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Southern Cross Educational Enterprises Ltd t/a Redwood College v Non-State Schools Accreditation Board (Costs)[2024] QCAT 529

Southern Cross Educational Enterprises Ltd t/a Redwood College v Non-State Schools Accreditation Board (Costs)[2024] QCAT 529

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Southern Cross Educational Enterprises Ltd t/a Redwood College v Non-State Schools Accreditation Board (Costs) [2024] QCAT 529

PARTIES:

SOUTHERN CROSS EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES LTD TRADING AS REDWOOD COLLEGE

(applicant)

v

NON-STATE SCHOOLS ACCREDITATION BOARD

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO:

GAR309-19

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

20 November 2024

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Scott-Mackenzie

ORDER:

The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the standard basis from 20 August 2021 to be assessed on the District Court of Queensland scale of costs.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – costs – where applicant gave the respondent a show cause notice under section 67(2) of the Education (Accreditation of Non-State Schools) Act 2017 (Qld) – where joint expert report – where applicant reconsidered the original decision and confirmed the decision – where applicant again reconsidered the original decision and set aside the decision – whether the interests of justice require an order for costs – whether the respondent’s conduct of the proceeding justifies or requires an award of costs on an indemnity basis

Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Act 2003 (Qld) (repealed), s 70, s 71

Education (Accreditation of Non-State Schools) Act 2017 (Qld), s 67, s 71, s 72, s 100

Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld), s 58, s 59

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 23, s 32, s 43, s 70, s 71, s 100, s 102, s 107

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), r 86, r 87

Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Shi (2021) 273 CLR 235

du Toit v Health Ombudsman [No. 2] [2024] QCAT 205

DYH v Public Guardian (No. 3) [2022] NSWCATAP 413

Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2023] QCATA 97

Health Ombudsman v du Toit [2024] QCA 235

Legal Services Commissioner v Bone [2014] QCA 179

LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo [2013] QCA 305

Marzini v Health Ombudsman (No. 4) [2020] QCAT 365

Medical Board of Queensland v Heiner [2008] QHPT 001

Pound v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2023] QCAT 298

Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No. 2) [2010] QCAT 412

Scaniainventor v Commissioner of Patents (1981) 36 ALR 101

Staples v McCall (1989) 98 FLR 152

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362

Tamawood Ltd & Anor v Paans [2005] QCA 111

Taylor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 319

White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) [1998] FCA 806

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This application was decided on the papers pursuant to section 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Application

  1. [1]
    The applicant (College) has made application to the Tribunal for an order requiring the respondent (Board) to pay the College’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding (College’s application for costs). The application is made under section 102(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act).

Background

  1. [2]
    On 2 November 2018 the Board gave to the College a show cause notice under section 67(2) of the Education (Accreditation of Non-State Schools) Act 2017 (Qld) (Accreditation Act). The notice stated the Board reasonably believes grounds exist to cancel the College’s accreditation for primary and secondary education.
  2. [3]
    On 3 December 2018 the College made written representations about the show cause notice to the Board.
  3. [4]
    On about 21 May 2019 the Board received a written report from authorised persons, provided under section 72 of the Accreditation Act.
  4. [5]
    On 9 July 2019 the Board, after considering the representations and report, still believed grounds existed to cancel the accreditation and believed the cancellation of the accreditation is warranted. It decided to cancel the accreditation under section 71(3) of the Accreditation Act (original decision).
  5. [6]
    On 6 August 2019 the College made application to the Tribunal to review the original decision (College’s application to review the original decision).
  6. [7]
    On about 20 August 2021 a joint expert report was filed in the Tribunal and delivered to the parties.
  7. [8]
    The Tribunal, on 23 December 2021, under section 23(1) of the QCAT Act, invited the Board to reconsider the original decision. It did so and confirmed the decision.
  8. [9]
    The College’s application to review the original decision was fixed for hearing by the Tribunal on 20 and 21 June 2022. The dates were vacated. It was then fixed for hearing on 6 and 7 March 2023, but once again those dates were vacated.
  9. [10]
    The Board, on 14 June 2023, was again invited by the Tribunal to reconsider the original decision. It did so and set aside the decision.
  10. [11]
    On 30 June 2023 the College filed in the Tribunal a notice of withdrawal of the College’s application to review the original decision.

Legislative framework

  1. [12]
    Division 6 of Chapter 2 of the QCAT Act provides for the costs of the parties to a proceeding before the Tribunal. Sections 100 and 102 provide:
  1. 100
    Each party usually bears own costs

Other than as provided under this Act or an enabling Act, each party to a proceeding must bear the party’s own costs for the proceeding.

  1. 101
    ...
  2. 102
    Costs against party in interests of justice
  1. (1)
    The Tribunal may make an order requiring a party to a proceeding to pay all or a stated part of the costs of another party to the proceeding if the Tribunal considers the interests of justice require it to make the order.
  2. (2)
    However, the only costs the Tribunal may award under subsection (1) against a party to a proceeding for a minor civil dispute are the costs stated in the rules as costs that may be awarded for minor civil disputes under this section.
  3. (3)
    In deciding whether to award costs under subsection (1) or (2) the Tribunal may have regard to the following:
  1. (a)
    whether a party to a proceeding is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceeding, including as mentioned in section 48(1)(a) to (g);
  2. (b)
    the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding;
  3. (c)
    the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties to the proceeding;
  4. (d)
    for a proceeding for the review of a reviewable decision:
  1. (i)
    whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the decision; and
  2. (ii)
    whether the applicant genuinely attempted to enable and help the decision-maker to make the decision on the merits;
  1. (e)
    the financial circumstances of the parties to the proceeding;
  2. (f)
    anything else the Tribunal considers relevant.
  1. [13]
    Section 105 contains a further power to award costs. It provides:

The rules may authorise the tribunal to award costs in other circumstances, including, for example, the payment of costs in a proceeding if an offer to settle the dispute the subject of the proceeding has been made but not accepted.

