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  4. Nicholls v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission - [2023] QCAT 107

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Nicholls v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission[2023] QCAT 107

Nicholls v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission[2023] QCAT 107

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Nicholls v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2023] QCAT 107

PARTIES:

Tracey May Nicholls

(applicant)

v

Queensland racing integrity Commission

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR110-21

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

21 March 2023

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Kent

ORDERS:

  1. The decision of the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission, dated 13 April 2021, to impose a 12-month disqualification, with 3 months wholly suspended for 2 years, is confirmed.
  2. The application for review is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS – RACING CLUBS AND ASSOCIATIONS – where greyhound trainer failed to present a dog free of a prohibited substances – where admitted failure to present a dog free of prohibited substances – where urine sample above the permitted threshold of a permanently prohibited substance – whether the appropriate penalty was disqualification or some lesser penalty

Greyhounds Australasia Rules, rule 83(2)(a)

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 20

Scott v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (No 2) [2018] QCAT 301

Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Gilroy [2016] QCATA 146

Darrel Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2021] QCATA 125

Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Scott [2019] QCATA 125

APPEARANCES &

REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Summary of events

  1. [1]
    Ms Nichols is a licensed greyhound trainer. She was the trainer of a greyhound called Seven Seas who competed in a race at Brisbane Greyhound Racing Club on 3 December 2020.
  2. [2]
    When Seven Seas was presented at the Brisbane Greyhound Racing Club to compete in Race One on 3 December 2020 a urine sample was taken from the animal. Subsequently upon analysis this was found to contain testosterone, the evidence of this was the presence of 5-androstane-3α, 17β-diol of 100ng/ml, more than the prescribed threshold.
  3. [3]
    Ms Nicholls was charged with a breach of Greyhounds Australasia Rules (GAR) (then) rule 83(2)(a) (the Rules),[1] which reads:
  1. (2)
    The owner, trainer, or person in charge of a greyhound -
  1. (a)
    nominated to compete in an Event;

…

shall present the greyhound free of any prohibited substance.

  1. [4]
    A breach of Rule 190 is a strict liability offence.[2]
  2. [5]
    The particulars of Ms Nicholl’s charge were[3] “that Seven Seas, of which Ms Nicholls was the registered trainer at the relevant time, was on 3 December 2020, presented at the Brisbane Greyhound Racing Club to compete in race 1 and a urine sample collected from Seven Seas was found upon analysis to contain testosterone, as evidenced by the presence of, above the prescribed threshold 5-androstane-3α, 17β-diol of 100ng/ml.
  3. [6]
    Ms Nicholl’s entered a plea of guilty to the charge and the Stewards imposed a penalty of 12 months disqualification of Ms Nicholls’s licence, with 3 months of the disqualification suspended for a period of 2 years, subject to no further breach of a similar rule.
  4. [7]
    Ms Nicholls told the Stewards that she did not know how the substance came to be detectable in her dog. The plea of guilty was entered on that basis and Ms Nicholls requested an internal review of the decision of the Stewards. This internal review came to the same conclusion as Stewards and maintained the same penalty.
  5. [8]
    Ms Nicholls filed an application to review at QCAT on 19 April 2021. On 12 May 2021, by consent of both parties the Tribunal granted a stay of the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission’s (QRIC) internal review decision pending the final determination or withdrawal of the application to review a decision that was filed by Ms Nicholls on 19 April 2021.
  6. [9]
    On 17 May 2022, by consent, the Tribunal vacated a listed hearing date on 25 May 2022 and determined that the application to review a decision filed on 19 April 2021 was to be determined by member of the Tribunal on the papers by written submissions filed not before 15 July 2022.
  7. [10]
    These orders and the reasons for them are the outcome of the Tribunal’s determination of the matter.

