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Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc (No 2)[2023] QCAT 459

Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc (No 2)[2023] QCAT 459

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc (No 2) [2023] QCAT 459

PARTIES:

John maximus merlo

(applicant)

v

queensland law society inc

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR169-21

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

24 August 2023 (orders)

19 January 2024 (further orders and reasons)

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Hon Peter Lyons KC, Judicial Member

ORDERS:

  1. 1.
    A copy of the reasons of the Tribunal determining the applicant’s application filed 14 June 2021 will be prepared, excluding paragraphs [25]–[80], [102]–[115], [138]–[181] and [189]–[265], marking the locations of the omitted parts “excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 24 August 2023 until further order”.
  1. 2.
    Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, pursuant to section 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the publication of:
  1. (a)
    the contents of a document or thing filed in or produced to the Tribunal;
  1. (b)
    evidence given before the Tribunal; and
  1. (c)
    paragraphs [25]–[80], [102]–[115], [138]–[181] and [189]–[265] of the reasons given by the Tribunal, other than to the legal representatives of the parties and to the parties themselves,
  1. in these proceedings is prohibited without further order of the Tribunal.
  1. 3.
    The applicant is given leave to produce an anonymised version of this order and the Reasons for Decision dated 24 August 2023 to the Family Court of Australia in proceeding BRC4579/2022 between the applicant and his former wife.
  1. 4.
    The respondent is permitted to publish, for the purposes of any appeal to the Court of Appeal, the unredacted draft (and any final) Reasons for Decision in Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc [2023] QCAT 205, the draft (and any further) reasons regarding non-publication, any material filed in these proceedings, being OCR169-21, anything produced to the Tribunal, and any evidence given before the Tribunal.
  1. 5.
    For the avoidance of doubt, the reference to the parties insofar as it concerns the respondent is a reference that includes the employees and Council members of the respondent.
  1. 6.
    A copy of the reasons of the Tribunal with respect to non-publication of the Reasons for Decision in Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc [2023] QCAT 205 (being these reasons) will be prepared and published, excluding paragraphs [33], [44](a)-(o), [47](a)-(f) and [49](a)-(g), marking the locations of the omitted parts “excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 19 January 2024 until further order”.
  1. 7.
    Pursuant to section 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, the publication of paragraphs [33], [44](a)-(o), [47](a)-(f) and [49](a)-(g) of the reasons given by the Tribunal, other than to the legal representatives of the parties and to the parties themselves, is prohibited without further order of the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – PROCEEDINGS IN QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – GENERALLY – REASONS FOR JUDGMENT – NON-PUBLICATION ORDERS – where the applicant sought a review of the respondent’s decision to refuse his application for the renewal of a solicitor unrestricted employee practising certificate – where the Tribunal made a temporary non-publication order for the draft reasons in the proceedings, together with other materials before the Tribunal – where the issues relied on by the respondent required the Tribunal to consider highly sensitive and personal material on the applicant’s financial and medical information, police history, children, and Family Court proceedings – whether the reasons should not be published, or in part, or with the applicant de-identified – whether a statutory ground for a non-publication order under s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) was satisfied – whether the information was “confidential information” – whether a non-publication order was in the interests of justice – whether and the extent to which the open justice principle and Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) were relevant – whether and to what extent a non-publication order should apply to the present reasons

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 121

Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 25, s 48

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 66, s 90, s 229

AH v SS [2005] FamCA 854; (2005) 194 FLR 111

Cutbush v Team Maree Property Service (No 3) [2010] QCATA 89

DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 3) [2019] FCA 1488

Herron v The A-G for New South Wales (1987) 8 NSWLR 601

Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1992-1993) 178 CLR 408

Medical Board of Australia v Cole [2019] QCAT 113

Medical Board of Australia v Evans [2013] QCAT 217

O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210

Queensland College of Teachers v JMJ [2017] QCAT 125

Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) (2006) 15 VR 22

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    Orders had been made in these proceedings, including on 3 July 2023, prohibiting publication of draft reasons in these proceedings, together with other materials before the Tribunal.  The parties have agreed on the orders to be made determining the primary application, in light of the draft reasons.  The applicant has, however, sought an order prohibiting the publication (with limited exceptions) of those reasons in final form (“Tribunal’s primary reasons”), and other materials, without further order of the Tribunal.  He has provided submissions in support of this application.  The respondent has provided no submissions on that question.  Orders were made on 24 August 2023 relating to the publication of the Tribunal’s primary reasons and other materials (“August non-publication orders”). 
  1. [2]
    Draft reasons for the August non-publication orders were circulated to the parties. They were invited to make submissions as to whether the reasons for the non-publication order should themselves be subject to the order, or published.  These reasons are an updated version of the circulated draft, updated to deal with that question, and with some minor corrections to the circulated draft.

Background

  1. [3]
    The applicant applied to this Tribunal for a review of the decision of the respondent to refuse his application for the renewal of an unrestricted employee practising certificate for the 2020/2021 year, and the grant of a principal practising certificate for the same year.  In opposing the application, the respondent relied extensively on the reasons of the Family Court of Australia, and to some extent the reasons given on appeal (“Family Court reasons”), both so far as they recorded evidence given in those proceedings, as well as the findings.  The Family Court reasons were published in a de-identified form, no doubt in view of the provisions of s 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“FL Act”).  A consideration of those reasons permeates the Tribunal’s primary reasons.  The primary reasons also refer extensively to matters which might be regarded as sensitive or private.  The applicant has sought a further non-disclosure order; prohibiting publication of (in substance) all material on the Tribunal file for this matter; and the factual reasoning of the Tribunal; or that the primary reasons only be published in de-identified form.
  2. [4]
    As stated, the respondent has not provided submissions on this application.

