Pivotto v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing
[2025] QCAT 130
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- Unreported Judgment
- Pivotto v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing[2025] QCAT 130
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Pivotto v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing[2025] QCAT 130
Pivotto v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing[2025] QCAT 130
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: | Pivotto v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing [2025] QCAT 130 |
PARTIES: | AmeliA Pivotto (applicant) v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing (respondent) |
APPLICATION NO/S: | GAR834-23 |
MATTER TYPE: | General administrative review matters |
DELIVERED ON: | 3 April 2025 |
HEARING DATE: | 12 February 2025 |
HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
DECISION OF: | Member Taylor |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | FIRE, EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS – FIREARMS – LICENSING AND RELATED MATTERS – REVOCATION OF LICENCE – FIT AND PROPER PERSON – PUBLIC INTEREST – where applicant was the holder of a firearms licence when charged with a traffic infringement and fined for speeding – where the applicant sought to challenge the charge and fine by writing a letter to the Queensland Police Service – where the content of that letter was cast in language which was consistent with a person who espouses sovereign citizen ideologies – where the firearms licence was subsequently revoked – whether the holding of such ideologies meant it was not in the public interest for the applicant to retain a firearms licence – whether something more was required before the discretion to revoke the firearms licence was exercised – whether the applicant did in fact hold such ideologies - meaning of ‘fit and proper person’ and ‘public interest’ – consideration of the way in which the discretion to revoke a firearms licence should be exercised – whether there is a real prospect of the applicant misusing a weapons such that the firearms licence should be revoked – whether the applicant is a real risk to public and individual safety – whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a weapons licence Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 13, s 15, s 20, s 21, s 25, s 29 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20, s 24 Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), s 3, s 4, s 10, s 10B, s 29, s 142 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 CAT v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCAT 43 Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v NSW (No 2) (Transport Case) (1955) 93 CLR 127 Magarry v Queensland Police Service Weapons Licensing Branch [2012] QCAT 378 Philips v Woolcock [2002] QDC 035 R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216 Stower v Smart [2007] QDC 004 Willingham v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCAT 361 |
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: | |
Applicant: | Self-represented |
Respondent: | Mr T. Ferguson |
REASONS FOR DECISION
Overview
- [1]Ms Pivotto is a young lady who, until being caught driving her car at a speed exceeding the prescribed limit, was the holder of a licence entitling her to possess and use firearms. Her conduct after receiving the infringement notice and fine resulted in her licence being revoked. I expect that most people reading this will immediately ask - what does a speeding fine have to do with a firearms licence? The answer to this lies in the manner in which Ms Pivotto chose to challenge that fine.
- [2]Having received the infringement notice and fine, she wrote a letter to the Queensland Police Service espousing views that, on any reading of the letter, indicated she held sovereign citizen ideologies. She effectively asserted that the Queensland Police had no authority to fine her for speeding, and that she was not the named person on the infringement notice but rather her ‘strawman’ name was what appeared thereon.
- [3]By the time of the hearing before me, she had seen the error of her way. She had accepted that what she had learned through her own research was not only entirely misguided it was simply wrong. As I listened to her, and observed her, during the hearing she had accepted that when choosing to challenge the fine in the manner she did, presenting her case as it was put in that letter, she was not only naïve, but her actions were also stupid.
- [4]That being said, whilst I understand the reason why the respondent took the step it did to revoke her firearms licence on the strength of the letter written and the ideologies expressed therein, something I say more about later in these reasons, having listened to and considered all that Ms Pivotto had to say in the hearing I was satisfied that a finding she was not a fit and proper person on the ground of public interest for her to hold a firearms licence is one that should not stand. Accordingly I set aside the respondent’s decision to revoke her licence.
Background
- [5]On 6 December 2022, Ms Pivotto was issued with a firearms licence under the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), licence number 26657936 (the Firearms Licence).
- [6]On 26 September 2023, she was charged with a traffic infringement, namely exceeding the designated speed limit of 100 KMH by at least 11KMH but not exceeding 20 KMH. It carried a fine of $464.00.
- [7]She chose not to pay the fine. Rather she sought to challenge the validity of the asserted infringement and fine. In doing so she sent an undated letter to the Queensland Police Service. It was short. It contained the following comments: (the Challenge Letter)
An infringement notice dated 26/09/23 addressed to AMELIA ROSE PIVOTTO was received containing an ‘Alleged Speed Travelled 113.’ …
This letter is being written to refute this alleged speeding fine as, according to section 8, sub-section 12 of the Imperial Acts Application Act, ‘All fines and forfeitures before conviction are illegal and void.’