Submissions

Hair Follicle test

  1. [11]
    Ms Nicholls’ appeal concerned penalty, only and this is the matter that my consideration must be confined to. Ms Nicholls’ submissions referred to her request to have a hair follicle test conducted on Seven Seas. It was stated that this had been refused by QRIC. It was submitted by Ms Nicholls that this test would be at the expense of her husband and herself. The purpose of the test was to demonstrate that the drug had not been administered to the animal and that these requests were denied.
  2. [12]
    This issue of no drug having been administered to the animal is at odds with Ms Nicholls’s other submissions that she pleaded guilty at the first opportunity. This indicated that she did accept the animal had these had an elevated reading and this substance was in its system.
  3. [13]
    It was submitted that the Stewards and the internal review decision did not consider the fact she entered a plea of guilty and showed remorse.
  4. [14]
    QRIC’s submissions in relation to the hair follicle test were that their expert advice was the urine sample indicated the presence of the permanently prohibited substance. There was also a discussion of the reliability of hair testing. The focus of these submissions indicated that it was QRIC’s view that the urine test being positive for a permanently prohibited substance was all that was required as evidence of the substance being in the animal’s system.
  5. [15]
    After reviewing these submissions, I formed that view that Ms Nicholls wished to have the dog hair follicle tested to prove that the substance had not been administered to the dog. These are submissions relate to substantiation of charge that Ms Nicholls had already entered a plea of guilty. Substantiation of the charge is not an issue before the Tribunal and not one that I will spend further time considering as it is not relevant to these proceedings

Penalty

  1. [16]
    Ms Nicholls submitted that she has no history with QRIC - At the time, the breach of the Rules involving Seven Seas occurred Ms Nicholls had been a trainer for approximately 7 months. This and the fact that Ms Nicholls has no history whatsoever were facts submitted by Ms Nicholls to be in favour of her receiving a lesser penalty than the penalty of 12 months’ disqualification, 3 months of the disqualification suspended for a period of 2 years, subject to no further breach of a similar rule.
  2. [17]
    It was submitted that her penalty was manifestly excessive when taking that lack of history into account.[4]
  3. [18]
    The reasons for QRIC’s Internal Review decision referred to Ms Nicholls length of time as a trainer and her lack of history with QRIC in those 7 Months she was a trainer.[5]
  4. [19]
    I considered Ms Nicholls’ clear history and balanced that against its the fact that Ms Nicholls had held trainer’s licence for only seven months. Although it was positive that she had no history this was not remarkable or exceptional in a person who had held a licence for such a brief time. This did not have the significance of, for example, a trainer who could point towards a long history when they had remained trouble-free. Another way of viewing this is that within a very short time of becoming a trainer Ms Nicholls found herself in the situation of presenting a dog with a permanently prohibited substance in their system. Ultimately, I considered her clear history in the brief time she had been a trainer to not be a factor that alone could result in me finding that a reduced penalty was appropriate.
  5. [20]
    Ms Nicholls pleaded guilty at the first opportunity – Ms. Nicholls’ submission on this point is correct and QRIC made no submissions to the contrary. QRIC referred to what they said were comparable cases on penalty. The similarity in these cases included not only penalty but also the fact the changed person in each of those cases had entered a plea of guilty at the first available opportunity.[6]
    1. (a)
      Joe Comito (NSW) – 2 February 2021 – disqualified for 9 months for a breach of GAR83(2)(a) for presenting a greyhound to race when the prohibited substance 5-androstane-3α, 17β-diol was detected. Mr Comito pleaded guilty to the charge at the first available opportunity, had no reasonable explanation as to how the substance came to be in the greyhound's system, had held a trainer licence for 11 years and had no like matters in his disciplinary history.
    2. (b)
      Rebecca Scott (NSW) – 25 June 2021 – disqualified for 9 months for a breach of GAR83(2)(a) when a urine sample taken from a greyhound trained by Ms Scott was found upon analysis to contain the prohibited substance 5-androstane-3, 17-diol. Ms Scott pleaded guilty to the charge at the first available opportunity, had no explanation for how the substance came to be in the greyhound's system, had held a trainer licence for less than 1 year when the breach occurred and had no prior disciplinary history; and
    3. (c)
      Henry Norman (NSW) – 2 March 2022 – disqualified for 8 months for a breach of GAR83(2)(a) when he presented a greyhound to race and the prohibited substance 5-androstane-3a, 17-diol was found to be present. Mr Norman pleaded guilty to the charge at the first available opportunity, had no explanation as to how the substance came to be in the greyhound's system, had held a trainer licence for approximately 31 years and had limited disciplinary history, with one prior breach of GAR83(2)(a) in 2008.[7]
  6. [21]
    In the current case, where QRIC imposed a 12-month disqualification with three months suspended for two years, this in effect means that Ms Nicholls would be serving a disqualification of nine months (12-month disqualification minus the 3-month suspension for a period of 2 years). This is well within the range of similar matters.
  7. [22]
    I note that all these cases referred to as comparatives QRIC deal with greyhounds presented with a permanently prohibited substance, testosterone, as evidenced by the presence of androstane-3α, 17β-diol of 100ng/ml”.
  1. [23]
    Also, the trainers had no explanation for the presence of the substance and entered pleas of guilty at the first available opportunity.
  1. [24]
    In Comito the trainer plead guilty to the charge at the first opportunity, he had no reasonable explanation for the substance being in the animal’s system and he had held trainer’s licence for 11 years and had no similar matters in his disciplinary history.
  2. [25]
    Scott is like Ms Nicholl’s case in that Ms Scott plead guilty to the charge at the first available opportunity, she could not explain how the substance came to be in the greyhound’s system and had like Ms Nicholls she had held a licence for less than one year.
  3. [26]
    Norman also involved an early plea of guilty, no explanation for the substance being in the animal’s system and Mr Norman had a much longer history as a trainer than Ms Nicholls. In his case his record was 31 years with only one other disciplinary matter. Ms Nicholls has presented a greyhound with a permanently prohibited substance in its system within 7 months of holding her licence.
  4. [27]
    I concluded that these were decisions were of assistance given their analogous facts to the current situation. All three of these decisions place Ms Nicholls’s penalty of 12 months disqualification with 3 months suspended for 2 years if no similar offence is committed well within the comparable rang of penalties given to trainers in similar situations to Ms Nicholls.
  5. [28]
    Ms Nicholls submitted that whilst she does not necessarily need a Trainer’s Licence, it would be better if she were in fact licenced to assist with the overall training and breeding operation that she and her husband conduct on their property.[8] The submission on Ms Nicholls’s behalf were as follows:

The effect of the original penalty is likely to cause severe financial hardship to Ms Nicholls and her husband. Greyhounds are the only source of income for Ms Nicholls and her husband, through prizemoney, training fees, rearing pups, and whelping for owners.

Ms Nicholls and her husband purchased their current property in 2014 with the intention of racing and breeding greyhounds. Ms Nicholls continued to work as an enrolled nurse until July 2018, when she resigned to assist her husband with the dogs on a full-time basis.

Ms Nicholls's husband sustained a back injury in 2014 and was deemed unemployable, contributing to Ms Nicholls's decision to resign from nursing and work full-time on the property, growing the business.[9]

  1. [29]
    In response to these submissions QRIC stated that Ms Nicholls submits “the effect of the original penalty is likely to cause severe financial hardship to Ms Nicholls and her husband.”26  QRIC  highlighted Ms Nicholls’s other submission “that whilst she does not necessarily need a Trainer’s Licence, it would be better if she was in fact licensed to assist with the overall training and breeding operation that she and her husband obviously conduct on their property”.[10] QRIC submits that these are contrasting submissions.
  2. [30]
    I accept that the disqualification may have an impact on the financial situation of Ms Nicholl.  However, it is a fact that the Tribunal ordered, by consent, on 12 May 2021 a stay of QRIC’s decision pending the determination of Ms Nicholl’ application to review an administrative decision.
  3. [31]
    Therefore, from 12 May 2021 until this decision date the decision has been stayed and Ms Nicholls has had no restraint on her that prevented her from training greyhounds. Any restrictions on her current activities are something that Ms Nicholls has chosen to impose upon herself. It is difficult to conceive why her own decision to place herself in what she describes as financial hardship, when this was not required post the stay decision, should be a matter that I would look at when considering a reduction of her penalty. Accordingly, I do not accept that the financial hardship she describes as suffering since QRIC decision, and the date of this decision is a relevant consideration for me when regarding penalty.
  4. [32]
    Another issue Ms Nicholls raised in her submissions was that the proceedings had been hanging over her for an excess of 12 months and that should be considered in determining penalty. QRIC’s submission was that such a matter is a consequence of the breach of the rule and the review process itself and that these delays, should they be causing her any hardship, have been remedied by the grant of the stay.
  5. [33]
    I find that QRIC’s submission is correct, and I also find that however long a matter takes to be finalised in the Tribunal is not something that goes directly to the factors that must be considered when imposing a penalty. The QCAT Appeals Tribunal in Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Gilroy identified these factors:[11]

