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Huang v Body Corporate for Anchorage One CTS 35311[2024] QCAT 381

Huang v Body Corporate for Anchorage One CTS 35311[2024] QCAT 381

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Huang v Body Corporate for Anchorage One CTS 35311 [2024] QCAT 381

PARTIES:

yue huang

(applicant)

v

body corporate for anchorage one cts 35311

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCL035-22

MATTER TYPE:

Other civil dispute matters

DELIVERED ON:

11 October 2024

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Judicial Member D J McGill SC

ORDERS:

It is the decision of the Tribunal that:

  1. The applicant satisfies the requirements of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) s 47B(1), and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine her application.

The Tribunal directs that:

  1. The respondent send a copy of this decision and my reasons to each owner of a lot in the respondent Body Corporate, except for lot 17, and to refer each lot owner to s 47B(5) and (6) of the Act, within 28 days from this decision. 
  2. If either party seeks an order for costs in respect of the issue before me, written submissions outlining the order sought, and the reasons to justify it, must be filed and served within 21 days. 
  3. If such submissions are not filed and served within that period, there be no order as to costs.
  4. If such submissions are filed and served within that period, the other party is to file and serve submissions in response within 21 days, and the question of costs will be decided by the Tribunal without an oral hearing. 

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where the applicant applies for the adjustment of a lot entitlement schedule under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 – whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the proceeding under the Act – whether there has been a “material change” to the contribution schedule

INTERPRETATION – GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION – GIVING EFFECT TO MANIFEST INTENTION – IN GENERAL – meaning of “material change” in s 47B of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 – where the interpretation of the provision is assisted by consideration of the legislative history – where previous versions of the legislation have been the subject of judicial interpretation

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) s 47B

Body Corporate for the Anchorage One CTS 35311 v Huang [2024] QDC 60

Fisher v Body Corporate for Centrepoint CTS 779 [2004] QCA 214 

Franklin v Body Corporate for La Porte D’Or [2004] QDC 154

McGahey v Body Corporate for Ambience on Burleigh [2012] QCAT 61

Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Condah Bay Investments Pty Ltd [2003] QDC 438

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

Appellant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

SLF Lawyers

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    On 12 July 2022 the applicant filed in the Tribunal an application for the adjustment of a lot entitlement schedule under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (“the Act”), by which she sought, as the owner of Lot 17 in that community titles scheme, to have the contribution schedule, and hence the size of the contribution liability to the respondent, of her lot reduced.[1]  By directions given by a Member on 29 November 2022, the respondent was made the respondent to the application.  On 20 December 2022 the respondent filed in the Tribunal a response resisting the application.
  2. [2]
    On 8 September 2023 a Member gave both parties leave to be legally represented in the proceedings, and gave directions about the filing and service of material.  At a compulsory conference held on 12 December 2023 a Member gave directions for the parties to file and serve submissions on the question of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the application under the Act.  Submissions in writing and affidavit material have been filed by the parties.  The Member further directed that the issue of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the within application for the adjustment of a lot entitlement schedule be decided on the papers, presumably as a preliminary matter.  It is that issue which is now before me. 
  3. [3]
    I should say that I have some very slight familiarity with the premises in question, a restaurant in Palmer Street, Townsville.  Years ago, while visiting Townsville from time to time on circuit, I have eaten occasionally at a restaurant on that site, but I think not since the applicant purchased the premises in 2014.  In the circumstances I do not consider that I should decline to decide this matter, particularly since the issue of jurisdiction is one which depends largely on technical legal considerations.  

Legislation

  1. [4]
    The Act provides for community based arrangements for the use of land which has been subdivided by a community titles scheme, having regard to the secondary objects set out in the Act s 4.[2]  A community titles scheme is defined by a plan of subdivision and by a community management statement, the recording of which establishes the scheme: the Act s 24.  One of the requirements of a community management statement is that it contain a contribution schedule providing lot “entitlements” for each lot in the scheme, each of which must be a whole number, more than zero: the Act s 46.  In 2011 the Act was amended to provide for principles for deciding such entitlements, but those principles were not made retrospective.  The significance of the contribution schedule is that, subject to a handful of specific exclusions, it determines the share of each lot owner of amounts levied by the body corporate: the Act s 47(2)(a).[3] 
  2. [5]
    The contribution schedule may be amended by the members of a body corporate by a resolution passed without dissent, subject to certain restrictions.[4]  Apart from this, the Act provides in s 47B relevantly as follows:
  1. This section applies if—
  1. a community titles scheme is affected by a material change that has happened since the last time the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme were decided; and
  1. the owner of a lot included in the scheme believes an adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme is necessary because of the material change.
  1. This section also applies if—
  1. a community titles scheme is established after the commencement of this section; and
  1. there has been no change to the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme arising from—
  1. a resolution passed under s 47A; or
  1. an order of a specialist adjudicator or QCAT mentioned in s 47AC; or
  1. a decision in relation to an appeal from an order of a specialist adjudicator or QCAT mentioned in s 47AC; and
  1. the owner of a lot included in the scheme believes the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme are not consistent with the deciding principle for the lot entitlements.
  1. (2A)
    In addition, this section applies if—
  1. a new community management statement is recorded for a community titles scheme to reflect a formal acquisition affecting the scheme; and
  1. there has been a change to the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme because of the formal acquisition; and
  1. the owner of a lot included in the scheme believes that, because of the change, the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme—
  1. are not consistent with the deciding principle for the lot entitlements, or are not just and equitable to the extent the deciding principle allows; or
  1. if there is no apparent deciding principle for the lot entitlements, are not just and equitable.
  1. The owner of the lot may apply—
  1. under Chapter 6, for an order of a specialist adjudicator for an adjustment of the contribution schedule for the community titles scheme; or
  1. as provided under the QCAT Act, for an order of QCAT, exercising the tribunal’s original jurisdiction, for an adjustment of the contribution schedule for the scheme.
  1. Despite any other law or statutory instrument, the respondent to an application mentioned in subsection (3) is the body corporate.

Note—

The body corporate must be given notice of the application under—

  1. for an application to a specialist adjudicator under Chapter 6 – s 243; or
  1. for an application to QCAT as provided under the QCAT Act - the QCAT Act s 37.

…..