This letter is also being written to address that my name is not on this infringement notice, rather my strawman’s name AMELIA ROSE PIVOTTO is whom this infringement notice is addressed to. Police, being a corporate entity, cannot claim power, authority or have jurisdiction over a living human, therefore, this alleged spending fine will not be paid by the living human, Amelia Rose Pivotto.
Lastly, according to section 71 of the Commonwealth Constitution ‘Department of the States have no lawful authority to issue fines or take property as they are not a court’. The Commonwealth Constitution is the highest law of the land and dictates that there are only two levels of government, Federal and State. Police act as a third tier of Government, coming under the State Government. Local Government bodies, such as the Police force, are not recognised and/or given authority to act as a de-facto third tier of Government.
- [8]Having received the Challenge Letter, on 30 October 2023 the respondent, via its authorised officer, caused a notice (the Revocation Notice) to be served on Ms Pivotto revoking her Firearms Licence. (the Decision)
- [9]The premise for the Decision was that the content of the Challenge Letter indicated to the respondent that Ms Pivotto held sovereign citizen beliefs relating to the laws of Queensland not being applicable to her. In the reasons provided to her accompanying that notice the decision-maker noted that he had considered the requirement under the Act that to be entitled to hold a firearms licence the person must be a ‘fit and proper person’, and as a result of the content of the Challenge Letter indicating those apparently held sovereign citizen beliefs he reached this conclusion:
I am satisfied that there is a real risk to public safety as you have advised you do not intend on complying with the laws of this State, and those which are enforced by Police.
Accordingly, I have determined that it is in the public interest for your licence to be revoked.
- [10]As Ms Pivotto was then entitled to do, on 27 November 2023 she applied to this Tribunal for a review of the Decision. The premise for her application was expressed as follows:
I am a law abiding citizen and personally believe that the law must be upheld. I have every intention of complying with the law, and do so daily. I never intended to come across as a Sovereign Citizen or to hold Sovereign Citizenship beliefs. I thought I was quoting the Constitution, (sic) however, I obviously received some poor legal advice without fully understanding what this advice meant. I have since paid the fine.
…
The Revocation notice served states ‘The expression “fit and proper person” standing alone, carries no precise meaning’ therefore, it is difficult to understand how this decision was made. One cannot judge another’s character based solely on one letter, rather, the whole character must be known and all facts considered.
- [11]It was against this background that the application came before me for hearing. It is hoped that the reasoning as I have expressed it herein assists Ms Pivotto to understand the basis upon which the Decision was made, albeit one which now I have set-aside.
The Nature of this Review Proceeding
- [12]This Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review the Decision arises under the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld)[1], it being read together with the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act).[2] In constituting the Tribunal for this proceeding, I was required to exercise this jurisdiction in accordance with both those pieces of legislation and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (the HR Act). In doing so I had all the functions of the decision-maker in terms of the decision to be made.[3]
- [13]The purpose of the review was to produce the correct and preferable decision, such to be reached by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.[4] It was not necessary for me to consider whether the respondent’s decision-maker had made an error in making the Decision, rather the focus was on the cogency of Ms Pivotto’s case as presented to this Tribunal. At the conclusion of the review, I was empowered to confirm or amend the Decision, set aside the Decision and substitute my own decision, or set aside the Decision and return the matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration with directions I considered to be appropriate.[5]
The Issues
- [14]The background facts gave rise to a singular issue to be decided in this proceeding. That is whether, on the premise of public interest, Ms Pivotto was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. As I discussed it with the respondent’s representative during the hearing after he had concluded his opening remarks, this could be dealt with by answering a single question, namely – ‘Does Ms Pivotto hold sovereign citizen ideologies ?’. If the answer to that was yes, then the Decision must be affirmed, although I say something more about that later in these reasons. If the answer to that was no, then the Decision must be set-aside.
- [15]That something more, which for the sake of completeness and hopefully future reference when the issue of the sovereign citizen argument rears its head, is the extent to which more than just the expression of sovereign citizen ideologies may be required in some circumstances where a decision-maker is being called up to consider the discretion which is enshrined in the Weapons Act to revoke a firearms licence.
