Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QCAT
  3. 2024
  4. Sowden v Bethany Christian Care - [2024] QCAT 171

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Sowden v Bethany Christian Care[2024] QCAT 171

Sowden v Bethany Christian Care[2024] QCAT 171

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Sowden v Bethany Christian Care [2024] QCAT 171

PARTIES:

GREGORY KEITH SOWDEN

(applicant)

v

BETHANY CHRISTIAN CARE

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCL068-23

MATTER TYPE:

Other civil dispute matters

DELIVERED ON:

11 April 2024

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Senior Member Brown

ORDERS:

  1. Proceeding dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where applicant resided in a retirement village – where respondent was an operator of a retirement village – where retirement village closed under an approved closure plan – where applicant disputes the payment of an exit fee following closure of retirement village – where no pre-proceeding dispute resolution process undertaken – where respondent brings an application to dismiss the proceeding due to the absence of a pre-proceeding dispute resolution process – whether dispute exempt from requirement for pre-proceeding dispute resolution process – consequence of non-compliance with pre-proceeding dispute resolution process

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 35C(1).

Retirement Villages Act 1999 (Qld) s 21, s 22, s 40, s 40B, s 41, s 53, s 58, s 59, s 60, s 63, s 65, s 67, s 154, s 157, s 169, s 170, s 171, s 173, s 209

Retirement Villages Regulation 2018 (Qld) s 5

A and C G Lee Pty Ltd v Collier [2019] QCAT 30

Armstrong v Kawana Island Retirement Village [2014] QCAT 51

Burinpipat Pty Ltd t/as Chili Coco v FFTOA Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 100

Wilson v LP and MJ Pty Ltd [2019] QCATA 82

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    This proceeding is about a retirement village dispute.
  2. [2]
    Bethany Christian Care (Bethany) has applied to dismiss the proceeding brought by Mr Sowden.
  3. [3]
    Bethany says that Mr Sowden failed to engage in the pre-proceedings dispute resolution process mandated by the Retirement Villages Act 1999 (Qld) (RV Act) before commencing the proceeding. Bethany says that the consequence of such non-compliance is that the proceeding must be dismissed.
  4. [4]
    The application falls to be determined on the papers.

What is the issue to be determined?

  1. [5]
    Bethany operated a retirement village in Brisbane. A decision was made by Bethany to close the retirement village. It is not controversial that a closure plan, mandated by the RV Act, was subsequently approved and implemented. The plan included the termination of Mr Sowden’s residence contract. The residence contract provided for the payment by the respondent to Mr Sowden of an exit entitlement upon termination. Mr Sowden disputes the amount paid to him by the respondent and says that an exit fee was deducted by the respondent.  Mr Sowden says that the respondent was not entitled to deduct the exit fee. This is the substance of the dispute.
  2. [6]
    The determination of the application turns principally on a single point – was Mr Sowden required to comply with the pre-proceedings mediation requirements set out in the RV Act before commencing the proceeding? If compliance was required, what is the consequence of non-compliance?

The relevant statutory framework – Retirement Villages Act 1999 (Qld)

