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Robert Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated[2022] QCAT 57

Robert Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated[2022] QCAT 57

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Robert Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2022] QCAT 57

PARTIES:

ROBERT LEGAT

(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY INCORPORATED

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR339-20

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

17 February 2022

HEARING DATE:

12 October 2021

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Hon Peter Lyons QC, Judicial Member

ORDERS:

  1.    The application of the applicant for a review of the respondent’s decision to refuse to renew the applicant’s practising certificate, and for an order for its renewal, is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSION AND TRADES – LAWYERS – PRACTISING CERTIFICATE – CANCELLATION AND SUSPENSION – where respondent refused to renew applicant’s practising certificate – where applicant failed to disclose ASIC banning order – where applicant’s company engaged in provision of finance provided through a franchise network – where applicant knew his business model was an artificial and contrived scheme – where applicant has made excessive criticisms of judicial officers – whether respondent made the correct and preferable decision – whether applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate 

Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 r 3.1, r 4.1.2, r 5.1

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 9, s 19(2), s 46, s 51(5), s 51(9)

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 20, s 28(3)

Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld) s 19

Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1055

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 243

Carter & Anor v Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd & Anor [2011] QCAT 525

Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd & Anor v Charter & Anor [2012] QCATA 51

Legat and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 685

New South Wales Bar Association v Cummin (2001) 52 NSWLR 279

Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Alcorn [2007] NSWCA 288

R v Metropolis Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (No 2) [1968] QB 118

REPRESENTATION:

 

Applicant:

L C Crowley QC, with M J Jackson of Counsel, instructed by Behlau Murakami Grant ILP

Respondent:

D G Clothier QC, instructed by Queensland Law Society

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    On 14 May 2019, the applicant applied to the respondent for the renewal of his practising certificate.  The respondent decided to refuse the application.  The applicant has applied to the Tribunal for a review of that decision.  He contends that the correct and preferable decision, on the basis of the materials before the Tribunal, is that the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to continue to hold a practising certificate, and accordingly his practising certificate should be renewed.  The issue arises primarily out of the applicant’s involvement in the provision of funding to persons pursuant to what is referred to as the “diamond model” and the applicant’s subsequent conduct in defence of that model.
  2. [2]
    No oral evidence was presented.  Relevant events have been considered by a number of decisions of the Federal Court of Australia and other tribunals.  It seemed to be common ground that their findings and reasons could (at least for the most part) be relied upon, and I generally propose to do so.  There were other materials before this Tribunal, to which reference will also be made.

Background

  1. [3]
    The applicant has been a solicitor admitted to practise in this State since 1998.  He worked as a solicitor with two firms between 1999 and 2002.  In 2001 he commenced work with an organisation he described as the Fast Access Finance group as in-house legal counsel, continuing in that role until 2017.  It appears that the company with the control of the operations of that group was Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd (“FAF”).  There were three shareholders of this company, one being a company associated with the applicant’s brother, James Legat; one being a company which the applicant referred to as his company; and the third being an acquaintance of James Legat.  The applicant was appointed company secretary in 1997.  He became a director in 2011. 
  2. [4]
    FAF engaged in the provision of finance, providing small loans for personal use usually to people in difficult financial circumstances.[1]  It appears that this was carried out, not by FAF itself providing the loans, but through a franchise network.  Franchisees included Fast Access Finance (Burleigh) Pty Ltd (“FAF Burleigh”), Fast Access Finance (Beenleigh) Pty Ltd (“FAF Beenleigh”) and Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd (“FAF Beaudesert”).
  3. [5]
    From 31 July 2008 the Queensland Government brought into effect statutory changes which limited the amount which could be charged by a lender to 48% of the amount of the loan, including interest, fees and other charges. The diamond model was devised to avoid this limit.  The applicant devised the model, and was the person mainly responsible for drafting the template documents by which it was implemented. 
  4. [6]
    Under the scheme, a person seeking funds (“consumer”) would approach a FAF franchisee.  The consumer would sign a document purporting to buy a quantity of diamonds for a price payable over a period of months from the FAF franchisee.  At the same time, the consumer would sign a document purporting to sell the diamonds to a company, Diamond Clearing House Pty Ltd (“DCH”), for half of the price to be paid to the franchisee.  In this manner the consumer obtained the funds which the consumer had sought.  The result was that the consumer would, over a period of months, pay to the FAF franchisee, 100% more than the funds which became available to the consumer from DCH.  The applicant was the person primarily responsible for the documentation used in these transactions, and for the instructions to those who used it.  The diamond model was in active operation from August 2008 until April 2012; though consumers continued to make payments in accordance with it until 2017.
  5. [7]
    DCH was a company specially established for its role in this model.  It purported to buy diamonds from FAF franchisee consumers; and to sell diamonds to the relevant franchisee.  Its sole director was Ms Joylene Lange, the sister-in-law of Mr James Legat.  After an initial period, DCH received a fixed fee of $500 per month, but otherwise did not profit from the transactions.
  6. [8]
    There are some features of this model which should be noted.  A consumer approaching a FAF franchisee was seeking short term finance; and had no interest in the purchase of diamonds.  The first document provided to a consumer was a Loan Application.  The consumer was required to sign a Privacy Act Consent Form, which contained a statement that the consumer had applied “to borrow a certain amount of money”.  Once a decision had been made to grant the loan, the consumer was required to enter into what was called a Sale Agreement, for the sale by the relevant FAF franchisee of a quantity of diamonds of a general description.  The price was $250 per diamond; a price which apparently did not vary from transaction to transaction, or over the period of some three years and eight months during which the model was in active use.  This document called for delivery of the diamonds to the consumer.  The diamonds were kept at the home of the applicant’s brother, in bags for each franchisee, but otherwise undifferentiated.  Except on a couple of occasions where a purchase in fact occurred, they remained there.  These occasions are not representative of the operation of the diamond model, and will be ignored.  Delivery did not occur to persons who were seeking funds.  Under the model, specific diamonds were not allocated to a particular sale, so that title did not pass to the consumer.[2]  The consumer also signed a Purchase Agreement for the sale of the same number of diamonds to DCH for $125 each (a price which similarly did not vary).  This document also called for delivery of the diamonds to DCH, but inevitably, this did not occur.  Nor could title pass from the consumer to DCH.  However it was as a result of these events that the consumer received the sum of money which the consumer had sought.  Any notional transaction between DCH and the FAF franchisee, to result in the franchisee regaining title to the diamonds, to be used in future transactions, likewise could not result in any delivery of the diamonds, or transfer of title.  It would seem that the only person to represent DCH when these transactions were purportedly carried out was a person associated with the relevant FAF franchisee.[3] 
  7. [9]
    To meet the repayment requirement of the Sale Agreement, the consumer signed a Direct Debit Request against the consumer’s bank account, in favour of the FAF franchisee.  Where security was taken, it was by a Collateral Security Agreement, typically over a consumer’s motor vehicle.
  8. [10]
    The diamond model was considered by Adjudicator LeMass of this Tribunal in Carter & Anor v Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd & Anor.[4]  The Adjudicator ordered the franchisee to repay all amounts recovered by it, save for the amount initially sought by the applicants by way of loan (corresponding to the “purchase price” from DCH under the Purchase Agreement).  He examined the documents used in the model, in light of the evidence of what occurred.  He rejected a submission that the transaction was not a credit transaction, but transactions for the sale and purchase of diamonds, saying:[5]

I find that the characterisation of the transaction in that manner is so highly unlikely, improbable and implausible as to be a complete fiction. It is ridiculous that a person would wish to enter a business premises in order to buy a product no matter what it be, to sell it immediately and make a loss.

  1. [11]
    Leave to appeal the Adjudicator’s decision was sought, but was refused.[6]
  2. [12]
    From 1 July 2011, the regulation of consumer credit was undertaken by the Commonwealth.  Its legislation required that a person who was in the business of providing consumer credit be licensed.  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) brought proceedings against FAF and two of its franchisees for declarations and penalties, because they engaged in consumer credit lending whilst unlicensed.  In the course of his reasons dealing with liability issues, Dowsett J said:[7]

I conclude that the arrangements for the sale of diamonds to Mr Eadie (the relevant consumer), and by him to DCH, comprised a pretence or sham, brought into existence as a mere piece of machinery, to conceal the true nature of the transaction, which was the provision of credit. Neither side intended that the Sales Agreement should create the relationship of vendor and purchaser as between FAF Beenleigh and Mr Eadie. Neither Mr Eadie nor DCH intended that the Purchase Agreement should create that relationship between them. I find that FAF Beenleigh intended to conceal the true nature of the transaction from those responsible for enforcing the interest cap. I doubt whether Mr Eadie had any such intention, but his involvement was no greater and no less than that of the successful tenants in the second appeal in Vaughan.

