Smyth v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (costs)
[2024] QCAT 585
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- Unreported Judgment
- Smyth v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (costs)[2024] QCAT 585
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Smyth v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (costs)[2024] QCAT 585
Smyth v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (costs)[2024] QCAT 585
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: | Smyth v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (costs) [2024] QCAT 585 |
PARTIES: | kerrod smyth (applicant) v queensland racing integrity commission (respondent) |
APPLICATION NO/S: | OCR175-21 |
MATTER TYPE: | Occupational regulation matters |
DELIVERED ON: | 12 December 2024 |
HEARING DATE: | On the papers |
HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
DECISION OF: | Member Gordon |
ORDERS: | The application made by Kerrod Smyth for his costs in the review to be paid by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission is refused. |
CATCHWORDS: | ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – costs – trainer’s application to review a decision made by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission that he had breached a racing rule – where the trainer was successful in having the finding of breach set aside – whether the Commission should pay the trainer’s legal costs in the review Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 100, s 102 Racing Integrity Act 2016 (Qld) Brisbane Marine Pilots Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v General Manager of Maritime Safety Queensland, Department of Transport and Main Roads and Ors (costs) [2022] QCAT 225 Commissioner of State Revenue v Telgrove Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] QCATA 113 Health Ombudsman v du Toit [2024] QCA 235 Pound v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2023] QCAT 298 Tamawood Ltd & Anor v Paans [2005] QCA 111 The Appeals of Adam Hyeronimus and Blake Paine heard by the Racing Appeal Panel of NSW Wolfgram v Racing Queensland [2012] QCAT 44 |
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: | This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) |
REASONS FOR DECISION
- [1]Kerrod Smyth applied to the tribunal for a review of a decision made by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission that he had breached the Australian Rules of Racing AR 236, concerning betting with or for a jockey. In the review, the member decided that the correct and preferable decision was that Mr Smyth had not breached the rule and so the decision was set aside.[1] Mr Smyth now applies for an order that the QRIC pay his legal costs incurred in the review.
- [2]Action was taken against Mr Smyth under the Racing Integrity Act 2016 (Qld). Under that Act the QRIC was established (amongst other things) to ensure the integrity of all persons involved with racing or betting under that Act or the Racing Act.[2] The QIRC has a statutory function (amongst other things) to license participants that are suitable to be licensed for a code of racing, to conduct investigations into breaches of the Act or the Racing Act (under which the rules of racing are established), to make decisions about disciplinary matters, to prevent noncompliance and lapses in integrity, as far as practicable, in the racing industry, and to make all necessary inquiries it believes necessary to fulfil these functions.[3]
- [3]The Australian Rules of Racing AR 236 provides:
A person must not bet with or for a jockey or apprentice jockey, or give or offer a rider any pecuniary or other gift or consideration, contrary to these Australian Rules.
- [4]Mr Smyth is a licensed trainer within the thoroughbred racing industry in Queensland. A stewards inquiry was held over four days starting on 19 February 2021 and concluding on 17 May 2021 that Mr Smyth had breached the rule by placing a bet of $200 for a licensed jockey, that is Nigel Seymour on LILY OF THE GLEN in a race at Rockhampton on 18 December 2020.
- [5]The stewards therefore found that Mr Smyth had breached the rule. They disqualified Mr Smyth for a period of six months.
- [6]Mr Smyth sought an internal review of the charge and penalty, arguing (in summary) that the finding of the stewards was unreasonable, against the evidence, and against the weight of the evidence and that there was no reason why his explanation about what happened should not be accepted. His application to set aside the decision on internal review was unsuccessful.
- [7]Mr Smyth then applied for a review of the decision in the tribunal. His disqualification was stayed by the tribunal pending a final decision. The member hearing the review accepted Mr Smyth’s explanation for the events which happened and found that he had not breached the rule. The member set aside the decision on internal review and substituted a decision that the charge was unsubstantiated.
The tribunal’s statutory provisions on costs
- [8]In this matter, the power to award costs is in Division 6 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act). The relevant part of these provisions are:
Division 6 Costs
100 Each party usually bears own costs
Other than as provided under this Act or an enabling Act, each party to a proceeding must bear the party’s own costs for the proceeding.