  1. If the specialist adjudicator or QCAT orders an adjustment of the contribution schedule, the adjusted contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the community titles scheme must—
  1. be consistent with the deciding principle for the existing contribution schedule lot entitlements, and be just and equitable to the extent the deciding principle allows; or
  1. if there is no apparent deciding principle for the existing contribution schedule lot entitlements, be just and equitable.
  1. If the specialist adjudicator or QCAT orders an adjustment of the contribution schedule, the body corporate must, as quickly as practicable, lodge a request to record a new community management statement incorporating the adjustment ordered.

Maximum penalty—100 penalty units.

Note—

Under section 46(10), a change to a lot entitlement takes effect on the recording of the new community management statement incorporating the change.

  1. To remove any doubt, it is declared that, if there is a deciding principle for the existing contribution schedule lot entitlements, the specialist adjudicator or QCAT can not change the deciding principle for the lot entitlements.
  1. [6]
    The expression “material change” is defined in Schedule 6 of the Act as follows:
  1. 1.
    A material change, for a community titles scheme, is a change that has, or may have, a significant effect on the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots included in the scheme, including, for example—
  1. the addition of 1 or more lots, other than by a subdivision not involving the addition of a subsidiary scheme; or
  1. the removal of 1 or more lots, other than by an amalgamation.
  1. 2.
    However, if a community titles scheme is intended to be developed progressively, a change arising from development proposed in the community management statement for the scheme is not a material change for the scheme.
  1. [7]
    That Schedule also defines “formal acquisition” as the acquisition of a lot or of common property under the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld).  It follows that s 47B(2A) will not apply in this matter.  It is not disputed that the respondent was established prior to the commencement of s 47B, and hence s 47B(2) will also not apply to this matter.  The applicant puts her case under s 47B(1).  It does not appear that there has been any adjustment to the contribution schedule lot entitlements since the original community management statement was registered in 2006.  There is however a dispute between the parties as to whether there has been a “material change” since then. 
  2. [8]
    The respondent referred to the definition, and submitted that there had been no “material change” on the basis that there has been no addition or removal of any lot since the scheme was established.  That is true, but is not conclusive, because of the fact that the examples given are simply examples; they do not define exhaustively the term “material change”[5].  This definition is an inclusive definition, and it is not necessary that the “material change” fall within the examples.  The underlying submission seems to be, in substance, that the change, to be material, must be one to the contribution schedule itself.  But that is not what the definition says; it is a change that “has had, or may have, a significant effect on the contribution schedule lot entitlements …”.  One could say that that could be achieved only by changing the numbers in the contribution schedule in some way, but if that had happened, under s 47A, a separate mechanism for challenging the decision was provided (in 2013) by s 47AA. 
  3. [9]
    Apart from under s 47A and s 47B, the Act provides only limited ways in which the numbers in a contribution schedule can be changed.  Section 50 allows the owners of two or more lots to agree in writing to change the distribution of the lot entitlements between or among themselves, but not so as to change the total of their lot entitlements.  If they notify the body corporate, it must give effect to the change, albeit at the expense of those owners.  Section 51A deals with a situation where a constructing authority acquires part of the scheme land,[6] while s 51B deals with the effect of the subdivision of a lot and s 51C deals with the amalgamation of lots, both of which deal specifically with the effect on lot entitlements in a way which will not affect other lots.[7]  If community title schemes are amalgamated under the Act Chapter 2 Part 10, or if an existing basic scheme is turned into a layered arrangement under the Act Chapter 2 Part 11, there will be new community management statements with appropriate lot entitlements, but these must be approved in meeting without dissent, or by the District Court.[8]  If the “material change” is confined to the examples given, there is little, or perhaps no, scope for it to operate, outside the exclusion from the exclusion in paragraph 2 of the definition. 
  4. [10]
    I consider that the more likely meaning was that what had to be material was a change in the effect of the contribution schedule because of things that had happened since the last time that it was adjusted.  That would be consistent with the second paragraph of the definition, which excludes a change resulting from progressive development of a scheme, provided that it is a change proposed in the original community management statement.  If in this way the original owners have had notice of what was coming, they cannot complain when it arrives, but if what they get is different – presumably significantly different – then they can. 
  5. [11]
    One indication that the section is not confined to a change to the contribution schedule itself is the use of the expression “or may have” in the definition.  If there is a change to the schedule, for example by increasing or decreasing the number of lots, the effect of the change will be obvious enough, and all that will remain is an assessment of whether that change is significant.  The use of this expression indicates that there is room for uncertainty as to what effect the relevant change would have. 
  6. [12]
    Such an approach is supported by a consideration of the history of this part of the legislation.  The first legislation on this topic in Queensland, the Building Units Title Act 1965 (Qld) provided for lot entitlements, but did not specify how they were to be determined, or provide any method for adjusting them.[9]  That Act applied only for a building of at least two stories, and when the Group Titles Act 1973 (Qld) was passed, to cover non-highrise schemes, it provided in s 15(2) that lot entitlements were to be proportional to the unimproved values of the lots in the scheme.  There was still no mechanism to adjust the lot entitlements provided, even if the proportions changed over time.  The same approach was applied when the two acts were combined in the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld): s 19(1).  That Act introduced a dispute resolution process, based on referees, whose decisions could be appealed to a magistrate, and, on a question of law, to the Supreme Court. 
  7. [13]
    There followed a period of controversy about regulation of such schemes, and a degree of political dithering, before the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) was enacted.  The Act recognised that the need for regulation depended on the nature of the scheme, which could be other than residential units, and provided for a series of “modules” which dealt with the detailed regulation of the different types of scheme.  The Act provided for separate contribution schedule lot entitlements and interest schedule lot entitlements, with the former governing the contributions to the financial needs of the body corporate, and the right to vote in meetings, while the latter reflected the lot owner’s interest in the common property, which became relevant if the scheme were terminated, and was also the vehicle by which some government charges were apportioned among lot owners. 
  8. [14]
    As well, the Act provided (in what was then s 46) that a lot owner could apply to the District Court to amend a lot entitlement.  In such a situation, the Court was required, for the contribution schedule, to apply the principle that lot entitlements should be equal, except to the extent that it was just and equitable for them not to be equal: s 46(4).  There was also a mechanism by which two or more lot owners could agree to change their respective lot entitlements, so long as the total of their lot entitlements remained the same: s 47.  The dispute resolution process was also made more complex, and appeals from the decisions of what were called “adjudicators” went, on a question of law, to the District Court. 
  9. [15]
    By amendments in 2003 a requirement was inserted in s 46(7) that, for a contribution schedule for a scheme which received development approval after the commencement of the amendment, the contribution lot entitlements were to be equal except to the extent to which it was just and equitable for them not to be equal.  Two examples were given, one of which was a layered arrangement where the lots had different uses with different requirements.  As well, s 46(8) required that, when deciding the lot entitlements in both schedules for such a scheme, regard must be had to how the scheme was structured, the nature, features and characteristics of the lots included in the scheme, and the purposes for which the lots are used. 
  10. [16]
    As well in 2003 s 49, which then dealt with adjustments to lot entitlements by the Court or adjudicator, provided that, when deciding if in the circumstances it was just and equitable for the contribution entitlements not to be equal, regard could be had to the matters listed in s 46(8), but regard could not be had to any knowledge or understanding, or any lack thereof, of the lot entitlements of the relevant lot or their purposes on the part of the applicant when entering into the contract to buy the lot. Provision was made, in what was then s 52, for adjustment of lot entitlements after acquisition of part of the scheme land.  
  11. [17]
    The issue of how the jurisdiction of the District Court should be exercised came before the Court of Appeal in Fisher v Body Corporate for Centrepoint CTS 779 [2004] QCA 214 (“Fisher”), when Chesterman J, with whom the other members of the Court agreed,[10] considered the terms of the Act and the Explanatory Note and Second Reading speech of the minister for the 2003 amending Bill, and said at [26]: 

