SJT[2023] QCAT 454

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. [1]
   In satisfaction of s 114A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) (the GAA Act), the adult and other active parties and interested persons where relevant are referred to herein in a de-identified format.

Background

2. [2]
   SJT is 54 years of age. As recorded in a medical professional’s report filed in this Tribunal in April 2014 he was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1980, and alcohol dependency in 2000 together with other medical conditions. It is also reported therein that for the previous 22 years he had been under the care of the Mental Health Division of the hospital in the region where he lives.^[1]
3. [3]
   The filing of that report accompanied an application to this Tribunal for appointments under the GAA Act. However, at that time there was an enduring power of attorney in force appointing RW as attorney to SJT for all financial, personal, and health matters. Subsequently in May 2017 a second application was made. What then followed over the past six (6) years has been a series of appointments of decision-makers for SJT under the GAA Act.
4. [4]
   The first was in June 2017 when the Public Trustee of Queensland (PTQ) was appointed his administrator for all financial matters albeit on an interim order only current for three (3) months. At the same time, an order was made that an enduring power of attorney dated 8 May 2014 appointing RW as attorney for all financial, personal, and health matters was overtaken by that appointment.^[2]
5. [5]
   On 6 September 2017, more permanent orders were made. RW was given leave to resign as attorney, the PTQ was appointed for all financial matters on that occasion current until further order of the Tribunal, and the Public Guardian was also appointed for decisions on accommodation and the provision of services.^[3]
6. [6]
   On 5 April 2018, an application was made by SMT, whom I understand to be SJT’s daughter, for a change to be made to the appointment of the PTQ as her father’s administrator.^[4] That prompted the scheduling of a review to be heard on 17 May 2018.
7. [7]
   There was also a simultaneous application for a stay of a decision of the PTQ concerning the administration of SJT’s financial affairs, namely the decision to sell SJT’s house in which he was then living. As I understand it:

   1. The application for a stay was made by SMT; and
   2. The decision in issue was made as a consequence of SJT being substantially in arrears in the payment to the local council for his rates on the property.
8. [8]
   In respect of that application, on 12 April 2018 this Tribunal gave these orders:^[5]

1. The decisions made by the [PTQ] to cause [SJT] to vacate his property at [address] by 23 April 2018 and to relocate him to a rented property and to cause a marketing campaign to take place to sell the property at [address] and to arrange an auction of the property to be held on 19 May 2018 are stayed until the hearing of the application to review the appointment of an administrator for SJT currently scheduled for 17 May 2018.

2. The stay is conditional on [SMT] and/or [JT] paying the arrears of rates on the property at [address] to the [local authority] and providing evidence that the payment has been made to the Tribunal and the PTQ.

9. [9]
   The review hearing ultimately was not conducted until 28 June 2018. On that occasion the Tribunal gave an order continuing the appointment of the PTQ for all financial matters but set it for review in one (1) year.^[6] There is however nothing contained in the orders from that review hearing otherwise dealing with the PTQ’s decisions referred to in the stay order of 12 April 2018. I thus infer that the arrears of rates had been paid and the need for the sale was averted.
10. [10]
    What then followed was a further order made on 30 April 2019 continuing the appointment of the PTQ for all financial matters, on that occasion reverting to it being to remain current until further order of the Tribunal.^[7]
11. [11]
    Then on 19 July 2021, that administration order was changed and SJT’s son, JST, was appointed as SJT’s administrator for all financial matters, being set for review within eighteen (18) months.^[8]
12. [12]
    The review of that appointment came on before me in a hearing on 23 August 2023. I gave an order then continuing the appointment of JST and setting it for review in three (3) years. However as relevant to this proceeding and to which these reasons relate, shortly before that review hearing was to occur, but after the Notice of Hearing of that review hearing was sent to all active parties, such including the PTQ, on 9 August 2023 the PTQ filed an Application for Miscellaneous Matters expressed in the following manner:

Seeking directions to be made for the adult to reimburse expenses incurred by the Public Trustee of Queensland during our time as administrator, as permitted pursuant to s. 47 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000.

13. [13]
    The existence of that application caused the review hearing before me to also effectively become a directions hearing for the purposes of the future conduct of that application. Following a short discussion with the PTQ’s representative who attended at the hearing, and JST as the one to effectively respond to the application as SJT’s administrator,^[9] I gave orders for:

    1. the filing of written submissions from JST in his capacity as administrator;
    2. the PTQ to file any response to those submissions; and
    3. consistent with the approach urged upon me by the PTQ in its application,  for the application to be thereafter determined on the papers unless either party requested an oral hearing.
14. [14]
    Relevant written submissions were subsequently received from SJT^[10] and the PTQ.^[11] Neither party requested an oral hearing. Accordingly I determined the application on the papers,^[12] namely the content of that contained in the documentation accompanying the application and the  subsequent written submissions.

The Application

15. [15]
    In the material accompanying the application, the PTQ stated the following:

[5] Following our appointment, PTQ became aware of a matter concerning owing rates on the property owned by [SJT] at [address].

[6] Per the enclosed letter from [council] dated 12 September 2017, the total rates amount owing inclusive of interest was $21,835.62. Per this same correspondence, it is noted that the council intended to sell the property to recoup these owing rates.

[7]  Accordingly, the PTQ as administrator for [SJT] instructed the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of [SJT] in this matter, in accordance with our powers and duties as set out in the [GAA Act].

[8] PTQ was able to halt the proceedings of the sale of the property whilst alternate arrangements were made to attend to the repayment of the arrears and management of [SLF’s] other liabilities to other creditors.

[9] Given this period of financial hardship, the PTQ also extended overdraft facilities to [SLF] to ensure that payment for the required maintenance, insurance and legals (sic) expenses pertaining to [SLF]’s affairs were able to be met without further financial penalty or unacceptable risk.

[10]  Since the appointment of [JST], the PTQ has sought payment of the expenses owed to our office from [JST] as the administrator for [SJT].