  1. [13]
    Dowsett J delivered separate reasons for imposing penalties[8] on FAF and the two franchisees.  The penalty imposed on FAF was a pecuniary penalty of $400,000, reflecting its known involvement in 17 contraventions. 
  2. [14]
    ASIC then took regulatory action against the applicant.  Acting under ss 80 and 81 of the National Consumer Protection Act 2009 (Cth), on 27 September 2017 it prohibited him from engaging in credit activities for a period of three years.  It also found that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a consumer credit licence.   The applicant sought a review of that decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”).  The matter was heard on 17 and 18 May 2018.  That Tribunal (constituted by Deputy President McCabe) delivered its decision on 9 April 2019.  It varied the decision of ASIC by increasing the period of the prohibition from three to five years, but otherwise did not disturb it.[9]  At this point it is sufficient to note that the Tribunal also took the view that the transactions carried out under the diamond model were sham transactions.[10]  The decision resulted in the publication of an article, highly critical of the applicant, on the Courier Mail website on 16 April 2019.[11]  The applicant appealed against the Tribunal’s decision, but the appeal was ultimately compromised, with orders being made by consent on 14 November 2019, dismissing the appeal with costs.
  3. [15]
    In the meantime, on 4 May 2018, the applicant made an application to renew his practising certificate for the 2018–2019 year.  In the application, he failed to disclose the ASIC decision of 27 September 2017, referred to in these reasons as the non-disclosure.  When the applicant applied on 14 May 2019 for a renewal of his practising certificate for the following year, he advised that he had been the subject of a suitability matter which he had not previously disclosed to the respondent.  In an email of the same date to the respondent, the applicant advised of the outcome of the AAT review, and specifically of its finding that he was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities, and that he was the subject of a banning order for a period of five years.
  4. [16]
    On 13 August 2020 the Executive Committee of the respondent resolved that it was satisfied that the applicant was not a fit and proper person for the renewal of a practising certificate.  The applicant was advised of this, and that his practising certificate would not be renewed, by an information notice dated 25 September 2020. The applicant seeks a review of the respondent’s decision.  He seeks orders that the decision be set aside, and that a decision be made to renew his practising certificate.

Submissions

  1. [17]
    For the applicant it was submitted that the seriousness of his impugned conduct was mitigated by his state of mind at the time he engaged in the conduct.  He now accepts and understands that there was no rational basis for his state of mind at that time.  The applicant did not knowingly contravene the credit legislation. It was submitted that the respondent’s decision did not give recognition to the applicant’s state of mind when devising and implementing the diamond model.  He did not intend to contravene the legislation regulating the provision of consumer credit.  It was his honest subjective belief that the diamond model did not contravene the legislation.  He has now shown insight into the mistakes he made, both in relation to the diamond model, and his conduct in defending that model and his role in relation to it, in the ASIC proceedings and in the AAT; and the fact that he was misguided.
  2. [18]
    It was submitted that the applicant has not pursued or repeated the diamond model since April 2012.  He has complied with the order banning him from conducting legal practice since it was imposed on 3 October 2017.  He has accepted that the model contravened the credit legislation.  He has shown insight into his past misconduct.  He did not deliberately withhold information when he applied for the renewal of his practising certificate in 2018; and voluntarily disclosed the position in 2019.  He has taken sufficient steps towards rehabilitation and addressing concerns about his character.
  3. [19]
    The submissions also relied upon the report of Dr Hatzipetrou, a psychologist. Dr Hatzipetrou considered that further assessment and examination was required to determine whether a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) could be made of the applicant, but considered that the applicant meets the criteria for a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (Level 1) (“ASD”).  Features of ASD consist of persistent impairments in reciprocal social communication and social interactions, and restrictive and repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities.  The applicant had described a meticulous process of research analysis, reviewing policies and developing knowledge to formulate a model that would support the business and generate profits.  This single intense focus is characteristic of ASD.  The applicant was likely to be immersed in this model without considering the potential and/or likely consequences.  He was likely to form justifications and beliefs about the model.
  4. [20]
    Dr Hatzipetrou reported that the applicant had denied an intention to engage in unlawful behaviour.  His persistence in defending the model was likely to be underpinned by a firm and unwavering belief that he was operating within the law.  The applicant believed that he did not deliberately attempt to engage in unlawful acts that contravened the credit legislation.  The applicant is likely to be compliant with rules and orders.  The condition is a lifelong condition.  However, the applicant would benefit from mentoring by an experienced colleague.  He would also benefit from engagement with a clinical psychologist, with a focus on improving his coping skills, in particular with anxiety and stress.  He would be a suitable candidate for behaviour therapy which focusses on improving his understanding of social interactions, and giving him greater awareness of his behaviours in social situations.  His ASD was not a barrier to the pursuit of a career or meaningful employment.
  5. [21]
    On the basis of Dr Hatzipetrou’s report, it was submitted that the applicant did not have character flaws which were incapable of rectification; and it was not shown that he was incapable of acting as a lawyer.
  6. [22]
    It was submitted that the applicant gave an explanation for his failure to disclose the ASIC decision when he applied to renew his practising certificate in May 2018.  The explanation was in his statement given to the respondent, dated 29 April 2020 (“applicant’s statement”).[12]  There was said to be considerable evidence of his remorse, including in a letter from his solicitor to the respondent of 5 August 2019 and in the reports of the psychologists.  There was other evidence of good character and professionalism.  Many years have passed since the applicant developed the diamond model, and played a role in its implementation.  The applicant’s written submissions pointed out that the relevant question is whether the applicant is now, and in the future will be, not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  His conduct in recent years, including undertaking a number of courses, was said to be in his favour.  He has had an otherwise unblemished professional career.
  7. [23]
    The respondent’s written submissions relied upon the findings of the Federal Court that the diamond model was a pretence and a sham and to have involved the deliberate and premeditated exploitation of vulnerable people.  The model was an artificial and contrived scheme, designed and implemented by the applicant, and intended by him to circumvent an important legislative protection for vulnerable recipients of consumer credit.  It involved the applicant authoring untrue statements to be made to consumers.  It was not discontinued when its true character was exposed publicly in Carter.  The applicant did not disclose the ASIC finding in his application for the renewal of his practising certificate in 2018.  In the AAT proceedings, the applicant continued to defend the legitimacy of the diamond model.  In doing so, he displayed a contemptuous and disrespectful attitude towards this Tribunal and towards the decisions of the Federal Court; and a complete absence of insight, responsibility and contrition.  The applicant displayed a similar absence of insight, responsibility and contrition in several submissions made on his behalf, and in his statement to the respondent.  In the circumstances, the respondent correctly concluded that the applicant did not possess the character, integrity, honesty or judgment required of a person to be considered to be a fit and proper person to continue to hold a practising certificate.  The applicant’s attempts to show insight, responsibility and contrition are inadequate.  His evidence in the Federal Court that FAF and its franchisees were in the business of selling diamonds, including for cash, and that customers could do what they wished with the diamonds, was disingenuous at best.  It is difficult to accept the applicant’s statement that he did not set out to exploit vulnerable people.  The statement reveals something particularly troubling about the applicant’s character.  The applicant’s stated acceptance of the correctness of the decisions in Carter and in the Federal Court has come late and it is open to infer that the acceptance was reluctant, and occurred only after the applicant’s ability to continue to practise as a solicitor was put in doubt.  The applicant still does not appreciate the full import and gravity of the findings made against him in the Federal Court and the AAT.  He has been unfairly critical of this Tribunal in relation to Carter; and of Dowsett J.
  8. [24]
    For the respondent, it was submitted orally that the applicant was seeking a principal’s practising certificate.  It was significant that the applicant had not gone on oath to depose to the matters on which he relied, and had thereby avoided exposure to cross-examination.  The applicant was responsible for devising and implementing the diamond scheme, which was artificial and contrived, engaged in for gain, and which the applicant has now accepted was legally baseless.  On the question of whether the respondent’s involvement in a breach of the legislative controls was intentional, reference was made to the findings of Dowsett J in FAF 2, as to the position of those involved in FAF’s operation.  Reference was also made to the fact that the legislation was protective of vulnerable people.  The applicant knew who the likely customers of FAF were. He was responsible for the deliberate and premeditated exploitation of these people.  He was responsible for a false explanation of the scheme to a consumer, as recorded in Carter at [14].  He was responsible for documents containing questionable or false explanations to consumers for the transactions involved in the diamond model, one plainly untrue, as recorded in the AAT decision at [18].  He defended this statement in his response to the respondent (see the respondent’s bundle at p 149). 
  9. [25]
    Some initial observations should be made about the respondent’s submissions.  It is significant that the applicant has not gone on oath and been exposed to cross-examination.  The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, and may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate[13].  While that means that documents recording statements of the applicant may be taken into account in determining factual matters, they may not attract the same weight as sworn evidence.   It is therefore undesirable, particularly for a legal practitioner whose character is in issue, to rely on unsworn material.  Because the applicant has not given evidence on oath, the Tribunal has been deprived of the assistance it might otherwise have received from the cross-examination of the applicant.  It also has the consequence that some matters have not been put to the applicant in cross-examination.  However, these have been raised in the respondent’s material, principally in its written submissions.  It will be necessary for the Tribunal to make findings on the material before it, notwithstanding that it is generally unsworn, and has not been the subject of cross-examination.
  10. [26]
    It is also convenient to make an observation about the characterisation which the respondent has given to a number of the applicant’s statements.  They are said to be disingenuous, or disingenuous at best.  The word may mean “slightly dishonest, or not speaking the complete truth”[14], “not truly honest or sincere”[15], or “not candid or sincere, typically by pretending that one knows less about something than one really does”[16].  The word plainly carries a connotation of dishonesty.  It is used by the respondent not infrequently in conjunction with a submission that the applicant was maintaining a pretence.  At one point the respondent submitted that it was “very difficult to accept (the applicant’s) statement of an honest belief that the genuine nature of the transactions pursuant to the diamond model were (sic) the sale and purchase of diamonds”[17].  It seems to me that it must have been clear to the applicant that the honesty of a number of his statements has been put in issue, even though the respondent was not able cross-examine the applicant to that effect.