[T]he preferable view is that a contribution schedule should provide for equal contributions by apartment owners, except insofar as some apartments can be shown to give rise to particular costs to the body corporate which other apartments do not. That question, whether a schedule should be adjusted, is to be answered with regard to the demand made on the services and amenities provided by a body corporate to the respective apartments, or their contribution to the costs incurred by the body corporate. More general considerations of amenity, value or history are to be disregarded. What is at issue is the ‘equitable’ distribution of the costs.

  1. [18]
    In that case there were two experts who assessed the extent to which the different units contributed to the cost of the things which were the responsibility of the body corporate.  Each analysis was detailed and thorough, and very similar in outcome.  This was regarded as showing that the then current distribution schedule (which was not equal) was also not just and equitable, nor would an equal schedule be, and that the schedule proposed would be.  In the District Court the application had been dismissed on the basis that such an analysis was too narrow.  This was set aside and the Court substituted the schedule proposed by the expert who had, in allocating the costs of the lifts, distinguished between the lifts in the taller and shorter towers. 
  2. [19]
    Apart from considering the parliamentary material, Chesterman J said that the nature of the contribution schedule suggested that the allocation of the burden of contributions should depend on the impact that individual lots make on the cost of operating the scheme: [31].  He also said that this was the only basis on which adjustment of contributions could consistently be made; if a wider range of matters were taken into account, it could result in idiosyncratic determinations: [32].  That view had not always been adopted in such applications.  In Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Condah Bay Investments Pty Ltd [2003] QDC 438 Robin DCJ expressed the view at [14] that there was no single “just and equitable” solution. 
  3. [20]
    In Franklin v Body Corporate for La Porte D’Or [2004] QDC 154 the same judge referred to the argument that people who had bought a unit on the basis of a particular share of contribution liability should not be subject to a larger share as a result of another owner’s application for a reduction.  An answer to that argument, at least for people who had bought since 1997, was that they also bought when the contribution schedule was subject to change in the event of an application under the Act.  Another answer is that, carried to its logical conclusion, it meant no application for an adjustment downwards by a lot owner could ever succeed, however unjust and inequitable the current schedule.  In any case, this consideration is in my opinion excluded by s 49(5).
  4. [21]
    I respectfully entirely agree with the approach of Chesterman J in Fisher.  The trouble was however that, particularly before the 2003 amendments, developers, when setting up contribution schedules, had not been too concerned with considerations of fairness and equity, and tended to adopt a contribution schedule which just followed the interest schedule, and hence the market value (ie the price) of the units.[11]  Hence there were a large number of unit blocks where application of the Fisher approach would result in a change in the contribution schedule, which would always mean losers as well as winners.  A lot of applications for adjustment were made, and a lot of people expected to be saddled with higher contributions.[12]  Noble objectives such as fairness and equity rapidly lost their shine for people if it was going to cost them money.  Those who had not been paying a fair share of body corporate contributions protested and lobbied politicians to avoid being required to do so.[13] 
  5. [22]
    The result was a spate of ill-considered amendments in 2011, perhaps the most bizarre of which was a provision that a decision on an amendment application could be set at nought by one adversely affected lot owner proposing a motion to overturn it to the body corporate.[14]  This much criticised feature, known as the “2011 reversion”, was itself terminated by another Act in 2013[15] which barred its operation as from the introduction of the Bill the previous year, and put in place a mechanism by which any reversion which had been completed prior to that could itself be reversed.[16]  It was the 2011 Act which introduced s 47B in essentially its current form, with the requirement that there have been a material change since the last time the contribution schedule was decided, and the definition of “material change”. 
  6. [23]
    The Explanatory Note for what became the 2011 Act said at p 2 that one of the objects of that Act was to “ensure that there is as much certainty around body corporate costs as possible, as well as providing appropriate and flexible principles for setting contribution schedule lot entitlements.”  This Act introduced the capacity for a contribution schedule to be on the “equality principle” or the “relativity principle”, the latter based on one or more of the five factors specified in the Act s 46S(3).  Since one of these was the market values of the lots, developers were able to continue the practice of having the contribution schedule, like the interest schedule, follow the prices of the units.  Apart from this, the five factors were broad enough so that almost any distribution of contribution entitlements could be justified under the relativity principle so long as that principle was nominated, and an explanation of the basis of the distribution was contained, in the original community management statement. 
  7. [24]
    Further, the requirement for a “material change” before an application could be made meant that it was no longer open to a lot owner to challenge the contribution schedule on the basis that, as set up by the developer, it was not fair and equitable.  This was the result of another objective of the 2011 Act, that “the ability to adjust contribution schedule lot entitlements will be limited for lot owners in community title schemes established prior to … the commencement of the Bill.” (Explanatory Note p 3.)  One of the complaints which led to the 2011 Act was that repeated applications could be made for adjustments, either by the owner of a particular lot, or by the owners of different lots. 
  8. [25]
    Prior to Fisher District Court decisions seem to have dealt with only the entry in the contribution schedule relating to the lot of the applicant.  One notable feature of the Fisher decision was that it substituted a new schedule for the old one, on the basis of a calculation of the relative cost burden of all lots in the Scheme.  That approach was followed in a number of later decisions before the 2011 Act was passed.  One of the effects of the requirement for a “material change” is that, if on an application the contribution schedule is adjusted only for the lot of the applicant lot owner, it is still necessary for any other lot owner who also seeks an adjustment to wait until another material change occurs before another application may be made.  That provides an incentive for any other unhappy lot owner to get involved if an application is made. 
  9. [26]
    The arrangement for recording the applicable deciding principle on the community management statement applied only to schemes set up after the commencement of the 2011 Act.  There was no mechanism for attributing a deciding principle to earlier schemes.  The statement for the respondent, predating the 2011 Act, does not identify a principle.  The provisions of s 47B(9) make it clear that the Tribunal, on an application under s 47B, cannot change the deciding principle for the lot entitlements.  Any change must be consistent with the deciding principle, and be just and equitable to the extent the deciding principle allows: s 47B(7)(a).  But if, as in this case, there is no apparent deciding principle for the existing contribution schedule lot entitlements, it must be “just and equitable”: s 47B(7)(b). 
  10. [27]
    The use of that expression in s 47B(7)(b) is significant.  By the time the legislature enacted s 47B in 2011, it was well aware of the interpretation of that expression in the context of a contribution schedule under the Act, as a result of the decision in Fisher and the resultant controversy.  If the legislature had intended to depart from the meaning of that term adopted in Fisher, it would have been easy enough to do so.  That the same wording was used confirms, in my opinion, that the authority of Fisher as to what was “just and equitable” in this context was not overturned.  It follows in my opinion that, in the case of a pre-2011 scheme with a community management statement which does not identify a deciding principle, if the contribution schedule is to be adjusted, it is the approach in Fisher which has to be followed. 
  11. [28]
    That approach involves a determination of the extent to which the various lots benefit from the body corporate expenditure.  The application of that approach, in circumstances where s 47B(1) applies, supports my opinion that the “material change” will have a significant effect on the contribution schedule lot entitlements if it changes the balance between different lots in the scheme in terms of the extent to which body corporate expenditure is relevant to the respective lots, to a significant extent.  That is the test to be applied in this matter.  
  12. [29]
    This is not, perhaps, an ideal test, because in a way it assumes that the contribution schedule was just and equitable prior to the relevant change, which may well not be the case on the Fisher approach, particularly if the contribution schedule just followed the interest schedule.  But it certainly has the effect of limiting the right of lot owners to apply to someone to adjust the contribution schedule, which seems to have been the main objective of the 2011 amendments. 
  13. [30]
    The respondent in submissions relied on the decision in McGahey v Body Corporate for Ambience on Burleigh [2012] QCAT 61, as establishing that it was necessary for an applicant for an adjustment to come within the specific provisions of s 47B, what was described as a “trigger”, before s 46A became relevant, and that the latter section did not provide a separate basis for an application to the Tribunal.  I respectfully agree, but that decision offers no general guidance on what will qualify as a material change for the purpose of s 47B(1).  In that case, the change was due to the amalgamation of two lots, where the new lot entitlements were the result of the operation of the Act, and this situation was specifically excluded from being a material change by the exclusion from the example in the definition. 

