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Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd v Ridong (Australia) International Pty Ltd[2022] QCAT 3

Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd v Ridong (Australia) International Pty Ltd[2022] QCAT 3

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd v Ridong (Australia) International Pty Ltd [2022] QCAT 3

PARTIES:

gold coast jet boating pty ltd

(applicant)

V

ridong (australia) international Pty ltd

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

RSL051-21

MATTER TYPE:

Retail shop leases matter

DELIVERED ON:

12 January 2022

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Deane

ORDERS:

Upon Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd giving the usual undertaking as to costs and damages, until 31 March 2022 or further order of the Tribunal or written agreement by the parties, Ridong (Australia) International Pty Ltd is restrained from acting in reliance on the Form 8 Notice dated 5 March 2021 or relocation or demolition notices issued to Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd prior to 12 April 2021.

CATCHWORDS:

LANDLORD AND TENANT – RETAIL AND COMMERCIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION – JURISDICTION, POWERS AND APPEALS OF COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – OTHER MATTERS – whether interim orders seeking declarations should be made – whether an interim order should be granted restraining the lessor from taking action on notices issued

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 3, s 4, s 58, s 59, s 67, s 68, s 68, s 69, s 70, s 71, s 72, s 73, s 74, Schedule 3

Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s 5A, S 5B, s 5C, s 5D, s 55, s 56, s 63, s 64, s 94, s 97, s 103, schedule

A and C Lee v Collier [2019] QCAT 30

Airlie Beach Real Estate Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2018] QCAT 317

Burinpinpat Pty Ltd t/as Chili Coco v FFTOA Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 100

Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola SA [1973] 1 WLR 349

McDonald’s Australia Ltd v Emaaas Pty Ltd [2011] QCAT 293

National Property Acquisitions Pty Ltd v IDS Investments Group Pty Ltd [2021] QCAT 24

Parkview Management Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Boca Raton Community Titles Scheme 22486 [2018] QCAT 6

Real Management Solutions Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2016] QCAT 370

The Software Link (Aust) Pty Ltd v Texada Software Inc [2005] FCA 1072

Wilson & Anor v LP & MJ Pty Ltd [2019] QCATA 82

APPEARANCES &

REPRESENTATION:

 

Applicant:

R Lee, Lee Lawyers

Respondent:

B Lashmar, Bell Legal Group

 

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act)

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd (the Tenant) leases premises from Ridong (Australia) International Pty Ltd (the Landlord) from which it operates its business.    On 12 April 2021 the Tenant lodged a Notice of Dispute in which it claims that it is entitled to quiet enjoyment of the leased premises to 31 March 2022 or reasonable notice in proper form of at least six months, reasonable alternative premises in the same shopping centre, reasonable compensation and costs.  The reasons given as to why such orders are sought are that the Landlord:
    1. (a)
      wishes to demolish or substantially renovate its property leased by the Tenant;
    2. (b)
      has not given proper notice of at least six months as required by the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) (RSL Act);
    3. (c)
      has not offered compensation;
    4. (d)
      has purported to give one month’s notice to the Tenant to vacate as a monthly tenant.
  2. [2]
    On 12 April 2021 the Tenant filed an Application for interim order in which it seeks the following orders, to preserve the status quo pending final resolution of the matter:
    1. (a)
      a declaration that the Leased Property is that property leased by the applicant from the respondent, defined as areas 7B, its Area B, 24B, 24C and 41 on land at 60-70 Seaworld Drive, Main Beach in the State of Queensland owned by the respondent and known as “Mariner’s Cove” (First interim order);
    2. (b)
      a declaration that the notice in Form 8 served by the respondent on 5 March 2021 on the applicant re the Leased Property is void (Second interim order);
    3. (c)
      until 31 March 2022, further order of the Tribunal or as agreed in writing between the parties:
      1. the respondent is restrained and forbidden from retaking exclusive possession of the Leased Property (Third interim order); and
      2. the respondent is directed to cause and allow the applicant quiet enjoyment of the Leased Property (Fourth interim order).
  3. [3]
    Directions were issued to allow the Application for interim order to be determined on the papers.[1]  Submissions have been received.[2]  I now proceed to determine the Application for interim order.  The delay in finalising this Application for interim order is extremely regrettable and relates to resourcing issues.
  4. [4]
    The Tenant contends that an interim order is required to prevent the Landlord from requiring vacant possession in accordance with the Form 8 served 5 March 2021 by 30 April 2021.[3]  The Form 8 is a Notice to Tenant purporting to require possession of premises the subject of a month-to-month tenancy. At the directions hearing held on 28 April 2021 the Landlord gave an undertaking not to act on the Form 8 dated 5 March 2021 pending determination of the Application for interim order.
  5. [5]
    The Landlord disputes that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to grant the interim orders or in the alternative that such orders ought not be made. 