102 Costs against party in interests of justice
- The tribunal may make an order requiring a party to a proceeding to pay all or a stated part of the costs of another party to the proceeding if the tribunal considers the interests of justice require it to make the order.
- However, the only costs the tribunal may award under subsection (1) against a party to a proceeding for a minor civil dispute are the costs stated in the rules as costs that may be awarded for minor civil disputes under this section.
- In deciding whether to award costs under subsection (1) or (2) the tribunal may have regard to the following—
- whether a party to a proceeding is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceeding, including as mentioned in section 48(1)(a) to (g);
- the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding; (c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties to the proceeding;
- for a proceeding for the review of a reviewable decision—
- whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the decision; and
- whether the applicant genuinely attempted to enable and help the decision-maker to make the decision on the merits;
- the financial circumstances of the parties to the proceeding;
- anything else the tribunal considers relevant.
- [9]Costs can also be awarded in the tribunal under section 47 of the QCAT Act (costs order following dismissal or strike out because the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance or an abuse of process) and also under section 105 and rule 86[4] (offers to settle).
- [10]Here we are concerned with an application for costs under section 102. At first sight section 100 seems to state a general rule, and section 102 gives the tribunal power to order costs if it considers the interests of justice require it to make the order. In Health Ombudsman v du Toit [2024] QCA 235 however, it was said that the words in section 100 ‘other than as provided under this Act’ made section 100 subordinate to section 102, so that the question whether to make a costs order resolves to:[5]
whether the interests of justice require the tribunal to make a costs order
- [11]And the use of the word ‘require’ in section 102 simply means that the tribunal:[6]
may make an order requiring a party to a proceeding to pay all or a stated part of the costs of another party if the Tribunal considers that the interest of justice calls for such an order
- [12]And that when considering that question it would be wrong to have regard to the usual rule in section 100 that each party should pay their own costs because the opening words of section 100 meant that if section 102 applied, then section 100 did not apply.[7]
- [13]Du Toit was a disciplinary proceeding like this one, and having reviewed the statutory provisions and extrinsic materials the court stated that where the nature of the review proceedings were complex, such that it necessitated the need for both parties to be represented, the QCAT Act contemplated a readiness to depart from the general position of minor civil disputes which ordinarily confront the Tribunal, in favour of an approach more aligned with conventional litigation.[8]
- [14]I will decide this cost application in the manner stated in du Toit.
- [15]When deciding whether the interests of justice require the tribunal to make a costs order there are various factors which can be considered. Some of these are in sections 102(3)(a) to (f) but others come from case law. The various factors identifiable in this way are whether the success of the costs application would be eroded when it was reasonably necessary to be legally represented to achieve that success and whether there are any countervailing considerations, the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding, whether there was a commercial element in the proceedings, the fact that the tribunal gave leave to be legally represented (or lack of such leave), the ‘chilling effect’ of costs orders on statutory bodies and review applicants (and effect on access to justice), the reasonable expectations of the parties with respect to costs, the aims and objects of the QCAT Act, whether a party to a proceeding acted in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceeding including as mentioned in section 48(1)(a) to (g), the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties to the proceeding, in reviews whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision maker and whether the applicant genuinely attempted to help the decision maker in making the decision on the merits, the financial circumstances of the parties to the proceeding, and anything else the tribunal considers relevant.
- [16]The importance of these factors, and whether there are any other factors which need to be considered, will vary from case to case, and I take the view that if a factor in sections 102(3)(a) to (f) does not seem to be relevant then it can be ignored.[9]
- [17]I think that the interests of justice involve both what is fair as between the parties but also has a public interest sense, which includes the interests of the administration of justice by the tribunal.[10]
- [18]In this application for costs it seems to me that the most important factors in the above list which guide my consideration as to whether the interests of justice require me to make a costs order are the fact that this was a review of a disciplinary decision, that Mr Smyth was successful in the review, and that it was reasonable for him to be legally represented in the tribunal.[11] I need to consider the points made on Mr Smyth’s behalf that he was not afforded natural justice by the decision maker for the decision.[12]
- [19]One factor which is of particular importance in this case is the merits of the review.