Background

  1. [31]
    Having determined the test for material change, the next issue is whether the applicant has met that test.  Before considering the basis on which she claims to have met the test, I shall first provide some background to the dispute.  Anchorage One CTS 35311 is located in Palmer Street, Townsville, on the edge of the main restaurant area of that street.  It was registered as a Community Titles Scheme on 18 April 2006, and the current Community Management Statement was registered on 18 May 2006.  It provides that the Accommodation Module applies to the scheme.[17]  The applicant is and has been since 2014 the owner of lot 17, which is set up as a restaurant.  It occupies a separate part of the building, opening on to Palmer Street, and has only one wall in common with the rest of the building. 
  2. [32]
    Lot 1 is used as a Management Office by the company which is the current caretaker.  The remaining lots in the scheme are residential units, most (but not all) of which are leased to a company (“the Operator”), and operated by it as an apartment hotel.[18]  Immediately adjacent to the scheme is another Community Titles Scheme, Anchorage Two CTS 17086, which consists of residential units, all or most of which are also leased to the Operator, and run as part of the hotel.  The caretaker apparently performs that role for both schemes.  It appears that the applicant alleges that that company also manages the hotel business for the Operator, and that it is a subsidiary of the Operator.[19] 
  3. [33]
    Lot 17 has, and always has had, ten entitlements in the contribution schedule, while the other lots in the scheme have twelve each.  The scheme has a pool and the building has a lift, both of which are irrelevant to Lot 17.[20]  That may explain the difference, as the parties suggested, although a more plausible explanation is that it was really because the market value of lot 17 was always lower than that of the other lots.  I note that, in the Community Management Statement, the interest schedule is the same as the contribution schedule.
  4. [34]
    The applicant alleges that the respondent is paying, out of body corporate levies, what should be regarded as expenses of the hotel.  She alleges that the respondent pays for the cable television service to the hotel units (and perhaps also the other accommodation units)[21] and pays for the pest control service and fire service for the hotel units as well as for the common property.  The last expense is greater because it covers a hotel, for which the requirements are more stringent and hence more expensive.  She alleges that lot 17 gets no benefit from the caretaker who in practice manages the hotel business, or the person employed to maintain the hotel units.  The applicant alleges (and the respondent denies) that she painted at her expense the part of the building that is her lot. 
  5. [35]
    One of the obligations of the respondent is to maintain the common area.  Lot 17 faces Palmer Street, but part of the front wall curves around so as to end up at right angles to it.  There is an awning extending out from the building along the curved front and side alignment, and from the time the applicant acquired lot 17 the area under it has been used by the restaurant for outside dining.  The liquor licence permits her to use the relevant land whether part of the common property or Council land, covering the part of the footpath involved, for outdoor dining, and it was used for that purpose until recently.[22] 
  6. [36]
    The applicant has had a long-standing dispute with the respondent about the maintenance of this area.  At one point there was a conciliation agreement between the parties requiring the respondent to do certain work in that area,[23] and on 1 June 2022 an adjudicator appointed under the Act ordered the respondent to restore the paved area to good condition.[24]  The applicant initially alleged that the respondent had not complied with either, but it appears that repairs were effected in October 2022, after the proceeding commenced.  In a proceeding in the District Court the applicant claimed damages from the respondent for failing to maintain this area properly.  It was held that the respondent had breached its duty to maintain the area, and damages were awarded to the applicant.[25]  Overall it appears the relationship between the parties is far from good.[26] 