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to make an interim order?

  1. [6]
    I find that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make an interim order.
  2. [7]
    The Tribunal is required to find its power to hear and determine disputes in either the QCAT Act or an enabling Act.  The parties concede that the relevant enabling Act is the RSL Act.
  3. [8]
    Before making a final decision, the Tribunal may make an interim order it considers appropriate in the interests of justice to protect a party’s position for the duration of the proceeding[4] or to require or permit something to be done to secure the effectiveness of the exercise of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  The Tribunal may grant an injunction including an interim injunction if it is just and convenient to do so.[5] 
  4. [9]
    The Landlord submits that the Tribunal lacks power to make an interim order because there is no proceeding before the Tribunal because the mandatory pre-proceeding mediation process had not been undertaken or attempted.  It is not disputed that at the time of the filing of the Application for interim order the mandatory pre-proceeding mediation process had not been undertaken or attempted.
  5. [10]
    The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear certain retail tenancy disputes.[6]  A retail tenancy dispute is defined as ‘any dispute under or about a retail shop lease, or about the use and occupation of a leased shop under a retail shop lease’.[7]  A ‘retail shop lease’ is defined as a ‘lease of a retail shop’ subject to exceptions, none of which appear to apply.[8]  A ‘retail shop’ means premises situated in a retail shopping centre or used wholly or predominantly for the carrying on of a retail business.[9]  Retail business is defined to mean a business prescribed by regulation.[10]

Is this a retail tenancy dispute?

  1. [11]
    I am satisfied that it is arguable that the dispute including about whether Area B forms part of the Lease gives rise to a retail tenancy dispute.  
  2. [12]
    There is no dispute that at least part of the leased premises is situated in a retail shopping centre.[11] There is a dispute between the parties as to the version of the lease governing their relationship.  Both versions before me show the expiry date as 31 March 2022 and the description of the premises being leased in item 5 of the Form 7 as ‘Shops 7B, 24B, 24C and 41 being part of the ground floor of the building erected on the Land as shown hatched in black on the attached plan.’  The plans of the leased areas attached differ.  The plans attached to the Tenant’s document only shows Shop 7B and Area B.  The plans attached to the Landlord’s document show Shops 7B, 24B, 24C and 41 but not Area B.  Neither version is signed by either the Tenant or the former Landlord.  Mr Johnson is the Tenant’s director and although it could be clearer, it appears was involved in the entering into of the agreements with the former Landlord.  The Landlord’s representative gives evidence of the version in the Landlord’s possession but not of involvement at the time the Lease was entered into by the former Landlord.
  3. [13]
    The primary dispute in this regard is as to whether the area referred to as ‘its Area B’ forms part of the leased premises under the written lease. The Tenant contends and I accept that Area B is an integral part of its business but that is not necessarily the same issue. 
  4. [14]
    It points to a copy of a Berthing Agreement which expressly stated it was interdependent with a lease of Shop 7B dated on or around the date of the Berthing Agreement.[12] On its face that Berthing Agreement stated that the RSL Act did not apply to it and even if the options were exercised it expired some time ago.  I note that a copy of a lease which states that it commenced a few days after the Berthing Agreement commenced expressly provided that the leased premises were shop 7B and Area B.[13]
  5. [15]
    This evidence raises issues as to whether there is a current Berthing Agreement in respect of Area B and if so whether the arrangements between the parties for the use of Area B are governed by the RSL Act.  There is no evidence before me explaining the current arrangements other than that the Tenant’s director’s evidence is that Area B forms part of the written lease.
  6. [16]
    The Tribunal has previously accepted that a retail tenancy dispute is not limited to claims under a retail shop lease but may be ‘about a retail shop lease’ where the claim was under a closely related agreement.[14]  The parties did not specifically make submissions on this point.
  7. [17]
    I am satisfied on the limited material before me that it is arguable that the dispute about whether Area B forms part of the lease gives rise to a retail tenancy dispute. 
  8. [18]
    I address related issues as to the requirements for a restraining order later in these reasons.