The Relevant Law
Weapons Act 1990 (Qld)
- [16]The primary piece of legislation under which the issues in this proceeding fell to be decided is the Weapons Act, the fundamental principles and objects of which are to:[6]
- Make weapons possession and use subordinate to the need to ensure public and individual safety; and
- Prevent the misuse of weapons.
- [17]The object of this Act is achieved by, amongst other means, establishing an integrated licencing and registration scheme for all for all firearms.[7] That scheme provides a number of relevant provisions which can be succinctly described as follows:
- In terms of the issuing of licences to persons permitting them to use firearms, a licence may be issued to an individual only if the person, amongst other things is a fit and proper person to hold a licence;[8]
- In determining whether an individual is a fit and proper person, what must be considered amongst other things is the public interest;[9] and
- When the authorised officer is satisfied that, amongst other things the licence holder is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence, a revocation notice may be given to the licensee revoking the licence.[10]
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)
- [18]There is also the application of the HR Act that I was required to consider, the main objective of which is to protect and promote fundamental human rights.
- [19]However the rights listed therein are not exclusive, nor are the rights protected thereunder absolute. They may be limited, but only as far as is reasonable and justifiable.[11]
- [20]In deciding whether a limit is reasonable and justifiable relevant factors include inter-alia the nature of the human right, the nature and purpose of the limitation, whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the importance of preserving the human right, considering the nature and extent of the limitation on the human right, and the balance between the last two points. That being said, all statutory provisions, as far as is possible consistent with their purposes, must be interpreted in a way that is compatible, or most compatible, with human rights.[12] Such includes the provisions of the Weapons Act.
- [21]In my opinion a number of human rights were relevant in this proceeding. Such included Ms Pivotto’s right to recognition and equality before the law, her right to freedom of thought and belief, her right to freedom of expression, and her right to reputation.[13] But in my opinion there was a competing right that could not be overlooked, and one that permissibly was considered by me that may limit Ms Pivotto’s rights in the circumstances of her seeking to be the holder of a firearms licence. That is the right that every member of the public has to be assured of safety, such which in my opinion falls with the HRA under each of the right to privacy and the right to security of person.[14] Thus, a decision under the Weapons Act that Ms Pivotto was not a fit and proper person, and/or that it was not in the public interest for her to hold a firearms licence, such which might be said to infringe her rights to which I have just referred, will nevertheless be compatible with human rights. This is because, despite any limit the decision places on her human rights, the decision will be justified by the factors outlined under s 13 of the HR Act. This is because, amongst other things, any limitation on Ms Pivotto’s human rights remains consistent with the principles and object of the Weapons Act, being the need to ensure public and individual safety.
- [22]That being so, it must be recalled that weapons possession and use are subordinate to the need to ensure public and individual safety which in my opinion it being a consideration to which all other factors must yield. Thus, to the extent Ms Pivotto is afforded a right under the HR Act, in making the correct and preferable decision, by application of the Weapons Act in conjunction with the HR Act such right must yield to the rights of the greater public and other individuals in a manner permissible under the Weapons Act consistent with the principles and objects of that legislation. That would include the making of a finding that Ms Pivotto demonstrated a holding of sovereign citizen ideologies and as such or otherwise it was not in the public interest for her to hold such a licence, and as such was not a fit and proper person, so as to deny her an entitlement to a firearms licence. Such is consistent with s 13 of the HR Act.
- [23]Notwithstanding my decision in this proceeding was that Ms Pivotto did not hold such ideologies and so it could not be found she was not a fit and proper person, I applied that approach given that it was open for me to find that she was not a fit and proper person and/or it would not be in the public interest for her to hold such a licence.