  1. [14]
    The Tribunal must fix the costs, if possible.[1] If it is not possible to fix the costs having regard to the nature of the proceeding, the Tribunal may make an order requiring that the costs be assessed under the rules.[2] The rules may provide that costs must be assessed by reference to a scale under the rules applying to a court.[3]
  2. [15]
    Rule 86 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Rules) contains a power to award costs if an offer to settle is rejected, in the following terms:
  1. (1)
    This rule applies if:
  1. (a)
    a party to a proceeding, other than a proceeding for a minor civil dispute, makes another party to the proceeding a written offer to settle the dispute the subject of the proceeding; and
  2. (b)
    the other party does not accept the offer within the time the offer is open; and
  3. (c)
    in the opinion of the tribunal, the decision of the tribunal in the proceeding is not more favourable to the other party than the offer.
  1. (2)
    The tribunal may award the party who made the offer all reasonable costs incurred by that party in conducting the proceeding after the offer was made.
  2. (3)
    If a proceeding involves more than 2 parties, this rule applies only if the acceptance of the offer would have resulted in the settlement of the matters in dispute between all the parties.
  3. (4)
    In deciding whether a decision is or is not more favourable to a party than an offer, the tribunal must:
  1. (a)
    take into account any costs it would have awarded on the date the offer was given to the other party; and
  2. (b)
    disregard any interest or costs it awarded relating to any period after the date the offer was given to the other party.
  1. [16]
    Rule 87 of the QCAT Rules provides for how costs are to be assessed under section 107 of the QCAT Act if the Tribunal makes a costs order that requires the costs be assessed under the Rules. The costs must be assessed by an assessor appointed by the Tribunal and, if the Tribunal directs the costs be assessed by reference to a scale of costs applying to a court, by reference to the scale of costs directed by the Tribunal.[4]

Submissions

College’s submissions on costs

  1. [17]
    The College filed written submissions with its application for costs (College’s submissions on costs). Additionally, it relies on the following material:
    1. College’s application for costs;
    2. affidavit of Kyra Ng sworn 24 July 2023 (Ms Ng’s affidavit);
    3. affidavit of Petrus Johannes Slabbert Pretorius sworn 24 July 2023 (Mr Pretorius’ affidavit); and
    4. College’s outline of submissions dated 11 March 2022 (College’s outline of submissions).
  2. [18]
    The College, in its submissions on costs, submits it has been wholly successful in the proceeding, the Board having decided to set aside the original decision about three weeks before the dates fixed for the hearing of the proceeding. Earlier, in about February 2022, the Board was offered an opportunity to reconsider the decision and decided to confirm the decision.
  3. [19]
    The Board, it is submitted by the College, was without any additional or different material when reconsidering the original decision in June 2023 to that in its possession when it reconsidered the decision in February 2022.
  4. [20]
    The submissions refer to paragraphs [21]-[29] of the decision of the Tribunal in Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No.2)[5]. There, the then President of the Tribunal, Wilson J, after referring to the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Tamawood Ltd & Anor v Paans[6] on the power to award costs in sections 70 and 71 of the repealed Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Act 2003 (Qld) (CCT Act), his Honour said the following about the power to order costs in section 102(1) of the QCAT Act:
  1. 28.Under that subsection QCAT has a discretion to make a costs order ‘... if the tribunal considers the interests of justice require it ...’. Section 102(3) says that, in deciding whether to award costs, the tribunal may have regard to matters not dissimilar to those set out in s 71 of the CCT Act including, in particular for present purposes, the nature and complexity of the dispute and the relative strength of each party’s claims.
  2. 29.Under the QCAT Act the question that will usually arise in each case in which costs are sought is whether the circumstances relevant to the discretion inherent in the phrase ‘the interests of justice’ point so compellingly to a costs award that they overcome the strong contra-indication against costs orders in s 100.
  1. [21]
    The submissions then address the matters the Tribunal may have regard to in section 102(3) of the QCAT Act.

Disadvantage to the College (section 102(3)(a) of the QCAT Act)

  1. [22]
    The Board, it is submitted, acted in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the College by prolonging the proceeding when it had an opportunity to resolve it at an earlier point in time. Dr Tracy McAskill, an expert in school curricula, conducted a review of the College’s educational programme and, on 18 February 2020, provided a report. The Board’s authorised persons disputed the report.
  2. [23]
    On 20 August 2021 a joint expert report was filed in the Tribunal. The Board’s experts, it is said, identified three relatively minor areas of non-compliance in the College’s educational programme. Dr McAskill continued to maintain the programme was compliant.
  3. [24]
    The parties met on 15 November 2021. Subsequently, the College’s lawyers sent to the Board a letter setting out why the cancellation of accreditation was not the correct and preferable decision. The letter included a proposal for resolving the differences of opinion of the parties.
  4. [25]
    On 22 December 2021 the Tribunal invited the Board to reconsider its decision. It did so and, on 7 February 2022, informed the Tribunal and College it had confirmed the original decision.
  5. [26]
    Further correspondence passed between the parties.
  6. [27]
    On 11 March 2022 the College filed in the Tribunal the College’s outline of submissions.
  7. [28]
    The proceeding was fixed for hearing by the Tribunal on 10 and 11 July 2023. On 14 June 2023, following correspondence between the parties, the Tribunal again invited the Board to reconsider the original decision. It did so and decided to set aside the decision.
  8. [29]
    The joint expert report, provided to the parties in August 2021, it is submitted, established that “… the numerous areas of non-compliance upon which (the original decision) was based, had to a large extent, evaporated.” It is further submitted the Board, when it reconsidered the original decision in February 2022, had in its possession all the relevant evidence and information upon which to decide. No further or fresh information was filed in the Tribunal between 7 February 2022 and 9 June 2023.
  9. [30]
    Because of the Board’s intransience, it is submitted, the College has incurred significant costs and has been disadvantaged by a delay in obtaining the decision it sought for more than three years.

Complexity of the dispute (section 102(3)(b) of the QCAT Act)

  1. [31]
    The College submits that both the subject matter and its relevant evidence, and the statutory structure against which the question ought to be assessed, are complex and required significant preparation by the College and its lawyers.

Relative strengths of the claims (section 102(3)(c) of the QCAT Act)

  1. [32]
    The Board, it is submitted, ought to have known by August 2021, when the joint expert report was provided to the parties, it did not have a strong case.