Applicant’s submissions

  1. [5]
    The applicant relied on s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”) in support of his application.  He referred to s 25 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (“HR Act”) as conferring on him a right not to have his privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and not to have his reputation unlawfully attacked.  It was submitted that the non-publication order was justified on the ground that it was necessary to avoid endangering the physical or mental health or safety of a person; to avoid the publication of confidential information or information if publication would be contrary to the public interest; and in the interests of justice.  The issues relied upon by the respondent in the primary application required an investigation into subject matter of a highly sensitive and personal nature for the applicant and his family.  The publication of the reasons relating to these matters would have adverse implications for the applicant, namely it would be very distressing to the applicant, and likely to place further strain on his health; the publication of the reasoning of the proceedings would have an adverse impact on the applicant’s professional life and reputation; there has been a detailed analysis of the applicant’s confidential information, such as his financial, medical and police history as well as confidential information about his children; and the Family Court reasons involve highly sensitive and confidential information.  An alternative would be to de-identify the applicant, and all persons referred to in the reasons.  If the applicant were named, it would give rise to a potential breach of s 121 of the FL Act.  The applicant also sought leave to provide an anonymised version of this Tribunal’s final order and the primary reasons to the Family Court of Australia, where the applicant will seek an order that the reason be placed in sealed envelope on that Court’s file, not be opened without an order of that court.