The Evidence
- [24]As it was required to do, the respondent provided its ‘List of Materials’ dated 2 January 2024 in which it included a copy of the Decision, the Challenge Letter, and a record of Ms Pivotto’s traffic record showing the speeding infringement. It also included extracts from the Weapons Act and references to a number of decisions of the Courts, which as I understood the purpose of same was to say they were relevant to the decision that was required to be made.[15]
- [25]Ms Pivotto similarly provided a small bundle of documents as she was required to do. This is as filed on 23 June 2024. It described in relatively brief terms the circumstances that brought about the fine and the later attendance by Queensland Police Officers at her residence, at which time she was served with the Revocation Notice and her firearms were seized. Therein she also included copies of other correspondence from the Police Service and a copy of a receipt showing payment of the fine.[16] Within the page entitled ‘Order of Events’, Ms Pivotto made these statements:
I was doubtful that I had really exceeded the speed limit by the amount stated and had previously heard of other people contesting speeding fines they thought were incorrect. I started to do some research on the Know Your Rights website, which advocates to assist people in ensuring Australia’s laws are properly applied and carries an endorsement from former Western Australian Senator Rod Culleton. I had read and watched videos on how to contest a speeding fine by writing a letter to the officer who issued the fine. After some research, I then wrote a letter quoting what I had read on the website as well as quoting the Constitution guidance. …
… I never thought sending a letter to contest the fine would have such negative consequences of affect my firearms licence in any way as I am a law abiding citizen and thus was my first offence. I wasn’t aware of the term “sovereign citizen”, which is not mentioned on the Know Your Rights website, and my research for this appeal reveals that it appears to relate to beliefs that I have never held. I quoted the Know Your Rights website and the Constitution as that was the advance that was given. …
- [26]Ms Pivotto also provided, and sought to rely on, five written reference from persons speaking to her character. Two of these are undated, the other three are dated in November 2023.[17] None of the persons who provided these references were presented as witnesses in the hearing.
- [27]Ms Pivotto was extensively cross-examined by Mr Ferguson for the respondent. In my opinion it is unnecessary for me to set out in great detail that examination, it being sufficient to note the following that became very apparent during that examination:
- The comments and views expressed in the Challenge Letter were for the most part Ms Pivotto quoting from what she had read on the Know Your Rights website, without any understanding of what it meant;
- She accepts the arguments she was making in the Challenge Letter were not correct;
- She accepts that the Queensland Government has the power to make laws, that the Queensland Police Services has the power to enforce laws, and that this Tribunal has the power to make decisions;
- She now accepts that the content of the Know Your Rights website is not correct; and
- She does not hold herself out as a sovereign citizen.
- [28]What also became apparent during the cross-examination is that Ms Pivotto had contravened the Weapons Act in two ways whilst holding her firearms licence, namely:
- She left her rifle in her car whilst her car was parked in the carpark of her home unit, albeit whilst the car was locked and the bolt of the rifle removed and locked in the car’s glovebox; and
- She uses her rifle for work purposes, such not permissible under the conditions of her licence such which was limited to recreational use and at a shooting club.
- [29]When these were brought to Ms Pivotto’s attention during the hearing she explained that her understanding of what she had done was correct in terms of securing her rifle, and in terms of work use of the rifle which she thought was covered by the recreational condition. But following the explanation given to her by Mr Ferguson as to the meaning of the legislation, she accepted neither was correct and that she had contravened the legislation.
The Submissions
- [30]In her closing submissions, Ms Pivotto stated the following:
- She relied on what she thought was a credible website;
- Her actions in sending the Challenge Letter was based on her own research and the thought that was what she had to do and the basis for any challenge;
- She accepts that her actions were misguided, misconceived, and based on ignorance;
- She does not claim to be a sovereign citizen.
- [31]In his closing submissions, Mr Ferguson raised these points for my consideration:
- The Challenge Letter clearly demonstrates sovereign citizen beliefs. It is the sort of rhetoric engaged in by a person holding such beliefs;
- The Queensland Police Service must be satisfied that a person who wishes to hold a firearms licence is a fit and proper person to do so. Whilst the Police Service is aware of the two contraventions of the Weapons Act by Ms Pivotto, she had explained her understanding was that what she did was correct, and if that is accepted as being true then it is another example of Ms Pivotto’s naivety;
- Whilst the persons giving the character references were not presented as witnesses, the content of those documents is consistent with what was observed of Ms Pivotto during the hearing;
- Overall, based on what he heard from and observed of Ms Pivotto during the course of the hearing nothing gave him cause for concern other than the content of the Challenge Letter.
Discussion on the Issues
- [32]In an article published in the Queensland Law Society’s journal ‘Proctor’ in September 2021 the following description of the term ‘sovereign citizen’ was given:[18]
The origins of the sovereign citizen … are etched in history. It is said to have first begun in America during the patriot movement and draws upon central tenants of social and political philosophy – the social contract, natural rights and the theory of the state.
Its anti-government platforms are strongly embedded with a mixture of conspiracy theories, constitutional re-interpretations and alternative versions of history.