What costs are claimed?
- [20]There is no information about what costs are claimed.
- [21]On behalf of Mr Smyth it is said that costs should be assessed on the District Court scale but the tribunal has a statutory duty to fix the costs if possible.[13] Since no attempt has been made to break down the costs by events and hourly rates, it is impossible to see whether the tribunal could fix the costs.
What is Mr Smyth’s case on costs?
- [22]The first main point is that the dispute was complex and justified both parties being represented by counsel. It is said that in Tamawood Ltd & Anor v Paans [2005] QCA 111 Keane JA ‘was of the view that where the complexity of the matter justified legal representation, it would not be in the interests of justice to bar the successful party from recovering costs that were reasonably necessary to achieve a satisfactory outcome’.
- [23]What Keane JA actually said was:
There is a clear distinction, in terms of the interest of achieving justice, between the mere fact of having representation and the fact of having reasonably obtained that representation because of the complexity of the case. In the absence of countervailing considerations, where a party has reasonably incurred the cost of legal representation, and has been successful before the Tribunal, it could not rationally be said to be in the interests of justice to allow that success to be eroded by requiring that party to bear the costs of the representation which was reasonably necessary to achieve that outcome.
- [24]There are two important differences between the submission made and what was said by Keane JA in that passage. The first is that there may be countervailing considerations, and the second is that Keane JA was referring to ‘success’ of such a type as to be capable of ‘erosion’ if no costs order were made.
- [25]There is much authority that in the tribunal, where legal representation was required and achieved a successful outcome, this is only one of the factors to take into account and it is not conclusive.[14]
- [26]The second main point made in support of the costs application is that Mr Smyth was not afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the decision, which is a factor in section 102(3)(d). Various things are relied on.
- [27]Whether there was a breach of natural justice needs to be considered in the light of the stewards process when conducting this inquiry. The stewards not only investigated the facts, but also decided if there could have been a breach of the rules, and then laid the charge, took a plea and then decided the outcome. In this case, the investigation of the facts was conducted in a series of meetings, then after the charge was laid, Mr Smyth was able to present further evidence and make submissions. The stewards then made a final decision about whether Mr Smyth had breached the rule in the charge, on the papers.
- [28]There is a chance to correct any failures in the process by way of internal review, and then by way of external review to the tribunal.
- [29]It is not suggested in the submissions on costs that the process followed by the stewards in this case was itself a breach of natural justice.
Being unaware of the jockey’s evidence to the inquiry
- [30]One of the alleged breaches of natural justice relevant to the question of costs is that although Mr Smyth was given an opportunity to cross examine the jockey in the stewards inquiry, at that time he did not know what the jockey had said so he could not do so.
- [31]This is a reference to a continuation of the inquiry on 25 March 2021 which was conducted on the telephone between one of the stewards, a stipendiary steward, the jockey and Mr Smyth. As was stated by the steward, the telephone meeting was organised to give Mr Smyth an opportunity to ask questions of the jockey because he had expressed a wish to do so. But Mr Smyth stated that it was hard to cross examine because he did not know what evidence the jockey had given and what statements he had made.[15]
- [32]Had the inquiry ended there, then it would be possible to say that Mr Smyth was at some disadvantage in not knowing what the jockey was saying against him. But the inquiry continued, with the steward encouraging Mr Smyth and the jockey to ask questions of each other, and this engendered a lively debate between the two. The steward then asked the jockey further questions about what had happened.
- [33]During the course of this debate the jockey said:
- on 17 December 2020 he had given $200 in cash to Mr Smyth;[16]
- the reason he gave Mr Smyth $200 was to have a bet on the horse;[17]
- Mr Smyth took the money gladly and put it in his pocket, and said something like his son was going to handle that sort of thing and put the bet on;[18]
- he thought Mr Smyth had placed the bet for him and this was the reason why he had not asked for the return of the $200;[19]
- at no time did Mr Smyth tell him that he would not place a bet for him or had not done so;[20]
- at no time had Mr Smyth tried to return the $200 to him.[21]
- [34]It can be seen therefore that after this telephone meeting Mr Smyth was left in no doubt about the evidence being given by the jockey. This meeting was well before the laying on the charge on 15 April 2021 and after which Mr Smyth could give further evidence and submissions to the stewards.