  1. [7]
    The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear retirement village issues within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.[1]
  2. [8]
    A ‘retirement village issue’ means a retirement village dispute, or an application under s 169, s 170, s 171 or s 173 of the RV Act.[2]
  3. [9]
    A ‘retirement village dispute’ means a dispute between a scheme operator and a resident of a retirement village about the parties’ rights and obligations under the resident’s residence contract or the RV Act. A ‘resident’ includes a former resident.[3] 
  4. [10]
    There are two pathways to the Tribunal for parties to a retirement village dispute.
  5. [11]
    The first pathway requires participation by the parties in the dispute resolution process set out in the RV Act. The parties to a dispute may refer a dispute to a mediation process under the RV Act only if there has first been an informal attempt to resolve the dispute.[4] If the informal process is unsuccessful, a party to a dispute may apply to the principal registrar of QCAT to have the dispute referred to mediation.[5] A dispute notice must, if the resident’s residence contract has been terminated, be given to the registrar within 4 months after the payment of the former resident’s exit entitlement.[6] A party to a retirement village dispute may apply to the Tribunal if the parties to the dispute cannot reach a mediation agreement to the dispute, or a party to the dispute does not attend the mediation, or the dispute is not settled within 4 months after the dispute notice is given to the registrar; or the party claims that another party to a mediation agreement has not complied with the agreement within the time specified in it or, if no time is specified, within 2 months after the agreement is signed.[7] A party to a building work dispute or mandatory buyback dispute may also apply to the tribunal even if they have not attempted to resolve the dispute via the dispute resolution process set out in the Act. The present proceeding does not involve either type of dispute.
  6. [12]
    The second pathway to the Tribunal does not require participation by the parties in the pre-proceeding mediation process however is confined to particular retirement village issues:
    1. Removal of a resident from a retirement village; deprivation of a resident’s right to reside in a retirement village; restriction of a resident’s right to use retirement village land;[8]
    2. Contravention by a retirement village operator of particular provisions of the RV Act relating to the provision of documents to a prospective resident or misleading or deceptive conduct by a retirement village operator;[9]
    3. Payment of an exit entitlement to a former resident;[10]
    4. Extension of time by a scheme operator for the payment of an exit entitlement or mandatory buyback.[11]
  7. [13]
    The RV Act deals with the closure of a retirement village. A number of the provisions relating to the closure of a village did not come into effect until after the subject residence contract was entered into. Prior to these amendments, the RV Act provided for a scheme operator to ask the chief executive to cancel the registration of a retirement village scheme in certain circumstances.[12] In such circumstances the scheme operator was required to give to each resident of the retirement village a written notice stating, among other things, how the closure would affect the resident.[13] Subsequent amendments to the RV Act provided greater clarity around the steps required to be undertaken by an operator to close a retirement village. These steps include the approval of a detailed closure plan.[14]  
  8. [14]
    Part 3, Division 4 of the RV Act deals with terminating the right of a resident to reside in a retirement village. A scheme operator may terminate a resident’s right to reside by giving written notice to the resident.[15] The required notice period, if the termination is on the basis of the implementation by the operator of an approved closure plan, is 2 months.[16]
  9. [15]
    Schedule 1A of the Retirement Villages Regulation 2018 sets out the matters to be stated in a closure plan. Section 12 of the schedule provides that, for an accommodation unit, the plan must include details of an exit entitlement for which the scheme operator may be liable including Section 30 of the schedule provides that residents must be provided with details of how and when the residents’ exit entitlements will be paid. Relevant to the latter is s 63 of the Act. Where a former resident’s right to reside is terminated under an approved closure plan, the scheme operator must pay the exit entitlement of the former resident 14 days after an agreed resale value of the right to reside is determined in accordance with s 60 of the Act. Section 60(1) provides that the former resident and the scheme operator are required to negotiate and if possible agree on a resale value. By s 60(2) if agreement on a resale value cannot be reached, the scheme operator must obtain a valuation of the right to reside in the unit from a valuer. By s 60(3) the valuation is taken to be the agreed resale value.
  10. [16]
    A copy of the approved closure plan has been filed by the respondent. It is not contended by Mr Sowden that the approved closure does not comply with the requirements of the RV Act and regulation.

What do the parties say?

  1. [17]
    Bethany says:
    1. Bethany gave to Mr Sowden a notice of termination of the residence contract on 3 April 2023 pursuant to s 53(3)(d) of the Act;
    2. On 8 May 2023 Bethany paid Mr Sowden’s exit entitlement in accordance with clause 32 of the residence contract;
    3. The exit entitlement payment was $132,750 being Mr Sowden’s incoming contribution of $177,000 less the exit fee of $44,250, the amount being calculated in accordance with clause 31 of the residence contract and s 53A of the RV Act;
    4. Pursuant to s 154 of the RV Act the parties engaged in informal discussions in an attempt to resolve the dispute;
    5. The dispute is not about the payment of an exit entitlement;
    6. Mr Sowden was required, and failed, to comply with the pre-proceeding mediation requirements in the RV Act;
    7. Mr Sowden was required to file a dispute notice with the registrar before 8 September 2023 and failed to do so;
    8. As a consequence of Mr Sowden’s failure to comply with the provisions of the RV Act, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of the dispute and the proceeding should be dismissed.
  2. [18]
    Mr Sowden submissions are somewhat opaque and adopt a relatively scattergun approach to various provisions in the RV Act which Mr Sowden says are relevant.
  3. [19]
    Addressing the argument that he failed to comply with the pre-proceeding mediation requirements, Mr Sowden says that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of the dispute is enlivened by the filing of the originating application (form 31) ‘which has force of law and is part of RVA due to Sections 33, 222 and 227 RVA. Accordingly Form 31 is part of RVA.’ Mr Sowden goes on to say that the dispute relates to the payment of his full exit entitlement which is a triable issue.
  4. [20]
    Mr Sowden relies upon s 171 of the RV Act which provides that a former resident may apply to the tribunal for the payment of an exit entitlement however the submissions fail to address in any meaningful way how the section applies to the present dispute.
  5. [21]
    Mr Sowden also relies upon s 222 of the RV Act which provides that nothing in the Act prevents a party to a residence contract from seeking or enforcing another remedy the party may have under another law.
  6. [22]
    Mr Sowden says that his failure to comply with s 157(3) and give a dispute notice to the registrar within 4 months after the payment of the exit entitlement is not fatal to the proceeding. He says that participation in the formal mediation process is not mandatory but discretionary, relying on the use of the word ‘may’ in s 157(1).