In a nutshell, sovereign citizens are people who believe that the laws of the state do not apply to them as they have revoked their ‘consent’ for this to occur. They consider themselves to be ‘natural’ persons – born with their own natural rights that are unable to be constrained by governments. Often they refer to the ‘common law’ as being the only law they recognise as legitimate.
Usually they oppose the very foundations of our democracy and rely on pseudo legal language, piecemeal, cryptic and often incorrect legal arguments to assert their independence.
…
The introduction of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) has seen an increase in human rights arguments. This is a good thing, even if some of those early arguments have been misguided. We are all learning a new area of human rights law.
However, the sovereign citizen argument is a different beast and should not be confused with the proper application of existing human rights law.
- [33]Shortly before the publication of that article, Cash QC DCJ on the District Court of Queensland had cause to consider the sovereign citizen argument in a matter before him in R v Sweet wherein the applicant, having been charged with offences under the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), argued that he constituted two separate legal entities, which his honour noted was the sovereign citizen argument of the strawman duality, and as such the applicant submitted that the indictment had charged the incorrect entity.
- [34]The following short extract from his Honour’s reasons is instructive in understanding the manner in which the Court dealt with the sovereign citizen argument on that occasion:[19]
[2] The applicant now applies for these charges to be dismissed. The essence of the applicant’s argument is that he possesses two distinct personas. One the ‘real live flesh and blood man’ and the other a ‘straw man’ or ‘dummy corporation’. The former is designated in the applicant’s material as ‘Kym-Anthony:’ and the latter as KYM ANTHONY SWEET. According to the applicant’s argument, the real person is not subject to the laws of Queensland, and the charges should be dismissed.
[3] Merely setting out the argument is sufficient to show it is nonsense. It is apparent that the applicant is one of a group of people who for some years have attempted, universally without success, to avoid the operation of laws with which they do not wish to comply. The term ‘organised pseudo legal commercial argument’ litigants (OPCA) was coined by Rooke ACJ in Meades v Meades to describe adherents to these discredited theories. The ideas promoted by OPCA litigants emerged, of course, in the United States. They have since spread to most parts of the common law world, including Queensland. Recognising that the arguments presented by OPCA litigants are largely incoherent, if not incomprehensible, courts have been increasingly willing to dismiss their claims summarily.
[4] The ‘straw man’ argument has its origins in the premise that human beings do not inherently possess a legal personality. Instead, some separate legal identity is imposed upon them (through birth certificates and the like) by the government. This process creates a kind of contract, but one that can be repudiated by the human being, usually through a declaration or affidavit … and ‘surrendering’ the birth certificate. The purported effect of such repudiation is to render the human being immune to the laws of the relevant polity. The processes adopted by OPCA litigants to achieve this repudiation can be arcane. Some of the language used, and documents relied upon, resemble spells or incantations.
[6] In Australia, a human being is also a legal person. An adult human being with full capacity can sue and be sued. They are subject to the criminal laws of this state. These fundamental propositions cannot be doubted. It is true that a natural person can create a legal entity that has a distinct legal personality – such entities are commonly called companies – but this is an adjunct to, rather than a replacement for, the legal personality of the human being. One way of illustrating why this must be so is to consider the consequences of the ability to ‘renounce’ legal personhood. The law has at times recognised categories of person who did not possess a legal personality. These categories included, before 1833, slaves, who were regarded as chattel property, could be bought and sold, and who had no rights under the law. At times women and children were thought not to possess a legal personality. Blackstone regarded children as the property of their fathers, and women have been regarded as chattels without a distinct legal personality. The fates of people who were in these categories were rarely pleasant. If the applicant were somehow able to renounce his legal personality, he would become a human being without rights. He would be mere property. Such an outcome would be antithetical to our society and system of laws.
- [35]Such bears a similarity to the argument raised by Ms Pivotto in the Challenge Letter noting that in that letter Ms Pivotto also asserted what she said was her ‘strawman’s name’ in capital letters, and used the language of a ‘living human’ not being subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Thus the reasoning and discussion by Cash QC DCJ is apposite to Ms Pivotto’s situation in this proceeding.
- [36]Yet when questioned during cross-examination about what she meant by these statements, Ms Pivotto could not explain it. The same can be said about the balance of what was contained in the Challenge Letter. Her only explanation for using the language and form of argument was that she followed what was on the website. This is clear evidence of Ms Pivotto’s naivety.