Statutory framework

  1. [27]
    The respondent’s decision to refuse to renew the applicant’s practising certificate was made under s 51(5) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (“LP Act”).  It is as follows:

(5)The regulatory authority must not renew a local practising certificate if it is satisfied that the applicant—

(a)was not eligible to apply for the renewal of the certificate when the application was made; or

(b)is not a fit and proper person to continue to hold the certificate.

Note—

See section 46  (Suitability to hold local practising certificate).

  1. [28]
    The relevant limb is s 51(5)(b).  The respondent’s decision was to be made by reference to s 46 of that Act:

46  Suitability to hold local practising certificate

(1)This section has effect for the purposes of section 51 and any other provision of this Act where the question of whether or not a person is a fit and proper person to hold, or to continue to hold, a local practising certificate is relevant.

(2)A regulatory authority of this jurisdiction, in considering whether a person is, or is no longer, a fit and proper person to hold a local practising certificate, may take into account any suitability matter relating to the person, and any of the following, whether happening before or after the commencement of this section—

(a)whether the person obtained an Australian practising certificate because of incorrect or misleading information;

(b)whether the person has contravened a condition of an Australian practising certificate held by the person;

(c)whether the person has contravened a relevant law or a corresponding law;

(d)whether the person has contravened—

(i)an order of a disciplinary body or the Supreme Court; or

(ii)an order of a corresponding disciplinary body, or of a court or tribunal of another jurisdiction exercising jurisdiction or powers by way of appeal or review of an order of a corresponding disciplinary body;

(e)without limiting any other paragraph, whether the person has failed to pay an amount for which the person is or was liable under a relevant law or a corresponding law, including, for example, an amount payable to the fidelity fund or other costs or expenses for which the person is liable under a relevant law;

(f)whether, without limiting paragraph (e), the person has contravened a provision of a relevant law or a corresponding law about professional indemnity insurance;

(g)whether the person is or was a legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice while the practice is or was insolvent;

(h)whether the person is or was a director of a corporation while the corporation is or was insolvent; 

  1. (i)
    other matters the authority thinks are appropriate.

(3)A person may be considered a fit and proper person to hold, or to continue to hold, a local practising certificate even though the person is within any of the categories of the matters mentioned in subsection (2), if the relevant authority considers that the circumstances warrant the decision.

(4)If a matter was—

(a)disclosed in an application for admission to the legal profession in this or another jurisdiction; and 

(b)decided by the Supreme Court or the board, or a Supreme Court of another jurisdiction or corresponding authority of another jurisdiction corresponding to the board, not to be sufficient for refusing admission to the legal profession; 

the matter can not be taken into account as a ground for refusing to grant or renew, or for suspending or cancelling, a local practising certificate, but the matter may be taken into account when considering other matters in relation to the person concerned.

  1. [29]
    The reference in s 46(2) to suitability matters makes it necessary to refer to s 9, which is as follows:[18]

9  Suitability matters

  1. (1)
    Each of the following is a suitability matter in relation to a natural person—
    1. (a)
      whether the person is currently of good fame and character;
    2. (b)
      whether the person is or has been an insolvent under administration;
    3. (c)
      whether the person is or has been a legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice while the practice is or was a chapter 5 body corporate;
    4. (d)
      whether the person is or has been a director of a corporation while the corporation is or was a chapter 5 body corporate;
    5. (e)
      whether the person has been convicted of an offence in Australia or a foreign country, and if so—
      1. the nature of the offence; and
      2. how long ago the offence was committed; and
      3. the person’s age when the offence was committed;
    6. (f)
      whether the person engaged in legal practice in Australia—
      1. when not admitted to the legal profession, or not holding a practising certificate, as required under a relevant law or a corresponding law; or
      2. if admitted to the legal profession, in contravention of a condition on which admission was granted; or
      3. if holding an Australian practising certificate, in contravention of a condition applicable to the certificate or while the certificate was suspended;
    7. (g)
      whether the person has practised law in a foreign country—
      1. when not permitted under a law of that country to do so; or
      2. if permitted to do so, in contravention of a condition of the permission;
    8. (h)
      whether the person is currently subject to an unresolved complaint, investigation, charge or order under any of the following—
  1. a relevant law;
  2. a corresponding law;
  3. a corresponding foreign law;
  1. (i)
    whether the person—
    1. is the subject of current disciplinary action, however expressed, in another profession or occupation in Australia or a foreign country; or
    2. has been the subject of disciplinary action, however expressed, relating to another profession or occupation that involved a finding of guilt;
  2. (j)
    whether the person’s name has been removed from—
    1. a local roll but has not since been restored to or entered on a local roll; or
    2. an interstate roll, but has not since been restored to or entered on an interstate roll; or
    3. a foreign roll;
  3. (k)
    whether the person’s right to engage in legal practice has been suspended or cancelled in Australia or a foreign country;
  4. (l)
    whether the person has contravened, in Australia or a foreign country, a law about trust money or trust accounts;
  5. (m)
    whether, under a relevant law, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, a supervisor, manager or receiver, however described, is or has been appointed in relation to any legal practice engaged in by the person;
  6. (n)
    whether the person is or has been subject to an order under this Act, a previous Act, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, disqualifying the person from being employed by, or a partner of, an Australian legal practitioner or from managing a corporation that is an incorporated legal practice;
  7. (o)
    whether the person currently is unable to satisfactorily carry out the inherent requirements of practice as an Australian legal practitioner;
  8. (p)
    a matter declared under an Act to be a suitability matter.
  1. (2)
    A matter under subsection (1) is a suitability matter even though it happened before the commencement of this section.
  1. [30]
    Under s 19(2) of the LP Act, the respondent’s satisfaction for the purposes of s 51(5) must be reasonable in the circumstances.
  2. [31]
    The right to bring this application to review the respondent’s decision is founded in s 51(9) of the LP Act.  The application is to be made as provided under the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (“QCAT Act”).  Under s 20 of that Act, these proceedings are a “fresh hearing on the merits” of the applicant’s application to renew his practising certificate; and the purpose of the review is “to produce the correct and preferable decision”.

Some legal principles

  1. [32]
    The ultimate question is whether this Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is (as at the time of this decision) not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  In deciding that question, the Tribunal may have regard to suitability matters, including whether the applicant is of good fame and character.  These expressions have been the subject of judicial consideration, more frequently in the context of disciplinary proceedings.  The applicant accepted the respondent’s statements of legal principle, which in a number of cases were based on decisions relating to disciplinary proceedings.  It seems to me that that acceptance is substantially correct.  That is because of their close connexion in the context of the statute itself;[19] and because both types of proceedings have similar underlying concerns.
  2. [33]
    The respondent identified relevant aspects of the public interest which support the requirement that a solicitor be a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice, by reference to the following passage from New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins:[20]

20    There are four interrelated interests involved. Clients must feel secure in confiding their secrets and entrusting their most personal affairs to lawyers. Fellow practitioners must be able to depend implicitly on the word and the behaviour of their colleagues. The judiciary must have confidence in those who appear before the courts. The public must have confidence in the legal profession by reason of the central role the profession plays in the administration of justice. Many aspects of the administration of justice depend on the trust by the judiciary and/or the public in the performance of professional obligations by professional people.

  1. [34]
    The paragraph immediately preceding this paragraph is also relevant:

19   Honesty and integrity are important in many spheres of conduct. However, in some spheres significant public interests are involved in the conduct of particular persons and the state regulates and restricts those who are entitled to engage in those activities and acquire the privileges associated with a particular status. The legal profession has long required the highest standards of integrity.

  1. [35]
    The respondent cited Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Alcorn[21] for the proposition that the question of whether a person is of a good fame and character requires consideration of matters affecting their moral standards and attitudes and qualities.  There is useful discussion of related considerations in the surrounding paragraphs of the judgment:

A person of good fame and character

57 The absence of “good fame and character” is a matter that falls to be determined at the time of the hearing not at some prior time (Ex parte Tziniolis; Re The Medical Practitioners Act (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448 per Holmes JA at 475.

58 In determining whether a person is of good fame and character, the Court is to consider “matters affecting the moral standards and attitudes and qualities (of an applicant for registration) and not merely consider what is his general reputation” – see Ex parte Tziniolis; Re Medical Practitioners Act  (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448 at 451 and Incorporated Law Institute of NSW v Meagher [1909] HCA 87;  (1909) 9 CLR 655 per Higgins J at 692.