16. [16]
    The PTQ also stated therein that the amount owing to his office was $17,997.16, plus interest, made up as follows:^[13]

    1. $15,278.84 for legal costs incurred in dealing with the [local authority];
    2. $2,673.88 for expenses including:^[14]
       1. (i)
          A building and pest inspection - $500;
       2. (ii)
          Smoke alarm testing and installation - $594;
       3. (iii)
          Property valuation - $484; and
       4. (iii)
          Vehicle insurance - $1,094.74.
17. [17]
    What are said to be copies of all relevant invoices supporting these asserted expenses were enclosed as part of the application. In terms of legal fees charged, the invoices show that it was in the engagement of the Official Solicitor to the PTQ, such having traversed the period 14 July 2017 to 25 January 2021.
18. [18]
    Also attached as part of the application documents is a copy of what I read as being correspondence between the PTQ and JST in which the PTQ sought payment of these expenses from SJT. The first is a letter from the PTQ addressed to JST dated 7 September 2021 in which the author thereof, a JW identified therein as a ‘Senior Public Trust Officer’, requested JST to advise the PTQ of an intended payment plan for settlement of these expenses. What then followed appears to be a series of e-mails between JST and JW wherein JST made this statement in his e-mail of 22 February 2022:

In Regards (sic) to the money owned for solicitation (sic) fees, unfortunately I’m going to have to decline the opportunity to set up repayments for those fees specifically.

The reasons being, I don’t believe my father owes that money to the trustee according to the information given. As I was apart (sic) of the proceedings in 2017-2019 and was informed by council of the process after receiving legal advice.

If further information is required please reply to this email.

However in regards (sic) to the approx. $2000 used from corporate funds for insurance etc, I’m happy to talk about repayments for this amount as soon as the solicitation (sic) fees are rectified.

19. [19]
    On the email chain as it is contained within the application documents, the response to this e-mail is simply another demand by JW, on that occasion dated 6 May 2022, for payment of the funds by way of a repayment plan. There is nothing contained in the PTQ’s material accompanying the application as to any request by PTQ for further information from JST, or any explanation by the PTQ being given to JST as to why the amounts should be paid notwithstanding that which JST stated in his e-mail.
20. [20]
    In conclusion of its application, the PTQ then made these submissions:

[18] [T]hese expenses were incurred in the lawful conducting (sic) of our duties and obligations imposed upon us by the Act and were within the powers that were held pursuant to s. 33 of the Act.

[19] That not to seek the appropriate legal assistance in the matter may have been seen contrary to our duties under s. 35 of the Act, as failure to take reasonable, timely and appropriate action may have resulted in [SJT] losing the property by way of forced sale.

[20] We seek the Tribunal to make orders directing the adult to reimburse the PTQ for the above referenced expenses which were reasonably incurred by our office in the discharge of our duties of the management of his affairs, solely for his benefit.

…

[23] … the Tribunal make order (sic) any orders it deems appropriate to make in respect of the reimbursement of the expenses.

[24] Further, should the Tribunal make such orders, that the Tribunal also permits the Public Trustee of Queensland to secure its interest by way of caveat on the property.

The Administrator’s Response

21. [21]
    Whilst confused and somewhat confusing in the manner by which JST provided his written response,^[15] I was able to discern the following relevant points as to being the basis thereof:

    1. As an admission:^[16]

Prior to my appointment of financial administration i (sic) had a discussion with my fathers (sic) previous public trustee officer regarding funds that were used from a corporate account of the Public Trustee of QLD of approx, (sic) $2200.. which was paid towards home insurance and smoke alarm testing for my fathers (sic) property .. and that the PTQ intended to be reimbursed for these funds.

2. As a denial:

The public trustee of QLD is owed $15,278.84 in fees that were reasonably incurred due to legal costs in an attempt to prevent the sale of my fathers (sic) property. whilst (sic) liasing (sic) with PTQ during this time regarding proceedings from the council, noone (sic) in my family was made aware of the legal costs being incured (sic) until after i (sic) was appointed as admin in july (sic) 2021. years (sic) later. (See Attachments).

22. [22]
    JST also provided a copy of what is shown to be a Guardianship Report from the Office of Public Guardian, showing a date received stamp of 6 April 2018.^[17] The quality of reproduction of that document is poor, but as I read it the content thereof which I consider relevant to this proceeding is as follows:^[18]

On 22 November 2017, a delegate of the Public Guardian visited [SJT] at his [address]. During the visit, [SJT] jumped from one topic to another. At the time of the visit it appeared that [SJT] did not have a full understanding of his circumstances. [SJT] advised the delegate guardian he wanted to remain in his home, but if he was not able to remain living in his him, his preference would be to rent a unit in [town named being the same as the town in which he then resided in his own home]. …

On 19 December 2017, a delegate of the Public Guardian advocated on behalf of [SJT] to remain in his home for the duration of the sale process should the sale of the property proceed.

On 21 December 2017, a delegate of the Public Guardian received written advice from the PTQ that the PTQ would not be approving this request for [SJT] to remain in his home for the duration of the sale process. The PTQ advised that remaining in the property would place unnecessary burden and stress on [SJT], and that by [SJT] remaining at the property. It will simply burden the sale process given his mental state of mind and may turn off potential purchasers.

On 21 December 2017, a delegate of the Public Guardian made a decision on behalf of [SJT] to not support the intention of the PTQ to compel [SJT] to vacate his property by 30 January 2018. The decision recommended that if [SJT] was agreeable, that appropriate alternative accommodation could be sourced for [SJT] prior to him being evicted from his property.

On 22 December 2017, a delegate of the Public Guardian wrote to the PTQ asking:

• If the PTQ had approached the [council] to stop the sale process of [SJT’s] house;
• Whether the [council] had been approached to discuss a payment plan for outstanding rates;
• If a copy of the valuation and property inspection have a breakdown of outstanding rates;
• If there is a financial plan that recommended the sale of property;
• Whether there is a re-payment plan negotiated on [SJT’s] behalf for his debts;
• Whether there is a possibility of [SJT] getting a tenant to help with costs;
• Whether [SJT’s] car loan can be written off as it is possible that [SJT] lacked capacity at the time of application of the car loan;
• Whether [SJT] had any other trust benefits and or superannuation benefits to assist with debt repayment; and
• Whether a small loan against [SJT’s] property has been considered.

On 22 December 2018, the PTQ provided written advice in response to the guardian’s questions stating that inaction on the house is not an option for [SJT] and that the sale of the property must be progressed as a matter of urgency. The PTQ advised that they were considering a small payment plan to the Council, however they had investigated all other options available.

…

23. [23]
    In addition, JST provided a copy of an exchange of e-mails between SMT and officers of the PTQ on 1 May 2018. Once again the quality of the reproduction of this copy is poor, but as I read it the content is this:

    1. From SMT

I am sending you this e-mail, as a refusal to relocate our father until the next hearing on the 17^th. It is our father’s birthday on the 9^th May and would be very sad if he was to spend his birthday being moved from his house to another place of residence.