- [35]It follows that there was no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness on these alleged grounds.
A steward reversed the burden of proof
- [36]It is said that one of the stewards reversed the burden of proof by forming the view by day 2 of the stewards enquiry that Mr Smyth was probably guilty, so that the following two days of the hearing were available to Mr Smyth to ‘prove his innocence’. This, it is said, infected the reasoning of the stewards enquiry. It is said that this is something which the steward told the tribunal when hearing the review. Although I would agree that this might have an effect on this costs application, unfortunately the record of the proceedings when this steward gave evidence is not available on the usual system and so I cannot understand what the steward meant in the context of the steward’s evidence as a whole.
- [37]It is also unclear how this could have infected the reasoning of the stewards inquiry because the steward in question was a cadet steward and one of three stewards on the panel.
- [38]In those circumstances I consider myself unable to take this point into account.
Reversal of burden of proof in the internal review
- [39]It is said that the burden of proof was reversed in the internal view, so that Mr Smyth was expected to prove his innocence rather than it being necessary to prove his guilt. Therefore, it is said, he was forced to apply for an external review in order to correct matters, and incurred legal costs in doing so.
- [40]If this had happened then there would be a good argument that it was in the interests of justice to award costs.
- [41]
Penalty manifestly excessive
- [42]Finally it is said that the penalty of six months disqualification was manifestly excessive, and in imposing this the stewards seemed to have been guided by the minimum penalty applicable to the rule under which the jockey was guilty which, it is said, was an incorrect approach. It is said that these errors meant that Mr Smyth had no option but to appeal the decision including in respect of penalty which was upheld on internal review.
- [43]On the question of penalty the stewards said:
referring both to the jockey and to Mr Smyth
When considering an appropriate penalty, Stewards view breaches of this kind very seriously, as it can have a detrimental effect on the image of racing, and penalties must serve as a general deterrent to illustrate to the entire racing industry that these activities cannot be condoned. Stewards also considered previous penalties for breaches of these rules, including minimum mandatory penalties, penalty submissions, pleas and Mr Smyth and Jockey Seymour’s records.
referring only to Mr Smyth
Having regard to the mandatory minimum penalty of 2 years disqualification applied for a breach of AR115(1)(e), the Stewards determine that Mr Smyth be disqualified for a period of six (6) months for this breach which reflects the seriousness of his conduct in being involved in a breach of AR115(1)(e) by Mr Seymour.
Kerrod Smyth was disqualified from 23 May 2021 to 23 November 2021.
- [44]On internal review the penalty was maintained.
- [45]It is said that ‘the stewards used the penalty associated with a contravention of AR115 as a benchmark in their determination as to penalty’, and this was a manifest error. In The Appeals of Adam Hyeronimus and Blake Paine heard by the Racing Appeal Panel of NSW, it was said that the stewards in that case ‘seem to have used the 2-year mandatory minimum penalty applying to Mr Hyeronimus as a guide of some kind to the penalty they imposed on Mr Paine’, and this was not the approach that the panel would take.
- [46]I do not think the stewards took the approach in Mr Smyth’s case that is described in Hyeronimus. The stewards said that the minimum penalty of 2 years for a breach of AR115(1)(e) reflected the seriousness of conduct in which a person was involved in a breach of AR115(1)(e). It is a correct statement to say that the minimum penalty demonstrates the seriousness of conduct of those in breach of AR115(1)(e). And it is a correct statement to say that having found Mr Smyth guilty of a breach of AR263, this meant that he was involved in the jockey’s breach of AR115(1)(e) in respect of that same bet. In those circumstances the stewards were saying that the penalty they imposed reflected such seriousness. There is nothing to show that the stewards started with 2 years and discounted the penalty back from that, which might have been an objectionable approach in the light of Hyeronimus.
- [47]It may be said in the submissions on costs on behalf of Mr Smyth that the 6 months disqualification was manifestly excessive in the light of a penalty of six months disqualification imposed on Blake Paine by the NSW panel in Hyeronimus for a much greater number of such offences. It can be seen from the report of that case however, that there were mitigating factors, so it cannot be said that Mr Smyth’s 6 months disqualification was manifestly excessive.