59 However the notion of good character is not at large. It must relate to the qualities relevant to practice as a professional. Kirby P described the concept as follows:

“The ‘good character’ which is required, the absence of which may give rise to complaint leading to sanctions, must be a ‘good character’ relevant to the purpose for which the complaint is entertained, viz for the making of an order affecting the practice of the medical practitioner concerned as such... The relevant function of the Tribunal is to protect the public from medical practitioners whose continued practice may cause harm to the public”.  (McBride v Walton (NSWCA unreported, 15 July 1994 at [15]).

60 Dixon J described the concept of “good fame and character” as follows:

“It would almost seem to go to without saying that conviction of a crime of dishonesty of so grave a kind as housebreaking and stealing is incompatible with the existence in a candidate for admission to the Bar of the reputation and more enduring moral qualities denoted by the expression ‘good fame and character’, which describes the test of his ethical fitness for the profession.” (In Re: Davis at 420)

61 There was no question that the conduct of the opponent during 2002 demonstrated the absence of qualities necessary in a person of good fame and character. The only question is whether that situation continues at the present time. Walsh JA provides assistance on this question in Tziniolis at 461:

“Reformations of character and of behaviour can doubtless occur but their occurrence is not the usual but the exceptional thing. One cannot assume that a change has occurred merely because some years have gone by and it is not proved that anything of a discreditable kind has occurred. If a man has exhibited serious deficiencies in his standards of conduct and his attitudes, it must require clear proof to show that some years later he has established himself as a different man.”

  1. [36]
    The respondent’s submissions also relied upon three provisions of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012[22] (“ASCR”).  They are: that a solicitor’s duty to the court and to the administration of justice is paramount; a solicitor must be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice; and a solicitor must not, in the course of practice or otherwise, engage in conduct which is likely, to a material degree, to be prejudicial to, or diminish the public confidence in, the administration of justice, or bring the legal profession into disrepute.

Some matters relating to applicant’s role in the diamond model

  1. [37]
    The respondent’s submission that the diamond model was an artificial and contrived scheme, designed and implemented by the applicant, and intended by him to circumvent an important legislative protection for vulnerable recipients of consumer credit, should be accepted.  The applicant has admitted that he knew the model was artificial and contrived.[23]  That the applicant designed it, and played a significant role in its implementation, is not in issue.  It is clear that the diamond model arose out of the desire to enable the FAF group to continue to provide funds to consumers at high cost, in the face of the changes made to the credit legislation in 2008.  It is difficult to think of any explanation for these changes, other than the protection of vulnerable people.  Who else would be prepared to repay, over a relatively short period of time, twice the amount made available through the series of transactions designed by the applicant?  There can be no doubt that the applicant understood that the consumers who approached FAF franchisees were seeking consumer credit.  The first of the suite of documents presented to them was a loan application; and the Privacy Act Consent Form recorded that the consumer had applied “to borrow a certain amount of money”. 
  2. [38]
    The respondent’s submission that the applicant engaged in this conduct for personal gain is plainly correct.
  3. [39]
    In his response to the respondent’s letter of 7 June 2019, the applicant stated that he “did not set out to deliberately and with premeditation exploit vulnerable people”.[24]  The respondent has submitted that it is difficult to accept this statement.  I do not consider it to be true.  The applicant set out to avoid protections which the legislature sought to provide to vulnerable people, with the consequence that they would pay, in addition to the amount made available, a relatively large amount for the use of money for a short period.  In my view, this involved exploitation of the vulnerability of these consumers, particularly because it was achieved in the face of legislation designed to protect them.  Dowsett J said, “the most heinous aspect of the case is the deliberate and pre-meditated exploitation of these vulnerable people”.[25]  In my respectful view, his Honour’s statement is correct.  The person whose conduct is most aptly described by the statement is the applicant, as the person ultimately responsible for the design and implementation of the model.
  4. [40]
    The applicant was the person principally responsible for authoring template documents to be used by sales assistants working for FAF franchisees, when dealing with consumers.  If a consumer asked why the sale of diamonds was a necessary feature of the deal, the sales assistant was instructed to say, “Government legislation prevents us from giving you a consumer credit loan”.  As Senior Member McCabe observed, this statement was untrue.[26]  The respondent made a submission to the same effect.[27] The applicant has on a number of occasions referred to his extensive research into the consumer credit legislation.  He could not have thought that the statement was true.  When he was cross-examined about the statement in the AAT, he did not suggest he believed the statement to be true.  Rather he said that the explanation for it was that there was no point in giving a technical response to an enquiry by a consumer because “consumers don’t understand interest rates”.  Although the answer does not give a sensible explanation for the statement in the template, it shows that a deliberate decision was made not to give a truthful answer to the consumer’s enquiry.  In Attachment 2 to his statement the applicant proffered that the statement was true, because compliance with the legislation would have led to the FAF entities trading insolvently.[28]  This explanation was not referred to in the applicant’s submissions, and the respondent has not dealt with it.  It is therefore unnecessary for me to do so.  In case I am wrong, I would record that I am not prepared to accept the factual basis for the explanation on the mere assertion of the applicant.  There is a degree of improbability about it.  It will be apparent that I have grave reservations about the applicant’s credit.  The response was designed as an answer to a question from a consumer about the need for the transactions.  It was intended to prevent the consumer from finding out the reason for the artificial transactions, namely, that the charges exceeded what was permissible if the funds were provided by a FAF entity in the ordinary way, by means of a loan.  It was therefore designed to obfuscate.  It was not intended to communicate that members of the FAF group would not remain solvent if they did not charge amounts in excess of those permitted by the credit legislation.
  5. [41]
    As the reasons in Carter reveal, Ms Carter made enquiries of Fast Access Finance on 2 December 2009 concerning the early repayment of a loan.  The applicant, in his capacity as “legal director of Fast Access Finance Group”, replied on the same day.  He said:

“Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd does not provide consumer loans. They are a diamond retailer, and may occasionally provide business loans. Diamonds are sold in two ways; for cash or on an instalment plan. The purchase price is paid over time usually by weekly or fortnightly instalments, no interest and no fees are charged. Customers may then deal with the diamonds as they see fit. We have an agency agreement with the company who will buy diamonds from our customer for cash at wholesale rates.”

  1. [42]
    The respondent has submitted that this was an attempt to maintain the pretence that the applicant had sought to establish (which I take to mean that transactions with consumers genuinely involved the sale of diamonds to them, with an on-sale to DCH); and that a number of statements in this email are disingenuous at best; that the statement that a consumer could deal with the diamonds as they see fit was untrue; and that the statement about an agency agreement was apt to convey a false impression about DCH’s true role in the diamond model.  I accept those submissions.  In particular, the suggestion that FAF franchisees were in the business of selling diamonds, which I take to be a reference to the statement the franchisee was a diamond retailer, could not be regarded as correct, as the applicant well knew.  On any view they were in the business of providing funds to consumers at relatively high cost, by means of an artificial and contrived scheme.  The material indicates that sales of diamonds almost never occurred (and if they did, it was exceptional).  There has been no suggestion that the applicant had any basis for stating that the franchisee was a diamond retailer, regularly selling diamonds.  Under the diamond model, neither title nor possession of the diamonds passed to the consumer.  It is difficult to think that the applicant did not know this.  Nothing has been identified which would enable the applicant to say, as a general description of operations of FAF franchisees, that customers would be in a position to deal with the diamonds as they saw fit.  To receive funds, which was the reason for the consumer’s approach to the franchisee, the consumer had to “sell” the diamonds to DCH.  The description was plainly misleading.  The statement about the relationship with DCH was also misleading.  It suggests that DCH was independent of the FAF group, but had an arrangement with the group to act as its agent for the purchase of diamonds at wholesale rates.  DCH was not in the business of buying diamonds; rather it contributed to the maintenance of the pretence that the transactions involving the diamonds were genuine, for doing which it was paid a fixed monthly fee.  The response to Ms Carter, taken as a whole, appears to be deliberately designed to give a false picture about the true nature of the business of FAF (Beaudesert).  The picture presented by the applicant to Ms Carter was deliberately misleading.
  2. [43]
    In a somewhat similar vein, the applicant sought to advance in the AAT proceedings an argument that he did not know that consumers were approaching the FAF group to obtain loans.[29]  The applicant’s unwillingness to admit that consumers were seeking loans was submitted by the respondent to be disingenuous at best.  As the AAT reasons record, the position taken by the applicant was inconsistent with one of the assumptions in the briefing note which the applicant had prepared.  It is also inconsistent with some of the documents of which he was the principal author, namely the Loan Application and the Privacy Act Consent Form.  It is not a position he could have honestly taken.  No reason has been advanced for not adopting the AAT’s finding that the applicant knew that potential customers of FAF group companies were looking for loans.[30]  If, as the AAT reasons suggest, the position were advanced by the applicant in evidence, it would be even more concerning; but that is not entirely clear.
  3. [44]
    When giving evidence in the Federal Court, the applicant said that a consumer would not take physical possession of diamonds unless the consumer asked for them.  The respondent submitted that the applicant knew that the diamond model was devised to provide moneys to consumers and involved no diamonds being delivered.  The applicant suggested by his evidence that there could be a sale of diamonds to a consumer, without a purchase by DCH, and that a consumer could actually take diamonds.  This was submitted to be disingenuous.  The submission should be accepted.  The transactions were structured in a way that meant that consumers would not take possession of diamonds; and could not do so if they wished to achieve their objective of obtaining funds.  Consistently, diamonds were not kept at the franchisee’s premises.[31]  While there were apparently rare occasions where a genuine sale of diamonds occurred (and it is not clear that those purchasers had sought loans), the applicant’s answer is designed to suggest that consumers generally were in a position to take physical possession of diamonds, which was untrue.
  4. [45]
    In the Federal Court, the applicant was asked if he knew that customers were not, in reality, coming to the FAF entities to buy diamonds.  He said that he would not agree or disagree with that proposition.[32]  The respondent submitted that it was clear from a briefing note which the applicant prepared before the model was implemented, that the respondent knew the proposition to be true.[33]  It was submitted that the applicant’s evidence in the AAT confirms this.  It is sufficient to refer to the briefing note.  It made plain, as articulated assumptions, that the diamond model was to be offered to consumers who approached a FAF franchisee seeking a consumer credit loan; and that diamonds would be “figuratively useless” to the consumer.  It might also be observed from the inclusion of the Loan Application and the Privacy Act Consent Form in the suite of documents of which the applicant was the principal author, that the model anticipated consumers applying for loans, not seeking to buy diamonds.  The applicant’s answer in the Federal Court conveyed that the applicant was not able to accept the proposition.  That was untrue, to the applicant’s knowledge.