Whether the College was afforded natural justice and genuinely attempted to enable and help the decision-maker (section 102(3)(d) of the QCAT Act)

  1. [33]
    The College concedes that it was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the original decision.
  2. [34]
    It submits it genuinely sought to address the Board’s concerns and explain why the Board’s experts and the Board had reached the wrong conclusions.

Financial circumstances of the parties (section 102(3)(e) of the QCAT Act)

  1. [35]
    The Board is a State funded authority, with sufficient resources to meet its legal costs, it is submitted.
  2. [36]
    The College is funded by government grants and subsidised fee payments by students’ families.

Anything else (section 102(3)(f) of the QCAT Act)

  1. [37]
    The College submits Ms Ng’s affidavit shows it made, “… somewhat strenuous efforts … to explore a resolution of the matter, notwithstanding that it disputed the findings of the (Board) in its original decision.” It incurred considerable costs to obtain the services of Dr McAskill and provide a report to the Board for its consideration, it is further submitted.
  2. [38]
    The College, after setting out reasons why it should be awarded costs, asks that the Tribunal order that the Board pay its costs, to be assessed on the standard basis, from 6 August 2019 until 19 August 2021. Additionally, it asks that the Tribunal order that the Board pay its costs, to be assessed on an indemnity basis, from 20 August 2021, the date on which the joint expert report was provided to the parties, until 30 June 2023, alternatively from 25 November 2021, the date by which the College’s lawyers afforded the Board a proper and fulsome opportunity to reconsider its position, until 30 June 2023.
  3. [39]
    A chronology of what is described as critical dates is annexure A to the submissions. It is reproduced in the schedule to these reasons for decision.

Mr Pretorius’ affidavit

  1. [40]
    Mr Pretorius is a director of the College. He exhibits to his affidavit a copy of the College’s representations about the show cause notice.
  2. [41]
    He sets out what he describes as the financial status of the College. The legal costs incurred by the College in the proceeding, he swears, are currently $297,751.25.

Ms Ng’s affidavit

  1. [42]
    Ms Ng is a solicitor employed by the College’s lawyers. She has the conduct of the proceeding on behalf of the College.
  2. [43]
    She deposes to the steps taken by the parties in the proceeding, exhibiting to the affidavit the relevant correspondence between the parties. She sets out in a table, in paragraph 37 of the affidavit, the cost and disbursements incurred by the College in the periods specified. The table is reproduced below:

Time period

Solicitors’ fees & outlays

Expert witness’ fees

Counsel’s fees

6/8/19 - 20/8/21

$22,576.25

$167,970.00

$33,990.00

21/8/21 - 24/11/21

$1,760.00

$1,925.00

25/11/21 - 30/6/23

$35,749.01

$33,781.00

Total

$60,085.25

$167,970.00

$69,696.00

$297,751.25

Board’s submissions on costs

  1. [44]
    The Board’s submissions on costs are divided into parts, as follows:
  1. A.Overview
  2. B.Applicable principles
  3. C.Submissions
  4. D.Conclusion.
  1. [45]
    Part C is divided into sub-parts, as follows:
  1. C1.Steps taken to become compliant
  2. C2.Date by which the College became arguably compliant
  3. C3.No impropriety of the kind the application alleges
  4. C4.Costs incurred before and after date of compliance
  1. –Costs incurred before 22 February 2022
  2. –Costs incurred after 22 February 2022
  3. –The expert’s costs
  1. [46]
    Part A of the submissions contains an overview of the Board’s submissions. It reads:
  1. 1.The respondent's submissions are that:
  1. (a)
    when the applicant began the review proceeding, it was not compliant with the requirements of its accreditation and the respondent was correct to decide to cancel it;
  2. (b)
    after commencing review proceedings, the college spent significant sums of money on independent consultants who improved its educational programs to ensure it became compliant with the requirements of its accreditation;
  3. (c)
    because of that, the respondent withdrew its decision;
  4. (d)
    the applicant then withdrew its application for review;
  5. (e)
    the applicant did not enjoy “success” - it did not conclude its application with the college in the same factual state as when the applicant began its application, instead the applicant overhauled the college’s educational program to bring about a different circumstance from what had confronted the respondent when it made its decision;
  6. (f)
    the respondent has, effectively, discharged its statutory function to monitor and ensure compliance with the requirements of accreditation of a non-state school, under the Education (Accreditation of Non-State Schools) Act 2017.
  1. 2.Any delay in the part of the respondent in withdrawing its decision visited minimal real prejudice on the applicant, and it is explicable by the delay in this matter coming on for final hearing.
  2. 3.The interests of justice do not call from a departure from the “default position” that each party should bear its own costs.
  1. [47]
    The Board sets out its submissions on what it says are the applicable principles to be applied by the Tribunal in deciding the application for costs. Reference is made to the decision of the Tribunal in Ralacom, at [21]-[29], and the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Tamawood, at [23].
  2. [48]
    The Board submits the costs incurred by the College were necessary costs of making itself compliant with the requirements of its accreditation. It expands on the submission, drawing attention to statements filed by the College in the proceeding.
  3. [49]
    Dr McAskill, it is submitted, was asked to “… provide advice to the College to improve aspects of its education delivery …” She conducted a one-day workshop with College staff and the College, the submissions continue, “… made a number of changes on Dr McAskill’s advice …”
  4. [50]
    The Board’s experts, in the joint expert report, accepted the College had become compliant in respect of one of the areas in which, in their opinion, it had not been compliant. Notwithstanding, they adhered to their opinion about other non-compliances.
  5. [51]
    The Board submits that, for the sake of the present argument, the Tribunal may proceed on the basis the College became compliant, and the Board ought to have accepted it had done so, by February 2022. It is incorrect to say the College was always compliant, the Board submits. The original decision was correct, the Board submits, evidenced by the following:
    1. the College sought the help of independent consultants to advise it about its operations;
    2. those consultants advised the College about necessary improvements;
    3. the College made changes to its operations;
    4. the respondent’s experts’ opinion changed about some (but not all) aspects of the College’s non-compliance;
    5. such non-compliance as the respondent continues to believe remains, does not justify cancellation of the applicant’s accreditation.
  6. [52]
    The allegation of impropriety on the part of the Board is rejected.
  7. [53]
    In relation to the costs incurred before 20 February 2022, the Board submits:
    1. it voluntarily incurred them, by starting proceedings and choosing to be represented by lawyers;
    2. its need to incur the costs of (at least some, if not all of) its independent expert was clear, given that it made changes to its educational programs upon the experts’ advice;
    3. those changes led to the respondent’s expert changing its opinion on one of the grounds of non-compliance;
    4. the respondent was discharging its statutory role, for the public benefit, by ensuring that the applicant (the provider of a non-state school) did not provide education to children in a manner that did not comply with the requirements of its accreditation.
  8. [54]
    In relation to the costs incurred after 22 February 2022, the Board submits only a relatively small proportion of the costs could have been avoided had the Board decided to withdraw the original decision on 22 February 2022.
  9. [55]
    The Board draws attention to the quantum of the expert’s fees.