The merits of the review in the tribunal
- [48]It seems to me that this is an important factor in the decision whether the interests of justice require the tribunal to make an order for costs against QRIC.
- [49]As explained in the decision made by the member on review in the tribunal, it was not controversial that on 17 December 2020 Mr Smyth received $200 from the jockey. The member found that when he received that money Mr Smyth knew that the jockey wanted him to use the money to place a bet on the horse to win.
- [50]Mr Smyth accepted that the next day he did place a $200 bet on the horse. The documents showed that the bet was placed by Mr Smyth at 3.34 pm, at odds of 9.00.[24] At the time Mr Smyth placed the bet, he was conducting a conversation with the jockey by text message. In that conversation, at 3.25 pm the jockey informed Mr Smyth that the odds had dropped from 13 to 10 in minutes. At 3.28 pm Mr Smyth asked the jockey whether he should place the bet ‘ew or on nose’, that is ‘either way’ or ‘to win’. At 3.29 pm the jockey answered saying (in effect), ‘to win’. Then as said above, at 3.34 pm, the bet was placed. Then at 3.35 pm Mr Smyth informed the jockey that he had placed the bet which had dropped to 9 as he did it, to which the jockey replied ‘I don’t think we will care too much if it goes off as planned’. Mr Smyth then said ‘give this everything we got mate’.
- [51]The next day the jockey rode the horse on which the bet had been placed but it came last.
- [52]Taking the text conversation and betting record together with the jockey’s evidence that Mr Smyth gladly accepted the $200 for the purpose of a bet was damning evidence against Mr Smyth.
- [53]Mr Smyth’s case however, was that he did not receive the $200 willingly, and when he asked the jockey in the text conversation whether he should place the bet either way or to win he was talking about a different horse.
- [54]He said that when he placed the $200 bet on the horse at 3.34 pm he did this for his wife (and not for the jockey). This was supported by a written statement from his wife and an unsigned statement from his daughter. In giving reasons, the stewards said they had considered these statements but did not explain why they did not accept them as truthful.[25] There was also a statement by a person who stated that they heard Mr Smyth tell the jockey that he would not be placing the bet for him. The stewards did not refer to that statement in their reasons.
- [55]The internal review set out the submissions then made on Mr Smyth’s behalf and summarised the evidence given by the various witnesses. With respect to the witness who stated they heard Mr Smyth tell the jockey that he would not be placing the bet for him, the internal reviewer noted that the statement was made two months after the event and had been prompted by Mr Smyth telling the witness about the conversation. Mr Smyth was saying that on three occasions he informed the jockey that he would not place, and had not placed, the bet but the internal reviewer noted that the jockey denied this and there was no corroboration for it. The internal reviewer noted that the jockey did not ask for the return of the $200 and that there was no evidence of Mr Smyth attempting to return it to the jockey. As for the statements of Mr Smyth’s wife and daughter, the internal reviewer said that they ‘must be mindful of the weight provided to such statements’ because of the family closeness. In the light of this approach, it is not surprising that that the stewards’ decision was maintained in the internal review.
- [56]The external review in the tribunal was a rehearing. It is significant that the jockey did not give evidence in the tribunal review. The member hearing the review said about this:
I attach little weight to Mr Seymour’s evidence given to the stewards in the hearing below about the placing of a bet on the horse in circumstances where Mr Seymour was not available for cross-examination at the Tribunal hearing. Further to that, for reasons explained below, I am satisfied that Mr Seymour had an opportunity to present his evidence to the stewards about the placing of the bet in breach of the rules before Mr Smyth was questioned by the stewards in the hearings below.
- [57]The jockey’s evidence directly contradicted Mr Smyth’s case not only about the circumstances of the giving of the $200, but also Mr Smyth’s case that he had informed the jockey on three occasions that he would not place, and had not placed, the bet. Giving little weight to the jockey’s evidence meant that the member was able to accept Mr Smyth’s explanation and the evidence of his witnesses.
- [58]Effectively the jockey’s absence converted the external review application from one with a poor chance of success into one with a reasonable chance of success.