The main purposes of the Racing Act 2002 (Qld) (“Racing Act”) are:

To maintain public confidence in the racing of animals in Queensland for which betting is lawful.

To ensure the integrity of all persons involved with racing or betting under the Racing Act; and

To safeguard the welfare of all animals involved in racing under the Racing Act.[12]

  1. [34]
    I find that the period that has elapsed between the original charge and plea of guilty and the Tribunal’s decision is not an overriding consideration for me in light of the purposes of the legislation and rules under which Ms Nicholls has entered a plea of guilty and had been given a penalty. I find the relevance of the efflux of time even less compelling in circumstances where the Tribunal granted, by consent, a stay of the decision on 12 May 2021. It is difficult for me to see why the Tribunal should consider the hardship Ms Nicholls states she suffered in this period when, due to the consent stay decision of the Tribunal, she has been able to continue to train greyhounds. The choice to not do so appears to be one of her own makings and not one that has been imposed upon her by the process.
  2. [35]
    The penalty that has been imposed to date will cause severe financial hardship to Ms Nicholls and her husband, which is a factor that is highly relevant to the penalty that the Tribunal should consider when imposing the appropriate penalty.
  3. [36]
    The Queensland Racing Integrity Commission submitted:

Even accepting that financial hardship may follow, this cannot be determinative of the penalty to be imposed. Penalties for breaches of the rules of racing are imposed for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the industry and to ensure the welfare of all animals involved in the industry. The gravity of the rule breach here committed, being the presence of a permanently prohibited substance, cannot be overlooked. The penalty precedents for such a breach establish a lengthy period of disqualification as the appropriate penalty, and the facts of this matter do not distinguish themselves from those precedents.[13]

  1. [37]
    After the giving consideration to the legislation and its purpose and the decision of Gilroy,[14] it is clear to me that a critical issue for the Tribunal to consider in coming to a decision about the appropriate penalty for Ms Nicholls is maintaining the public confidence in racing, in this case greyhound racing. I also must consider that this is an industry where people wager money on the outcome of these races and if these races were not to be run with integrity and without the use of prohibited substances in animals that the public would very quickly lose confidence in the industry. It follows any person betting would be at an unfair disadvantage if they were not aware of which greyhounds in a race had a prohibited substance in their bodies which ones did not.
  2. [38]
    A further consideration is stated as ensuring the integrity of all persons involved with racing or betting. Allowing a person who has entered a plea of guilty to presenting a greyhound with a prohibited substance in their system to be given a lighter penalty than someone else who committed the same breach but may not be in the same degree of financial hardship surely cannot be within the true spirit of interpreting the legislation.
  3. [39]
    I accept QRIC’s submissions on the gravity of the rule breach committed here and of significant importance to my considerations was the presence of a permanently prohibited substance. The precedents for such a breach in the greyhound industry establish a lengthy period of disqualification is the appropriate penalty. I accept the submissions of QRIC that the facts of this case do not distinguish themselves from those precedents. As previously discussed, the practical effect of the penalty provided by QRIC to Ms Nicholls was that she would serve a nine-month disqualification which is well and truly in line with Comito, Scott and Norman. I do not find that Ms Nicholls’ submission relating to financial hardship persuades me that the Tribunal should find that Ms Nichols is deserving of a lighter penalty than the one that was given to her by the Stewards and confirmed by the Internal Review of that decision by QRIC.