Statutory provisions

  1. [6]
    Section 66 of the QCAT Act, relied upon by the applicant, includes the following:-
  1. 66
    Non-publication orders
  1. (1)
    The tribunal may make an order prohibiting the publication of the following other than in the way and to the persons stated in the order—
  1. (a)
    the contents of a document or other thing produced to the tribunal;
  1. (b)
    evidence given before the tribunal;
  1. (c)
    information that may enable a person who has appeared before the tribunal, or is affected by a proceeding, to be identified.
  1. (2)
    The tribunal may make an order under subsection (1) only if the tribunal considers the order is necessary—
  1. (a)
    to avoid interfering with the proper administration of justice; or
  1. (b)
    to avoid endangering the physical or mental health or safety of a person; or
  1. (c)
    to avoid offending public decency or morality; or
  1. (d)
    to avoid the publication of confidential information or information whose publication would be contrary to the public interest; or
  1. (e)
    for any other reason in the interests of justice.
  1. [7]
    Also relevant are the following from s 90 of the same Act:-
  1. 90
    Public hearing
  1. (1)
    Unless an enabling Act that is an Act provides otherwise, a hearing of a proceeding must be held in public.
  1. (2)
    However, the tribunal may direct a hearing or a part of a hearing be held in private if the tribunal considers it is necessary—
  1. (a)
    to avoid interfering with the proper administration of justice; or
  1. (b)
    to avoid endangering the physical or mental health or safety of a person; or
  1. (c)
    to avoid offending public decency or morality; or
  1. (d)
    to avoid the publication of confidential information or information whose publication would be contrary to the public interest; or
  1. (e)
    for another reason in the interests of justice.
  1. [8]
    Section 229 of the QCAT Act provides:-
  1. 229
    Register of proceedings
  1. (1)
    The principal registrar must keep a register of proceedings (the register) containing the matters stated in the rules.
  1. (2)
    The principal registrar must ensure the register is available for inspection by the public at the main office of the registry during office hours on business days.
  1. (3)
    A party to a proceeding may inspect the part of the register relating to the proceeding without charge.
  1. (4)
    Another person may, on payment of the prescribed fee (if any)—
  1. (a)
    inspect the register; or
  1. (b)
    obtain a copy of a part of the register.
  1. (5)
    This section does not authorise, entitle or permit a person to access a part of the register containing anything whose publication or disclosure to the person is prohibited by a non-publication order.
  1. [9]
    In view of the applicant’s reliance on the HR Act, the following provisions of that Act are relevant:-
  1. 3
    Main objects of Act
  1. The main objects of this Act are—
  1. (a)
    to protect and promote human rights; and
  1. (b)
    to help build a culture in the Queensland public sector that respects and promotes human rights; and
  1. (c)
    to help promote a dialogue about the nature, meaning and scope of human rights.
  1. 4
    How main objects are primarily achieved
  1. The main objects are to be achieved primarily by—
  1. (a)
    stating the human rights Parliament specifically seeks to protect and promote; and
  1. (b)
    requiring public entities to act and make decisions in a way compatible with human rights; and
  1. (c)
    requiring statements of compatibility with human rights to be tabled in the Legislative Assembly for all Bills introduced in the Assembly; and
  1. (d)
    providing for a portfolio committee responsible for examining a Bill introduced in the Legislative Assembly to consider whether the Bill is compatible with human rights; and
  1. (e)
    providing for Parliament, in exceptional circumstances, to override the application of this Act to a statutory provision; and
  1. (f)
    requiring courts and tribunals to interpret statutory provisions, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, in a way compatible with human rights.
  1. 7
    Meaning of human rights
  1. Human rights means the rights stated in part 2, divisions 2 and 3.
  1. 9
    Meaning of public entity
  1. (1)
    Each of the following entities is a public entity—
  1. (a)
    a government entity within the meaning of the Public Sector Act 2022, section 276;
  1. (b)
    a public service employee;
  1. (c)
    the Queensland Police Service;
  1. (d)
    a local government, a councillor of a local government or a local government employee;
  1. (e)
    a Minister;
  1. (f)
    an entity established under an Act when the entity is performing functions of a public nature;
  1. (g)
    a member of a portfolio committee when the committee is acting in an administrative capacity;
  1. (h)
    an entity whose functions are, or include, functions of a public nature when it is performing the functions for the State or a public entity (whether under contract or otherwise);
  1. Example of an entity not performing functions of a public nature for the State—
  1. A non-State school is not a public entity merely because it performs functions of a public nature in educating students because it is not doing so for the State.
  1. (i)
    a person, not otherwise mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (h), who is a staff member or executive officer (however called) of a public entity;
  1. (j)
    an entity prescribed by regulation to be a public entity.
  1. (2)
    A public entity includes—
  1. (a)
    a registered provider when the provider is performing functions of a public nature in the State; and
  1. (b)
    a non-State police officer, under the Police Service Administration Act 1990, section 5.17, while the officer—
  1. (i)
    is appointed as a special constable under section 5.16(1) of that Act; or
  1. (ii)
    is authorised under section 5.17(2) of that Act to exercise the powers of a police officer; or
  1. (iii)
    is exercising a power under another law of the State.
  1. (3)
    Also, a public entity includes an entity for which a declaration is in force under section 60.
  1. (4)
    However, a public entity does not include—
  1. (a)
    the Legislative Assembly or a person performing functions in connection with proceedings in the Assembly, except when acting in an administrative capacity; or
  1. (b)
    a court or tribunal, except when acting in an administrative capacity; or
  1. (c)
    an entity prescribed by regulation not to be a public entity.
  1. (5)
    In this section—
  1. entity means an entity in and for Queensland.
  1. registered provider means a registered provider of supports or a registered NDIS provider under the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cwlth).
  1. 25
    Privacy and reputation
  1. A person has the right –
  1. (a)
    not to have the person’s privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and
  1. (b)
    not to have the person’s reputation unlawfully attacked.
  1. 48
    Interpretation
  1. (1)
    All statutory provisions must, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.
  1. (2)
    If a statutory provision can not be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, the provision must, to the extent possible that is consistent with its purpose, be interpreted in a way that is most compatible with human rights.
  1. (3)
    International law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting a statutory provision.
  1. (4)
    This section does not affect the validity of—
  1. (a)
    an Act or provision of an Act that is not compatible with human rights; or
  1. (b)
    a statutory instrument or provision of a statutory instrument that is not compatible with human rights and is empowered to be so by the Act under which it is made.
  1. (5)
    This section does not apply to a statutory provision the subject of an override declaration that is in force.
  1. [10]
    In addition, the following provisions of the FL Act should be considered:-
  1. 97
    Procedure
  1. (1)
    Subject to this Act, to the regulations and to the applicable Rules of Court, all proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia or in a court of a Territory (other than the Northern Territory) when exercising jurisdiction under this Act, shall be heard in open court.
  1. 121
    Restriction on publication of court proceedings
  1. (1)
    A person who publishes in a newspaper or periodical publication, by radio broadcast or television or by other electronic means, or otherwise disseminates to the public or to a section of the public by any means, any account of any proceedings, or of any part of any proceedings, under this Act that identifies:
  1. (a)
    a party to the proceedings;
  1. (b)
    a person who is related to, or associated with, a party to the proceedings or is, or is alleged to be, in any other way concerned in the matter to which the proceedings relate; or
  1. (c)
    a witness in the proceedings;
  1. commits an offence punishable, upon conviction by imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.
  1. (2)
    A person who, except as permitted by the applicable Rules of Court, publishes in a newspaper or periodical publication, by radio broadcast or television or by other electronic means, or otherwise disseminates to the public or to a section of the public by any means (otherwise than by the display of a notice in the premises of the court), a list of proceedings under this Act, identified by reference to the names of the parties to the proceedings, that are to be dealt with by a court commits an offence punishable, upon conviction by imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.
  1. (3)
    Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), an account of proceedings, or of any part of proceedings, referred to in that subsection shall be taken to identify a person if:
  1. (a)
    it contains any particulars of:
  1. (i)
    the name, title, pseudonym or alias of the person;
  1. (ii)
    the address of any premises at which the person resides or works, or the locality in which any such premises are situated;
  1. (iii)
    the physical description or the style of dress of the person;
  1. (iv)
    any employment or occupation engaged in, profession practised or calling pursued, by the person or any official or honorary position held by the person;
  1. (v)
    the relationship of the person to identified relatives of the person or the association of the person with identified friends or identified business, official or professional acquaintances of the person;
  1. (vi)
    the recreational interests, or the political, philosophical or religious beliefs or interests, of the person; or
  1. (vii)
    any real or personal property in which the person has an interest or with which the person is otherwise associated;
  1. being particulars that are sufficient to identify that person to a member of the public, or to a member of the section of the public to which the account is disseminated, as the case requires;
  1. (b)
    in the case of a written or televised account or an account by other electronic means—it is accompanied by a picture of the person; or
  1. (c)
    in the case of a broadcast or televised account or an account by other electronic means—it is spoken in whole or in part by the person and the person’s voice is sufficient to identify that person to a member of the public, or to a member of the section of the public to which the account is disseminated, as the case requires.
  1. (9)
    The preceding provisions of this section do not apply to or in relation to:
  1. (a)
    the communication, to persons concerned in proceedings in any court, of any pleading, transcript of evidence or other document for use in connection with those proceedings; or
  1. (aa)
    the communication of any pleading, transcript of evidence or other document to authorities of States and Territories that have responsibilities relating to the welfare of children and are prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph; or
  1. (b)
    the communication of any pleading, transcript of evidence or other document to:
  1. (i)
    a body that is responsible for disciplining members of the legal profession in a State or Territory; or
  1. (ii)
    persons concerned in disciplinary proceedings against a member of the legal profession of a State or Territory, being proceedings before a body that is responsible for disciplining members of the legal profession in that State or Territory; or
  1. (c)
    the communication, to a body that grants assistance by way of legal aid, of any pleading, transcript of evidence or other document for the purpose of facilitating the making of a decision as to whether assistance by way of legal aid should be granted, continued or provided in a particular case; or
  1. (d)
    the publishing of a notice or report in pursuance of the direction of a court; or
  1. (da)
    the publication by the court of lists of proceedings under this Act, identified by reference to the names of the parties, that are to be dealt with by the court; or
  1. (e)
    the publishing of any publication bona fide intended primarily for use by the members of any profession, being:
  1. (i)
    a separate volume or part of a series of law reports; or
  1. (ii)
    any other publication of a technical character; or
  1. (f)
    the publication or other dissemination of an account of proceedings or of any part of proceedings:
  1. (i)
    to a person who is a member of a profession, in connection with the practice by that person of that profession or in the course of any form of professional training in which that person is involved; or
  1. (ia)
    to an individual who is a party to any proceedings under this Act, in connection with the conduct of those proceedings; or
  1. (ii)
    to a person who is a student, in connection with the studies of that person; or
  1. (g)
    publication of accounts of proceedings, where those accounts have been approved by the court.
  1. (11)
    In this section:
  1. court includes:
  1. (a)
    an officer of a court investigating or dealing with a matter in accordance with this Act, the regulations or the Rules of Court; and
  1. (b)
    a tribunal established by or under a law of the Commonwealth, of a State or of a Territory.
  1. electronic means includes:
  1. (a)
    in the form of data, text or images by means of guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy; or
  1. (b)
    in the form of speech by means of guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy, where the speech is processed at its destination by an automated voice recognition system.