College’s submissions on costs in reply

  1. [56]
    The College asserts in its submissions on costs in reply nothing stated by the Board about the principles applicable to the Tribunal deciding the application for costs is controversial.
  2. [57]
    It disputes the Board’s assertion the costs incurred were to render its educational programme compliant. The depth of Dr McAskill’s investigations, it is submitted, was necessary due to the broad and numerous deficiencies asserted by the Board in the original decision. “These were not, as asserted by the respondent, attributable to the improvement of Redwood College’s educational program, but directed towards properly informing the Tribunal to assist its decision.” The College, it is conceded, did make changes to various aspects of its school operations.
  3. [58]
    From at least February 2020, it is submitted, deeply researched expert evidence before the Tribunal showed the College’s educational programme was compliant.
  4. [59]
    The Board’s experts, in the joint expert report, found only three factual areas of non-compliance, as follows:
  1. (a)
    reference to the concept of Creation in the Year 10 Science programme;
  2. (b)
    use of PACEs in Year 2 Mathematics; and
  3. (c)
    use of PACEs in Year 2 English.
  1. [60]
    Contrary to the Board submissions, it is said, by 20 August 2021 it should have realised the cancellation of the College’s accreditation was no longer, “… the correct and preferable decision …”
  2. [61]
    The two important stages of the proceeding, it is submitted, are:
  1. (a)
    February 2020 when Dr McAskill provided a report to the parties; and
  2. (b)
    August 2021 when the joint expert report was provided to the parties.
  • [62]
    Dr McAskill, it is submitted, was required to carry out an in-depth analysis of the College’s educational programme. Also, she was required to embark on a lengthy and necessarily detailed joint report process, involving two experts appointed by the Board. Her efforts, it is asserted, have assisted the Tribunal and the parties.

    • Consideration

    Party and party costs

    1. [63]
      As I observed in Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission[7], there are two lines of authority on the approach to be adopted by the Tribunal in deciding an application for costs under section 102 of the QCAT Act. The first, or traditional, approach is that articulated by the then President of the Tribunal, Wilson J, in Ralacom. His Honour, at [4] and [5], said:
    1. 1.The starting point concerning costs in QCAT is that each party must bear its own: QCAT Act, s 100. This presumption may, however, be displaced if the Tribunal considers it in the interests of justice to order a party to pay all or part of the costs of another party: s 102(1). The phrase “in the interests of justice” is not defined in the Act but is to be construed according to its ordinary and plain meaning, which obviously confers a broad discretionary power on the decision-maker.
    2. 2.In determining whether it is in the interests of justice to award costs against another party the Tribunal may have regard to the nature and complexity of the dispute; the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties; and, whether a party has acted in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party: QCAT Act, s 102(3).

    (Citation omitted)

    1. [64]
      Later, his Honour added:

    Under the QCAT Act the question that will usually arise in each case in which costs are sought is whether the circumstances relevant to the discretion inherent in the phrase ‘the interests of justice’ point so compellingly to a costs award that they overcome the strong contra-indication against costs orders in s 100.[8]

    1. [65]
      The second, or more recent approach, is that sections 100 and 102 of the QCAT Act should be read together. In Marzini v Health Ombudsman (No. 4)[9], Judicial Member McGill SC, after reviewing the decided cases on the operation of sections 100 and 102 of the QCAT Act, in detail, summarised his conclusion on the correct approach to the operation of sections 100 and 102 in the following terms:
    1. [36]
      In my opinion the correct approach to the operations of s 100 and s 102 of the QCAT Act is similar to that formulated by the Hon P Lyons QC in Thompson v Cannon (supra): The ultimate question posed by the statutory provisions is whether in a particular case the interests of justice require the Tribunal to make a costs order. That is the effect of the terms of the statute. Because of the use in s 102(1) of the word “require”, the default position of no order as to costs should not be too readily departed from. I respectfully agree with the approach of the Hon J B Thomas QC in Lee (supra) to the comments of Keane JA in Tamawood (supra), and with his analysis of the considerations relevant to the interests of justice in disciplinary proceedings in Antley (supra).
    2. [37]
      I do not consider that there is any justification in the words of the statute for any further constraint on the operation of the power to order costs under s 102, although the section directs attention to a number of matters which may in a particular case be usefully considered. The reference to “any other matter the Tribunal considers relevant” shows that this list is not to be read in a confining sense. One matter which is relevant is that this proceeding is one where there was a right to legal representation.
    1. [66]
      The correct approach was put to rest in the recent decision of Queensland Court of Appeal in Health Ombudsman v du Toit[10], an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in relation to an order for costs.
    2. [67]
      The respondent applied to the Tribunal for a review of a decision of the appellant to take immediate registration action against him under sections 58 and 59(4) of the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) (HO Act) by imposing conditions on his registration as a specialist in gynaecology and obstetrics. The hearing before the Tribunal included five days of oral testimony from the respondent, expert witnesses for both the appellant and respondent, and 12,000 pages of evidence. The parties were represented by senior and junior counsel.
    3. [68]
      The Tribunal was not satisfied the evidence established the respondent was a serious risk to patients. It ordered that the decision of the appellant be set aside, and the respondent be allowed to return to clinical practice in Queensland.
    4. [69]
      The respondent applied to the Tribunal for a costs order. It held:

    In this case, the [respondent] was entitled to legal representation to assist him to litigate a complex matter. He was successful. There can be no criticism of him pursuing his rights and despite the spirited defence of the [appellant’s] decision up to and including the Tribunal hearing, I cannot find the countervailing considerations sufficient to say it is not in the interests of justice to award the applicant costs.[11]

    1. [70]
      The language of sections 100 and 102 of the QCAT Act, the Court of Appeal held, is to be construed in the context of the Act as a whole, citing the observations of Gageler J (as the Chief Justice then was) in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[12], at [37]. An important contextual consideration in construing section 100, the Court continued, is that the Tribunal, in the exercise of its jurisdictions, deals with a multiplicity of matters which vary in nature, both in terms of complexity and the seriousness of the outcomes. When section 100 is construed in this context, it is a provision of general application which is to be applied to a multiplicity of matters that fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
    2. [71]
      The Court drew attention to section 43(1) of the QCAT Act providing that the main purpose of the section is to have the parties represent themselves unless the interests of justice require otherwise, and the similarity of the language in the subsection to that in section 102(1), ‘the interests of justice require’.
    3. [72]
      The Court then referred to the four circumstances in which a party may be represented in a proceeding, including if the party has been given leave by the Tribunal to be represented. Both parties were entitled to be represented, recognising the serious nature of disciplinary action. Even if the respondent did not have an express right to be represented under section 42(2)(b)(ii), the circumstances identified in sections 43(3)(a) and (b), the Court held, would have supported a grant of leave under section 43(3). Sections 100 and 102, the Court added, should therefore be construed in the context that section 43(2) gives a limited class of persons, including parties involved in disciplinary action, an entitlement to be represented.
    4. [73]
      The Court continued:

    Another important consideration in construing ss 100 and 102 is that the usual rule in s 100 is made subject to other provisions of the QCAT Act by use of the words “[o]ther than as provided under this Act”. The usual rule in s 100 is therefore expressly made subject to s 102. Section 102 gives to the Tribunal a discretion to make a costs order other than that contemplated by s 100. The discretion under s 102(1) is wide. The fact that there is a discretion is indicated by the use of the word “may”. The width of the discretion is apparent from the use of general terms such as “if the Tribunal considers” and “the interests of justice require”. With respect to what constitutes “the interests of justice”, this will vary according to the circumstances of each case. As it has been judicially considered, however, the term is capable of wide application.

    (Citation omitted)

    1. [74]
      The Court of Appeal then considered the meaning of the term ‘interests of justice’, referring to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Shi[13], the Federal Court of Australia in Staples v McCall[14] and the Federal Court in Taylor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[15]. In the latter case, French J (as his Honour then was) said:

    The ‘interests of justice’ is a wide term. It can encompass a circumstance in which, regardless of the merits of his appeal, the significance of the outcome to an appellant and perhaps to third parties such as family members is such that the appellant should be afforded every opportunity to properly present his or her case and should have legal representation for that purpose. That does not mean that if the legal representation is unavailable the litigation must come to a halt. It may be that, if in the end, no pro bono practitioner is found who is willing to act then the appellant would have to represent himself.

    1. [75]
      In Scaniainventor v Commissioner of Patents[16], the Full Court of the Federal Court observed:

    The word ‘required’ has a wide range of meanings, as reference to the dictionaries and the many decided cases attest.

    1. [76]
      After referring to the ‘wide range of circumstances’ identified in section 102(3) of the QCAT Act and the explanatory notes to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Bill 2009 (Qld), the Court in du Toit, at [44], continued:

    In the present case, both parties accept that the nature of the review proceedings were complex, such that it necessitated the need for both parties to be represented. In these circumstances, the QCAT Act contemplates a readiness to depart from the general position of minor civil disputes which ordinarily confront the Tribunal, in favour of an approach more aligned with conventional litigation.

    1. [77]
      The Court, after returning to the explanatory notes, and referring to the second reading speech, observed its construction of sections 100 and 102 of the QCAT Act is consistent with that adopted by Judicial Member McGill SC in Marzini, at [36] and [37].[17]
    2. [78]
      The Court referred to the decision of Keane JA (as his Honour then was) in Tamawood, at [30]-[33], observing what was said was in a different but broadly similar statutory context.
    3. [79]
      The appellant in du Toit relied on the following passage from the judgement of Wilson J in Ralacom, at [29]:

    Under the QCAT Act the question that will usually arise in each case in which costs are sought is whether the circumstances relevant to the discretion inherent in the phrase ‘the interests of justice’ point so compellingly to a costs award that they overcome the strong contra-indication against costs orders in s 100.

    1. [80]
      There are a number of difficulties with it doing so, the Court of Appeal held, adopting what was said by Judicial Member McGill SC in Marzini, at [17]:

    The formulation of A Wilson J has subsequently been widely accepted as stating the correct approach to these provisions, but the wording is curious. There is nothing in the terms of s 100 to show a ‘strong contra-indication’ against costs orders. Leaving aside the reference to a provision of another Act, when s 100 and s 102 are read together, the position is that no order for costs is to be made unless the Tribunal considers the interests of justice require it to do so. This is in essence the interpretation attributed to the terms of the earlier Act in Tamawood at [28]. The QCAT Act provisions could have been drafted to entrench that approach. The terms of the sections make it clear that the starting point is that no order for costs is to be made, but authorises a costs order if the interest of justice require it. The use of the word ‘require’ suggests that the interests of justice must clearly support a costs order; but to say that they must do so ‘compellingly’, and to treat s 100 as having ‘a strong contra-indication against costs orders’, is to read into the statutory discretion restrictions which are not based on the terms of the Act.

    (Citations omitted)

    1. [81]
      Reference was made by the Court to the decision of the Tribunal in Pound v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[18], at [41]-[44]. It then continued:

    While it is correct that provisions should be construed consistently with the objects and purposes of an Act, it should not be accepted that the Tribunal, in exercising its discretion under s 102(1) and in considering whether the interests of justice require the making of a costs order, must have specific regard to s 100. This construction does not give effect to the introductory words of 100, namely “other than as provided under this Act or an enabling Act.” Those words contemplate that a favourable exercise of discretion under s 102(1) will necessarily result in a departure from the usual position as to costs contemplated by s 100. This is simply the consequence of s 100 being made subject to other provisions of the QCAT Act including s 102.