Discussion of cases cited by the parties

  1. [40]
    Ms Nicholls made the following submissions regarding cases:

The Tribunal’s attention is drawn to the recent decision of Darrel Graham v. Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2021] QCATA 125 dated 1 November 2021 where Judge Allen and Senior Member Howard stated the following:

In respect of Mr Graham's culpability, the learned Member discussed Wallace v Queensland Racing as referring to categories of cases, which in ascending order could justify a more severe penalty: where there is an innocent explanation for the presence of the prohibited substance; where there is no explanation for the elevated reading, and where the explanation demonstrates moral blameworthiness.[15]

Mr Graham contends, the Tribunal because of its findings as to culpability, applied Wallace and imposed a sanction that was more severe than was justified on the evidence and is manifestly excessive such as to be erroneous at law. He submits that but for the finding of blameworthiness, which is a material consideration, a penalty of a fine would have been more appropriate. Accordingly, Mr Graham submits that the penalty imposed is manifestly excessive.[16]

I would accept that the findings made about the degree of Mr Grahams’s culpability go directly to the sanction to be imposed and that if not for the impugned findings of blameworthiness, the sanction imposed would have been in a lower range.

Senior Member Howard stated in that case that a penalty of 10 weeks’ suspension would be an applicable penalty due to Mr Graham’s reduced culpability, in contrast to the penalty of 12 months’ suspension which was originally given at the QCAT external review.

Ms Nicholls has very clearly stated that she has no idea what may have caused the readings in the dog to elevate above the permissible threshold, and there has been no suggestion of moral blameworthiness on the part of Ms Nicholls.

It is therefore submitted that the current penalty of 12 months’ disqualification is manifestly excessive, given Ms Nicholls’ low level of culpability in line with Senior Member Howard’s comments in Darrel Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission.

Senior Member Howard also considered a number of other prohibited substance presentation cases, including that of Scott v QRIC (No 2), in which Ms Nicholls was found to have been moderately careless and had two prior offences. A 3-month suspension and a fine of $6,000.00 was imposed.

Ms Nicholls here has no history whatsoever. It is submitted that the penalty of 12 months' disqualification is manifestly excessive when taking that lack of history into account.

  1. [41]
    The Queensland Racing Integrity Commission’s provided alternative views of these cases, raising lack of consideration of the decision of Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Scott:[17]

The Applicant provides no explanation for the elevated levels detected in the greyhound and seeks to rely upon the decisions of Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission and Scott v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (No 2) as supporting the position that the penalty imposed is excessive.

The Queensland Racing Integrity Commission recognises that the degree of culpability, as enunciated by McGill DCJ in Wallace v Queensland Racing, is relevant to the determination of an appropriate penalty. However, the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission submits Ms Nicholls’s reliance upon the QCAT decision of Scott to demonstrate the severity of the penalty here imposed, is in error. Ms Nicholls has failed to recognise the QCATA decision of Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Scott which overturned the QCAT decision on penalty and imposed a penalty of 9 months suspension in addition to the 3 months suspension ordered by QCAT; the outcome being, a 12-month suspension and no fine.

The Queensland Racing Integrity Commission submits Ms Nicholls’s reliance upon the QCATA decision of Graham is also problematic, in that the Appeal Tribunals’ considerations in that matter (as to an appropriate penalty) seems also to have failed to recognise the QCATA decision of Scott.

Notwithstanding, the penalties imposed (or considered) in the matters of Graham and Scott are of no relevance to present considerations, as the substance detected in those proceedings was not a permanently prohibited substance.[18]