The open justice principle

  1. [11]
    Section 66 of the QCAT Act creates a discretionary power to authorise encroachments on the open justice principle.  The significance usually attributed to it by courts is apparent from the following passage from the judgment of Perry J in DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 3):-[1]

“[132]

In the fifth place, notwithstanding the way in which the applicant put her case, the right which she asserts is ultimately not properly characterised as a right to privacy.  Rather it is better understood as a right to keep confidential or private the existence of findings made against her in Family Court proceedings.  This is important because the starting point at common law is that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice (commonly described as the principle of open justice): cf the assumption underpinning the applicant’s submissions at ACS (in response to R4CS) at [10]-[14].  As Hill J, for example, observed in SRD v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 52 FCR 187 at 189:

  1. ‘It will ordinarily be essential in order to maintain confidence in the integrity and independence of the Court that its proceedings be open to scrutiny by the general public and it will only be in exceptional cases where the interest of justice would override the ordinary requirement of open justice.’

[133]

Similarly, Allsop CJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Egan [2018] FCA 1320 that:

  1. ‘4.  The principle of open justice is one of the overarching principles in the administration of justice, in this Court and all others.  It lies at the heart of the exercise of judicial power as part of the wider democratic process.  The principle involves justice being seen to be done.  A key part of this task is enabling accurate and fair public reports of proceedings.  Open justice is not an absolute concept, unbending in its form.  It must on occasion be balanced with other considerations, including but not limited to considerations such as the avoidance of prejudice in the administration of justice or the protection of victims.’”
  1. [12]
    It is against this background that s 66 falls to be considered.

Statutory grounds for a non-publication order under s 66

  1. [13]
    As will be seen, the interests of justice ground itself creates a very broad discretion.  The inclusion of other specific grounds suggests an intention on the part of the legislature to have the discretion exercised more broadly and with some greater sensitivity than might occur in courts.  Some support for this view is found in the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill which became the QCAT Act.  The following appears, with reference to what became s 66:-[2]

The tribunal will deal with a wide variety of matters, including matters involving sensitive personal circumstances and issues, such as professional disciplinary matters which may involve allegations about the professional’s impaired health or allegations of abuse of clients in vulnerable situations. Under this section, the tribunal will have the power to make orders protecting the information about, and the identity of, people who may be further harmed by the public release of the information or by the release of the information to a particular person. Proceedings before the tribunal may also involve the disclosure of other information which may be confidential or where public release or release to particular persons would be contrary to the public interest.

  1. [14]
    The applicant specifically relied upon s 66(2)(b), (d) and (e).  Section 66(2)(b) does not require further elucidation.  However some consideration should be given to the effect of s 66(2)(d) and (e).
  2. [15]
    The expression “confidential information” has not been defined in the QCAT Act.
  3. [16]
    In Medical Board of Australia v Evans,[3] Horneman-Wren SC DCJ, Deputy President, made an order prohibiting the publication of information identifying patients listed in the Board’s application for a non-publication order.  His Honour said:-
  1. “[63]
    The Board seeks an order pursuant to s 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 prohibiting the publication of certain documents filed in the proceedings so as to avoid the publication of confidential information relating to the persons to whom the application relates.
  1. [64]
    Those documents do contain a large volume of information personal to those persons, including their medical records, the publication of which would be contrary to the public interest.              It may also be the case that publication of that information may endanger the mental health of those persons.  It is also in the interests of justice to prohibit the publication of that material in order to balance on the one hand, the need for such material to be referred to in medical disciplinary proceedings such as these, with the protection of the rights to privacy and confidentiality which would otherwise attach to sensitive medical records.
  1. [65]
    For those reasons, the Tribunal will make an order prohibiting the publication of the documents contained in the schedule attached to these reasons.” (footnotes omitted)
  1. [17]
    It is not entirely clear that his Honour treated the information in the documents which he was considering as “confidential information” for the purposes of s 66(2)(d) of the Act.  However he regarded their confidential nature (as well as the right to privacy) as relevant to his decision to make the order, in the public interest.  In a somewhat similar fashion, Senior Member O'Callaghan, in Queensland College of Teachers v JMJ,[4] made an order prohibiting publication of information which identified a relevant school and students, on the basis that the publication would be contrary to the public interest.
  2. [18]
    In Medical Board of Australia v Cole,[5] Sheridan DCJ made an order prohibiting publication of medical records, and of evidence given before the Tribunal, to the extent that it could identify or lead to the identification of any patient.  Her Honour relied on s 66(2)(d) of the Act, but it is not clear that her Honour regarded the documents in question as containing “confidential information”.
  3. [19]
    In Johns v Australian Securities Commission,[6] Brennan J said:-

“Prima facie, it is the privilege of any person who possesses information to keep the information confidential.  That person may wish not to disclose it at all or may wish to disseminate it or to authorise its dissemination only for a limited purpose or to a limited class of persons.  In Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers (No 2)[7] – the Spycatcher case – Bingham LJ said:

‘It is a well-settled principle of law that where one party (“the confidant”) acquires confidential information from or during his service with, or by virtue of his relationship with, another (“the confider”), in circumstances importing a duty of confidence, the confidant is not ordinarily at liberty to divulge that information to a third party without the consent or against the wishes of the confider.’