    1. [82]
      The Court concluded the Tribunal, in exercising its discretion under section 102(1), had regard to the decision in Marzini for the proper construction of sections 100 and 102. It then went on to consider the relevance of the appellant’s a statutory function, referring to the decision in Medical Board of Queensland v Heiner[19] where his Honour Judge O'Brien, at [5], said:

    It is contrary to the public interest that those responsible for instituting disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal should be deterred by fear of an adverse costs order.

    1. [83]
      The Court of Appeal observed the parties correctly accepted that, in relation to disciplinary proceedings, the statutory function of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision will be a relevant matter for the Tribunal in considering whether the interests of justice require it to make a costs order contemplated by section 102(1) of the QCAT Act. The precise weight to be given to the decision-maker’s statutory function, however, the Court continued, will vary according to the circumstances of each case. After examining several of the circumstances in du Toit, the Court concluded:

    Having taken the statutory function of the appellant into account, it was a matter for the Tribunal, in the particular circumstances of the proceeding, as to how much weight was to be ascribed to this consideration.

    1. [84]
      The appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the Tribunal at first instance awarding the respondent his costs of the proceeding was dismissed.
    2. [85]
      Here, several factors weigh against making a costs order. First, the Board is a statutory body representing the state. Its functions include:
    1. to assess applications for accreditation of non-State schools;
    2. to accredit non-State schools;
    3. to assess and decide applications about governing bodies’ eligibility for government funding;
    4. ...
    5. to monitor whether accredited schools continue to comply with the accreditation criteria;
    6. to monitor whether the governing bodies of accredited schools are suitable to continue to be a school’s governing body;
    7. to monitor whether the governing bodies of non-State schools that are eligible for government funding for the schools continue to meet the government funding eligibility criteria;
    8. to monitor and enforce compliance with this Act;
    9. to conduct investigations about contraventions of, or noncompliance with, this Act;

    (j) and (k) …[20]

    1. [86]
      The Board was carrying out its statutory functions.
    2. [87]
      The College invites the Tribunal to infer from the Board’s delay in setting aside the original decision it was relying on the possibility the College may not be able to fund the ongoing litigation. The only reasonable inference, it is submitted by the College, is the Board did not take sufficient care when reconsidering the original decision on the first occasion.
    3. [88]
      The assertions made by the College are serious. They are without any or any sufficient evidence on which to draw the inferences urged and are rejected.
    4. [89]
      Secondly, weighing against a costs order, the College, as submitted by the Board and I accept, following the commencement of the proceeding, asked Dr McAskill to provide advice on improving aspects of its education delivery. She conducted a one-day workshop with College staff and the College made several changes on the advice of Dr McAskill.
    5. [90]
      The factors weighing in favour of a costs order include:
    1. Dr McAskill’s statement and report were provided to the Board on 18 February 2020;
    2. whilst Dr McAskill’s findings and opinions in her statement and report were challenged by the Board’s authorised persons, by 20 August 2021 the Board had received the joint expert report;
    3. the Board reconsidered the original decision on the first occasion and, notwithstanding the joint expert report, confirmed the decision;
    4. the Board reconsidered the original decision on the second occasion without any additional material and set aside the decision.
    1. [91]
      Whilst the College has been successful in the sense the original decision has been set aside, the litigation, in particular the involvement of the Board’s authorised persons and Dr McAskill, I am satisfied, contributed to that success. As the College put it in its submissions on costs, the joint expert report showed, “… the numerous areas of non-compliance upon which (the original decision) was based, had to a large extent, evaporated.”
    2. [92]
      The outcome of the proceeding, I accept, was of the utmost importance to the College. The dispute the subject of the proceeding was complex.
    3. [93]
      The parties were granted leave by the Tribunal to be represented by lawyers at an earlier point in time. They were represented by both solicitors and counsel.
    4. [94]
      The material filed in the Tribunal by the parties is voluminous. The joint expert report is detailed and lengthy and the statements of evidence filed by the parties are contained in four lever arch folders. The parties made several interlocutory applications to the Tribunal, supported and opposed by lengthy submissions.
    5. [95]
      The Board ultimately recognised it did not have a strong case and set aside the original decision. In my opinion, it should have done so on receipt of the joint expert report.
    6. [96]
      It is not suggested the Board did not afford the College natural justice. I accept the College genuinely attempted to enable and help the decision-maker to make the original decision on the merits. Those attempts continued following the commencement of the proceeding in the Tribunal.
    7. [97]
      I also accept the financial circumstances of the parties favours the Board.
    8. [98]
      In my opinion, the College is entitled to a costs order from 20 August 2021, the date on which the Tribunal and parties received the joint expert report. Whilst the original decision may have been the correct and preferable decision at the time made, the report made clear that was no longer the case. The Board should have immediately taken the necessary steps to set aside the decision and end the litigation.
    9. [99]
      In reaching a decision, I have had regard to the proper construction of sections 100 and 102 of the QCAT Act outlined by the Court of Appeal in du Toit, the matters the Tribunal may have regard to set out in section 102(3) of the Act, in particular the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding and the Board having before it when it set aside the original decision the same material it had when it reconsidered and confirmed the decision on the first occasion. I accept the College was not compliant with the requirements of its accreditation at the time of the original decision and became compliant following the commencement of the proceeding and the involvement of Dr McAskill and the Board’s experts.