Applicant’s case on material change

  1. [37]
    The applicant relied on four matters as constituting the significant material change which would enliven the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider an applicant for adjustment under the Act. 
    1. The body corporate had taken on a number of expenses relating to the operation of the accommodation units as body corporate expenses, where these were of no relevance and of no benefit to the applicant’s lot. 
    2. The management office had been extended into the common property, so that expenses of the hotel management had come to be borne by the body corporate, although those expenses were of no relevance to the applicant’s lot.
    3. The respondent had removed the common electricity supply from the applicant’s lot, thus depriving that lot of one of the few benefits it had obtained from the body corporate since its inception. 
    4. The respondent had prohibited the applicant from using an outdoor area adjacent to her lot as an outdoor dining area, which area had been used in this way since the start of the operation of the body corporate. 
  2. [38]
    As to the first, the general meeting of the body corporate in 2007 approved the payment of pest control costs for the entire premises, including the accommodation lots, but not including Lot 17, at the expense of the body corporate.[27]  It is no part of the function of a body corporate to be paying for services such as pest treatments provided to individual lots, although it is able to provide such services in return for proper payment by the owners, which must cover costs.[28]  I note that the Annual Financial Statements for the respondent for the 2021-2 year do not show any entry for payments from lot owners for services provided, although they do include an amount of $4,269.26 for pest control services.[29]  Although the respondent has not admitted that the applicant pays for her own pest control services,[30] what matters is that this is, at least to a significant extent, body corporate expenditure which is of no benefit to the applicant. 
  3. [39]
    An affidavit filed by the respondent said that the current pest control treatment arranged by the respondent includes Lot 17 in theory, but the pest controller did not in fact treat Lot 17 because access to it was unavailable, and the applicant did not respond to a “call back” card.[31]  Four invoices were exhibited, all dated 28 September 2023 and all referring to lots 1 – 17.  This occurred after the present proceeding was commenced.  The respondent said nothing about the position prior to this, so the evidence of the applicant was not contradicted, and there was no evidence of cost recovery by the respondent from the lot owners for any services provided to the other lots.  As well, I cannot see how pest control services can be provided by the respondent to the applicant without her agreement.  No real answer to this allegation has been made by the respondent. 
  4. [40]
    Two of the exhibited invoices relate specifically to “external” work, and I infer that the other two relate to internal work, that is, inspection and treatment inside the accommodation units, including the office of lot 1.  The former is a proper function of the respondent for the benefit of all units; the latter is a service provided to the other lots.  On the basis of the amounts charged in those invoices, approximately 64% of the cost of pest treatment on that occasion related to the internal work in the residential lots. 
  5. [41]
    The next matter relied on was the provision of services in the form of cable (or internet) television to the residential lots.  It is not clear when this started, but there was no provision for it in the 2006-7 budget, so it began after the last Community Management Statement was filed.  In the 2022-3 year the amount spent on the television service was $10,777.80.  Nothing specific was said about this in the respondent’s affidavit, although there was a general statement that “all expenditure [in the 2022-3 statement of income and expenditure] is required and necessary to maintain and upkeep the Complex.” [sic]  I consider that the provision of television to the occupants of the lots other than lot 17 plainly does not meet that description.  Again, no answer to this allegation has been made by the respondent. 
  6. [42]
    The applicant relies on the cost of fire protection services, which has two aspects.  First, that she procures her own fire protection services for lot 17 so does not benefit from this expenditure, and second, because most of the premises are used as a hotel, the cost of such services is higher because of the standards required for premises with that use.  On the face of it the latter should be an expense of the hotel.  The 2022-3 accounts include an amount of $9,176.61 for such services.  The applicant has exhibited an invoice for such services for her lot, and exhibited the statement of income and expenditure for another body corporate with a broadly similar level of expenditure, but with no hotel, where the cost of fire services was $1,852.  The applicant also said that in 2019 there was a special levy imposed to cover the cost of upgrading the fire protection arrangements for the complex, of over $80,000 overall, which related to the requirements of the hotel, but of which she was levied her share. 
  7. [43]
    The evidence of what was spent by the other body corporate is of little weight, and indeed much of what the applicant said about this is not backed up by detail.  There should be some evidence about whether the charges imposed for fire services extend to fire services for individual lots, and whether the charges have been increased by the fact that most of the complex is run as a hotel.  But these are plausible propositions, and again they are entirely uncontradicted by the respondent’s affidavit.  It is a case where little evidence outweighs no evidence, and I accept that most of the fire services charges are of no relevance to the applicant.  In the 2006-7 financial year the budgeted amount for the respondent was $1,200.  That supports an inference that since then the scope of the fire services provided has expanded.  Doing the best I can, I attribute two-thirds of the current expenditure to matters not relevant to the applicant.
  8. [44]
    There is other expenditure for the benefit of the accommodation lots which is paid by the respondent, in particular the pool maintenance, the lift maintenance and the costs of the caretaker.  The by-laws provide expressly that, although the owners and occupiers of lots 1 – 26 have exclusive use of the pool area and that lift, the cost of maintaining and servicing them shall remain a responsibility of the respondent.[32]  The fact that this expenditure is of no relevance to the applicant remains relevant to the application of the just and equitable test, but because this situation was in place when the current Community Management Statement was put in place these expenses cannot contribute to a case that there has been a material change since then, unless it can be shown that something else has changed about them since then.  It just shows that the contribution schedule was not just and equitable from its inception. 
  9. [45]
    In the affidavit filed by the respondent it was said that “at some point in time” the occupier of lot 17 used the lift to deliver meals to rooms.  That, if it occurred, was not inconsistent with the by-law, because lift usage extends to invitees of the occupants of lots 1 – 16, and no doubt meals were not delivered to units unless the occupants of the units had requested them.  The person using the lift for this purpose was doing so in the character of an invitee of the occupant, not as or on behalf of an occupant of lot 17.  I regard any related advantage to lot 17 as incidental and trivial. 
  10. [46]