Applicant’s state of mind in relation to diamond model

  1. [46]
    A fundamental tenet of the applicant’s case is that the seriousness of the applicant’s impugned conduct was mitigated by the applicant’s state of mind at the time of that conduct.  He believed the diamond model to be lawful.
  2. [47]
    In the Federal Court, the applicant denied that he understood that the diamond model was really a pretence, and that, in reality, there was no sale or purchase of diamonds.  The respondent pointed out that the applicant has now acknowledged that he always understood that the diamond model was an artificial and contrived means of providing money to consumers seeking loans.  It was submitted that Dowsett J rejected the substance of the applicant’s evidence, and found that it was well understood that consumers approached FAF franchisees for loans, rather than the purchase of diamonds, and that no genuine purchase or sale of diamonds was intended.  It was submitted that the applicant’s evidence was disingenuous. 
  3. [48]
    Dowsett J found that, in particular transactions, a FAF franchisee did not intend that the documents used would create the relationship of vendor and purchaser as between the FAF franchisee and the customer; a similar conclusion should be reached in relation to the purported on-sale to DCH; that the arrangements comprised a pretence or sham, brought into existence as a mere piece of machinery, to conceal the true nature of the transaction, which was the provision of credit; and that the franchisee intended to conceal the true nature of the transaction from those responsible for enforcing the interest cap.[34]  His Honour’s conclusions are based, not on direct evidence of the state of mind of persons associated with the franchisee and DCH, but on an examination of the documents used in the model, and the circumstances which led to the arrangements and the transactions.  There is no reason to think that the conclusion is not appropriate generally in respect of transactions under the diamond model; nor that it would not apply to the applicant as its author.  Elsewhere, Dowsett J said it was difficult to know what to make of the applicant’s evidence, and that it was possible that the applicant honestly thought that the transactions were genuinely by way of sale and purchase, rather than lending and borrowing.[35]  Dowsett J thought it possible that the applicant did not appreciate the artificiality of any explanation of the transactions which might have been given to consumers.  However the applicant has said that he always understood the model to be artificial and contrived.  Dowsett J appears to have taken the view that the applicant may not in fact have realised that a typical consumer would be looking for cash and not diamonds, and that the consumer would be unlikely to care much about the apparent structure of the documentation.  The briefing note, not before Dowsett J, demonstrates that the applicant knew that consumers would be looking for cash, and not diamonds, and would have no interest in purchasing diamonds.  It seems to me that the ground for considering it possible that the applicant genuinely believed that the transactions involved a sale and purchase, rather than a loan, no longer exists.
  4. [49]
    Elsewhere, Dowsett J said, with respect to the diamond model,[36] “The idea of selling diamonds to people who came looking for small loans, and expect to pay high interest rates, borders on the ridiculous”.  His Honour also found that FAF “well understood the transactions using the diamond model” which were being undertaken by FAF franchisees, and was “knowingly concerned” in the transactions which they undertook,[37] which his Honour found to be in truth the provision of credit,[38]  There has been no challenge in these proceedings to his Honour’s conclusions, and they reflect the material which has been put before me.  I am prepared to adopt them. As the person who was responsible for the design and implementation of the model, and its in-house legal counsel, the applicant is the person most likely to know that transactions under the model were not genuine transactions of sale or purchase, and that each was a pretence.  In those circumstances, the applicant’s denial in the Federal Court that he understood that the transactions were a pretence should not be accepted.  The respondent’s submission that the evidence was disingenuous should also be accepted.
  5. [50]
    The applicant’s denial is closely related to his assertion that he believed that the transactions involved a genuine sale and purchase of diamonds.  The applicant has asserted the belief in his statement to the respondent.[39]  He has also stated that he believed the transactions to be lawful.  He has relied on his active participation in the proceedings in this Tribunal, the Federal Court, and the AAT, as demonstrative of that belief[40]. The respondent has pointed out that the applicant has admitted[41] that there was no rational basis for his belief, and submitted that this calls into serious question whether the belief existed at all.[42] 
  6. [51]
    I have made a number of findings already which reflect adversely on the applicant’s credit.  I am not prepared to accept the applicant’s statements that he held such a belief in light of the improbability of the transactions under the diamond model, the applicant’s admission that there was no rational basis for such a belief, the findings of Dowsett J, and my findings adverse to the applicant’s credit.  He had a significant interest in the outcome of the proceedings on which he has relied.  I am not satisfied that his participation in them demonstrates a genuine belief that the transactions were lawful.
  7. [52]
    I am conscious, in making these findings, of the views of Dr Hatzipetrou.  I accept his diagnosis of ASD.  I note his view that the applicant was likely to form justifications and beliefs about the model; and his view that the applicant’s persistence in defending the model was likely to be underpinned by a belief that he was operating within the law.  These views must significantly depend upon statements made by the applicant.  While the applicant’s condition is relevant to the probability that the applicant’s statements about his beliefs were true, that consideration carries little weight in comparison to the matters I have relied upon.
  8. [53]
    I have made findings on the basis of my own review of the material before this Tribunal.  I also note that the applicant submitted orally (as I understood it) that the respondent did not deal with the applicant’s state of mind in reaching its decision.[43]  However the respondent relied on the findings of Dowsett J that the applicant was clearly aware that the model was set up to avoid the statutory interest cap; that the applicant, even with a small amount of imagination, would have realised that the typical customer would be looking for cash, not diamonds; and his Honour’s doubt whether those who controlled FAF really believed that they had devised a scheme which would not engage the legislation.  Taken together, the matters then relied upon by the respondent deal with the applicant’s state of mind, and cast doubt on his belief that the model was lawful.
  9. [54]
    It follows that I do not accept that the applicant had the state of mind on which his Counsel’s submissions rely.