    Indemnity costs

    1. [100]
      The College has applied to the Tribunal for an award of costs on an indemnity basis from 20 August 2021 to 30 June 2023, alternatively from 25 November 2021 to 30 June 2023.
    2. [101]
      The legal principles applicable to an award of costs on an indemnity basis were considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Legal Services Commissioner v Bone[21]. There, Morrison JA (with whom Fraser and Gotterson JJA agreed), at [67], adopted what was said by the Court in LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo[22]:
    1. [21]
      The applicable principles for the awarding of indemnity costs were usefully summarised by Sheppard J in Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd. However, those principles operate as a guide to the exercise of the relevant discretion. They do not define all of the circumstances in which the discretion is to be exercised and do not limit the width of that discretion. Further, the categories in which the discretion to award indemnity costs may be exercised are not closed.
    2. [21]
      Whilst the awarding of costs on an indemnity basis will always ultimately depend upon the exercise of a discretion in the particular circumstances of each individual case, the justification for an award of indemnity costs continues to require some special or unusual feature of the particular case. As was observed by Basten JA in Chaina v Alvaro Homes Pty Ltd, the general rule remains that costs should be assessed on a party and party basis, and the standard to be applied in awarding indemnity costs ought not “be allowed to diminish to the extent that an unsuccessful party will be at risk of an order for costs assessed on an indemnity basis, absent some blameworthy conduct on its part”.

    (Citations omitted)

    1. [102]
      The principles or guidelines distilled by Sheppard J out of the authorities to which he referred in Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd[23] are found in paragraph [24] of the decision. They are:
    1. 1.The problem arises in adversary litigation, i.e. litigation as between parties at arm's length. Different considerations apply where parties may be found to be entitled to the payment of their costs out of a fund or assets being administered by or under the control of a trustee, liquidator, receiver or person in a like position, e.g. a government agency or statutory authority.
    2. 2.The ordinary rule is that, where the Court orders the costs of one party to litigation to be paid by another party, the order is for payment of those costs on the party and party basis. In this Court the provisions of Order 62, rules 12 and 19, and the Second Schedule to the Rules will apply to the taxation. In many cases the result will be that the amount recovered by the successful party under the Order will fall short of (in many cases well short of) a complete indemnity.
    3. 3.This has been the settled practice for centuries in England. It is a practice which is entrenched in Australia. Either legislation (perhaps in the form of an amendment to rules of Court) or a decision of an intermediate court of appeal or of the High Court would be required to alter it. No doubt any consideration of whether there should be any change in the practice would require the resolution of the competing considerations mentioned by Devlin LJ in Berry v. British Transport Commission and Handley JA in Cachia v. Hanes on the one hand and by Rogers J in Qantas on the other. The relevant passages from the respective judgments have been earlier referred to.
    4. 4.In consequence of the settled practice which exists, the Court ought not usually make an order for the payment of costs on some basis other than the party and party basis. The circumstances of the case must be such as to warrant the Court in departing from the usual course. That has been the view of all judges dealing with applications for payment of costs on the indemnity or some other basis whether here or in England. The tests have been variously put. The Court of Appeal in Andrews v. Barnes said the Court had a general and discretionary power to award costs as between solicitor and client “as and when the justice of the case might so require.” Woodward J in Fountain Selected Meats appears to have adopted what was said by Brandon LJ (as he was) in Preston v. Preston namely, there should be some special or unusual feature in the case to justify the Court in departing from the ordinary practice. Most judges dealing with the problem have resolved the particular case before them by dealing with the circumstances of that case and finding in it the presence or absence of factors which would be capable, if they existed, of warranting a departure from the usual rule. But as French J said in Tetijo, “The categories in which the discretion may be exercised are not closed”. Davies J expressed similar views in Ragata.
    5. 5.Notwithstanding the fact that that is so, it is useful to note some of the circumstances which have been thought to warrant the exercise of the discretion. I instance the making of allegations of fraud knowing them to be false and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud (both referred to by Woodward J in Fountain and also by Gummow J in Thors v. Weekes; evidence of particular misconduct that causes loss of time to the Court and to other parties (French J in Tetijo); the fact that the proceedings were commenced or continued for some ulterior motive (Davies J in Ragata) or in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law (Woodward J in Fountain and French J in J-Corp); the making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions (Davies J in Ragata); an imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise (eg Messiter v. Hutchinson, Maitland Hospital v. Fisher (No. 2), Crisp v. Keng and an award of costs on an indemnity basis against a contemnor (eg Megarry V-C in EMI Records). Other categories of cases are to be found in the reports. Yet others to arise in the future will have different features about them which may justify an order for costs on the indemnity basis. The question must always be whether the particular facts and circumstances of the case in question warrant the making of an order for payment of costs other than on a party and party basis.
    6. 6.It remains to say that the existence of particular facts and circumstances capable of warranting the making of an order for payment of costs, for instance, on the indemnity basis, does not mean that judges are necessarily obliged to exercise their discretion to make such an order. The costs are always in the discretion of the trial judge. Provided that discretion is exercised having regard to the applicable principles and the particular circumstances of the instant case its exercise will not be found to have miscarried unless it appears that the order which has been made involves a manifest error or injustice.

    (Citations omitted)

    1. [103]
      Whilst the principles or guidelines provide useful guidance to the type of special or unusual circumstance that will enliven the discretion to award costs on an indemnity basis, they do not define all the circumstances in which the discretion is to be exercised, and do not limit the width of that discretion.[24]
    2. [104]
      The normal focus in determining whether indemnity costs should be ordered is on the conduct in, and in respect of, the litigation by the party against whom the costs order is sought.[25] I accept the reasons for the original decision, and the arguments advanced by the Board, were not obviously unsustainable. Whilst the Board should have taken steps to set aside the original decision on receipt of the joint expert report on 20 August 2021, the Board’s conduct of the proceeding, in my opinion, does not justify or require an award of costs on an indemnity basis.

    Order

    1. [105]
      The order of the Tribunal is that the Board pay the College’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the standard basis from 20 August 2021 to be assessed on the District Court of Queensland scale of costs.

    Schedule

    Chronology

    Date

    Event

    06 August 2019

    Application for review filed

    17 December 2019

    Respondent provided bundle of relevant documents

    13 November 2019

    Statement of reasons provided

    17 February 2020

    Statement of Kathy Fisher filed (by applicant)

    18 February 2020

    Dr Tracey McAskill’s report filed (by applicant)

    21 February 2020

    First compulsory conference

    06 July 2020

    Report of Dr Nayler and Ms Hall filed (by respondent)

    15 September 2020

    Second compulsory conference

    15 September 2020

    Tribunal makes directions requiring conclave of curriculum experts & the preparation of a joint report of curriculum experts.