  1. [42]
    After consideration of these submissions, I find that the decisions of Grahami and Scott related to a substance that was not a permanently prohibited substance. A permanently prohibited substance, in this case testosterone, as evidenced by the presence of 5-androstane-3α, 17β-diol of 100ng/ml, above the prescribed threshold of 100ng/ml is one where legislators who decide the content of Acts and Rules such as the Greyhound Australasia Rules indicate that this is in a serious category of breach of the rules.
  2. [43]
    Testosterone, as evidenced by the presence of 5-androstane-3α, 17β-diol, above the prescribed threshold of 100ng/ml is by its categorisation of being a permanently banned, is a serious of breach of the Rules. I do not accept that I should view the presence of Testosterone, as evidenced by the presence of 5-androstane-3α, 17β-diol, above the prescribed threshold of 100ng/ml in the same way as other breaches that are not for the presentation of animals with permanently prohibited substances in their system. It is on this basis that I distinguish the cases referred to by Ms Nicholls (Graham and Scott at first instance) based on their relating to substances that are not permanently prohibited substances. In the circumstances I find the comparable decisions of Comito, Scott and Norman to be of more assistance to me in making my decision.
  3. [44]
    As the cases of Graham[19] and Scott[20] are distinguishable on the basis referred to in the paragraphs above, I have found they are not of assistance to me in coming to a decision about penalty for Ms Nicholls. However, for the sake of completeness, I have considered QRICs submissions regarding the decisions of Graham and Scott. These submissions centred on a failure to consider the QCAT Appeal Tribunal’s decision of Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Scott[21] in in relation to the categories of culpability. I accept that Ms Nicholls’ submissions on Scott ignore the relevant appeal decision (Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Scott) and that the decision of Graham also is to use the words of QRIC’s submissions “problematic” as it also appears to be silent on the appeal decision in Scott.
  4. [45]
    I agree and follow the decision of McGill DCJ in Wallace v Queensland Racing[22] in relation to the categories of culpability and Ms Nicholls is to be placed in the category of culpability of where there is no explanation for the substance being in the greyhound’s system.

Penalty

  1. [46]
    Ms Nicholls submitted that the Tribunal should find the following in terms of penalty:
    1. (a)
      It is submitted that having regard to Ms Nicholls's low level of culpability and lack of any related history, that the following penalty ought to be considered as appropriate:
      1. That our client be convicted.
      2. That our client not be punished.
      3. That there be no further order.
    2. (b)
      In the alternative, is this submission is not accepted, then it is our submission that a suspension wholly suspended is the appropriate penalty, with a period of say three months for a suspended period of six months.[23]
  2. [47]
    The Queensland Racing Integrity Commission submitted that:

The decision of the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission to impose a 12-month disqualification, with 3 months wholly suspended for 2 years, must be accepted as appropriate. Any penalty of the kind advanced by Ms Nicholls would be manifestly inadequate having regard to the serious nature of the breach and comparable authorities.[24]

Decision

  1. [48]
    I have concluded that the decision of QRIC to impose a 12-month disqualification, with three months wholly suspended for two years provided a similar breach is not committed is the appropriate penalty. I considered the following points:
    1. (i)
      the seriousness of the breach.
    2. (ii)
      the relevance of such a breach to upholding the purposes of the relevant legislation; and
    3. (iii)
      the placement on the scale of culpability of Ms Nicholls on what was described by then Judge McGill as “no explanation for the substance appearing in the animal’s body” anything less than the penalty imposed would be manifestly inadequate. It would not serve the purposes of deterrence to the rest of the industry.
  1. [49]
    A lesser penalty does not serve the purpose of upholding the integrity of not only the industry but also the gaming industry that operates to bet on races such as the one that Seven Seas was presented for. Also, the first purpose of the enabling legislation is described as “To maintain public confidence in the racing of animals in Queensland for which betting is lawful; (emphasis added).
  2. [50]
    It is difficult to imagine a breach of the Rules that could strike deeper at the heart of the integrity of the industry than an animal being presented with a permanently prohibited substance in their system. Members of the public and the rest of the greyhound racing profession have no way of knowing whether a dog is presented with one of the permanently prohibited substances in its system unless this disciplinary system is upheld. Part of this disciplinary structure is that serious breaches such as Ms Nicholls’ attract serious penalties.
  3. [51]
    In these circumstances Ms Nicholls will be in effect serving the same amount of time as the greyhound trainers discussed in the comparable penalties provided to me by QRIC. Ms Nicholls has a 12-month period of disqualification but three months of that will be suspended for a period of two years provided she does not breach a similar rule in that time. The practical effect of this is, provided she abides by the rules of Greyhound Australasia Racing, she will be serving a 9-month disqualification period. This is well within the range of comparative greyhound racing decision.
  4. [52]
    In maintaining the suspension of the disqualification for three months I considered Ms Nicholls’ circumstances of an early plea, no explanation for the presence of the presence of the prohibited substance in the animal’s system and no prior history in the 7 months she had held a trainer’s licence.
  5. [53]
    A12-month period of disqualification with three months of that period suspended for a period of two years provided Ms Nicholls does not breach a similar rule in that time is not an unreasonable penalty and indeed the full penalty of a 12-month disqualification is with well within the range for this type of offence.
  6. [54]
    Ms Nicholls has come to the attention of the authorities by presenting such an animal with a permanently prohibited substance in its system within the very first seven months of her being a licenced trainer. Ms Nicholls’ breach of the Greyhound Australasia Rule (then) rule 83(2)(a),[25]  has very serious consequences for the community’s and industry’s confidence in the integrity of the industry. I confirm the decision of QRIC’s internal review and dismiss Ms Nicholls application.