    The applicant complained that she gets no benefit from the cost of a caretaker for the scheme.  The respondent has exhibited the caretaking agreement made between the respondent and another company, not the current caretaker, on 31 May 2006, which was said to be the current agreement.[33]  That was after (soon after) the Community Management Statement was registered, and I expect was the first such agreement.  The work to be done by the caretaken was set out in the Second Schedule to the agreement; it including keeping clean the barbecue area, doing routine maintenance on the pool, and doing things like maintaining the grounds, and cleaning the common areas.  It does not include providing any services to the owners or occupiers of the lots, or deal with any management of the hotel, or management of a letting business, although the latter was contemplated by the agreement. 
  11. [47]
    The pool and the barbeque are of no relevance to the applicant, but for present purposes what matters is that the same agreement is still in place, even if not with the same caretaking company, so nothing in here can contribute to any material change.  Under the agreement, the remuneration was indexed to inflation, but the term was for ten years from 31 May 2006 and the remuneration might have been adjusted in 2016.  In any case, the payment for caretaking services in 2022-3 was $30,397.60, which is not obviously inconsistent with inflation.  The applicant alleges that the respondent is paying the cost of repairs and maintenance for the hotel units, but there is really no evidence to support this.  The 2022-3 expenditure statement includes only $508.21 for general repairs, which seems appropriate.  There is also an amount of $599.10 for gardening and lawn maintenance, which appears to be covered by clauses 2.1 and 3.2 of the caretaking agreement and so on the face of it should be covered by the payment to the caretaker, but the 2006-7 budget also contained an allowance for gardens and grounds, so this payment cannot contribute to a material change. 
  12. [48]
    The affidavit on behalf of the respondent asserted that lot 17 receives a 43% discount on contribution entitlements, based on the fact that it has a larger floor area than the other lots.  Apart from the fact that this ignores the different nature of lot 17, it is inconsistent with the reasoning in Fisher.  Such an approach is quite wrong.  The deponent also referred to certain practices in relation to body corporate costs as “industry standard”, without providing any basis for why her opinion on such a matter would be deserving of any weight.  There was also evidence from the insurance broker for the respondent, to the effect that most of the cover of the insurance obtained by the body corporate was compulsory for such a body corporate. 
  13. [49]
    The budget in 2006-7 allowed $5,000 for insurance, while in 2022-3 the cost for insurance was $30,111.72 for the building, and $13,224.08 for unspecified insurance.  According to the insurance broker, the cost for insurance for an unspecified period, presumably the period current in October 2023, that a body corporate is required to have was $49,380.52, while the current policy includes non-compulsory items which increased the premium by $2,738.37.[34]  Insurance costs have risen a lot since 2006-7, so the increase is not particularly surprising, and there is no evidence that the non-compulsory items were not taken in 2007, or that the extent of the compulsory items has changed since then.  The applicant did not particularly rely on insurance in her case on material change,[35] and I do not accept that it has contributed to any such change. 
  14. [50]
    The respondent, in a statement of evidence filed on 1 November 2023, said that the applicant gets the benefit of the main building structure because it provides cover for the three car parks allotted to her lot.  No doubt in Townsville a covered car park is better than one without cover, but the building does so much more than this that to allocate more that a slight share of the costs to lot 17 seems to me to be inappropriate.  This is a matter which would have been clarified by the sort of evidence before the court in Fisher (supra). 
  15. [51]
    The applicant also referred to electricity, claiming she receives little or no benefit from the electricity costs for the respondent.  One aspect of this is that the respondent used to provide the electricity for an illuminated sign for the restaurant, but recently cut this off.  In the 2022-3 expenditure statement the electricity cost was $4,491.91, which I suspect includes, and largely consists of, power for the lift and the pool equipment, and $2,109.14 for electrical repairs, which seems a lot.  But the 2006-7 budget had an amount for community power of $8,000, and I suspect that the fact that the applicant is by contributing to this subsidising the other lots does not reflect a change. 
  16. [52]
    The applicant complained of a cost incurred by the respondent of $1,650.40 for “intercom and security” in the 2022-3 year.  This was the first time that item had appeared in the expenditure statements, and it was not in the 2006-7 budget, so it looks to be something new.  The respondent has said nothing about it, and I accept that it is of no relevance to lot 17, so this expenditure does contribute to a material change case.  The applicant also referred to plumbing costs of $4,953.21, which are much larger that the amounts in earlier years, and the budget in 2006-7, but it occurs to me that this sort of expenditure could easily be “lumpy”.  There was some allowance for plumbing in 2006-7, and it would have been helpful if the respondent had condescended to explain this amount, but in the circumstances I am not persuaded that this contributes to a case for material change. 
  17. [53]
    The second matter relied on by the applicant was that the respondent had allowed the construction of an extension of the office of lot 1, in effect as the reception for the hotel business, on the common property, and this was said to have increased the costs of the body corporate because it now had the costs associated with maintaining that extension.  This certainly qualifies as a change, but it is not obvious that it has produced any additional costs for the respondent.  The difficulty I have with this is that there is virtually no material about what this involved, and nothing but the applicant’s bare assertion that it has produced additional costs for the body corporate.  I do not even know when this is supposed to have occurred, so as to see whether anything shows up in the annual accounts to support the allegation of additional costs. 
  18. [54]
    On the face of it, for the Operator to build an office extension on part of the common property next to lot 1 involves blatant disregard of the provisions of the Act and of the Accommodation Module; but it may be difficult to do anything about it.  This is the problem with the system in the Act for Body Corporate governance: it assumes that there can be a functioning democracy with the lot owners, and that does not work where the majority of the voting rights are controlled by a single owner, or bloc of some kind.  There is then great scope for oppression.  I expect in practice the respondent is run by, and perhaps for, the Operator, and potentially it can do what it likes, while disregarding the interests of the applicant, or even deliberately damaging them.  The Act really offers very little protection for dissenting minorities.  The difficulty with the second matter relied on is that the evidence of any real increase in body corporate expenses because of this is absent, and it cannot contribute to a case for a material change. 
  19. [55]
    The next matter relied on is that the respondent in 2016 deprived the applicant of the use of community power for the sign for the restaurant, which had previously been paid for by the respondent, since that was how it was wired.  Again, that was a change, but the difficulty is that I have no material to show the extent to which the value of the benefits to the applicant from the respondent was reduced as a result.  That makes it difficult to take this into account as contributing to a case of material change.  There is also the consideration that this probably also amounted to providing without charge a service for the benefit of the owner of a particular lot, contrary to the provisions referred to earlier.  This does not contribute to the case for material change.