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction in the absence of the mandatory pre-proceeding mediation process being completed?

  1. [19]
    I find the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to make urgent interim orders prior to the mandatory pre-proceeding mediation process being completed.
  2. [20]
    The RSL Act sets out pathways for a retail tenancy dispute to be determined by the Tribunal:
    1. (a)
      lodgement of a Notice of Dispute that is within a mediator’s jurisdiction[15] with the chief executive in the approved form.[16]  The chief executive’s delegate is the Tribunal’s Principal Registrar.  Nomination of a mediator and the issuing of notices to the parties to attend.[17] Those actions are administrative in nature.  Reference of the dispute by the mediator to the Tribunal;[18] or 
    2. (b)
      a party to a retail tenancy dispute may apply directly to the Tribunal, by way of a Form 34 – Application for an order to resolve a retail tenancy dispute, where the retail shop lease has not ended more than one year before the dispute was lodged and one of three circumstances applies:
      1. a party claims non-compliance by the other of a mediation agreement; or
      2. a mediator refuses to refer the dispute to the Tribunal; or
      3. a court has ordered that a proceeding started in the court be removed to the Tribunal.[19]
  3. [21]
    The Tribunal has accepted that it has power to make an interim order, in the nature of injunctive relief, prior to completion of the pre-proceeding mediation process.[20]  The Landlord contends that Emaas is wrong. The Tribunal has accepted on many occasions that it has such power.
  4. [22]
    The pre-proceeding mediation under the RSL Act is similar to but different to a compulsory conference under the QCAT Act.[21] A compulsory conference may be scheduled by the Tribunal after reference of the dispute by the mediator to the Tribunal or after a party directly applies in accordance with section 64 of the RSL Act.
  5. [23]
    I accept that the Notice of Dispute is not a proceeding before the Tribunal until it is referred.  His Honour Wilson J, the then President, found in Emaas[22] that the application for injunction was itself a proceeding before the Tribunal.[23] 
  6. [24]
    I find that the proceeding before the Tribunal is the Application for interim order. 
  7. [25]
    His Honour also acknowledged that:[24]

Different questions may arise, and different conclusions may apply, when proceedings do not involve applications to this Tribunal for relief under ss 58 and 59 of the QCAT Act.

  1. [26]
    His Honour expressly considered whether an applicant was restricted to applying for injunctive relief in a court rather than an interim order in the Tribunal prior to the pre-proceeding mediation and found that such an outcome would be contrary to the objects of the QCAT Act.
  2. [27]
    The Landlord submits, and I accept, that the Tribunal does not have power to dispense with the pre-proceeding mediation under the RSL Act.[25]  The Tenant does not expressly seek such an order.   
  3. [28]
    Senior Member Brown in Burinpinpat Pty Ltd t/as Chili Coco v FFTOA Pty Ltd[26] accepted that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine an application for interim order before referral by a mediator of the Notice of Dispute.[27]
  4. [29]
    The Landlord’s submissions also referred to:
    1. (a)
      Wilson & Anor v LP & MJ Pty Ltd.[28]   Member Howe’s decision did not concern an application for interim order.
    2. (b)
      National Property Acquisitions Pty Ltd v IDS Investments Group Pty Ltd.[29]  The paragraphs referenced in my decision related to an attempt to amend final relief sought and did not concern an application for interim order.
    3. (c)
      A and C Lee v Collier.[30] Senior Member Brown’s decision did not concern an application for interim order.  Senior Member Brown expressly states:

In my view McDonald’s can be distinguished from the present case. There, the Tribunal was dealing with an application for urgent injunctive relief.[31]

  1. [30]
    The objects of the QCAT Act include to enhance the quality and consistency of tribunal decisions.[32]  To achieve the objects of the QCAT Act the Tribunal must ensure like cases are treated alike.[33] 
  2. [31]
    I am not satisfied that Emaas and the many other decisions of the Tribunal, which have accepted Emaas, are clearly wrong. 

Should an interim order be made?

  1. [32]
    Whether an interim order or injunction should be made depends upon the nature of the orders ultimately sought and whether the interim order or injunction is in aid of that relief.

First and Second interim orders

  1. [33]
    I am not satisfied that such orders are required to preserve the status quo pending determination of the Tenant’s entitlement to final relief or secure the effectiveness of the exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or that it is just and convenient to do so.
  2. [34]
    The First and Secord interim orders seek declarations as to the leased premises and the validity of the Form 8 served on 5 March 2021.  Those orders are essentially final relief rather than interim orders. 
  3. [35]
    As mentioned earlier in these reasons, there is a dispute between the parties as to the version of the lease governing the relationship between the parties and whether and on what basis ‘Area B’ is part of the leased premises.  It is not appropriate on such an Application for interim order to make final findings as to whether Area B forms part of the lease. 
  4. [36]
    In relation to the Form 8, there is evidence before me about a course of negotiation between the parties.  The Form 8 is inconsistent with the versions of the lease produced by both parties, which states that its expiry date was 31 March 2022.  However, there is some evidence before me that the parties were negotiating an agreed relocation in respect of part of the leased premises, with an earlier vacating date.    There is a dispute about whether an agreement was reached and the terms of any such agreement.
  5. [37]
    Further evidence is required to make such findings.  Those are matters which ought to be determined after a final tribunal hearing.

Third and Fourth interim order

  1. [38]
    I am not satisfied that such orders are required to preserve the status quo pending determination of the Tenant’s entitlement to final relief or secure the effectiveness of the exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or that it is just and convenient to do so.
  2. [39]
    The third and fourth interim orders sought are restraining orders.  The formulation of these orders was slightly modified in the draft order attached to the Applicant’s submissions filed 28 April 2021.  The modified formulation was:

Until 31 March 2022, further order of the Tribunal or as agreed in writing between the parties:

  1. (a)
    The respondent is restrained and forbidden from retaking exclusive possession of the Leased Property.
  2. (b)
    The respondent must cause and allow the applicant quiet enjoyment of the Leased Property.
  1. [40]
    The principles about whether a restraining order should be made are that:
    1. (a)
      the Tenant has an arguable case that may entitle it to final relief; and
    2. (b)
      the balance of convenience favours the making of the order.
  2. [41]
    In making such an order the Tribunal may require that the Tenant give an undertaking as to costs and damages.[34]  The Tenant maintains that it ought not be required to provide an undertaking but says if the Tribunal requires an undertaking as to damages, it will provide it.  An undertaking as to damages is required to afford a measure of protection to the party restrained in the event it is determined that it was wrongly restrained.  I am not satisfied that there is sufficient reason why the usual undertaking ought not be provided. 
  3. [42]
    A restraining order may provide for the lifting of the order if stated conditions are met.[35]   The parties have not proposed any conditions.
  4. [43]
    I accept the Landlord’s submission that if granted in the form sought, which is very broad, the order may prevent the Landlord from exercising its contractual rights and rights under the RSL Act.  The Tenant concedes that it does not seek to prevent the Landlord from exercising its properly exercised rights under the RSL Act.[36]  The orders sought are broader in scope than the orders sought in the Notice of Dispute.   I am not satisfied that they are therefore in aid of the final relief sought.