Non-disclosure of banning order

  1. [55]
    Nor am I prepared to accept the applicant’s explanation for his failure to disclose the decision of ASIC in 2017, when applying to renew his practising certificate in May 2018.
  2. [56]
    One of the matters the applicant relied upon was the pressure and strain of the imminent hearing of the AAT review of the ASIC decision.[44]  As was submitted on behalf of the respondent, the ASIC decision must have been at the forefront of his thinking when he was preparing the application.
  3. [57]
    The applicant also stated, by way of explanation for the non-disclosure, that he did not then accurately understand that the ASIC finding constituted a finding of guilt in a disciplinary matter relating to another profession or occupation, for the purposes of s 9(i)(ii) of the LP Act.  The respondent submitted that this statement contradicts and undermines the statement made in the letter from the applicant’s solicitor to the respondent of 5 August 2019.  That does not seem to me to be correct.  The letter speaks of the applicant’s understanding at a later time.  The respondent also submitted that the applicant took the view that there was no finding of guilt against him; and that this shows that the applicant made a conscious decision not to disclose the ASIC finding. The only relevant statement appears to be the one referred to at the beginning of this paragraph.  Nevertheless, I accept that that statement demonstrates an awareness of the obligation to disclose the fact that he had been the subject of disciplinary action involving a finding of guilt against him, and a conscious decision not to disclose the banning order, when he made the renewal application.
  4. [58]
    The respondent also submitted that the applicant’s explanation that he did not consider that the ASIC decision amounted to a finding of guilt is difficult to accept.  I do not consider that this is a satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s failure to make disclosure.  ASIC clearly took disciplinary action.  The grounds for the banning proceedings under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) were that the applicant was likely to be involved in a contravention of a credit legislation provision, and that the applicant lacked fitness and propriety to engage in credit activities.[45]  It is not clear whether both grounds were established, or only one, though both seem to have been in issue in the AAT review.[46] It is difficult to see how a person in the applicant’s position could have thought the banning order might have been made without a finding of guilt on his part.
  5. [59]
    For completeness, reference should be made to the applicant’s explanation that he was confused about the obligation, because the delegate was not prepared to make findings against him under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).[47]  Whatever the effect of the findings under the Corporations Act, the fact remained that at the time of the renewal application, the applicant was the subject of disciplinary action which involved a finding of guilt.  The position reached by the delegate under the Corporations Act could not have led to any confusion about that fact.  Moreover, the explanation can only be relevant if the applicant turned his mind to the obligation to disclose certain disciplinary action, and made a deliberate decision not to disclose the banning order.
  6. [60]
    In his statement, when dealing with the non-disclosure, the applicant stated that he was not advising or acting as a solicitor in credit matters.[48]  The respondent submitted that the relevant conduct occurred by reason of the applicant’s role as in-house counsel for FAF.  The applicant has not taken issue with this submission.  It is not entirely clear what the applicant meant to convey in his statement.  It follows a statement that he had ceased acting for FAF 6 years earlier, and perhaps was intended to refer to his position at the time when the banning order was made.  However, the applicant’s statement records that he continued to be in-house legal counsel for FAF until 2017.[49]  The statements, taken together, appear to be of doubtful reliability; but it is unnecessary to consider them further.
  7. [61]
    The respondent also submitted that candour was required of those seeking the privilege of practising as a solicitor, a requirement that the applicant disregarded.  His excuse reflected his capacity to come up with irrational justifications for improper conduct, reflecting poorly on his character, integrity, honesty or judgment.  I accept that an absence of candour in relation to an application to renew a practising certificate is relevant when considering whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  Its significance will depend upon the circumstances of the case.  I also accept that the applicant was not candid when making the 2018 renewal application.  I also accept that this was the product of a deliberate decision on his part. 
  8. [62]
    It was submitted for the applicant that his disclosure of the banning order in his 2019 renewal application was a significant remedial step.  The applicant did not know that the respondent was by then aware of the order.
  9. [63]
    I have not found a statement by the applicant to the effect that he did not know that the respondent was aware of the banning order by May of 2019;[50] nor that he was unaware of the Courier Mail article.  Given its terms, there is a real prospect that he became aware of this article shortly after its publication; and that it played a role in his decision to disclose the order shortly afterwards.  The absence of evidence, and the fact that there has not been an opportunity to explore these matters in cross-examination, makes it difficult to reach a conclusion about the circumstances in which the applicant disclosed the banning order to the respondent, and whether that is to the applicant’s credit.  I am not prepared to find that the applicant’s disclosure in 2019 is a significant remedial step.
  10. [64]
    The applicant failed to comply with his disclosure obligation when applying in 2018 to renew his practising certificate.  The failure was deliberate.  I have found that the applicant has not given a satisfactory explanation for the failure.  If these views were wrong, I would consider that the applicant failed to be candid in making the application.  Either conclusion is of some significance in determining the application before the Tribunal.  They involve a serious failure on the part of the applicant to comply with an important professional obligation.

Applicant’s reaction to adverse findings

  1. [65]
    The respondent submitted that the applicant disagreed with, and was contemptuous about, the decisions of this Tribunal and the Federal Court;[51] made irrational and disrespectful comments about the decisions and the decision makers;[52] and that he levelled irrational and unprofessional criticisms at the QCAT Adjudicator and at Dowsett J, which went beyond any legitimate expression of disagreement[53].  It is convenient to identify some of the criticisms of Dowsett J in summary form:
    1. (a)
      Dowsett J got the facts and the law wrong in a number of respects;
    2. (b)
      His Honour “saw fit to disregard uncontested evidence especially without any apparent basis for doing so”; and it was said that his Honour’s approach “appears strange”;
    3. (c)
      His Honour’s reasoning established “a dangerous precedent”;
    4. (d)
      Some of the factual findings were said to be “patently untrue and remarkably short-sighted”;
    5. (e)
      Some of his Honour’s findings were “ill-informed”;
    6. (f)
      There were a number of discrepancies and curiosities in his Honour’s judgment, and the applicant did not think “it’s Justice Dowsett’s finest decision, to be honest”;
    7. (g)
      It was “curious” that the decision had taken some time before it was handed down; and when asked if by that comment the applicant was suggesting that his Honour was influenced by others, he responded, “Well, who knows.  Who knows.”
  2. [66]
    The applicant addressed these matters in his statement to the respondent.[54] He pointed to authorities which recognise the right to criticise judgments.[55]  His Honour’s statement[56] that there was no evidence of the true value of the diamonds was said to show a disregard for uncontested evidence, because valuation documents from the diamond supplier had been put into evidence.  The “dangerous precedent” was said to be that his Honour accepted that it was the consumer’s intention which defined the contract, said to be an unfair application of the exceptions to the parole evidence rule.  His Honour’s finding that the provisions for the sale and resale of the diamonds added nothing to the transaction was said to be “patently untrue and remarkably short-sighted”.  His Honour stated, “[t]here has been, as far as I can see, little or no cooperation with ASIC”.  Of this, the applicant said in the ASIC proceedings, “[f]or the Court to make such a comment appears ill-informed”.  The applicant’s explanation was that the Court had not been informed of all relevant matters.  In effect, the applicant denied suggesting that his Honour had been influenced by others.
  3. [67]
    The only guidance given by the parties as to what constitutes permissible criticism of a Court is in the applicant’s material.  In determining when such criticism amounts to contempt of court, assistance is found in the following statements from the judgment of Lord Atkin speaking for the Privy Council in Ambard:[57]

Their Lordships can find no evidence in the article, or in any facts placed before the Court, to justify the finding either that the article was written with the direct object mentioned, or that it could have that effect: and they will advise His Majesty that this appeal be allowed. It will be sufficient to apply the law as laid down in Reg. v. Gray by Lord Russell of Killowen C.J.: “Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicke L.C. characterised as ‘scandalising a Court or a judge.’ (In re Read and Huggonson.) That description of that class of contempt is to be taken subject to one and an important qualification. Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court.”

…

But whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men.

…

Their Lordships have discussed this case at some length because, in one aspect, it concerns the liberty of the Press, which is no more than the liberty of any member of the public, to criticise temperately and fairly, but freely, any episode in the administration of justice. They have come to the conclusion that there is no evidence upon which the Court could find that the appellant has exceeded this right, or that he acted with untruth or malice, or with the direct object of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.  (citations omitted)

  1. [68]
    The statements that his Honour erred in fact or in law are, of themselves, of no present significance.
  2. [69]
    The statement that there was no evidence of the true value of the diamonds occurred in a passage where his Honour was explaining his finding that the entire suite of documents relating to the diamond model had to be signed in order for an advance to be made.  His Honour’s primary basis for the finding was the evidence of a Mr Bray, which was supported by the circumstances in which consumers approached FAF franchisees.  There has been no suggestion that his Honour’s finding was erroneous.  His Honour’s statement was true, in the sense that there was no evidence of the value of the particular quantity of diamonds, in the markets in which the transactions were said to have occurred, at the time when the consumer approached the franchisee.  That does not matter, for criticism may be based on error, without amounting to contempt of court.  In the present case, however, the criticism seems to me to be a needless and pointless attack on his Honour, since the conclusion was not in issue.  Moreover, the applicant has attributed to his Honour a decision to disregard evidence of some relevance to his conclusion. There is no proper basis for doing so.  The statement, as explained by the applicant, goes beyond “reasonable argument and expostulation”.  It seems to me that, as submitted by the respondent, this is an irrational and unprofessional criticism of Dowsett J.  It is not a genuine exercise of the right of criticism. 
  3. [70]
    As I understand his Honour’s judgment, contrary to the applicant’s criticism, he found the model to be a sham by reference to his findings about the intentions of the franchisee, the consumer, and DCH.[58]  The criticism that the decision set a dangerous precedent may therefore be wrong-headed, but that does not mean that it would amount to contempt; nor does it seem to me to be of significance in the present application.
  4. [71]
    The criticism of his Honour’s finding that the purported sale and resale of diamonds added nothing to the transactions is at its heart a denial of the correctness of the finding.  The finding is fundamentally a characterisation of the transactions, by the application of legal principles to the evidence.  Disagreement with the finding is of no present consequence.  The characterisation of the finding as “patently untrue and remarkably short-sighted” is however quite concerning.  It is unsupported by any rational argument.  It flies in the face of both the finding made by his Honour, and the much earlier finding in Carter.  Yet the statement suggests gross error bordering on wilful blindness on the part of his Honour.  It goes well beyond “reasonable argument and expostulation”.  Nor is it the exercise of “the liberty of any member of the public, to criticise temperately and fairly, but freely, any episode in the administration of justice”.  Its hostile and personally critical tone speak of malice towards his Honour.  Again, it is an instance of irrational and unprofessional criticism.
  5. [72]
    To describe the Court as appearing ill-informed is again a personal criticism of the judicial officer.  The applicant explained this description by reference to his statement that, “his Honour was not aware of all the pertinent matters and I do not recall him being presented with any evidence in this respect.”  A reading of the relevant passage of his Honour’s reasons indicates that he was attempting to find a mitigating circumstance in the evidence before him.  In doing so, he was limited to the material presented by the parties, including FAF.  The criticism goes beyond an assertion that there was other relevant evidence on the question.  Again, there is an element of ill-will apparent in the choice of language.  It too is an instance of irrational and unprofessional criticism.
  6. [73]
    The potentially most concerning matter is the applicant’s response to a question whether he thought that his Honour was influenced by others.[59]  His immediate response was, “Who knows.  Who knows.”  The applicant said he did not intend to imply that his Honour had been influenced by others.[60]  He also relied on his subsequent statement that he “wouldn’t even put that up there”.  On its face, the response raised, as a real prospect, the possibility that his Honour was inappropriately influenced by persons other than those who participated in the hearing.  No basis for doing so has been identified.  No sensible explanation for the response has been given.  The response is quite concerning.  The AAT observed in another context that, when the applicant made a provocative remark which elicited a reaction, he gave a wide-eyed “Who me?” response.[61]  His subsequent statement came after the delegate said, “I’m not having a bar of that.  I think that’s silly.”  The applicant’s next statement was, “I only said that because you asked the question”; followed by the applicant’s denial.  There may be some similarity between this matter and the matter referred to by the AAT.  There is reason to suspect that the applicant made the remark intending the imputation, but I do not think that the evidence is sufficiently clear to reach that conclusion.  I do not intend to take this matter into account.
  7. [74]
    Although the respondent made submissions in general terms about criticisms said to have been made by the applicant of the decision in Carter, I have not been able to identify specific criticisms to which the respondent might be referring.  Accordingly I do not intend to take criticisms of that decision into account.
  8. [75]
    The respondent’s submissions referred to findings by the AAT that the applicant had presented as “arrogant, supercilious and obtuse”.[62]  With no disrespect to that Tribunal, I find it hard to draw anything from these findings, expressed in general terms, and without the benefit of their context and the observations on which they are based.