Consideration

  1. [23]
    Before addressing the substantive issues it is necessary to deal with two of Mr Sowden’s contentions.
  2. [24]
    Mr Sowden’s reliance upon the filing of the originating application as invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is without substance. Mr Sowden cites no authority in support of such a proposition. An application for a retirement village dispute may be decided by the Tribunal only if the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the RV Act. To suggest that the filing of the originating application of itself confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal is entirely misconceived.
  3. [25]
    Mr Sowden’s submissions regarding the application of s 222 are similarly misconceived. Contrary to Mr Sowden’s submissions, s 222 does not operate to confer upon the Tribunal any general jurisdiction additional to the specific jurisdiction conferred by the RV Act. Rather, s 222 preserves the rights of parties to a residence contract to enforce entitlements and remedies under a law other than the RV Act and in a forum other than QCAT. 
  4. [26]
    I turn now to the issue of the subject matter of the proceeding. In the originating application Mr Sowden states that the dispute is one in relation to the payment of an exit entitlement. His submissions reinforce this position.
  5. [27]
    Section 171 of the RV Act provides:

171 Former resident may apply for order for payment of exit entitlement

  1. (1)
    This section applies if—
  1. (a)
    a retirement village scheme operator fails to comply with former section 58(2) or section 59A(4), 60(2), 65 or 67(2); and
  1. (b)
    a former resident of the retirement village is materially prejudiced by the failure.
  1. (2)
    The former resident may apply to the tribunal for an order that the operator pay to the former resident the former resident’s exit entitlement.
  1. (3)
    In this section—
  1. former section 58(2) means section 58(2) as in force immediately before the commencement and applied in relation to a current residence contract under section 237K.
  1. [28]
    It is not controversial as between the parties that if the subject matter of the proceeding falls within s 171, compliance with the pre-proceeding mediation provisions of the Act was not required before the proceeding was commenced.
  2. [29]
    Section 171 is engaged if both limbs of s 171(1) are satisfied. Firstly, there must be a failure by a retirement village scheme operator to comply with former s 58(2), or s 59A(4), s 60(2), s 65 or s 67(2). Secondly, the former resident must be materially prejudiced as a result of such failure.
  3. [30]
    The former s 58(2), and s 59A(4) and s 65, which relate to work necessary to reinstate or renovate an accommodation unit, and the scheme operator’s obligation to specified give information to a former resident relevant to the sale of the right to reside in an accommodation unit, have no application for present purposes. That leaves for consideration s 60(2) and s 67(2).
  4. [31]
    Section 60(2) sits within Part 3, Division 5 of the Act which is headed ‘Reselling and valuing resident’s right to reside’. Following the date of termination of a resident’s right to reside in an accommodation unit, the former resident and the scheme operator are required to attempt to negotiate and if possible agree on a resale value of the right to reside in the unit. In the event of agreement not being reached, the scheme operator is required to obtain a valuation of the right to reside in the unit from a valuer and any such valuation is taken to be the agreed resale value.
  5. [32]
    ‘Termination date’, as it is relevant for present purposes, is defined as meaning the date a resident’s right to reside under a residence contract, including an existing residence contract, in an accommodation unit in a retirement village is terminated under the RV Act.
  6. [33]
    By s 57, division 5 applies if a resident’s right to reside under a residence contract, including an existing residence contract, in an accommodation unit in a retirement village is terminated under the Act. The division applies despite anything to the contrary in an existing residence contract.
  7. [34]
    Section 67(2) also sits within part 3, division 5. Section 67(2) applies if a former resident’s right to reside has been terminated under s 53(3)(d) and the former resident has not been paid an exit entitlement under s 63.  The former resident and the scheme operator are required to reconsider the resale value of the right to reside at least every 3 months and, if possible, agree in writing on a new resale value, which may be the same value.
  8. [35]
    Mr Sowden’s submissions do not address the application of the two limbs of s 171(1).
  9. [36]
    A residence contract is required to contain specified details.[17] These details include the resident’s exit entitlement.[18] Of note for present purposes is that a residence contract is not required to contain details of the parties’ entitlements and obligations in the event of the closure of a retirement village scheme. This is presumably because the Act and the regulations deal with the closure of a retirement village. For the purposes of the present proceeding it is unnecessary to further consider this point.
  10. [37]
    An ‘exit entitlement’ is defined as the amount that a scheme operator may be liable to pay to a former resident arising from the resident ceasing to reside in the accommodation unit to which the contract relates or the settlement of the sale of the right to reside in the accommodation unit.[19]
  11. [38]
    Clause 16 of the residence contract permitted Bethany to terminate the residence contract on 2 months written notice to Mr Sowden in specified circumstances. Those circumstances did not include the retirement village ceasing operations although as I have noted neither the Act nor the regulations required the inclusion in a residence contract of provisions relating to the closure of a scheme. Clause 27 of the residence contract required, within 30 days of the date of termination of Mr Sowden’s right to reside in the accommodation unit, Bethany and Mr Sowden to (inter alia) negotiate and if possible agree on a resale value of the right to reside in the unit. If agreement on the resale value could not be reached, by clause 29 of the residence contract, the provisions of s 60 of the RV Act applied.
  12. [39]