If you have to proceed with anything, you can do it with him still in the house, I think you are completely unaware of the full affect this will have on our father’s health, even if temporarily removed from his premises.

…

2. From the PTQ.

Thank you for your e-mail. We remain concerned about the payment of the rates arrears and being able to make the necessary arrangements to relocate your father prior to the June 30, 2018 deadline.

As was mentioned in the QCAT hearing on the 12^th of April, it is important that if this property is to be sold that the Public Trustee has enough time to secure the best possible price for his house. This will allow your father to have enough funds to pay out his debts and have some money left over to live comfortably.

Another reason for our concern is, if the Council sells your father’s property [SJT] may not have somewhere to live on very short notice. This would cause a great deal of distress to him and your family, so it is our preference to avoid this situation.

Could you please advise if you still intend to pay the rates, as we have been advised by the Council that this did not occur by the stay of the decision expiry which was the 30^th of April 2018.

Please reply at your earliest convenience.

The PTQ’s Reply

24. [24]
    The PTQ’s response to JST’s submissions was short. No further detailed submission was made, but rather a copy of a letter from the PTQ to JST and SMT was provided with the following statement being made in reference to it:^[19]

… for the Tribunal’s benefit we wish to submit correspondence sent to [JST] dated 24 January 2018 evidence of our explanation as to why family members were not earlier engaged in respect of the matter.

This did not occur as it was the expressed wish of [SJT] to not involve his family members in such matters, and accordingly the Public Trustee of Queensland wished to preserve [SJT]’s right to privacy.

25. [25]
    Whilst that letter is extensive in its content, it contains a few parts which I consider to be relevant to the application before me, such which I extract here:

Communication with your father

When the Public Trustee received the Order we contacted your father to advise him that we had been appointed for financial matters. When we consult with the client we obtain a family history and obtain his instructions regarding who he would like us to include in financial decisions.

Honouring your father’s wishes is in keeping with the General Principles as prescribed in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). The Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 seeks to balance the rights of an adult with impaired decision making capacity so they are independent and receive appropriate support. To achieve this balance, guardians and administrators are required to apply a range of general principles.

The Public Trustee is committed to following these General Principles and we have enclosed them for your assistance.

During our many conversations with [SJT] he described his relationship with his children as ‘estranged’. The initial application  to QCAT was completed by your aunt [RW] (attorney). In this application she advised the Tribunal of the following:

• That only herself and [VM] (solicitor) had been assisting your father and consulted regarding this application;
• That there was no other party that should be consulted;
• That [RW] is your father’s closest family member; and
• That there was no one else (including siblings, children or advocates) who would be interested in this application.

We rely on the information provided to QCAT when determining who is involved with the client. We were advised by your father that [RW] and [M] (your uncle) were the only people that assisted him. We appreciate that this information is upsetting to you both, and is not how you see your family or relationship with your father.

Given the length of time and frequency of our contact with [SJT] (weekly calls) we can confirm that at no stage have we received instructions from him to make contact with you in relation to his financial affairs. Last week we contacted your father to seek his permission to provide financial documentation to [SMT] and he agreed we could now contact you both to discuss these issues.

26. [26]
    After then addressing SJT’s financial position, and the issue with the council and the substantial arrears of rates, under the heading ‘Legal Advice’ the PTQ then stated the following:

We have instructed the Official Solicitor to the Public Trustee of Queensland to provide us with advice in relation to the following matters:

1. Your father’s options in regards (sic) to the Default Notice issued by the [local authority]; and

 …

2. Your father’s options regarding the car financing loan with [financier named].

27. [27]
    Notably, the PTQ did not provide this Tribunal with a copy of his reply of 22 December 2017 to the Public Guardian as referred to in the guardian’s report to which I referred in paragraph [22] herein.

Discussion on the Application

The Relevant Statutory Law

28. [28]
    As noted in paragraphs [12] and [18] herein, the PTQ advances his application in this Tribunal by reference to s 33, s 35, and s 47  of the GAA Act. It is thus appropriate to extract those provisions, to the extent relevant, within these reasons. There is a related provision, namely s 34, which whilst not referred to by the PTQ in his submissions it is a relevant provision, thus it is also extracted herein.^[20]

33  Power of guardian or administrator

1. …

2. Unless the tribunal orders otherwise, an administrator is authorised to do, in accordance with the terms of the administrator’s appointment, anything in relation to a financial matter that the adult could have done if the adult had capacity for the matter when the power is exercised.

3. …

34  Apply principles

1. A guardian or administrator must apply the general principles.

2. …

35  Act honestly and with reasonable diligence

A guardian or administrator who may exercise power for an adult must exercise the power honestly and with reasonable diligence to protect the adult’s interests.

47  Payment of expenses

A guardian or administrator for an adult is entitled to reimbursement from the adult of the reasonable expenses incurred in acting as guardian or administrator.

29. [29]
    As should readily be noted, s 34 required the PTQ to apply the general principles when appointed as SJT’s administrator. These are those principles as prescribed in the GAA Act. At the time of the PTQ’s appointment from 6 September 2017 these were prescribed under s 11 of the Act, and in turn found in Schedule 1 of the Act. However from 30 November 2020 the Act was amended and from then up to the end of the PTQ’s appointment they were prescribed by, and found in, s 11A of the Act. There was also some changes made in the expression of the relevant principles from the earlier version. A change was also made in terms of the manner in which the presumption of capacity was to be applied by the PTQ once appointed as administrator.
30. [30]
    For ease of reference in terms of the discussion that follows herein, the parts of the GAA Act as it was in force at the relevant times, and which I consider to be relevant to the decision I was being asked to make, are extracted here:

    1. Current from the start of the PTQ’s appointment to 29 November 2020:

11  Principles for adults with impaired capacity

1. A person or other entity who performs a function or exercises a power under this Act for a matter in relation to an adult with impaired capacity for the matter must apply the principles stated in schedule 1 (the general principles and, …).

2. …

Schedule 1 Principles

Part 1 General principles

1  Presumption of capacity

An adult is presumed to have capacity for a matter.

7  Maximum participation, minimal limitations and substituted judgment

1. An adult’s right to participate, to the greatest extent practicable, in decisions affecting the adult’s life, including the development of policies, programs and services for people with impaired capacity for a matter, must be recognised and taken into account.

2. Also, the importance of preserving, to the greatest extent practicable, an adult’s right to make his or her own decisions must be taken into account.