The jurisdictional basis or bases of this principle may not have been finally determined[8] but there is certainly jurisdiction in equity to grant relief against actual or threatened abuse of confidential information.  In Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. V. Philip Morris Ltd. [No 2][9] Deane J said:

‘It is unnecessary, for the purposes of the present appeal, to attempt to define the precise scope of the equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against an actual or threatened abuse of confidential information not involving any tort or any breach of some express or implied contractual provision, some wider fiduciary duty or some copyright or trade mark right. A general equitable jurisdiction to grant such relief has long been asserted and should, in my view, now be accepted: see The Commonwealth v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd.[10]  Like most heads of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, its rational basis does not lie in proprietary right.  It lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained.’”

  1. [20]
    The common law does not attach privilege to communications between doctors and their patients.[11]  However it has been said that a duty of confidentiality invariably applies to information held or controlled by health professionals, extending to all individuals who are employed in health settings; and this is regarded as a fundamental principle in health care ethics.[12]  Indeed, as Maxwell P said in the Royal Women’s Hospital case:-[13]

“What matters for present purposes, however, is that these are concerns about the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the patient-doctor relationship.  This is a matter of high public importance.  The preservation of medical privacy is of concern to the whole community.  Appropriately, therefore, as Charles JA has pointed out,[14] the Victorian Parliament has legislated to provide wide – though not unqualified – protection of that confidentiality.”

  1. [21]
    In the same case, Charles JA said:-[15]

“…There is plainly a considerable public interest in the protection of medical confidentiality, which was not disputed by the board.…

…Parliament has taken the view that the public interest in medical confidentiality is not unqualified.  In each case, Parliament has recognised that the public interest in the protection of medical confidentiality may be required to give way to a competing public interest.” 

  1. [22]
    That the maintenance of the protection of the privacy of health information is a matter of some importance is recognised by the body of legislation in force in Australia for that purpose.[16]
  2. [23]
    It seems to me that these considerations warrant the conclusion that no narrow view should be taken of the expression “confidential information” in s 66.  If some information which would otherwise be confidential has lost that status because it was available for public inspection for a period in the course of a proceeding in the Tribunal, or was referred to in a hearing which was open to the public, it may nevertheless be regarded as confidential for the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 66.  Alternatively, having regard to the public interest in the preservation of medical privacy, it may be that an order prohibiting publication of such information may be warranted on the ground that publication would be contrary to the public interest.
  3. [24]
    The final ground to be discussed is that in s 66(2)(e).  In Cutbush v Team Maree Property Service (No 3),[17] Alan Wilson J, President, said:-

“The phrase ‘in the interests of justice’ is not defined in the QCAT Act but generally confers a broad discretionary power on the decision-maker.[18]  The wording of s 66(2) makes it plain that the discretion is not to be exercised lightly, and only if the Tribunal considers the order is necessary.”

  1. [25]
    In Herron v Attorney General for NSW,[19] Kirby P said:-

“Those words ‘in the interests of justice’ are plainly words of the widest possible reference.  Indeed, there could scarcely be a wider judicial remit.”

  1. [26]
    In O'Sullivan v Farrer,[20] Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said:-

“Indeed, the expression ‘in the public interest’, when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only ‘in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view’.”

  1. [27]
    It is sufficient to note, at this stage, that the “interests of justice” ground provides a broad basis for the exercise of the discretion to make a non-publication order.  Nevertheless, in exercising that discretion, the legislative context is significant.  The starting point for considering how the discretion is to be exercised is s 90(1) of the QCAT Act, which gives effect to the “open court” principle.  While this ground for exercise of the discretion may be broad, nevertheless, the Tribunal must bear in mind the significance of this principle when deciding how to exercise it.  However it will also be necessary to bear in mind the overall context provided by s 66, and the apparent legislative intent discussed previously.

Human Rights Act

  1. [28]
    The applicant has relied on s 48 of the HR Act.  That section is directed to the interpretation of statutory provisions.  Relevantly for present purposes, its effect would seem to be to require that s 66 of the QCAT Act be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the applicant’s right not to have his privacy or family unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and not to have his reputation unlawfully attacked.  It may well follow (in some case) that in determining whether a non-publication order should be made, that right should be borne in mind.  However the applicant has not explained how the refusal of the order might be inconsistent with the right in s 25.  He has not suggested that the refusal of the order would be unlawful or arbitrary.  It seems to me that privacy concerns are to be considered by reference to s 66, without any guidance provided by s 48 and s 25 of the HR Act.

Family Court material

  1. [29]
    In AH v SS,[21] Bryant CJ gave some consideration to the policy behind s 121 of the FL Act.  Her Honour said:-
  1. “[26]
    Section 121 of the Act was inserted into the Family Law Act upon its inception. It is commonly accepted that when the Family Law Act was enacted, s 121 was placed in the Act to overcome prurient reporting that had occurred prior to the passing of the Family Law Act in relation to parties who were involved in divorce proceedings.
  1. [27]
    Initially the court was a closed court, but subsequent amendments to the Act made the court open so that members of the public were free to attend and listen to, and observe the proceedings. What they were not permitted to do however, by virtue of s 121, was to publish an account of the proceedings which identified parties or witnesses in the manner that I have described.”
  1. [30]
    Perry J also discussed the policy behind this section in DOQ17, saying:-[22]

“[135]

Significantly in this regard, s 121 was introduced together with s 97(1) of the Family Law Act which provided as a presumptive rule that all proceedings are to be heard in open court. As the 1983 Explanatory Memorandum explained (at p. 1), significant amendments to the Family Law Act to be made by the Bill included:

“•  provision that proceedings under the Act be heard in open court;

• replacement of the absolute prohibition on the publication of details of proceedings under the Act by a prohibition on the publication of details that identify individuals involved in those proceedings; …”

[136]

As such, the primary purpose of these amendments was self-evidently to strike a balance between safeguarding the public interest in open justice on the one hand, and protecting the privacy of litigants and their families given the special nature of family law proceedings and the fact that they often involve children, on the other hand: see Sitwell v Sitwell [2014] FamCAFC 5 (Sitwell) at [33].