Should any interim order be made?

  1. [44]
    On balance I find that a restraining order should be made.
  2. [45]
    The Tribunal may make an interim order or interim injunction on its own initiative.[37]
  3. [46]
    The Landlord submits that any restraining order ought only be granted on the basis that the Landlord is restrained from acting on an earlier issued relocation notice, demolition notice or Form 8 notice served on 5 March 2021 and should not include a restraint in respect of Area B.  It says that the Tribunal could not be sufficiently satisfied that there was an arguable case that may entitle the Tenant to final relief in respect of Area B.  I accept that the evidence is not overly strong, but I am not satisfied that the claim is impossible. The current evidence of the Tenant’s director is that the written lease includes Area B. 
  4. [47]
    I accept, for the purposes of the Application for interim order, that there is an arguable claim.
  5. [48]
    The Landlord contends that the balance of convenience favours the Landlord because the Tenant has been aware of the proposed relocation of its premises since 25 September 2020 and failed to bring proceedings earlier, it previously agreed to leave the premises on 30 April 2021 and therefore ‘is not of clean hands’ in seeking the restraining order, the effect of the RSL Act is that the relocation notice is deemed accepted in the terms provided for in section 46F of the RSL Act,  the Tenant has not previously objected to the validity of the relocation notices, compensation has been offered and protracted negotiations have taken place, there is no evidence that supports the contention that compensation greater than the $10,000 offered is required and that as the dispute is essentially as to the amount of compensation that damages are an adequate remedy. 
  6. [49]
    Contrary to the Landlord’s submission, the evidence before the Tribunal is that the Tenant took issue with the Notice of Change of Rental Property.[38]  It did so reasonably promptly[39] and sought to negotiate an acceptable outcome.  It was only when those negotiations broke down that it sought the Tribunal’s assistance to restrain what it contends is the Landlord’s actions in breach of the RSL Act and the lease.  I am not satisfied that its attempt to resolve the matter by agreement is a lack of ‘clean hands’ preventing it from seeking an appropriate restraining order. 
  7. [50]
    If the Landlord is not restrained and it invalidly terminates the lease and locks the Tenant out, then the Tenant says it would render the proceedings nugatory.  To the extent that the proceedings seek a declaration that the Tenant is entitled to quiet enjoyment until 31 March 2022 such a declaration could still be sought.  The Landlord says that rather than being allowed to remain in possession any rights flowing from such a declaration would sound in damages. Similarly, the Landlord contends that any order that the Tenant was entitled to six months’ notice in proper form or reasonable alternative premises and reasonable compensation would sound in damages.
  8. [51]
    The Landlord contends that this is essentially a dispute as to adequate compensation.  It says that the terms of the new lease are determined under section 46F of the RSL Act as the Tenant did not give notice to terminate under section 46E of the RSL Act.  However, as I understand the Tenant’s position it says those provisions are only applicable if a valid notice is given under section 46D, which requires the notice to be given at least three months before the relocation day and it says it was not.  On this basis the terms of the new lease are in dispute.
  9. [52]
    In weighing the balance of convenience, a significant factor is whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the applicant.[40]  The concept of adequacy of damages has sometimes been expressed as requiring an assessment as to whether it is just, in all the circumstances, to confine the applicant to the remedy of damages.[41]
  10. [53]
    The Tenant says damages are not an adequate remedy because if the Landlord is not restrained it will cause disruption to the Tenant’s business and its employees and customers.  In view of the nature of the Tenant’s business there is likely to be limited alternative premises from which it can lawfully operate particularly at short notice.  There is no evidence before me as to the consequences to the Landlord if an appropriate restraining order is made.  It would seem likely that the Landlord’s proposed changes to the premises would be delayed but there is no evidence before me as to the particulars.
  11. [54]
    In relation to the balance of convenience, SM Brown observed:

The court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been ‘wrong’, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party who fails to establish his right at the trial, or in failing to grant an injunction to a party who succeeds at trial.[42]