Applicant’s insight into conduct and contrition

  1. [76]
    The applicant stated that he has accepted the findings that have been made in the proceedings discussed earlier in these reasons.  He has submitted that he has shown sufficient insight in acknowledging the seriousness of his misconduct in relation to his mistaken belief about the diamond model, in representing himself in the ASIC hearing and the AAT proceedings, and in his non-disclosure.  He now appreciates that his subjective beliefs about the lawfulness of the diamond model were mistaken.  His thinking was said to be affected by the fact that he acted both as a director of FAF, and as its solicitor.  It was submitted that his recognition and acceptance of his precarious situation and his misguided state of mind are powerful indicators of insight.  His disclosure of the banning order was said to demonstrate an appropriate understanding of what is required of a solicitor.  His conduct over a number of years has been good, and he has taken a number of steps towards rehabilitation.
  2. [77]
    The respondent submitted that the timing of the applicant’s disclosure of the banning order indicates that he delayed the disclosure until he knew the outcome of his AAT review, which was the subject of publicity.  He may not have made the disclosure if the review had been successful. The applicant’s attempts to show insight, responsibility and contrition in the events that occurred were inadequate.  The fault he accepted was in not obtaining better legal advice, rather than in contriving a sham scheme, authorising untrue statements to consumers, and failing to discontinue the scheme when its true character was first exposed in this Tribunal.  The applicant continued to present his involvement as a matter of past innocent mistake, unlikely to be repeated.  He did not see anything wrong with it when he appealed against the AAT decision.  The applicant had not addressed the actual reasons for discontinuing the model, the limited way in which it was discontinued, and the real detriment it caused.  His defence of the diamond model was less than frank, particularly in this Tribunal and the Federal Court.  The applicant had not addressed the full impact of the findings made in the Federal Court; nor those of this Tribunal and the AAT.  In his statement the applicant said that he had “always said that the consumers were looking for ‘cash’ and that the diamond model was an artificial mechanism to accomplish that outcome”, carried out in “contrived circumstances”.[63]  This was said to be a hollow attempt to reconstruct a position of past candour; to be contrasted with the position he presented in correspondence to Ms Carter, and on oath before Dowsett J and the AAT.  The respondent also pointed to the applicant’s reliance on the proposition that the Federal Court proceedings were brought against FAF and not against him; they concerned past events; and Dowsett J did not make any finding expressly against the applicant[64].  It was submitted that, subject to the word “expressly”, the applicant failed or refused to understand the import or gravity of the findings made by Dowsett J.
  3. [78]
    The respondent submitted that the applicant argued passionately in the ASIC proceeding that the QCAT and Federal Court decisions were wrong.[65]  This was contrasted with his assertion that his efforts were misconstrued because he was merely attempting to demonstrate that he had a reasonable basis for his view at the time of his conduct.[66]  This was said to amount to reconstruction.  His statement that the actions and failures were those of FAF, which he did not control, was an attempt to deflect responsibility.  The applicant’s assertion in his statement to the respondent that the ASIC decision, by its terms, did not involve a finding of guilt, undermines the earlier acknowledgment, through his solicitors, that he should have disclosed the banning order.  His statement, in relation to the non-disclosure of the banning order, that he was not advising or acting as a solicitor in relation to credit matters, is impossible to understand, when the very thing that he did was to advise and act as a solicitor.
  4. [79]
    Reference was made to the applicant’s attempt to explain the criticisms made of him by the AAT on the basis that he must have offended the Deputy President.  The applicant’s response, in Attachment 2 to his statement, to the criticism made by the respondent that he oversaw the introduction of the diamond model without the benefit of proper advice, was that he sought advice from a competent and experienced barrister; when he had admitted in the AAT that the barrister was relevantly junior, and had no relevant experience.  It was also difficult to reconcile the explanation with the acknowledgment by his solicitor that he should have sought advice from a barrister with more experience and expertise.   Reference was also made to the applicant’s statement in support of his criticisms of the judgment of Dowsett J, that his Honour treated the consumer’s intention as governing, and the intention of the FAF-related entities was of no consideration, when his Honour made findings relating to the intention of both (in fact, his Honour made findings that these entities did not intend that a purchase and sale occur[67]; and their intention to conceal the true nature of the transaction was decisive[68]).
  5. [80]
    The applicant does not accept that he has engaged in wrongful conduct by designing and overseeing the implementation of the diamond model.  The most he acknowledges is that the model was unlawful, but even that acceptance is heavily qualified[69].  He asserts that he honestly but mistakenly believed that the model was lawful; and he did not set out to exploit vulnerable people.   The applicant’s statements that he believed the model to be lawful and that he did not set out to exploit vulnerable people have not been accepted.  At best for the applicant, he set out to do this by using a scheme he knew to be artificial and contrived and he did so for financial gain for himself and others.  Even on that basis he has not acknowledged that his conduct was wrongful.
  6. [81]
    In assessing the extent to which the applicant has shown insight into his conduct, and remorse for it, it is convenient to refer to his passionate and prolonged defence of that model.  That does not sit comfortably with recognition of the applicant’s wrongful conduct.  The applicant has sought to diminish the significance of the findings made about the model, and by implication to justify his conduct.  For example, he attributed the decision of this Tribunal, at least in part, to the failure of FAF Beaudesert to follow procedures relating to disclosure,[70] when it is plain that the decision was based on the Tribunal’s view about the substance of the transaction[71].  Moreover, his explanation rings hollow: notwithstanding changes to disclosure procedures, sales under the model ceased in April 2012.  In his statement, the applicant makes points that the proceedings in this Tribunal and the Federal Court were against FAF or a FAF related entity, and not against him. The apparent purpose of these points is to deflect criticism from him; and to avoid recognising his central role in the conduct criticised in those proceedings.  His conduct in the AAT is quite inconsistent with that of a person who acknowledges that he has engaged in wrongful conduct; quite the contrary.  In his statement, the applicant says that after the ASIC decision was given in April 2019, and discussions with friends and colleagues, he slowly came to realise that “my dogmatic belief on the veracity of my actions had unintentionally fixated me on the views I had about the rectitude of the diamond model, such as to seriously impair my judgment throughout this entire unhappy saga”.[72]  That is quite a limited acknowledgement.  The applicant appealed against this decision.  The appeal was discontinued on 14 November 2019.  The applicant’s reasons for not pursuing the appeal do not include any recognition that his conduct had been wrongful.[73]  The letter from the applicant’s solicitors to the respondent of 5 August 2019 contains no more than an acknowledgment that the “operation of (the diamond) model was obviously unsatisfactory”.  Given the distinction drawn by the applicant between the design of the model (for which he was responsible) and its operation (the responsibility of others),[74] the wording used by the applicant is hardly a clear acknowledgment that the applicant did anything wrong.
  7. [82]
    The applicant continues to be critical of the judgment of Dowsett J.  It is difficult to reconcile these criticisms, and in particular their tenor, with insight into his wrongdoing.  Moreover, the applicant has maintained his criticisms, without any recognition that a number of them go well beyond legitimate criticism.  The applicant attempted to explain the strongly worded findings made against him by the AAT by saying that he “must have offended the Deputy President”.[75]  Apart from implying that the Deputy President lost objectivity, the statement does not recognise that the substance of the findings provided a basis for the strong wording.  The applicant has sought to characterise his defence in the AAT proceedings as an attempt to set out his reasoning and beliefs, not as an attempt to recontest earlier adverse decisions.[76]  The applicant plainly sought to demonstrate that the earlier decisions were wrong.  The characterisation of his defence reflects some distortion of a matter of fact by the applicant, but it is of little significance compared to other matters raised against him.
  8. [83]
    In my view, the applicant has not demonstrated any real insight into his wrongdoing, or any real contrition. 