[137]

Equally, in qualifying the fundamental principle of open justice recognised by s 97(1), s 121 facilitates the administration of justice in the public interest in family law matters. Thus, not only does it protect by way of a prohibition the privacy of litigants and their families for their own benefit; it also ensures that evidence can be led on highly personal matters and which may affect the interests of minors without fear that the identity of the parties and their family would be disclosed save in the limited circumstances provided for by s 121(9). Absent such a protection, the fear of public disclosure might have a chilling effect upon the giving of evidence in such matters to the detriment of the proper administration of justice. That is a matter affecting the public interest as it bears upon the maintenance of public confidence in the courts exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act, and is not merely of concern to the litigants and their families who are directly affected.”

  1. [31]
    To the extent that the Tribunal’s primary reasons deal with matters arising from the Family Court reasons referred to earlier, it is inevitable that their publication would result in the identification of persons associated with the hearing in that court, and would defeat the result intended to be achieved by s 121.  It seems to me that the identity of such persons may be regarded as “confidential information”; or that it is information publication of which would be contrary to the public interest which underlies s 121.  Alternatively, it would be in the interests of justice to make a non-publication order to protect such information.

Publication endangering health

  1. [32]
    The applicant submitted that the publication of the factual reasoning of the proceedings would be very distressing to the applicant, and likely to place further strain on his health.  For that reason, it is likely to endanger his mental health, warranting a non-publication order.  The submission appears to relate to any publication of reasoning relating to factual matters considered by the Tribunal.

(paragraph [33] excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 19 January 2024 until further order)

  1. [34]
    As will become apparent, it is intended to make a non-publication order for substantial parts of the reasons.  The question then becomes whether the publication of limited parts of the reasons is sufficiently likely to endanger the applicant’s mental health to provide a basis for an order preventing the publication of the factual reasoning in full (or, perhaps, to warrant an exercise of the discretion to make such an order).  Given the favourable views expressed about the applicant’s progress, I do not consider that to be the case.

Effect on professional life and reputation

  1. [35]
    It was submitted that the publication of the Tribunal’s factual reasoning would have an adverse impact on the applicant’s professional life and reputation.  That would be an unfair consequence for the applicant, since the Tribunal has not found that he is not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.  It would therefore be in the interests of justice to make a non-publication order relating to that part of the reasons.
  2. [36]
    Again the question falls to be considered by reference to the limited parts of the reasons to be published.  In assessing the question, recognition should be given to the ultimate finding of the Tribunal.  In my view, any adverse impact is not sufficient to warrant a non-publication order.

Health-related information

  1. [37]
    In the present case, the bulk of the evidence provided by health care experts was from persons who had provided treatment to the applicant.  It recorded communications made by the applicant in that context, together with opinions formed on the basis of those communications.  At least at that point, these matters, it seems to me, constituted confidential information for the purposes of s 66.
  2. [38]
    It is likely that by the time information of this kind is placed before the Tribunal, persons other than the patient and the treating health care expert will have come to have some knowledge of the information that was until that point confidential.  In my view, it is likely that s 66 would intend the information nevertheless to be regarded as confidential.  Alternatively, the considerations which have been referred to would indicate that there is a public interest in limiting the extent to which such information might become available to the public generally.  This view might explain why some earlier decisions of this Tribunal have not specifically identified whether the information was confidential, or information in relation to which there is a public interest that it not be disclosed.  On either basis, it seems to me that there is a ground on which the applicant may rely, when seeking a favourable exercise of the discretion. 
  3. [39]
    Nevertheless, the discretion falls to be exercised by a reference to a range of considerations.  The open court principle remains a matter of some importance.
  4. [40]
    In my opinion, there is a public interest in protecting, so far as possible, the confidentiality of communications between a person such as the applicant, and the health care professionals who are treating him.  The legislation envisages that there may be an encroachment of the open court principle in such a case.  The objectives which lie behind this principle include the exposure of courts to public scrutiny and criticism, and the maintenance of public confidence in the work of courts and tribunals.  These considerations do not raise sufficient concerns in the present case to warrant a refusal of a non-publication order.  To some extent, such concerns can be addressed by making such an order subject to further order.
  5. [41]
    Accordingly, it seems to me that a non-publication order in the present case should extend to the medical reports of the treating health care professionals, and the reasons dealing with them.  Since the reports of the other two health care professionals were derivative of those reports, the same conclusion should be reached in respect of them.  In any event, it is difficult to permit publication of those parts of the reasons which relate to the applicant’s health, but excluding references to the reports (and evidence) of the treating professionals.  It would therefore follow that the sections of the reasons which refer to the applicant’s health should not published.

Other information

  1. [42]
    The applicant submitted that the proceedings involved a detailed analysis of his confidential information, such as his financial, medical and police history, and confidential information about his children, and other matters referred to in the Family Court proceedings.  The topics I have already discussed deal sufficiently with information referred to in this submission.

De-identification or anonymisation

  1. [43]
    The order determining the application must have public operation.  That may limit the effectiveness of any order for de-identification of the applicant and other persons.  Moreover there is extensive reference in the reasons to matters publication of which carries the risk of the identification of the applicant, and thus a number of other persons referred to in the reasons.  It seems to me this course is not satisfactory in the present case.