  20. [56]
    The fourth matter relied on was that in 2022 the respondent deprived the applicant of the use of the outdoor eating area, or at least that part of it which was on the common property.[36]  This was a change, and in a sense it was a reduction of the benefit the applicant obtained from the common property, but the difficulty is that it was apparently not a benefit to which the applicant had any legal entitlement.  There was no by-law giving the applicant exclusive use of this part of the common property, nor was there apparently any agreement between the parties to permit some lesser right to use it.  It simply meant that the benefit of her use of this part of the common property in this way ceased.  This was not something which affected the expenditure of the respondent, so it was not something which contributed to the effect of the distribution schedule. 
  21. [57]
    One can say in retrospect that if the applicant, when purchasing lot 17, paid anything for the benefit of the use of this part of the common property, she should have either ensured that there was a legal right to use it, or taken the risk that the ability to use it would be lost.  This is further evidence that there is not a working relationship between the parties, and perhaps a petty revenge by the respondent for the fact that the applicant obtained from an adjudicator the order for the respondent to effect repairs to the area, but it cannot contribute to a case for material change. 
  22. [58]
    It follows that it is only the changes in the provision of services to the residential lots at the expense of all lot owners which can contribute to the applicant’s case for material change.  The ones I accept are:
    1. Internal pest treatments $3,569.12[37]
    2. Provision of television $10,777.80
    3. Additional fire services $6,117.74
    4. Intercom and security $1,650.40
    5. Total $22,115.06
  23. [59]
    This may be compared with the total of the Administrative Fund expenditure for that year of $189,479.93.  That figure needs some consideration, however, because it includes one large item, for legal services of $58,643.05 in that year.  It was $52,668.18 in the previous year.  I expect this related to the proceeding between the parties in the District Court, which culminated in a trial lasting several days.  This was a claim by the respondent for unpaid levies, and a counterclaim by the applicant for damages for failing to maintain the part of the common area used for outdoor dining.  From the reasons for decision it appears that most of the time at the trial was devoted to the counterclaim, on which the applicant was successful on liability but recovered only a limited amount of damages.  I do not know what order was made about costs, but for present purposes what matters is that this level of expenditure is no doubt quite unusual. 
  24. [60]
    That impression is supported by an examination of such of the earlier expenditure statements as are available to me.  It follows that the expenditure of the respondent was inflated atypically in those years, and for the purpose of assessing material change it would not be appropriate to assess the significance of the relevant additional expenditure against total expenditure inflated in this way.  I consider that the total expenditure for the 2022-3 year should be adjusted by reducing the amount for legal services to what may be described as a long term average figure of $5,000.  If that is done, the adjusted total expenditure for the year becomes $135,836.88.[38]  $22,115.06 is 16.3% of $135,836.88. 
  25. [61]
    The question is then whether relevant additional expenditure of 16.3% amounts to a significant effect, so as to produce the result that the changes in the way the respondent has been run since the last time the contribution schedule lot entitlements for the lots in the scheme were decided means that it should be amended.  The word “significant” can have different shades of meaning when used in a statute, and its meaning needs to be understood in the context in which it was used.  As I have said, it is clear from the legislative history that the function of this limitation on the right of a lot owner was to limit the opportunity for applications for adjustment of the contribution schedule to be made, and in particular to prevent repeated applications from being made.  In those circumstances I do not approach the matter on the basis that “significant” just means “not insignificant”, and consider that something more is required.
  26. [62]
    I do not think it is helpful to attempt to express the statutory test in different words; it must be applied as enacted, and is a matter of judgment.  I am not aware of any guidance on this provided by other decisions, and the question becomes whether I consider that the relevant increase in the expenditure can fairly be described as “significant” in its effect.  I find that it can, and that therefore there has been a material change, and the requirement of the Act s 47B(1)(a) has been satisfied.  It is clear that the applicant is the owner of a lot and believes an adjustment is necessary as a result.  It follows that the applicant in this proceeding satisfies the trigger in s 47B(1), and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide her application.  As I have said, that involves applying the “just and equitable” test, as expounded in Fisher. 
  27. [63]
    It is true that the outline of the dispute filed with the application by the applicant did not expressly allege that there had been a material change, but that is not a pleading, and the issue is whether there has in fact been a material change.  I have found that there has.  That is all that is before me, but there are three things which I should say. 
  28. [64]
    The first is that, as I have mentioned, there may be some doubt about whether some of the activities of the respondent, or those running it, have been in accordance with the requirements of the Act and the Accommodation Module.[39]  This is not a matter raised in this proceeding by either party in relation to the issue I have had to decide, I have had no submissions on it, and accordingly I have proceeded on the basis that all expenditure of the respondent has been valid. 
  29. [65]
    The second is that I consider that it would be very helpful for whoever decides the balance of this matter to have some independent expert evidence of the kind led in Fisher as to the extent to which the owner or occupier of lot 17 benefits from any particular part of the respondent’s expenditure. 
  30. [66]
    The third is that it is clear from that decision that any change in the contribution schedule should involve a redrawing of the schedule, not just an adjustment to the figure for lot 17.  In that regard, I note that if that is done there is no requirement that the total number of entitlements in the schedule remains the same.  In view of the terms of the section, it is particularly important for the owners of other lots, particularly the owners of any lots not leased to the Operator, to be given notice of this proceeding, and the opportunity to get involved.  I will therefore give a direction that copies of my decision and reasons be provided to the owners of all other lots in the Scheme. 
  31. [67]
    The applicant was not legally represented before me but may have had some legal assistance in relation to this matter.  I will receive submissions as to costs.  There does not appear to have been an application by the respondent for the proceeding to be struck out for want of jurisdiction, so there is no such application to dismiss. 