3. So, for example —

1. the adult must be given any necessary support, and access to information, to enable the adult to participate in decisions affecting the adult’s life; and

2. to the greatest extent practicable, for exercising power for a matter for the adult, the adult’s views and wishes are to be sought and taken into account; and

3. a person or other entity in performing a function or exercising a power under this Act must do so in the way least restrictive of the adult’s rights.

4. Also, the principle of substituted judgment must be used so that if, from the adult’s previous actions, it is reasonably practicable to work out what the adult’s views and wishes would be, a person or other entity in performing a function or exercising a power under this Act must take into account what the person or other entity considers would be the adult’s views and wishes.

5. However, a person or other entity in performing a function or exercising a power under this Act must do so in a way consistent with the adult’s proper care and protection.

6. Views and wishes may be expressed orally, in writing or in another way, including, for example, by conduct.

8  Maintenance of existing supportive relationships

The importance of maintaining an adult’s existing supportive relationships must be taken into account.

…

10 Appropriate to circumstances

Power for a matter should be exercised by a guardian or administrator for an adult in a way that is appropriate to the adult’s characteristics and needs.

11  Confidentiality

An adult’s right to confidentiality of information about the adult must be recognised and taken into account.

2. Current from 30 November 2020 to the end of the PTQ’s appointment:^[21]

11  Application of presumption of capacity

1. If, in performing a function or exercising a power under this Act, the tribunal or the court is required to make a decision about an adult’s capacity for a matter, the tribunal or the court is to presume the adult has capacity for the matter until the contrary is proven. (

2. If the tribunal or the court has appointed a guardian or an administrator for an adult for a matter, the guardian or administrator is not required to presume the adult has capacity for the matter.

3. …

11B  General principles

1. The principles (the general principles) set out below must be applied by a person or other entity that performs a function or exercises a power under this Act.

2. Also, a person making a decision for an adult on an informal basis must apply the general principles in making the decision.

3. …

General principles

1  Presumption of capacity

An adult is presumed to have capacity for a matter.

…

4  Maintenance of adult’s existing supportive relationships

1. The importance of maintaining an adult’s existing supportive relationships must be taken into account.

2. Maintaining an adult’s existing supportive relationships may, for example, involve consultation with—

1. the adult, to find out who are the members of the adult’s support network; and

2. any persons who have an existing supportive relationship with the adult; and

3. any members of the adult’s support network who are making decisions for the adult on an informal basis.

3. The role of families, carers and other significant persons in an adult’s life to support the adult to make decisions should be acknowledged and respected.

…

8  Maximising an adult’s participation in decision-making

1. An adult’s right to participate, to the greatest extent practicable, in decisions affecting the adult’s life must be recognised and taken into account.

2. An adult must be given the support and access to information necessary to enable the adult to make or participate in decisions affecting the adult’s life.

3. An adult must be given the support necessary to enable the adult to communicate the adult’s decisions.

4. To the greatest extent practicable, a person or other entity, in exercising power for a matter for an adult, must seek the adult’s views, wishes and preferences.

5. An adult’s views, wishes and preferences may be expressed orally, in writing or in another way, including, for example, by conduct.

6. An adult is not to be treated as unable to make a decision about a matter unless all practicable steps have been taken to provide the adult with the support and access to information necessary to make and communicate a decision.

9  Performance of functions and exercise of powers

 A person or other entity, in performing a function or exercising a power under this Act in relation to an adult, or in making a decision for an adult on an informal basis, must do so—

1. in a way that promotes and safeguards the adult’s rights, interests and opportunities; and

2. in the way that is least restrictive of the adult’s rights, interests and opportunities.

10  Structured decision-making

1. In applying general principle 9, a person or other entity in performing a function or exercising a power under this Act in relation to an adult, or in making a decision for an adult on an informal basis, must adopt the approach set out in subsections (2) to (5).

2. First, the person or other entity must—

1. recognise and preserve, to the greatest extent practicable, the adult’s right to make the adult’s own decision; and

2. if possible, support the adult to make a decision.

3. Second, the person or other entity must recognise and take into account any views, wishes and preferences expressed or demonstrated by the adult.

4. Third, if the adult’s views, wishes and preferences can not be determined, the person or other entity must use the principle of substituted judgement so that if, from the adult’s views, wishes and preferences, expressed or demonstrated when the adult had capacity, it is reasonably practicable to work out what the adult’s views, wishes and preferences would be, the person or other entity must recognise and take into account what the person or other entity considers the adult’s views, wishes and preferences would be.

5. Fourth, once the person or other entity has recognised and taken into account the matters mentioned in subsections (2) to (4), the person or other entity may perform the function, exercise the power or make the decision.

31. [31]
    As will be noted from the extract taken from the PTQ’s letter to JST and SMT referred to in paragraph [25] herein, the PTQ asserted a commitment to following the general principles. Accordingly, before discussing the evidence that was before me in that regard, in my opinion it is appropriate to firstly turn to the manner in which these provisions have been judicially considered.

The Relevant Caselaw

32. [32]
    Recently the Queensland Court of Appeal had cause to consider issues concerning the PTQ’s conduct in his role as an administrator appointed under the GAA to an adult in terms of decisions made to, inter-alia, sell some of the adult’s real property. It was a matter that had its genesis in decisions of this Tribunal at first instance and subsequently this Tribunal’s Appeal Division. This was against the background of the General Principles as they applied before the amendments that took effect from 30 November 2020. That was in the matter of TJ v The Public Trustee of Queensland & Anor.^[22]
33. [33]
    The substantive issue in that proceeding was a claim by the adult, via his administrator, for compensation from the PTQ for losses said to have resulted from the PTQ’s decisions to sell property. As such it is distinguishable from the present circumstances before me where it is the PTQ seeking compensation from the adult via his administrator for expenses said to have been incurred in the decisions made to sell property. However, notwithstanding that difference, in my opinion the reasoning of the Court therein remains directly relevant to matters before me.
34. [34]
    In delivering the leading decision of the Court, Boddice JA expressed the following observations:^[23]

[32]  Section 33 of the Act provides that an administrator is authorised to do anything in relation to a financial matter that the adult could have done if the adult had capacity when the power was exercised, unless QCAT orders otherwise.

[33]  Relevantly, s 34 of the Act provides that an administrator must apply the General Principles. The General Principles are not fixed rules, but rather considerations which must genuinely be taken into account to the extent appropriate in the circumstances.