Outcome

  1. [44]
    In my view, those parts of the reasons which appear under the following headings should be the subject of a non-publication order:-

(paragraphs [44](a)-(o) excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 19 January 2024 until further order)

  1. [45]
    The non-publication order will not extend to the following topics:-
    1. Bow use at primary school;
    2. Collapse of ACEL: phoenixing allegation;
    3. Failure to give Form 6.
  2. [46]
    Nor will the order extend to the balance of the reasons.
  3. [47]
    A number of topics should be excluded from publication because they are likely to facilitate the identification of the parties and other persons connected to the Family Court proceedings; and are also likely to result in the publication of confidential information.  They are:-

(paragraphs [47](a)-(f) excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 19 January 2024 until further order)

  1. [48]
    The topics relating to medical evidence should be excluded for reasons already given. 
  2. [49]
    Evidence on a number of other topics is be excluded from publication.  They are topics where the conclusion is based on reasoning otherwise excluded from publication.  They are:-

(paragraphs [49](a)-(g) excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 19 January 2024 until further order)

  1. [50]
    The reasons for a number of these topics depend on findings made about the applicant’s medical condition.  Although not always referred to in detail, it is difficult to appreciate the effect of the reasoning without a full knowledge of the evidence, reasoning and findings relating to this topic.  Publication of the reasoning in those circumstances does not achieve the objectives of the open court principle.  It would however reveal matters which are to varying extents private; and others which would have adverse impacts on the applicant’s reputation.  What would not be revealed also are the efforts made by the applicant to deal with his health issues, which would result in some lack of fairness.  In my view, the reasons dealing with these topics should be excluded in the interests of justice.
  2. [51]
    The sections of the reasons dealing with the respondent’s case and the overview identify allegations made against the applicant, the reasons relating to which have been excluded from publication.  In my view there is some unfairness in this.  I do not consider that the open court principle calls for the publication of these parts of the reasons.  They are excluded on the basis that a non-publication order is in the interests of justice.
  3. [52]
    The applicant has not identified sufficient reason for a non-publication order for the balance of the reasons.

Evidence and filed documents

  1. [53]
    In view of the reasons already given, substantial parts of these materials should be the subject of a non-publication order.  The making of an order which identifies categories of documents (or parts of documents) publication of which is prohibited is likely to present considerable difficulty for the Tribunal’s Registry.  In those circumstances, the orders sought by the applicant relating to these materials will be made.   Again, this order will be subject to further order of the Tribunal.

Publication to Family Court

  1. [54]
    The applicant’s submissions state that, in Family Court of Australia (FCA) proceeding BRC4579/2022 between the applicant and his former wife, Justice Baumann has adjourned the matter as he was not prepared to proceed without having an opportunity to consider the Tribunal’s decision in this matter. Accordingly, the applicant has sought leave to provide an anonymised versions of Tribunal’s final order and Reasons for Decision to the FCA on the basis that he will seek an order that they be placed in a sealed envelope on the FCA file which is not to be opened without an order of the FCA.
  2. [55]
    There is no reason to doubt the factual assertion made in the applicant’s submission.
  3. [56]
    While the non-publication order is substantially for the benefit of the applicant, he is not the only person who receives some benefit from the order.  Nevertheless, on the basis of what the applicant has said through his submission, the order he seeks seems necessary for the progress of the proceedings in the Family Court.  It should be made.

Facilitation of appeal

  1. [57]
    The respondent is apparently considering an appeal against the Tribunal’s decision.  It is appropriate to permit publication of the reasons, and other materials, to the extent reasonably necessary for that purpose.

Publication of these reasons

  1. [58]
    The applicant may wish to seek a non-publication order in relation to these reasons.  Accordingly, an order will be made authorising publication of these reasons to the parties, to be kept confidential until further order.  Completion of these reasons, and the making of a non-publication order, will be delayed for a short period to enable them to respond.

Orders

  1. [59]
    In those circumstances, having provided the parties a copy of the draft reasons on a confidential basis, and enabled the parties to make submissions about them, I make the following orders:-
  1. 1.
    A copy of the reasons of the Tribunal determining the applicant’s application filed 14 June 2021 will be prepared, excluding paragraphs [25]–[80], [102]–[115], [138]–[181] and [189]–[265], marking the locations of the omitted parts “excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 24 August 2023 until further order”;
  1. 2.
    Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, pursuant to section 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the publication of:
  1. (a)
    the contents of a document or thing filed in or produced to the Tribunal;
  1. (b)
    evidence given before the Tribunal; and
  1. (c)
    paragraphs [25]–[80], [102]–[115], [138]–[181] and [189]–[265] of the reasons given by the Tribunal, other than to the legal representatives of the parties and to the parties themselves,
  1. in these proceedings is prohibited without further order of the Tribunal;
  1. 3.
    The applicant is given leave to produce an anonymised version of this order and the Reasons for Decision dated 24 August 2023 to the Family Court of Australia in proceeding BRC4579/2022 between the applicant and his former wife; and
  1. 4.
    The respondent is permitted to publish, for the purposes of any appeal to the Court of Appeal, the unredacted draft (and any final) Reasons for Decision in Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc [2023] QCAT 205, the draft (and any further) reasons regarding non-publication, any material filed in these proceedings, being OCR169-21, anything produced to the Tribunal, and any evidence given before the Tribunal.
  1. 5.
    For the avoidance of doubt, the reference to the parties insofar as it concerns the respondent is a reference that includes the employees and Council members of the respondent.