    02 December 2020

    Conclave of experts (part 1)

    24 May 2021

    Further directions - defining scope of on-site review and requiring further conclave for JER

    20 and 23 July 2021

    On-site curriculum review by experts

    29 July 2021

    Conclave of experts (part 2)

    20 August 2021

    Joint report of curriculum experts provided to the Tribunal and the parties

    9 November 2021

    Applicant’s solicitors wrote to Crown Law proposing further meeting to explore resolution (Ng affidavit exhibit page 6)

    15 November 2021

    Parties meet

    25 November 2021

    Applicant's solicitors made open submission to Crown Law (Ng affidavit exhibit page 11-23)

    29 November 2021 and 30 November 2021

    Applicant filed statements for hearing of matter

    23 December 2021

    Tribunal (at request of both parties) invited the respondent to reconsider its decision

    07 February 2022

    Respondent notified the Tribunal and the applicant that it confirmed its original decision (Ng affidavit exhibit page 24-49)

    02 March 2022

    The applicant makes further proposal to resolve the proceeding (Ng affidavit exhibit page 51-53)

    11 March 2022

    Applicant’s outline of submissions for hearing filed

    11 April 2022

    Respondent’s outline of submissions for hearing filed

    03 May 2022

    Applicant’s submissions in reply filed

    30 May 2022

    Tribunal set down hearing date for 20/21 June 2022 (vacated due to availability of respondent's counsel)

    23 December 2022

    Tribunal set down hearing date for 6/7 March 2023 (vacated due to availability of respondent's witnesses)

    06 June 2023

    Tribunal set hearing date for 10/11 July 2023

    09 June 2023

    Respondent’s solicitors wrote to applicant’s solicitors on a without prejudice basis

    16 June 2023

    At request of the parties the Tribunal invited the respondent to reconsider its decision

    23 June 2023

    Respondent advised the Tribunal and the applicant that it had reconsidered its decision and decided to set it aside.

    23 June - 29 June

    Parties exchange correspondence as to aspects of the respondent's notification

    30 June 2023

    Date costs application filed

    30 June 2023

    Date of withdrawal

    Footnotes

    [1] QCAT Act, s 107(1).

    [2] QCAT Act, s 107(2).

    [3] QCAT Act, s 107(3).

    [4] QCAT Rules, r 87(2).

    [5] [2010] QCAT 412.

    [6] [2005] QCA 111.

    [7] [2023] QCATA 97.

    [8] Ralacom, [29].

    [9] [2020] QCAT 365.

    [10] [2024] QCA 235.

    [11] Health Ombudsman v du Toit [2024] QCA 235, at [22].

    [12] (2017) 262 CLR 362.

    [13] (2021) 273 CLR 235.

    [14] (1989) 98 FLR 152.

    [15] [2005] FCA 319.

    [16] (1981) 36 ALR 101.

    [17] Set out in [65] of these reasons for decision.

    [18] [2023] QCAT 298.

    [19] [2008] QHPT 001.

    [20] Accreditation Act, s 100.

    [21] [2014] QCA 179.

    [22] [2013] QCA 305.

    [23] (1993) 46 FCR 225.

    [24] LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips, Hickey and Toigo [2013] QCA 305, at [21].

    [25] White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) [1998] FCA 806.

    Close

    Editorial Notes

    • Published Case Name:

      Southern Cross Educational Enterprises Ltd t/a Redwood College v Non-State Schools Accreditation Board (Costs)

    • Shortened Case Name:

      Southern Cross Educational Enterprises Ltd t/a Redwood College v Non-State Schools Accreditation Board (Costs)

    • MNC:

      [2024] QCAT 529

    • Court:

      QCAT

    • Judge(s):

      Member Scott-Mackenzie

    • Date:

      20 Nov 2024

    Appeal Status

    Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

    Cases Cited

    Case NameFull CitationFrequency
    Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 F.C.R 225
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (1993) 46 F.C.R 225
    Cite 2 - (1993) 46 F.C.R 225
    Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Shi (2021) 273 CLR 235
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (2021) 273 CLR 235
    Cite 2 - (2021) 273 CLR 235
    du Toit v Health Ombudsman [No 2] [2024] QCAT 205
    1 citation
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2024] QCAT 205
    DYH v Public Guardian (No. 3) [2022] NSWCATAP 413
    1 citation
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2022] NSWCATAP 413
    Graham v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (Costs) [2023] QCATA 97
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2023] QCATA 97
    Cite 2 - [2023] QCATA 97
    Health Ombudsman v du Toit [2024] QCA 235
    3 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2024] QCA 235
    Cite 2 - [2024] QCA 235
    Cite 3 - [2024] QCA 235
    Legal Services Commissioner v Bone [2014] QCA 179
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2014] QCA 179
    Cite 2 - [2014] QCA 179
    LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Phillips [2013] QCA 305
    3 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2013] QCA 305
    Cite 2 - [2013] QCA 305
    Cite 3 - [2013] QCA 305
    Marzini v Health Ombudsman (No 4) [2020] QCAT 365
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2020] QCAT 365
    Cite 2 - [2020] QCAT 365
    Medical Board of Queensland v Heiner [2008] QHPT 1
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2008] QHPT 1
    Cite 2 - [2008] QHPT 1
    Pound v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2023] QCAT 298
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2023] QCAT 298
    Cite 2 - [2023] QCAT 298
    Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2010] QCAT 412
    Cite 2 - [2010] QCAT 412
    Scaniainventor v Commissioner of Patents (1981) 36 ALR 101
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (1981) 36 ALR 101
    Cite 2 - (1981) 36 ALR 101
    Staples v McCall (1989) 98 FLR 152
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (1989) 98 FLR 152
    Cite 2 - (1989) 98 FLR 152
    SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
    Cite 2 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
    Tamawood Ltd v Paans[2005] 2 Qd R 101; [2005] QCA 111
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 111
    Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 111
    Taylor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 319
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [2005] FCA 319
    Cite 2 - [2005] FCA 319
    White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) [1998] FCA 806
    2 citations
    Jump To
    Cite 1 - [1998] FCA 806
    Cite 2 - [1998] FCA 806

    Cases Citing

    No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

    1

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