[34] …^[24]

[35] Section 35 of the Act provides that an administrator must exercise the power for an adult “honestly and with reasonable diligence to protect the adult’s interests”.

[36]  Correspondingly, s 51 of the Act imports the “prudent person investment rule”. That imports the duties at s 22 of the Trusts Act which require the Public Trustee to “…exercise the care, diligence and skill a prudent person engaged in that profession, business or employment would exercise in managing the affairs of other persons…”.

[37]  The applicant submits that the Public Trustee’s decisions to sell the bush retreat and to rent out and subsequently sell the unit did not comply with the Act or its General Principles …

…

[39]  At the initial hearing before QCAT and at the hearing before QCATA, the Public Trustee did not lead any direct evidence of its decision-making in 2004 to initially tenant the unit; in respect of the decision in 2005 to sell the bush retreat; and in respect of the decision to sell the unit in 2007.

[40]  There was evidence of a submission, made by the Public Trustee in 2011, in which it was recorded that on 5 February 2004 the Public Trustee met with CRG’s biological father and his wife; that the biological father had quit his job to look after CRG; that the biological father was requesting money but the Public Trustee had insufficient funds at that time; and that it was agreed with the biological father “that the unit … should be rented and that the [bush retreat] should be considered for sale”. The submission did not record any consideration of alternative options.

[41]  Consistent with its obligations as administrator to act with reasonable diligence to protect CRG’s interests under s 35 of the Act, to apply the General Principles, and to exercise the relevant care, diligence and skill a prudent person would exercise in managing the affairs of others under s 22 of the Trusts Act, the Public Trustee had an obligation to analyse and assess the courses of action which may be reasonably taken by a prudent person and to assess the financial consequences of those actions, when determining whether to tenant CRG’s unit in 2004; to sell the bush retreat in 2005; and to sell the unit in 2007.

[42]  Relevantly, one course of action would include retaining the unit, whilst disposing of the bush retreat, thereby leaving CRG with his own home in the future. Such a course of action would have particular regard to the consequences to CRG in not having available to him his own residence within which to reside, and the financial implications of the investment of the proceeds of those funds on the availability of any government entitlements.

[43]  There was simply no evidence before QCAT or QCATA as to any analysis or assessment of what were reasonable alternative courses of action, or as to their consequences for CRG, in respect of such decisions. Even the 2011 submission failed to outline any consideration of options, such as retaining the unit while selling the bush retreat to realise cash or as to the consequences of such steps to CRG and their financial implications in relation to the receipt of ongoing government benefits.

[44]  Further, in undertaking that analysis and assessment, the General Principles required the Public Trustee to recognise and take into account CRG’s right to participate, to the greatest extent practicable, in decisions affecting his life; the importance of preserving, to the greatest extent practicable, his right to make his own decisions; and, in exercising the principle of substituted judgment, to take into account what others considered would be CRG’s views and wishes, if it was reasonably practicable to work out CRG’s views and wishes from those persons.

[45]  There was no evidence that the Public Trustee sought CRG’s views or even attempted to do so, prior to making the decisions to rent to unit, sell the bush retreat and, ultimately, sell the unit.

…

[50]  There was also no evidence that the Public Trustee had, in determining that the unit should be sold in 2007, sought the views of CRG’s support network, …, or other members of his family.

[51]  That being so, there was no evidential basis upon which QCATA could conclude that the Public Trustee had, in exercising the power to initially tenant the unit and to subsequently sell the bush retreat and the unit, complied with its obligation as administrator under the Act to apply General Principle 7.

35. [35]
    In terms of the last of those observations, his Honour noted the PTQ ‘s submission to the Court that there was no breach of General Principle 7 as the course of action taken was consistent with the adult’s proper care and protection. His Honour did not accept that submission expressing this view:^[25]

[52] … However, that course of action could not be said to be for CRG’s proper care and protection where it was undertaken without having first analysed and assessed other reasonable alternative courses of action, and without seeking CRG’s views or those of his mother and other support networks.

[53]  Accordingly, it was an error of law for QCATA to find there was evidence the Public Trustee had applied General Principle 7 in determining to make the relevant decisions. Further, it was an error of law for QCATA to find that the Public Trustee had exercised the power with reasonable diligence to protect CRG’s interests, pursuant to s 35 of the Act, when there was no evidence the Public Trustee had applied General Principle 7.

36. [36]
    Whilst the facts of the case before the Court in that matter involved not just the sale of property but the investment in other property, and thus the application of s 51 of the GAA and in turn s 22 of the Trusts Act 1973(Qld) squarely arises, in my opinion the circumstances that were before me in the present case make the observations of Boddice JA at paragraphs [35] and [36] in the extract just given directly relevant here and apposite to be adopted by this Tribunal.
37. [37]
    As I see it, the decision to either sell or retain the property in question in the face of substantial arrears in rates needing to be settled, and the foreshadowed forced sale by the council, gives rise to the need for exercise of the ‘prudent person investment rule’. It opened the door for the questions – should the current investment be retained and an alternative to sale found – should the current investment be sold, the debt settled, and a different property be purchased for SJT to live in – should the current investment be sold and a property rented for SJT to live in, with the remaining proceeds of sale invested. Such questions required the exercise of requisite degree of care etc in managing the affairs of another person that would be exercised in engaging in the task of investment for that person. As I discuss more fully later in these reasons, in my opinion the PTQ did not exercise its decision making processes consistent with that requirement.
38. [38]
    In saying that, as may be noted from the observations of Boddice JA, a principle issue for the Court was the effect of General Principle 7(5), namely conduct being “consistent with an adult’s proper care and protection”. With the amendments to the Act in late 2020 and the substantive changes to the expression of the General Principles, this was then to be found in General Principle 9, more specifically being the exercise of power that “promotes and safeguards the adult’s rights, interests, and opportunities.”
39. [39]
    Late last year Henry J of the Queensland Supreme Court had cause to consider the application of General Principle 9, as it appears in identical form within the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), once again in terms of an issue of sale of  property albeit on that occasion the sale of a property by at attorney to a related person, thus a conflict transaction. That was in the matter of BP v PM & Ors.^[26] Whilst once again the case is distinguishable on its fact from the present circumstances before me, in my opinion once the judicial interpretation of the relevant general principle, as it relates to the decisions I was asked to make, is apposite.
40. [40]
    In discussing the application of this Principle, Henry J expressed the following view:^[27]

[43] Principle 9 requires that in performing the function or exercising the power the decision-maker must do so in a way that promotes and safeguards and is least restrictive of the adult’s rights, interests and opportunities. Given how significantly [the adult’s] cognitive capacity is impaired this principle does not relate in any practical sense to the process part of dealings with her prior to arriving at the decision. Rather, it relates to the content of the decision to be reached. In this context the best treatment of her rights and opportunities aligns with a decision which promotes, safeguards and is least restrictive of [the adult’s] interests. To have that quality the decision sought (ie. to authorise the transaction) should be in [the adult’s] interests and be more in her interests than the status quo or some other apparently available course. Putting it another way, the decision to authorise should be in her best interests.