Publication of these reasons

  1. [60]
    The respondent made submissions on this question, as follows (it will be noted that the paragraph numbering has changed, with revision of these reasons; the numbering has been corrected in the submissions reproduced below):-
  1. 3.
    Consistent with the principle of open justice set out in the non-publication reasons, the Respondent submits that the non-publication reasons should be published to the fullest extent possible.
  1. 4.
    The Respondent accepts generally that non-publication of some of the non-publication reasons may be appropriate, consistent with the consideration of this issue in the non-publication reasons. However, the Respondent submits that the general tenor of the issues relevant to consideration of non-publication under s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) should still be discernible in the non-publication reasons.
  1. 5.
    The respondent submits that this could be achieved by limiting redactions to the following paragraphs:
  1. (a)
    paragraph [33] (from “Dr Morris”), which includes specific references to factual matters excluded from publication in the principal reasons, by order (a) of the Tribunal dated 24 August 2023;
  1. (b)
    paragraphs [44](a)-(o), [47](a)-(f) and [49](a)-(g), which list the parts of the principal reasons to be redacted in accordance with the non-publication order ultimately made by the Tribunal on 24 August 2023; and
  1. (c)
    paragraph [54] (first sentence), which sets out specific details about the Family Court proceedings, which again is a matter excluded from publication in the principal reasons by order of the Tribunal on 24 August 2023.
  1. 6.
    Otherwise, the Respondent submits that general references to the matter submitted by the Applicant, and considered by the Tribunal, as being relevant to the decision whether or not to make orders for non-publication of the principal reasons should not be redacted. Where such general references do not disclose information or details specific to the Applicant, they should be published as an example of the Tribunal’s consideration of non-publication orders under s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
  1. [61]
    The applicant has not provided submissions on this question.  It seems unlikely that he has abandoned his position about the non-publication of matters dealt with earlier in these reasons.  The respondent appears to have proceeded on that basis, and the Tribunal proposes to take the same course.
  2. [62]
    The Tribunal accepts the respondent’s submissions set out above, save in relation to paragraph 5(c).  Paragraph [54] of these reasons identifies a proceeding in the FCA to which the applicant and his former wife are parties.  It is not an account of those proceedings.  It is not apparent that the publication of paragraph [54] would have any of the effects s 121 of the FL Act was intended to avoid.
  3. [63]
    Accordingly, further orders will be made as follows:-
  1. 6.
    A copy of the reasons of the Tribunal with respect to non-publication of the Reasons for Decision in Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc [2023] QCAT 205 (being these reasons) will be prepared and published, excluding paragraphs [33], [44](a)-(o), [47](a)-(f) and [49](a)-(g), marking the locations of the omitted parts “excluded from publication by order of the Tribunal dated 19 January 2024 until further order”; and
  1. 7.
    Pursuant to section 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, the publication of paragraphs [33], [44](a)-(o), [47](a)-(f) and [49](a)-(g) of the reasons given by the Tribunal, other than to the legal representatives of the parties and to the parties themselves, is prohibited without further order of the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal.

Footnotes

[1]  [2019] FCA 1488.

[2]  At p 45.

[3]  [2013] QCAT 217.

[4]  [2017] QCAT 125 at [19]–[23].

[5]  [2019] QCAT 113; see at [79]–[80].

[6]  (1992-1993) 178 CLR 408 at 426–427.

[7]  [1990] 1 AC 109, at p. 214.

[8]  [1990] 1 AC, at p. 281, per Lord Goff of Chieveley.

[9]  (1984) 156 CLR 414, at pp. 437–438.

[10]  (1980) 147 CLR 39, at pp. 50–52.

[11]  Cross on Evidence, digital version [25325] consulted on 3 August 2023.

[12]  Westlaw The Law of Australia para [20.7.10] consulted on 3 August 2023; see also Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) (2006) 15 VR 22 at [58].

[13]  At [58].

[14]  See Royal Women’s Hospital at [132]–[134].

[15]  At [132]–[134].

[16]  See TLA at [20.7.2].

[17]  [2010] QCATA 89 at [7].

[18] Herron v The A-G for New South Wales (1987) 8 NSWLR 601 at 613 (per Kirby P).

[19]  (1987) 8 NSWLR 601 at 613.

[20]  [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210 at 216.

[21]  [2005] FamCA 854; (2005) 194 FLR 111.

[22] DOQ17 at para [135]–[137].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc (No 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc (No 2)

  • MNC:

    [2023] QCAT 459

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Hon Peter Lyons KC

  • Date:

    24 Aug 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
AH & SS [2005] FamCA 854
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] FamCA 854
Cite 2 - [2005] FamCA 854
AH v SS (2005) 194 FLR 111
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 194 FLR 111
Cite 2 - (2005) 194 FLR 111
Attorney-General (U.K.) v Guardian Newspapers [No. 2] (1990) 1 AC 109
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 1 AC 109
Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1980) 147 CLR 39
Cutbush v Team Maree Property Service (No 3) [2010] QCATA 89
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCATA 89
Cite 2 - [2010] QCATA 89
DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 3) [2019] FCA 1488
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] FCA 1488
Cite 2 - [2019] FCA 1488
Herron v Attorney-General for N.S.W. (1987) 8 NSWLR 601
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1987) 8 NSWLR 601
Cite 2 - (1987) 8 NSWLR 601
Cite 3 - (1987) 8 NSWLR 601
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1992-1993) 178 CLR 408
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992-1993) 178 CLR 408
Cite 2 - (1992-1993) 178 CLR 408
Medical Board of Australia v Evans [2013] QCAT 217
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCAT 217
Cite 2 - [2013] QCAT 217
Medical Board of Australia v Valerie Cole [2019] QCAT 113
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCAT 113
Cite 2 - [2019] QCAT 113
Merlo v Queensland Law Society Inc [2023] QCAT 205
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QCAT 205
Cite 2 - [2023] QCAT 205
Cite 3 - [2023] QCAT 205
Cite 4 - [2023] QCAT 205
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Egan [2018] FCA 1320
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] FCA 1320
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 414
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 156 CLR 414
O'Sullivan v Farah [1989] HCA 61
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1989] HCA 61
Cite 2 - [1989] HCA 61
O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 168 CLR 210
Cite 2 - (1989) 168 CLR 210
Queensland College of Teachers v JNJ [2017] QCAT 125
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QCAT 125
Cite 2 - [2017] QCAT 125
Royal Women's Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 15 VR 22
Cite 2 - (2006) 15 VR 22
Sitwell v Sitwell [2014] FamCAFC 5
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] FamCAFC 5
SRD v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 52 FCR 187
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1994) 52 FCR 187

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
JCN v James Cook University & Ors No 3 [2024] QCAT 2582 citations
Milne v Mantarro [2025] QCAT 832 citations
Queensland College of Teachers v JBJ [2024] QCAT 5002 citations
Queensland College of Teachers v NSP [2024] QCAT 5132 citations
1

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