The statutory duty of the QRIC acting as a disciplinary body
- [59]On behalf of the QRIC, reliance is placed on Wolfgram v Racing Queensland [2012] QCAT 44 where it was said:[26]
Racing Queensland is a body tasked by the Racing Act 2002 to regulate the racing industry. One of the main purposes of the Racing Act 2002 is to ensure the integrity of all persons involved with racing. The awarding of costs against such a body may act as a deterrent to it fulfilling its duties. Such an outcome is not desirable and is a factor against awarding costs.
- [60]Similar things have been said on many occasions in the tribunal when considering costs applications against regulatory bodies.[27] These authorities now need to be considered in the light of du Toit. The court in du Toit made it clear that it would be wrong to require a finding that the regulatory body had acted unreasonably before an order for costs can be made.[28] The aims and objects of the regulatory body and the nature of the statutory functions, in particular whether the body was exercising a discretion (as opposed to being obliged to refer the matter to the tribunal), would be taken into account. The precise weight to be given to these things would vary according to the circumstances of each case.[29]
- [61]Here the QRIC properly exercised its statutory functions, and whereas it is true that Mr Smyth was able to clear his name by applying to the tribunal for an external review, as mentioned above the decisions made by or on behalf of the QRIC had probably been inevitable.
Conclusion
- [62]On my analysis, the evidence before the stewards was damning, and because of this Mr Smyth’s denials and the statements he had submitted appeared contrived and unreliable. Inevitably the stewards found that Mr Smyth had breached AR 236.
- [63]Since the internal review was on the papers only, and there was no new information, it was inevitable that it would reach the same conclusion as the stewards.
- [64]When the matter came to the tribunal for external review, the most important witness, the jockey, did not attend. The member hearing the review decided to give little weight to the evidence the jockey had given to the stewards. On that basis the member was able to accept the explanation given by Mr Smyth for what happened and the evidence of his witnesses. Effectively the jockey’s absence converted the external review application from one with a poor chance of success into one with a reasonable chance of success.
- [65]In these circumstances it cannot be said that the interests of justice require the tribunal to order the QRIC to pay Mr Smyth’s costs of legal representation in the review before the tribunal.
Footnotes
[1]A decision published as Smyth v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2022] QCAT 242.
[2]Section 3(1)(b).
[3]Section 10.
[4]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld).
[5][50].
[6][39].
[7][59] and [64].
[8][44].
[9]This seems to be supported by section 32CA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) which provides that if the word ‘may’ is used in statute in relation to a power then it indicates that the power may be exercised, or not exercised, at discretion. I note that ‘power includes authority’: schedule 1.
[10]Brisbane Marine Pilots Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v General Manager of Maritime Safety Queensland, Department of Transport and Main Roads and Ors (costs) [2022] QCAT 225, [95].
[11]And he had a right to be legally represented because it was a review of a decision about taking disciplinary action – section 43(2)(b)(ii) of the QCAT Act.
[12]Something I may consider under section 102(3)(d) of the QCAT Act.
[13]Section 107 QCAT Act.
[14]For example, Commissioner of State Revenue v Telgrove Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] QCATA 113, Senior Member Aughterson and Member Lumb. This seems to be confirmed by what was said in du Toit at [44] that there would be a ‘readiness’ to award costs in such circumstances.
[15]Transcript P-5 line 1.
[16]Transcript P-12 line 10.
[17]Transcript P-17 line 1.
[18]Transcript P-17 line 30.
[19]Transcript P-5 line 30, P-12 line 24, line 28.
[20]Transcript P-7 line 15, P-8 line 10, P-12 line 19, P-13 line 5, line 13, line 17, P-15 line 9, P-17 line 27.
[21]Transcript P-7 line 18, P-19 line 18.
[22]Submissions on costs dated 11 July 2022, paragraph 59.
[23]Section 21 document, page 128.
[24]Section 21 documents page 19.
[25]Stewards’ reasoning given by email on 11 May 2021, section 21 documents page 73.
[26][26], Member Sandra G Deane.
[27]See in particular Pound v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2023] QCAT 298, [48], Senior Member Aughterson.
[28][59].
[29][72].