41. [41]
    His Honour then continued considering the question of what was, on the issues before the Court, in the best interests of the adult, expressing this view:^[28]

[44]  The decision whether to authorise the sale transaction is a decision about a financial matter with the consequence that consideration of what is in [the adult’s] best interests requires consideration of what is in her financial best interests.

….

42. [42]
    Having considered the question of what was in the adult’s financial best interests, and determining that on the evidence before the Court the sale would be financially beneficial, his Honour then expressed this further view on the question of what was in the adult’s best interest:^[29]

[64] Other than [the adult’s] financial interests the only other consideration with the potential to bear upon whether the proposed transaction is in [the adult’s] best interests is her emotional well-being, in that the maintenance of her connection to the property may provide some comfort to her. It is, however, an inescapably vague consideration because of Victoria’s significantly impaired cognition. To the extent it is relevant it can only be sensibly considered by reference to its effect in a theoretical moment of correct understanding. In that equation the level of emotional distress [the adult] may feel at no longer being the owner of her home is likely to be outweighed by the comfort she would draw from the knowledge that the sale will lift the ongoing managerial and financial burden of ownership of her home in a way which safely preserves her substantial asset pool, while at the same time preserving the state of her home and her possessions in it for her, for so long as she may be able to visit there.

Consideration of the evidence related to the law

43. [43]
    With all that being said, I thus turn to the evidence that is before me. I considered it in terms of the extent to which I am able to ascertain it may properly be said the PTQ applied the General Principles. Following that discussion I discuss the relief the PTQ seeks and the extent to which I have determined he is entitled to it.
44. [44]
    I accept as a fact that the PTQ engaged in discussions with SJT from which it is said the PTQ determined that SJT’s views, wishes, and preferences, were established but only to the extent to which the PTQ was not to communicate SJT’s financial circumstances to JST and/or SMT. This is an explanation why it is said the PTQ did not discuss the matters with JST and/or SMT, and to that extent it shows at least some compliance with General Principle 7 (1) to (3) as it appeared in the earlier version of the Act, later General Principal 8 in the amended version of the Act.
45. [45]
    However, it does not explain, and there is no other explanation given by the PTQ, whether the PTQ considered the need to, notwithstanding such expressed views, wishes, and preferences, to still discuss the relevant matters with SJT’s family members. In that regard it must not be overlooked that, in the circumstance of the PTQ having been appointed as administrator under the GAA Act, such could only have occurred on the basis that SJT was of impaired capacity in terms of decision making for all financial matters. That being so, the question that remains unanswered is whether SJT did actually understand the nature and effect of his decision, such effectively being what it was, to inform the PTQ not to discuss his financial affairs with JST and/or SMT. As the Public Guardian noted in the guardian’s report which I have extracted part of in paragraph [22] herein, it was the guardian’s opinion as at 21 December 2017 that SJT did not fully understand his circumstances. That gives rise to the question whether SJT understood the nature and effect of his preference, if followed, not to have his financial affairs discussed with his children.
46. [46]
    Whilst under the provisions of the GAA Act as they were when the PTQ was first appointed, it was a requirement of s 11 of the Act that General Principle 1 be applied in all instances, that being there was a presumption of capacity. However with the later amendments to the Act, whilst that same General Principle existed and was ordinarily required to be applied, under the then s 11(2) of the Act once this Tribunal had made the administration order appointing the PTQ, the PTQ was no longer required to presume SJT had capacity.
47. [47]
    However notwithstanding that relatively rigid requirement of the earlier version of the Act, in my opinion it would not have been inconsistent with the General Principles current at that time, more specifically General Principle 10, had the PTQ exercised his power as the appointed administrator in a way that was appropriate to SJT’s characteristics and needs, such that would have dictated discussion with family members. Given SJT’s reduced cognitive abilities and thus his impaired capacity in respect of all financial matters, such being not only a characteristic but indicative of a need, in my opinion it dictated that the PTQ should have done that.
48. [48]
    For these reasons it seems to me that the PTQ did not fully comply with the General Principles to the extent of engaging with SJT’s family members, and had he done so it might have given rise to circumstances being identified that could possibly have avoided the incurring of what may be said to be reasonably substantial legal fees.
49. [49]
    But there is another issue, one which is in my opinion critical, of what is in my opinion a failure of the PTQ to have complied with the General Principles. There is no evidence before me to show that the PTQ did at any time discuss with SJT any one or more of the following:

    1. the sale of his house either by the council or the PTQ;
    2. the consequences to SJT (if any) of not having available to him own house within which to reside;
    3. the financial implications (if any) of the sale of the house and the subsequent available proceeds of the sale (if any) on the availability of any government entitlements;
    4. the need for, and cost of obtaining, legal advice on the issues;.
    5. any alternatives to sale that may be available to him, or more critically the absence of any alternative, and in turn the consequences for SJT.
50. [50]
    Moreover, there is no evidence of the PTQ’s consideration, and subsequent reasons for decisions made, of these issues regardless of whether his officers discussed the issues with SJT. That is so notwithstanding the PTQ’s statement said to have been made to the Public Guardian on 22 December 2018 that “inaction on the house is not an option” and they had investigated all other options available”, as the guardian’s report I referred to earlier recorded. In my opinion the Public Guardian asked the right questions of the PTQ which were of the issues and options to have been investigated, and in turn to have been discussed with SJT even in the circumstances of his impaired capacity, and as necessary given that impaired capacity with his support network inclusive of family members. These are as I have identified them in the extract from the guardian’s report in paragraph [22] herein.
51. [51]
    It is the evidence of his consideration of these questions, and the discussion of same with SJT at the very least, which should have been put before me in support of the PTQ’s application to show his compliance with the General Principles. In the absence of this evidence, I am left to draw the inference that at the very least no such discussion with SJT took place, and more critically I am left with drawing the conclusion by inference that no such consideration of these issues took place, or at the very least only minimal consideration was given.
52. [52]
    In all respects, on reading of the material before me, the relevant parts of which I have extracted or otherwise identified in these reasons, I am left with the impression that the PTQ’s officers involved in the decision made to press forward with the sale of SJT’s house, and simultaneously to have him move out of the house before it was sold, can only be described as one which was ‘heavy handed’ and absent the necessary degree of consultation with all interested parties. A good example of this is found in the exchange of correspondence between both JST and the PTQ, and his sister SMT and the PTQ which I refer to and extract parts of in paragraphs [18] and [23] herein.
53. [53]
    Accordingly it leads me to the conclusion that the PTQ did not meet the requirements of the GAA Act in terms of engaging all relevant General Principles, namely Principle 7 as it was expressed at the time of the PTQ initial appointment, and later Principal 8 as it was expressed from 30 November 2020 onwards.
54. [54]
    That conclusion then takes me back to the reasoning and conclusions of Boddice JA in TJ v The Public Trustee of Queensland & Anor as I have extracted it, and given emphasis to, in paragraph [34] herein, in regard to which I make the following observations on the evidence as it was before me:

    1. The PTQ had an obligation to analyse and assess the available courses of action which may be reasonably taken by a prudent person and to assess the financial consequences of those actions, before deciding to proceed and sell SJT’s house;
    2. In the questions asked of the PTQ by the Public Guardian, some alternatives were raised such which may have resulted in SJT being able to stay within his own home whilst still ensuring his debts were met;
    3. There were other questions that also should have been considered and answered, such as the effect (if any) the sale of the house might have had on SJT in turn losing his own residence, but having funds remaining after sale, and in turn on the availability of government entitlements.
    4. There was simply no evidence before as to any analysis or assessment by the PTQ of what reasonable alternative courses of action were, or as to their consequences for SJT in respect of the decision the PTQ made and for which he says he sought and obtained legal advice at a cost which he now seeks to be paid by SJT.
55. [55]
    Turning then to the reasoning of Henry J in BP v PM & Ors as I have referred to it in paragraphs [40] to [42] herein, there similarly was no evidence before me from the PTQ that the decision he had made, and seemingly was focussed on implementing notwithstanding the opposition taken to it by the Public Guardian, was more in SJT’s interests than any alternative.
56. [56]
    Moreover there is no evidence that at any time the PTQ gave any consideration to SJT’s emotional well-being in the circumstances SJT faced at that time, and whether on balance the lifting of an ongoing financial burden would have outweighed any emotional stress. As is shown by reference to the PTQ’s communications with the Public Guardian on 21 December 2017 as reported in the guardian’s report, and his Officer’s communication with SMT on 1 May 2018, the PTQ was readily aware of the concerns of emotional stress on SJT of the possibility of relocation from his own home and its sale. Thus, a burden was placed on the PTQ to have worked through this issue as part of his decision making process, but there is no evidence that he did so. In the absence that evidence I am left to infer it does not exist because it did not occur.
57. [57]
    All that being said, as to the PTQ’s assertion that his decision making was consistent with the requirements imposed on him under s 33 and s 35 of the GAA Act, I do not accept that as being correct. His officers charged with the conduct of the administration of SJT’s financial affairs simply did not comply with the GAA Act in terms of the application of the General Principles. For that reason there is no basis upon which the PTQ should be entitled to reimbursement of the total of that which he seeks from SJT.

The Relief the PTQ Seeks

58. [58]
    As noted earlier herein, the PTQ seeks orders from me that:

    1. I direct SJT, via JST, to reimburse the PTQ for the expenses incurred; and
    2. I make an order permitting the PTQ to place a caveat on SJT’s property as a form of security for those expenses until reimbursed.
59. [59]
    It must not be overlooked that the PTQ’s application before this Tribunal is one for giving of ‘Advice, Directions, or Recommendations’. Such falls within the functions of the Tribunal under s 81(d) of the GAA Act, and is a permissible application as provided for under s 115 of the Act. The express power of the Tribunal is then in turn found in s 138 of the Act.
60. [60]
    But in my opinion such a function and its accompanying power does not extend to this Tribunal effectively making a ‘money order’ in the PTQ’s favour. An application under s 115 of the Act is not a proceeding which permits the presentation of  a claim for monetary relief. This is because it is not a proceeding that permits the proper testing of any such claim in a manner that would provide the respondent to such a claim, in this instance SJT, the requisite degree of procedural fairness. In that regard I observe that, whilst the PTQ expresses his application by reference to s 47 of the GAA Act, the PTQ has not identified the source of the power he presumably considers this Tribunal has to make such orders.
61. [61]
    In my opinion, the applicant may be determined only within the ambit of s 47 ‘Payment of Expenses’ and/or possibly s 48 ‘Remunerations of professional administrators’. But, in both instances the limitation expressed therein is one of reasonableness, with such being refined for the purposes of s 48 by the matters prescribed in s 48(3), three parts of which are relevant namely:

    1. The care, skill and specialised knowledge required to provide the service;
    2. The responsibility displayed in providing the service; and
    3. The circumstances in which the service was provided.
62. [62]
    That being said, save only for one qualification that I will raise in the second next paragraph herein, it seems to me that given what I discussed earlier in these reasons and the conclusion I reached on the issue of whether the PTQ complied with the General Principles, in my opinion it could readily be said that none of these provisions have been met by the PTQ to the standard required. As such, it could not be said that the PTQ should be entitled to be reimbursed the expenses he has incurred.
63. [63]
    He should not be reimbursed the legal expenses. Not only did he not comply with the General Principles before and during the engagement of the Official Solicitor to the PTQ and in turn incur those expenses, thus leading to them not having been reasonably incurred, but there are a number of issues with the charges that indicate a lack of them being reasonable in terms of their value to SJT.
64. [64]
    As I noted it earlier herein, the legal costs incurred by the PTQ traversed the period 14 July 2017 to 25 January 2021. That is, it started whilst the PTQ was appointed under an Interim Order, and continued up to about six (6) months prior to the appointment of the administrator being changed to JST. I have taken the time to read and consider the content of the Tax Invoices issued by the Official Solicitor to the PTQ enclosed as part of the PTQ’s application documents covering this period. Some things should be said about the content of time recorded attendances shown thereon.
65. [65]
    Firstly, there is no record of any attendance of a solicitor meeting with or otherwise conferring with SJT, notwithstanding that effectively the solicitor was acting for SJT. Notwithstanding that the PTQ was appointed as SJT’s administrator and as such it was appropriate for the solicitor to take instructions from the PTQ officer conducting that role, in my opinion it was incumbent on the solicitor to have met with SJT together with the PTQ officer to discuss the circumstances SJT was in. The PTQ should have arranged this, such being a requirement of General Principles 7 and 8 as they applied at the relevant times.
66. [66]
    Secondly, there are some entries recorded therein which in my opinion, as I read them, reflect attendances beyond merely the issue of the sale of the house and are more properly seen to be attendances that deal with matters concerning the PTQ’s appointment as administrator, rather than the conduct of that appointment. As such the issues which gave rise to these attendances by the solicitor such should have been either dealt with by a PTQ officer or would be internal advice given to the PTQ officer re the appointment issue. Some examples of this are found in the following entries:

26/03/2018   Telephone call with trust officer and regional manager regarding potential change of administrator and implications for relocation timeframe - $90.95.

04/04/18 Reading letter received from solicitors acting for [SJT]’s cousin regarding review of administrator and documents provided in support, including report by medical practitioner to QCAT - $121.26.

05/04/18 Reading documents filed by [SJT]’s daughter with QCAT regarding interim orders being sough (sic) - $90.95

05/04/18 Telephone call to trust officer seeking clarification regarding documents filed with QCAT and whether the matter would be listed for hearing - $60.63

05/04/18 Telephone call to QCAT to ascertain with the application filed by [SJT]’s daughter will be listed for a hearing and dictating file note regarding same - $60.63

67. [67]
    What then followed these entries of 5 April 2018 was an extensive number of entries from that day up to 13 April 2018 concerning the application for stay of the PTQ’s decision, the QCAT hearing, and the decision on it. Most, if not all, of these entries appear to me as describing legal services provided that, at best. is the giving of advice to the PTQ’s officers in terms of the conduct of the PTQ’s role as administrator in the face of the application for a stay of a decision. I am unable to discern from the description of the attendances as recorded that it could be said, in any way, that the attendance was for the benefit of SJT. One entry in particular stands out, it being on 12 April 2018 recorded as

Reading e-mail from trust officer regarding correspondence between the Public Trustee and Bob Katter - $30.32.

68. [68]
    There are then entries in May 2018, one of which also stands out as being entirely for something that had no purpose in providing a benefit to SJT, it being on 3 May 2018 recorded as

Telephone call with Regional Manager regarding the current status of the matter and recent developments regarding application for a review of the Public Trustee’s appointment - $60.63.

69. [69]
    These beg the answer to the question as to how these attendances in any way could have anything to do with benefitting SJT.
70. [70]
    Finally, it is to be observed that there are questionable entries recording attendances in 2020, namely

05/06/20 Reading file reallocated from LO40 position and email to Trust Officer seeking update  - $215.60

06/07/20 E-mail to Trust Officer chasing response to previous e-mail - $30.80

31/07/20 Email to Trust Office again querying whether legal’s attendance still required - $30.80

07/08/20 Email from trust officer requesting file remain open, e-mail to trust officer confirming instructions - $30.80

71. [71]
    In my opinion none of these charges, and many of the others recorded, are charges that should have been levied against SJT. They record attendances that can only be viewed as one which is internal conduct of a matter within the office of the PTQ. In general terms, it can readily be said that the PTQ’s attempts to have SJT, an adult of impaired capacity to whom the PTQ was appointed as administrator for all financial matters, to pay to the PTQ the legal costs said to have been incurred in the conduct of the administration of SLF’s financial affairs is deplorable. Not only is much of it not a charge that should have been raised in any event, being matters of internal conduct, but many of the charges also appear to be levied without adequate oversight of a senior practitioner, and moreover levied in circumstances where the PTQ has not followed the General Principles he is mandated to follow.
72. [72]
    Nor in my opinion should the PTQ be entitled to reimbursement for the expense incurred of obtaining a building and pest inspection report. Absent any other reason being given as to why it was obtained, I infer that the only purpose for which it was obtained the sale of the house. Given the absence of the PTQ’s compliance with the General Principles under the GAA Act in respect of that decision, such an expense is one which should not need to be met by SJT.
73. [73]
    That then leaves the expenses incurred for insurance of SJT’s car, the testing and installation of a smoke alarm to the house, both of which would have benefitted SJT regardless of the issue of selling the house, and the cost of obtaining a valuation of the house which would have been necessary as part of the decision making process that should have been engaged in before reaching the conclusion that the house must be sold. In my opinion these are expenses which in my opinion were reasonably incurred and would fall within the ambit of s 47 of the Act. In addition, they are expenses that, as I understand JST’s response to the application, he agrees should be reimbursed to the PTQ.
74. [74]
    Finally, there remains the issue of the ‘permission’ the PTQ seeks from this Tribunal that he be permitted to place a caveat on SJT’s property. There is no such power afforded this Tribunal to give any such permission. But moreover, the PTQ has not shown within its material that in any way it could be said to be seized of a caveatable interest and so is a person falling within the ambit of s 122 of the Land Titles Act 1994 (Qld). There is no basis for me to make any such order.

Conclusions on Advice, Directions, Recommendations

75. [75]
    For the reasons I have discussed herein, based on the conclusions I have reached and explained, my orders reflect the following advice being given:

    1. The PTQ is not entitled to reimbursement for any of the legal expenses he has incurred in the conduct of his administration of SJT’s financial affairs;
    2. The PTQ is not entitled to reimbursement of the cost of a building and pest inspection report he obtained relative to SJT’s house;
    3. The PTQ is entitled to reimbursement of expenses he incurred on SJT’s behalf for a property valuation ($484), smoke alarm testing and installation ($594), and vehicle insurance ($1,094.74).
    4. JST, as SJT’s administrator, should promptly pay from SJT’s funds the sum of $2,172.74 to the PTQ in reimbursement of those expenses.
    5. There is no identified basis upon which the PTQ may lodge a caveat on SJT’s property as a means of security pending payment of this reimbursement.
76. [76]
    As to the PTQ’s asserted claim for interest, it will be readily observed that this advice does not reflect anything for interest. This is because the PTQ has not explained the details of any interest calculation and as such on the material before me there is nothing to support it.
77. [77]
    All that being said, I made orders giving that ‘advice’. With such being given, there are no ‘directions’ required nor did I see the need to give any ‘recommendations’.