Other matters

  1. [84]
    Reliance is placed on the applicant’s good conduct in recent years.  This does little to affect the overall view taken of the applicant’s character, and whether he is a fit and proper person to continue to hold a practising certificate.  While the applicant should be given some credit for undertaking professional development courses, they are not directed to the character issues raised in these proceedings, and are of no real significance in the present application.  Nor do I attribute weight to Dr Hatzepetrou’s diagnosis, and the prospect of treatment.  It does not seem to me that conditions could be imposed which adequately address the character issues raised in these proceedings.

Conclusion

  1. [85]
    The applicant has engaged in conduct designed to exploit vulnerable people by avoiding the protection which the legislation intended to provide for them.  I have not accepted that he did so with a genuine belief that the diamond model was lawful.  In any event, even on his own admission, the model was artificial and contrived.  On a number of occasions he has made untrue statements in relation to the model or in its defence.  He has made excessive criticisms of judicial officers, which go well beyond legitimate criticism, and which are inconsistent with a lawyer’s obligation to foster and maintain respect for the administration of justice.  Although he has stated on a number of occasions that he now accepts the findings made against him, he has not shown insight into his wrongful conduct, nor contrition for it.    It is a matter of serious concern that the applicant failed to disclose the ASIC banning order when he applied to renew his practising certificate in 2018.  Matters relied on in his favour are not sufficient to affect the conclusion reached overall, namely that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.
  2. [86]
    The application for a review of the respondent’s decision to refuse to renew the applicant’s certificate is itself refused.

Footnotes

[1]See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1055 (“FAF 1”) [41], [283].

[2]See Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld) s 19.

[3]See Carter & Anor v Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd & Anor [2011] QCAT 525 [9]-[10].

[4][2011] QCAT 525.  It may be that the correct name of the applicant is Charter, but the name given in the title to the judgment will for convenience be used throughout.

[5]Ibid [27].

[6]Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd & Anor v Charter & Anor [2012] QCATA 51.

[7]FAF 1 [277].

[8]See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 243 (“FAF 2”).

[9]Legat and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 685 (“AAT proceedings”).

[10]Ibid [39], [45].

[11]The article is at page 1 of the respondent’s bundle of documents, exhibited to the affidavit of Renee Elizabeth Fitzpatrick (“respondent’s bundle”).

[12]Found in the respondent’s bundle of documents, exhibited to the affidavit of Ms Fitzpatrick, page 127.

[13]See Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 28(3).

[14]Cambridge Dictionary (online at 22 December 2021) ‘disingenuous’.

[15]Mirriam-Webster Dictionary (online at 22 December 2021) ‘disingenuous’.

[16]Lexico Dictionary (online at 22 December 2021) ‘disingenuous’.

[17]Respondent’s written submissions [80(b)].  See also [93].

[18]Taken from the current version of the LP Act. In earlier versions, s 9(1)(i) appeared as s 9(1)(h).

[19]See, for example, LP Act s 46(1).

[20](2001) 52 NSWLR 279 [20].

[21][2007] NSWCA 288 [58].

[22]3.1, 4.1.2, and 5.1.

[23]See [51] of the applicant’s statement to the respondent; and the applicant’s response to [4] of the respondent’s letter of 27 February 2020.

[24]See the response to [24] of the letter, respondent’s bundle of documents pages 146-147; and see [109(e)] of the applicant’s statement.

[25]FAF 2 [23].

[26]AAT proceedings [18].

[27]See the respondent’s submissions [37].

[28]See respondent’s bundle of documents at page 149 at Item 3.

[29]See AAT proceedings [19].

[30]See AAT proceedings [21].

[31]See FAF 1 [28].

[32]FAF 1 [26].

[33]AAT proceedings [11].

[34]FAF 1 [277].

[35]FAF 1 [33].

[36]FAF 2 [17].

[37]FAF 1 [287].

[38]FAF 1 [27]

[39][16(c)], [19(a)]; see also [51], [52], [62], [114], [117], [124]; and the applicant’s response to [19], [24], [25], [27] and [35] of the respondent’s letter of 7 June 2019.

[40]Applicant’s statement  [52], [117].

[41]See [2(a)] of Annexure A to the application for a review of the respondent’s decision.

[42]See [86] of the respondent’s written submissions.

[43]The submission referred to the letter of 25 September 2020, in the respondent’s bundle at page 336.

[44]See [88] of the applicant’s statement to the respondent; see also [68].

[45]See [53] of the applicant’s statement.

[46]See AAT proceedings [38]-[40].

[47]See [88] of the applicant’s statement to the respondent; see also [59].

[48]See [68] of the applicant’s statement to the respondent.

[49]Applicant’s statement [5].

[50]See the applicant’s statement [88]-[89]; the letter from the applicant’s solicitors to the respondent dated 5 August 2019, in the respondent’s bundle of documents at page 82.

[51]Respondent’s submissions [60(e)].

[52]Respondent’s submissions [80(d)].

[53]Respondent’s submissions [88].  This appears to be based on matters which appear in AAT proceedings [25]-[37].

[54]See Attachment 2 to the applicant’s statement, pages 151-156.

[55]Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322 (“Ambard”); R v Metropolis Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (No 2) [1968] QB 118.

[56]FAF 1 [235].

[57][334]-[335], [337].

[58]See FAF 1 [277].

[59]See AAT proceedings [28].

[60]See Attachment 2 to applicant’s statement, pages 154-155.

[61]AAT proceedings [36].

[62]Respondent’s submissions [60(f)].

[63]See applicant’s statement [63] and [108]; see also [57]; and see Attachment 2 to the applicant’s statement, page 24.

[64]Applicant’s statement [47] and [101].

[65]See applicant’s statement [63] and [108].

[66]See applicant’s statement [65]; Attachment 2 to applicant’s statement, page 22 at item 1.  See also the letter from BMG to the respondent of 11 August 2020 [31].

[67]FAF 1 [239], [265], [277].

[68]FAF 1 [277].

[69]See applicant’s statement [51], [109], [124].

[70]Applicant’s statement [29], [30].

[71]See Carter [2], [26]-[30].

[72]Applicant’s statement [121].

[73]Applicant’s statement [82]-[86].

[74]Applicant’s statement [28(b)], [35], Attachment 2 pages 24-25, item 5.

[75]Applicant’s statement [80].

[76]Applicant’s statement [65]; see also [107].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Robert Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Robert Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated

  • MNC:

    [2022] QCAT 57

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Hon Peter Lyons QC, Judicial Member

  • Date:

    17 Feb 2022

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2022] QCAT 5717 Feb 2022-
Notice of Appeal FiledFile Number: CA3710/2220 Mar 2022-
Appeal Determined (QCA)[2022] QCA 18423 Sep 2022-

Appeal Status

Appeal Determined (QCA)

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ambard v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1936] AC 322
Cite 2 - [1936] AC 322
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1055
13 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 2 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 3 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 4 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 5 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 6 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 7 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 8 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 9 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 10 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 11 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 12 - [2015] FCA 1055
Cite 13 - [2015] FCA 1055
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 243
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] FCA 243
Cite 2 - [2017] FCA 243
Cite 3 - [2017] FCA 243
Cite 4 - [2017] FCA 243
Carter and Anor v Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd and Anor [2011] QCAT 525
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCAT 525
Cite 2 - [2011] QCAT 525
Cite 3 - [2011] QCAT 525
Cite 4 - [2011] QCAT 525
Cite 5 - [2011] QCAT 525
Ex parte Tziniolis Re The Medical Practitioners Act (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448
Cite 2 - (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448
Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd and Anor v Charter and Anor [2012] QCATA 51
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCATA 51
Cite 2 - [2012] QCATA 51
Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher (1909) 9 CLR 655
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1909) 9 CLR 655
Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher [1909] HCA 87
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1909] HCA 87
Legat v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 685
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] AATA 685
Cite 2 - [2019] AATA 685
Cite 3 - [2019] AATA 685
New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 52 NSWLR 279
Cite 2 - (2001) 52 NSWLR 279
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Alcorn [2007] NSWCA 288
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] NSWCA 288
Cite 2 - [2007] NSWCA 288
R v Metropolis Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (No 2) [1968] QB 118
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1968] QB 118
Cite 2 - [1968] QB 118

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Legal Services Commissioner v Winning [2025] QCAT 1982 citations
Legat v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2022] QCA 1842 citations
1

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