- [37]Having observed her during the hearing and listening to her answers to the questions posed of her by Mr Ferguson, I was readily able to conclude that she did not understand the meaning of that which she had written in compiling the Challenge Letter. She did so in total ignorance of what it meant and the effect it might have on her in the circumstances of how she may be viewed by the law. That being so, I accept she does not hold sovereign citizen ideologies. She stupidly embarked on a serious step without in any way endeavouring to properly inform herself of the correctness of what she was doing. She charged in totally blind as to its meaning and effect.
- [38]For these reasons, given the manner in which the issues were framed as I discussed them with Mr Ferguson and Ms Pivotto at the start of the hearing, and moreover what I heard from Mr Ferguson in his closing submissions about not holding any concerns about Ms Pivotto following what he had heard and observed during the hearing, it is not necessary for me to discuss in any great detail the issue of whether Ms Pivotto is a fit and proper person in terms of the Weapons Act. However for completeness I will do so.
- [39]In the much cited passage on the issue of what is a ‘fit and proper person’ from the High Court’s decision in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond, Toohey and Gaudron JJ observed:[20]
The expression “fit and proper person", standing alone, carries no precise meaning. It takes its meaning from its context, from the activities in which the person is or will be engaged and the ends to be served by those activities. The concept of “fit and proper" cannot be entirely divorced from the conduct of the person who is or will be engaging in those activities. However, depending on the nature of the activities, the question may be whether improper conduct has occurred, whether it is likely to occur, whether it can be assumed that it will not occur, or whether the general community will have confidence that it will not occur. The list is not exhaustive but it does indicate that, in certain contexts, character (because it ·provides indication of likely future conduct) or reputation. (because it provides indication of public perception as to likely future conduct) may be sufficient to ground a finding that a person is not fit and proper to undertake the activities in question.
- [40]But how does this relate to the issue of public interest as being a basis upon which a finding of ‘fit and proper person’ can be made?
- [41]
The specific meaning and application of ‘public interest’ can vary depending on the context and the legislation or legal principles involved. Generally, it serves as a guiding principle to ensure that actions, decisions, and laws are designed to benefit society as a whole and address broader community needs
- [42]The Member went on to express these observations, which I respectfully adopt as part of my reasons in this proceeding due to their succinctness and clarity:[22]
In Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Ltd v O'Connor & Ors, Wilcox CJ and Keeley J, explained:
The purpose of the reference to ‘public interest’ is to ensure that private interests are not the only matters taken into account; to make clear that the interests of the whole community are matters for the Commission’s consideration. The effect of the reference is to amplify the ‘scope and purpose’ of the legislation.8
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Kaye, Fullagar and Ormiston JJ), in Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith, earlier held:
... The public interest is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order of society and for the well being (sic) of its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct from the interest of an individual or individuals ...
The term public interest is an inherently broad concept giving a decision-maker the ability to have regard to a wide range of factors in choosing whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual. It allows for issues going beyond the character of a person to be considered, including concerns in relation to public protection, public safety, and public confidence in the administration of the licensing system.
- [43]Returning to Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond, shortly after the passage to which I referred earlier, their Honours Toohey and Gaudron JJ also expanded on the points made therein by reference to what may be viewed as the ‘public interest’ connection. Therein they discussed, in the context of the issue before the Court being a commercial broadcasting licence, the public expectations of a licence holder. In doing so they made these observations:[23]
Commercial broadcasting plays a significant role in the dissemination of information and ideas. That dissemination is vital to the maintenance of a free and democratic society…. A commercial broadcasting licence thus carries with it an obligation to the community. It also carries with it the potential for powerful influence. The community is entitled to confidently expect that a licensee will discharge its obligation and, in particular, that the potential for influence will not be abused. Within this context it is necessarily sufficient to ground a finding that a licensee is not a fit and proper person to hold a commercial licence that the community could not or would not have confidence that the licensee would discharge that obligation. Equally it is sufficient to ground a finding that the licensee is no longer fit and proper that the community could or would no longer have that confidence. Those questions are apt to be answered by reference to the character and reputation of the licensee.