    Clause 31 of the contract required Mr Sowden to pay the respondent the exit fee on the date and for the amount stipulated in the contract.
  13. [40]
    Clause 32 of the contract required the respondent to pay Mr Sowden the Exit Entitlement within 14 days after the payment to the respondent of the ingoing contribution for the unit by the new licensee.
  14. [41]
    Mr Sowden does not assert that the dispute arises out of a failure by the parties to agree on a resale value of the accommodation unit and the requirement for the respondent to obtain a valuation of Mr Sowden’s right to reside in the unit, being the circumstances in which s 60(2) is engaged. Nor does Mr Sowden assert that s 67(2) has application. Regardless, neither s 60(2) nor s 67(2) have application in the present circumstances. The payment of the exit entitlement to Mr Sowden was wholly unconnected with the value of the right to reside in the accommodation unit. The exit entitlement was calculated by reference to a formula set out in clause 32 of the residence contract. While Bethany was required to comply with the provisions of s 60(2) as a consequence of the termination of Mr Sowden’s right to reside, such compliance was not relevant to the calculation of Mr Sowden’s exit entitlement. The requirement to fix a resale value of the right to reside in the accommodation unit was a mechanical requirement of the RV Act and had no bearing on the calculation of the exit entitlement. The residence contract provided that the exit entitlement was payable within 14 days after the payment to the respondent of the ingoing contribution for the unit by a new licensee. As there was no sale of the right to reside, by operation of s 63(1)(d) the exit entitlement was payable 14 days after an agreed resale value was determined in accordance with s 60.[20] Section 63(1)(d) enabled the fixing of the date by which the exit entitlement was required to be paid to Mr Sowden in circumstances where there is no incoming resident. Clause 31 of the contract required Mr Sowden to pay the respondent the exit fee on the date and for the amount stipulated in the contract. The schedule to the contract set out how the exit fee was to be calculated. It is unnecessary to set out in exhaustive detail how the exit fee was calculated. Suffice it to say, in compliance with the Act, the contract provided that the fee was worked out on a daily basis. The contract also provided for a minimum exit fee and a maximum exit fee.
  15. [42]
    Nor does s 67(2) apply to the present circumstances. The section has very specific and limited application to circumstances in which the scheme operator has failed to comply with the requirements to reconsider, and if possible agree, the resale value of the right to reside at least every 3 months before the payment to the former resident of an exit entitlement. Here, there is no dispute about the fixing of the resale value. Furthermore, s 67(2) only operates in circumstances where a former resident has not been paid an exit entitlement under s 63. Here, the exit entitlement had been paid to Mr Sowden in accordance with s 63(1)(d). Further, the approved closure plan reflected s 63(1)(d) of the RV Act in providing that the resident’s exit entitlement would be paid within 14 days after an agreed resale was determined.
  16. [43]
    Mr Sowden asserts in the originating application that Bethany deliberately omitted from the residence contract a provision relating to the calculation of the exit entitlement in the event of the closure of the village and that in the absence of such a contractual stipulation Bethany had no right to payment of the exit fee. Mr Sowden’s complaint is that the provisions of the residence contract did not require the payment by him of the exit fee in circumstances where the retirement village was closed.
  17. [44]
    Section 171 must be construed by reference to the words of the section and the context in which the section is found in the RV Act. Section 171 is headed ‘Former resident may apply for order for payment of exit entitlement’. The heading to a section of an Act forms part of the provision to which it is a heading.[21] The heading is of limited assistance in ascertaining the meaning of s 171. Section 171(1) prescribes the very specific circumstances in which a former resident of a retirement village may apply to the tribunal for an order that the operator pay the former resident’s exit entitlement. As I have observed, in this proceeding the provisions relevant to the operation of s 171(1)(a) are s 60(2) and s 67(2). The general words used in the heading to s 171 do not operate to expand the operation of s 171(1)(a). Section 171 is confined in its operation to disputes regarding the payment of an exit entitlement by a retirement village operator in circumstances where it is alleged that the operator has breached particular provisions of the RV Act relating to the resale of the unit and the resident is materially prejudiced by the contravention. This conclusion is reinforced by s 194 which deals with orders the tribunal may make for the payment of an exit entitlement. 
  18. [45]
    Mr Sowden’s complaint that the residence contract did not entitle Bethany to receive the exit fee is quite different to a dispute falling within s 171(1) of the RV Act, and is not a matter relating to a failure by Bethany to comply with the former s 58(2), or s 59A(4), s 60(2), s 65 or s 67(2) of the RV Act.
  19. [46]
    The construction I prefer of the relevant provisions of the RV Act is consistent with the objects of the RV Act which include providing for processes for resolving disputes between residents and scheme operators.[22] The legislature intended limited types of disputes to be exempt from the requirement for parties to a dispute to engage in a pre-proceeding dispute resolution process, otherwise such compliance is required.
  20. [47]
    Having concluded that the dispute does not fall within s 171 of the RVA Act, it is necessary to consider what the consequence is of non-compliance with the pre-proceeding mediation process.
  21. [48]
    Section 154(1) of the RV Act provides that the parties to a retirement village dispute may refer the dispute to a mediation process under part 9 only if the parties have attempted to resolve the dispute under the section. Section 157(1) provides that a party to a retirement village dispute that a mediator may mediate may apply to the registrar to have the dispute referred to mediation. Section 167(1) of the Act provides that:

(1) A party to a retirement village dispute may apply to the tribunal if—

  1. (a)
    the parties to the dispute can not reach a mediation agreement to the dispute; or
  1. (b)
    a party to the dispute does not attend the mediation conference for the dispute; or
  1. (c)
    the dispute is not settled within 4 months after the dispute notice is given to the registrar; or
  1. (d)
    the party claims that another party to a mediation agreement has not complied with the agreement within the time specified in it or, if no time is specified, within 2 months after the agreement is signed.
  1. [49]
    In Armstrong v Kawana Island Retirement Village[23] it was held that compliance with the pre-proceeding mediation process is a mandatory step before a proceeding can be commenced in the tribunal in relation to a retirement village dispute. The tribunal stated:

Mr Armstrong did not give the prescribed Notice. This is not a mere procedural deficiency. The legislature has expressed the clear intent that parties in retirement village disputes attempt to resolve their issues before applying to the Tribunal. The Notice facilitates this by containing prescribed information including the parties and the matters in dispute. Mr Armstrong’s attempt to rely upon a Notice issued by another party circumvents due process. It is a precondition to jurisdiction that a party give the Notice. The provision is therefore substantive and defines the limits of jurisdiction.

…

The cause of action was not complete until the prescribed Notice was given and mediation or negotiation did not succeed. Mr Armstrong’s Application was premature. The giving of the prescribed Notice is a mandatory precondition to jurisdiction and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed:

The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is derived from various “enabling Acts”… An enabling Act may vary or exclude provisions of the QCAT Act… any such provision, or one mentioned in subsection 6(7), prevails over inconsistent provisions of the QCAT Act, and that Act must be read accordingly.

