi said that he expressly gave John power to arrange the “movement” of Roudi’s horses, which he says encompassed agistment and training. On that basis the invoices raised by the applicant for the agistment and training arranged by John for Roudi’s horses is payable by Roudi. John is also responsible as the agency was not disclosed, at least not with specifics by John to the applicant. The applicant understood the horses to be a “father and son” enterprise but nothing further.
- (d)Further, in relation to the invoices, the applicant sent a text message to the first respondent with its fees and that was accepted by the first respondent before the applicant returned to the property to collect the horses owned by the second respondent for training and agistment. Upon collection of these horses a contract was entered into for the training and agistment of the horses, as well as permitting the future sale of the horses, and that contract was performed by the applicants in good faith, relying upon the authority of the first respondent to act for the second respondent.
- (e)It is of no consequence that a more formal agreement was sent later in time, and it is of no consequence that the second respond did not sign the agreement – or any agreement.
- (f)Ruckus was purchased by the applicant from the first respondent who acted on behalf of the second respondent in brokering the sale. John had authority to bind the second respondent in this deal and signed the receipt evidencing the purchase on Roudi’s behalf, having ostensible or apparent authority to do so. Even to a civil standard, Ruckus was sold by John to the applicant on Roudi’s behalf and with Roudi’s knowledge and consent – he was not stolen. It does not matter that Roudi was unhappy with the deal struck. This is a finding of fact: I have no power to make any order or declaration to that effect.
- (g)Dixie Prospect and Cluster were sold to the applicant by the second respondent, acting directly on his own behalf. Roudi, not John discussed the sale, agreed the price, agreed that the method of payment would be by way of set-off from the outstanding invoice and the applicants subsequently received a receipt/invoice for the transaction that accurately reflects the discussion had. For Roudi to subsequently allege that these horses were stolen is a vexatious nonsense. They were sold to the applicant and are owned by them, although again, I have no power to make any declarations or orders that give effect to this finding of fact.
- (a)
- [47]The training and agistment fees incurred in the sum of $2,881.20 are properly payable by both respondents. The respondents having wrongly prevented the sale of the horses owned by the applicant breached their sale contract and the $220 auction listing fee is a liquidated cost incurred by the applicant and wasted due to the respondents’ breach. That sum is also awarded to the applicant. It is a matter for the respondents to sort out any dispute between them as to whether John exceeded his actual authority, and whether any consequences should flow from that.
- [48]I award $3,101.20 to the applicants and interest on that sum from 3 November 2021 being the due date for the fees, until the hearing date. I calculate this on the tribunal scale to be $51.21.
- [49]There is no evidence of a quote given, any discussion had, or any agreement reached in relation to, or promise to pay the transport costs claimed in the sum of $2,700. These seem to have been imposed by the applicant as an after-thought when the parties found themselves in conflict. I dismiss that part of the claim as there is no basis in contract to award them.
- [50]The debt collection and legal fees are not recoverable in this jurisdiction. For those reasons, to the extent the application seeks reimbursement of these fees in the collective sum of $584.00, that part of the application is refused.
- [51]I do exercise my discretion to award the applicant their filing fee paid in the sum of $127.50 pursuant to section 102 of the QCAT Act as the application to recover their training and agistment fees succeeded and as the respondents’ conduct has put them to considerable expense and inconvenience.
Footnotes
[1] For completeness, the earliest recorded use of the literary term comes from the 1866 play by Dion Boucicault, the “Flying Scud” in which a character says “I’ve got to see a man about a dog.” This phrase later formed the more popular version of “I need to see a man about a horse.”
[2] Submissions filed 10 March 2022, at the second to last page (they are not numbered).
[3] Paragraph 6 of his submissions filed 10 March 2022.
[4] The bank transfer receipt is set out in Annexure H to Roudi Blunsdon’s submissions.
[5] Section 3(b) of the QCAT Act.
[6] Ibid, section 4(b).
[7] Ibid, section 4(c).
[8] [2022] QCATA 25.
[9] [2020] QCATA 71.
[10] [2020] QCATA 36.
[11] Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1955) 93 CLR 546.