- [44]These observations are apposite to any consideration of whether a person wishing to hold a firearms licence is a fit and proper person when considering the issue of public interest. This is because of the principles and objects of the Act as I noted them earlier, namely that weapons possession and use are subordinate to the need for public and individual safety. The community is entitled to confidently expect that a person holding a firearms licence would discharge that inherent obligation to ensure public and individual safety. That is the ‘public interest’ element.
- [45]All that being so, in the circumstances of a person holding sovereign citizen beliefs and thus considering themselves not to be bound by the law as imposed across the community, in this instance the Weapons Act, in my opinion that confidence could be eroded. But is that enough to conclude that a person who holds such beliefs not be a fit and proper person in terms of the Act?
- [46]The answer to that is found in the following passage from the decision of McGill DCJ in Philips v Woolcock wherein his Honour was concerned with an earlier version of the Weapons Act, albeit in terms of provisions essentially identical to the relevant sections as they now appear in the legislation.[24] That matter concerned a licence holder who had been convicted of offences relating to the misuse of drugs, which in turn gave rise to a consideration of the ‘mental and physical fitness of the person’ under what is now s 10B(1)(a) of the Act. His Honour expressed these observations relevant to the exercise of discretion given under s 29 of the Act to revoke a firearms licence, that effectively being the discretion this Tribunal is being asked to exercise when considering an application to review a decision made under that provision:[25]
… The object of the Act is to prevent the misuse of weapons: s. 3(2). The discretion given in s. 29 must be exercised with reference to that objective, no other considerations being specified by the legislation. All the Magistrate was concerned with was the mental fitness of the licensee, and he ought to have been considering whether there was some aspect of his mental state which gave rise to some real risk of misuse of weapons by him. A propensity to display violence towards others might well lead to such a conclusion, but merely getting angry occasionally (not accompanied by violent behaviour to others) in my opinion is too remote and does not give rise to a logical concern about the fitness of the licencee (sic) because of a propensity to misuse weapons.
- [47]Thus, in my opinion the proper test is to consider whether the circumstances of the licence holder were such as to lead to the conclusion that there was some real risk of the misuse of weapons by her. It may very well be the case that there could be such a risk and so a concern that leads to the public interest test being applicable. However in my opinion that concern must be found in something more than merely the expression of sovereign citizen ideologies. As McGill DCJ continued in his reasons therein:[26]
It is also necessary to bear in mind that there was other evidence which spoke in positive terms of the responsibility of the appellant in relation to the use of firearms. The reliability of that evidence was not challenged, and even if the other matters could give rise to some slight concern that ought certainly to have been outweighed by evidence that the appellant had behaved properly and responsibly in his use of firearms. This was important evidence because it showed that, when he had access to firearms, he had not misused them. If a person already has a licence, and therefore has access to a firearm, he necessarily has a greater opportunity to misuse it than a person who is merely applying for a licence. In my opinion a track record of absence of misuse of firearms provides a much better indication of the likely behaviour of a licensee in respect of such matters than any of the circumstances relied on by the magistrate here
- [48]I consider that observation to be apposite to the circumstances Ms Pivotto found herself in, albeit one of her own making given her decision to issue the Challenge Letter. On the material before me it can properly be said that up to the point of the hearing Ms Pivotto had been the holder of the Firearms Licence for almost eleven months without any reported misuse of a firearm. Whilst that is only a relatively short period of time, it is still sufficient to indicate to some degree her understanding of the obligation to ensure public and individual safety. Albeit the engaged in two actions dealing with her weapons which were not precisely in accordance with the requirements of the Act, she did demonstrate at least some understanding of that obligation by having secured her rifle in her locked car with the bolt removed and further secured separately in the glove box of the car, and not otherwise using her rifle in a manner outside which she thought to be the ambit of her licence condition. That is, she did not act recklessly or misuse her weapon in any substantial way to put the public or an individual in danger.
- [49]But moreover, her character references together with her demonstration of humility and understanding of her naivety during the hearing before me was sufficient to show me that she would be aware of that obligation. In my opinion this would be sufficient to demonstrate that, even in the circumstances of her holding sovereign citizen ideologies, she would still fulfill her obligations and not misuse a firearm.