  1. [50]
    The dispute resolution provisions in the RV Act mirror those found in the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) (RSL Act). Compliance with the pre-proceeding dispute resolution provisions in the RSL Act has been held to be a mandatory pre-condition to commencing a proceeding for a retail tenancy dispute in the tribunal.[24] In the Explanatory Memorandum to the original bill preceding the RV Act reference is made to the informal dispute resolution process, now found in s 154(1), as being a ‘mandatory dispute resolution procedure’.[25] It is difficult to conceive that the legislature did not intend the formal mediation process to be similarly mandatory.
  2. [51]
    I accept the correctness of the observations in Armstrong and find that compliance with the pre-proceeding mediation process is mandatory step before a proceeding may be commenced in the tribunal for a retirement village dispute unless the proceeding is an application for an order under s 169, s 170, s 171 or s 171A of the RV Act. Compliance with the pre-proceeding mediation process is not a procedural step that may be waived by the tribunal exercising the power conferred by s 61(1)(c) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
  3. [52]
    Mr Sowden places some emphasis on the use of ‘may’ in s 154(1) and s 157(1). He says that the use of ‘may’ means that compliance with the pre-proceeding mediation process is not mandatory. I do not accept Mr Sowden’s submission. The tribunal does not have an exclusive jurisdiction in respect of retirement village disputes. This is made explicit by s 222 of the RV Act. However, by s 215(1) of the RV Act once an application about a retirement village issue under part 9 or 10 of the Act is given to the registrar, subject to the operation of s 215(2), the issue must not be referred to arbitration or heard by any court. Accordingly, the use of ‘may’ in s 154 and s 157 simply reflects that a party to a dispute may elect to either proceed with the dispute resolution process, which in turn may lead to the tribunal, or commence proceedings in a court exercising the party’s other rights and remedies.
  4. [53]
    Mr Sowden failed to comply with the requirements of part 9 and part 10 of the Act before commencing the proceeding. In the absence of compliance, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of the dispute.

Conclusion and orders

  1. [54]
    In the absence of jurisdiction, the proceeding is misconceived and lacks substance and should be dismissed pursuant to s 47 of the QCAT Act. I make orders accordingly.

Footnotes

[1]  RV Act, s 209.

[2]  RV Act, s 22.

[3]  RV Act, s 21(3).

[4]  RV Act, s 154(1).

[5]  RV Act, s 157(1).

[6]  RV Act, s 157(3).

[7]  RV Act, s 167(1).

[8]  RV Act, s 169.

[9]  RV Act, s 170.

[10]  RV Act, s 171.

[11]  RV Act, s 171A.

[12]  RV Act, s 40(1)

[13]  RV Act, s 41(3)(a).

[14]  RV Act, s 40B.

[15]  RV Act, s 53(1).

[16]  RV Act, s 53(3)(d).

[17]  RV Act, s 45(1); Retirement Villages Regulation 2018 (Qld) s 5.

[18]  RV Act, s 45(1)(f).

[19]  RV Act, s 16.

[20]  Note s 57 which provides that (1) division 5 applies if a resident’s right to reside under a residence contract, including an existing residence contract, in an accommodation unit in a retirement village is terminated under the Act; and (2) the division applies despite anything to the contrary in an existing residence contract.

[21]Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 35C(1).

[22]  RV Act, s 3(2)(e).

[23]  [2014] QCAT 51.

[24]Burinpipat Pty Ltd t/as Chili Coco v FFTOA Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 100, followed in Wilson v LP and MJ Pty Ltd [2019] QCATA 82; A and C G Lee Pty Ltd v Collier [2019] QCAT 30.

[25]  Explanatory Memorandum at p 51.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Sowden v Bethany Christian Care

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Sowden v Bethany Christian Care

  • MNC:

    [2024] QCAT 171

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Senior Member Brown

  • Date:

    11 Apr 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
A & C G Lee Pty Ltd v Collier [2019] QCAT 30
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCAT 30
Cite 2 - [2019] QCAT 30
Armstrong v Kawana Island Retirement Village [2014] QCAT 51
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCAT 51
Cite 2 - [2014] QCAT 51
Burinpipat Pty Ltd v FFTOA Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 100
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCAT 100
Cite 2 - [2016] QCAT 100
Wilson v LP & MJ Pty Ltd [2019] QCATA 82
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCATA 82
Cite 2 - [2019] QCATA 82

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.