Orders

  1. The decision of the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission, dated 13 April 2021 to impose a 12-month disqualification, with 3 months wholly suspended for 2 years, is confirmed.
  1. The application for review is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1]  The Greyhounds Australasia Rules were updated on 1 May 2022, the relevant rule is now 141(1)(a).

[2]  The Greyhounds Australasia Rule 83(3).

[3]  Section 21(2) material, p 45 at 11-17.

[4]           Ms Nicholls’s submissions filed 25 July 2022, paragraph 25,

[5]  Internal Review Decision dated 13 April 2021, page 5.

[6]  Joe Comito (NSW) – 2 February 2021; Rebecca Scott (NSW) – 25 June 2021; Henry Norman (NSW) – 2 March 2022.

[7]  Queensland Racing Integrity Commission’s submission filed 25 July 2022, paragraph 2020.

[8]  Ms Nicholls’s submissions filed 27 June 2022, paragraph 25(d).

[9]  Ms Nicholls’s submissions filed 27 June 2023, paragraphs 21,22 and 23.

[10]  Queensland Racing Integrity Commission’s submissions filed on 25 July 2022, paragraph 25.

[11]  [2016] QCATA 146.

[12] Racing Act 2002 (Qld) s 4, as cited in QRIC v Gilroy [2016] QCATA, paragraph 17.

[13]  Queensland Racing Integrity Commission’s submissions filed on 25 July 2022, paragraph 26.

[14] QRIC v Gilroy [2016] QCATA.

[15] Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2021] QCATA 125, [192].

[16]  Ibid at [205].

[17]  [2019] QCATA 125.

[18]  Queensland Racing Integrity Commission’s submission filed 25 July 2022, paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17.

[19]         [2021] QCATA 125

[20]         [2018] QCAT 301

[21]  [2019] QCATA 125.

[22]  [2007] QDC 168 at [69].

[23]  Ms Nicholls’s submissions filed 27 June 2022, paragraphs 33 and 34.

[24]  Respondent’s submissions filed 25 July 2022, paragraph 27.

[25]  The Greyhounds Australasia Rules were updated on 1 May 2022, the relevant rule is now 141(1)(a).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Nicholls v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Nicholls v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission

  • MNC:

    [2023] QCAT 107

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Member Kent

  • Date:

    21 Mar 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2021] QCATA 125
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QCATA 125
Cite 2 - [2021] QCATA 125
Cite 3 - [2021] QCATA 125
Cite 4 - [2021] QCATA 125
KBJ Legal Pty Ltd v Pocock [2019] QCATA 125
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCATA 125
Cite 2 - [2019] QCATA 125
Cite 3 - [2019] QCATA 125
Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Gilroy [2016] QCATA 146
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCATA 146
Cite 2 - [2016] QCATA 146
Scott v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (No 2) [2018] QCAT 301
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCAT 301
Cite 2 - [2018] QCAT 301
Wallace v Queensland Racing [2007] QDC 168
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] QDC 168

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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