  1. [55]
    The Landlord contends that since the Notice of Dispute has been lodged section 94 of the RSL Act prevents it from commencing proceedings to secure vacant possession based on the notice to leave.  It says it acts as a stay so that a restraining order is not required.  Section 94 of the RSL Act provides subject to certain exceptions[43] that once a notice of dispute is lodge the dispute must not be referred to arbitration or heard by any court.  Section 94 may prevent an application to a court in respect of the issue in dispute in the Notice of Dispute but does not necessarily prevent the Landlord from unlawfully changing the locks.
  2. [56]
    I find that the balance of convenience favours the making of a restraining order to protect the Tenant’s position and secure the effectiveness of the exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and it is just and convenient to do so because to do so carries the lower risk of injustice should it turn out to be ‘wrong’. 
  3. [57]
    The Landlord should be restrained from acting in reliance on the Form 8 Notice dated 5 March 2021 or relocation or demolition notices issued to the Tenant prior to 12 April 2021, the date of the filing the Application for interim order.  The restraint should be in place until 31 March 2022 or further order of the Tribunal or written agreement by the parties, upon the Tenant giving the usual undertaking as to costs and damages.

Footnotes

[1]  Directions 15 April 2021 and 28 April 2021.

[2]  Tenant’s submissions filed 19 April 2021 and 28 April 2021. Landlord’s submissions filed 28 April 2021 (dated 23 April 2021) and 29 April 2021.

[3]  Affidavit of Anthony Johnson filed 12 April 2021, AJ12.

[4] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 58(1) (QCAT Act).

[5]  Ibid, s 59(1).

[6] Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s 103 (RSL Act).

[7]  Ibid, schedule (definition ‘retail tenancy dispute’).

[8]  Ibid, s 5A.

[9]  Ibid, s 5B.

[10]  Ibid, s 5C.

[11]  Ibid, s 5D. 

[12]  Affidavit of Anthony Johnson filed 12 April 2021, AJ4, cl 2.40.

[13]  Ibid, AJ3, item 5.

[14] Real Management Solutions Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2016] QCAT 370, [38] – [39].

[15]  RSL Act, s 97.

[16]  Ibid, s 55.

[17]  Ibid, s 56.

[18]  Ibid, s 63.

[19]  Ibid, s 64.

[20] McDonald’s Australia Ltd v Emaaas Pty Ltd [2011] QCAT 293 (Emaas).

[21]  QCAT Act, s 67 – s 74.

[22]  [2011] QCAT 293, [27].

[23]  QCAT Act, Schedule 3, (definition of ‘proceeding’).

[24]  [2011] QCAT 293, [30].

[25] Burinpinpat Pty Ltd t/as Chili Coco v FFTOA Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 100, [14].

[26]  [2016] QCAT 100.

[27]  Ibid, [8].

[28]  [2019] QCATA 82.

[29]  [2021] QCAT 24, [40]-[42]

[30]  [2019] QCAT 30.

[31]  Ibid, [48].

[32]  QCAT Act, s 3(c).

[33]  Ibid, s 4(d).

[34]  Ibid, s 58(3), s 59(6).

[35]  Ibid, s 58(3)(b), s 59(6)(b).

[36]  Applicant submissions filed 28 April 2020, page 4, [25].

[37]  QCAT Act, s 58(2), s 59(3).

[38]  Affidavit of Anthony Johnson filed 12 April 2021, AJ7.

[39]  Ibid, AJ8.

[40] Airlie Beach Real Estate Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2018] QCAT 317, [70].

[41] Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola SA [1973] 1 WLR 349; The Software Link (Aust) Pty Ltd v Texada Software Inc [2005] FCA 1072 at [22].

[42] Parkview Management Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Boca Raton Community Titles Scheme 22486 [2018] QCAT 6, [24].

[43]  RSL Act, s 94(2).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd v Ridong (Australia) International Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Gold Coast Jet Boating Pty Ltd v Ridong (Australia) International Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2022] QCAT 3

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Member Deane

  • Date:

    12 Jan 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

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