- [50]Whilst premised in facts different from those before me, the same approach was applied by the Appeal division of this Tribunal in CAT v Queensland Police Service wherein the following observations were expressed, in part in reference to earlier decisions of the District Court or this Tribunal:[27]
The relevant principles in Stower were succinctly stated in Magarry:
a) It is of extreme importance to bear in mind the object of the Act which is stated in s 3(2) to be “to prevent the misuse of weapons”.
b) The proper exercise of discretion would require the decision maker to evaluate the evidence of the character of the applicant.
c) The proper exercise of discretion would then lead to the questions “in these circumstances is there any real prospect of the applicant misusing his weapons so that his licence should be suspended? Is his right to possess firearms a real risk to public and individual safety?”
- [51]Shortly thereafter the Appeal Tribunal also made this observation in reference to two decisions of the High Court:[28]
The question whether a person is a fit and proper person is one of value judgment. A person’s fitness is to be gauged in the light of the nature and purpose of the activities that person will undertake.
- [52]Once again these observations are apposite to the circumstances as they were before me.
- [53]With those observations in mind, the position may be expressed in another way. In my opinion the mere holding of sovereign citizen ideologies would not be, of itself, sufficient to warrant the exercise of the discretion to revoke a firearms licence in the absence of some other evidence which points to the risk of misuse. But that is not to say that the mere holding of such ideologies would not be sufficient to warrant not issuing a firearms license in the first place. It seems to me that it would be sufficient of itself unless an applicant for such a licence could demonstrate awareness of the need for public and individual safety, and that he/she would take the requisite steps to ensure such safety.
Conclusion
- [54]On the evidence that was before me at the hearing, it is readily apparent that the Challenge Letter as authored and sent by Ms Pivotto in her misguided efforts to challenge the speeding fine demonstrated, on its face, sovereign citizen ideologies. But, as she explained to me, and I accepted, she was naïve in adopting what she thought was correct information from a website. Put simply, not only was it naïve, but it was also a stupid and reckless effort on her behalf.
- [55]I also accepted that on her explanations given, and her demonstration of humility during the hearing, she did not hold any such ideologies. That of itself was sufficient to dispose of her application and for me to reach the conclusion that the respondent’s decision should be set aside.
- [56]However, there was also the absence of any evidence before me to suggest that Ms Pivotto, even if she did subscribe in some small way to such ideologies, would be a risk to the public at large by the misuse of weapons. Such is, as I have discussed it herein a necessary element to have established in terms of exercise of the discretion under s 29 of the Weapons Act to have revoked her licence. Her failure to have properly complied with the Act in terms of the two contraventions pointed out by Mr Ferguson, even once again accepting her naivety in her understanding that her actions were correct, were not in my opinion sufficient to reach the conclusion that she would misuse a weapon. Thus, even if I am wrong about the sovereign citizen argument, it would not be enough on its own to justify the revocation of Ms Pivotto’s licence.
- [57]For all these reasons I concluded that the respondent’s decision to have revoked her firearms licence should be set aside. An order was made to that effect.
Footnotes
[1] See s 142(1)(e) therein.
[2] See Chapter 2 Division 3 therein.
[3] QCAT Act s 19.
[4] QCAT Act s 20.
[5] QCAT Act s 24.
[6] Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) s 3.
[7] Ibid s 4(b).
[8] Ibid s 10(2)(e).
[9] Ibid s 10B(1)(d).
[10] Ibid s 29(1)(d).
[11] HR Act s 13(1). The factors for determining what is reasonable and justifiable are set out in s 13(2) of the Act.
[12] Ibid s 48(1) & (2).
[13] Ibid s 15, s 20, s 21 and s 25.
[14] Ibid s 25 and s 29.
[15] Ex 1.
[16] Ex 2.
[17] Ex 3.
[18] Queensland Law Society ‘Proctor’ September 2021 by Ella Scoles.
[19] R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216. Footnotes omitted.
[20] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 380.
[21] Willingham v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCAT 361, [30].
[22] Ibid, [31] to [33]. Footnotes omitted.
[23] Ibid, 382. Citations and Footnotes omitted.
[24] Philips v Woolcock [2002] QDC 035.
[25] Ibid, [29]. Emphasis added.
[26] Ibid at [32]. Emphasis added.
[27] CAT v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCAT 43,[26]. Footnotes omitted. The references therein to Stower is to Stower v Smart [2007] QDC 004, and to Magarry is to Magarry v Queensland Police Service Weapons Licensing Branch [2012] QCAT 378.
[28] Ibid,[31]. Footnotes omitted. The authorities referenced were Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 and Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v NSW (No 2) (Transport Case) (1955) 93 CLR 127.