Footnotes

[1]  For convenience I shall refer to Ms Huang as the applicant and to the Body Corporate as the respondent. 

[2]  See the Act s 2. 

[3]  It also determines the voting rights at meetings of the body corporate. 

[4]  The Act s 47A, also inserted in 2011.  Even then, there is a mechanism by which a lot owner can challenge the effect of the amendment: the Act s 47AA. 

[5]  See Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (10th Ed 2024) para 6.13. 

[6]  Hence the provision for an application under s 47B(2)(a), quoted earlier. 

[7]  Hence the exclusion of subdivision and amalgamation from the examples in the definition of “material change”.  Note that if subdivision involves the addition of a subsidiary scheme it is excluded from the exclusion, and s 51B does not apply, as is also the case if the subdivision is part of a scheme intended to be developed progressively: s 51B(2)(a).  That is excluded by paragraph two of the definition, unless the developer strays away from what was proposed by way of progressive development. 

[8]  The Act s 85, s 91. 

[9]  Lim, A, History of Community Titles Legislation in Queensland, at documents.parliament.qld.gov.au.

[10]  McPherson JA and Atkinson J – a strong Court. 

[11]  I do not know if it was a selling point for the more desirable, and hence the more expensive, units that they received in this way a greater interest in the common property, and more voting power. 

[12]  A Lim, supra, at p 19. 

[13]  I expect developers also resented the revelation that contribution schedules they had devised had not been fair and equitable. 

[14] Body Corporate and Community Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Qld) s 41.  Discussed in A Lim, supra, at pp 21, 22. 

[15]  The Body Corporate and Community Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 (Qld), passed following a change in government. 

[16]  The reversal of the reversion generated a good deal of heat in some quarters: see Williams v Body Corporate for Magic Mountain Apartment Two [2013] QCATA 217. 

[17]  The applicant claimed that her lot falls under the Commercial Module: Affidavit 1, paragraph 3.  But as I read the document, the Accommodation Module applies to all the lots in the scheme.

[18]  The applicant alleged inn the application that the leases were to StayWell Holdings Pty Ltd, as do the Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the respondent for 2019.  In a statement of evidence filed 1 November 2023, the respondent said that the lessee was Park Regis Townsville Pty Ltd. 

[19]  There is some correspondence in the material suggesting that the person in charge on site is managing the hotel, as the applicant has been asked to communicate with the respondent’s management company, Body Corporate Services (Qld) Pty Ltd instead.  

[20]  Indeed, By-law 23 gives all lots except 17 exclusive use of the pool and surrounds. 

[21]  The respondent in the Response admitted that cable TV was provided to 27 rooms in the scheme, and 18 rooms in the adjacent Anchorage Two, and that pest control treatments are provided to both schemes regularly. 

[22]  Affidavit 1 Exhibit p 12, 13.  The respondent has now banned her from using this area, on the basis that she has no documentary entitlement to use it.  It is certainly not a part of the common property for the exclusive use of lot 17.  There is such a part, but it is a small area of land between the western wall of the lot and the boundary fence: By-law 24; area B on plan, affidavit of Born filed 1 November 2023, Exhibit p 9. 

[23]  Affidavit 1 Exhibit p 30.

[24]  Affidavit 1 Exhibit p 31, 

[25] Body Corporate for the Anchorage One CTS 35311 v Huang [2024] QDC 60.  See [235]. 

[26]  See also ibid [231]. 

[27]  As appears from an extract from the Minutes of that meeting, resolutions 10 and 11. 

[28]  The Act s 158; Accommodation Module s 200(3). 

[29]  The position in the 2022-3 financial statements was similar, although the pest control costs had risen to $5,576.75: Affidavit of applicant filed 4 October 2023 (“Affidavit 1”) Exhibit YH p 17. 

[30]  Response para 19(a).  The applicant has exhibited invoices, and there is no reason to doubt her evidence that she pays for this herself. 

[31]  Affidavit of Born filed 1 November 2023, para 18. 

[32]  By-laws 23, 26. 

[33]  Presumably the agreement has since been assigned, possibly more than once, to the current company.

[34]  Affidavit of Born, Exhibit. 

[35]  The applicant has a complaint that people associated with the respondent obstructed her claim for loss of rental following floods in Townsville, but that is not relevant to the issue before me. 

[36]  Letter from the respondent’s lawyers to the applicant dated 29 June 2022. 

[37]  64% of the figure for pest control in the 2022-3 expenditure statement. 

[38]  $$189,479.93 - $58,643.05 + $5,000.

[39]  See also Cathedral Place Community Body Corporate v The Proprietors Cathedral Village BUP 106957 [2020] QCA 239 at [65], and see [26] – [32].  That case involved different legislation, but dealing with a similar issue. 

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Huang v Body Corporate for Anchorage One CTS 35311

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Huang v Body Corporate for Anchorage One CTS 35311

  • MNC:

    [2024] QCAT 381

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Judicial Member D J McGill SC

  • Date:

    11 Oct 2024

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2024] QCAT 38111 Oct 2024Proceedings for adjustment of lot entitlements: Judicial Member McGill SC.
Notice of Appeal FiledFile Number: CA 15261/2408 Nov 2024Application filed.
Appeal Determined (QCA)[2025] QCA 8427 May 2025Leave to appeal granted; appeal dismissed: Freeburn J (Flanagan and Bradley JJA agreeing).

Appeal Status

Appeal Determined (QCA)

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Body Corporate for The Anchorage One v Huang [2024] QDC 60
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QDC 60
Cite 2 - [2024] QDC 60
Cathedral Place Community Body Corporate v The Proprietors Cathedral Village BUP 106957(2020) 6 QR 211; [2020] QCA 239
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QCA 239
Fischer v Body Corporate for Centrepoint Community Title Scheme 7779[2004] 2 Qd R 638; [2004] QCA 214
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] QCA 214
Cite 2 - [2004] QCA 214
Franklin v Body Corporate for La Porte D'Or [2004] QDC 154
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] QDC 154
Cite 2 - [2004] QDC 154
McGahey and Anor v Body Corporate for Ambience on Burleigh CTS 37449 [2012] QCAT 61
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCAT 61
Cite 2 - [2012] QCAT 61
Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Condah Bay Investments Pty Ltd [2003] QDC 438
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QDC 438
Cite 2 - [2003] QDC 438
Williams v Body Corporate for Magic Mountain Apartments Two [2013] QCATA 217
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCATA 217

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Body Corporate for Anchorage One CTS 35311 v Huang [2025] QCA 84 2 citations
1

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