Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QCAT
  3. 2025
  4. Sheppard v Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos - [2025] QCAT 331

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Sheppard v Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos[2025] QCAT 331

Sheppard v Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos[2025] QCAT 331

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Sheppard v Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos [2025] QCAT 331

PARTIES:

karissa leone sheppard

(applicant)

robert anthony sheppard

(applicant)

v

piryani pty ltd t/as galaxy autos

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

MVL253-23

MATTER TYPE:

Motor vehicle matter

DELIVERED ON:

2 September 2025

HEARING DATE:

21 May 2025; final submissions filed 19 June 2025

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Senior Member Brown

ORDERS:

  1. Karissa Leone Sheppard and Robert Anthony Sheppard must, at their expense, deliver up the Holden Colorado motor vehicle to Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos within 7 days of the date of these orders.
  2. Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos must pay to Karissa Leone Sheppard and Robert Anthony Sheppard $30,223.07 within 14 days of the delivery up of the Holden Colorado.

CATCHWORDS:

TRADE AND COMMERCE – COMPETITION, FAIR TRADING AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION – CONSUMER PROTECTION – GUARANTEES, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES IN CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS – GUARANTEES, CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES – Where vehicle advertised as being in mechanically perfect condition prior to purchase – where vehicle engine suffered catastrophic failure and engine required replacement three months after purchase – where respondent refused to allow return of vehicle and to refund purchase price – where worn components in engine would have been present when applicants purchased vehicle – where respondent failed to comply with consumer guarantees under Australian Consumer Law – where failure to comply was a major failure as a reasonable consumer would not have purchased the vehicle if acquainted with the pre-existing defect – where applicants gave notice of their intention to reject the goods within the rejection period – where claims for purchase price, towing fees, loan interest payments and insurance allowed – where costs limited to recovery of prescribed fee

Australian Consumer Law, s 54(2), s 54(3), s 259, s 260, s 262, s 263

Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s 50A, s 50C

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 102, s 110, s 111

APS Satellite Pty Ltd (formerly known as “Sky Mesh Pty Ltd”) v Ipstar Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1898

Effem Foods Ltd v Nicholls [2004] NSWCA 332

Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd T/As Sports Auto Group [2015] FCA 1127

Hinterland Express Pty Ltd v Inchcape European Automotive Pty Ltd & Anor [2023] QCATA 130

Howarth & Anor v Biscamoss Pty Ltd [2022] QCATA 72

Jarmain v Market Direct Group Pty Ltd t/as MDC Camper Trailers & Offroad Caravans [2022] QCAT 375

Knox v Tait Motors Pty Ltd t/as Tait Auto Group [2021] QCATA 87

Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney (2003) 130 FCR 182

Sazdanoff-Haynes v MLS Wholesales Pty Ltd [2023] QCAT 37

Vautin v BY Winddown, Inc. (formerly Bertram Yachts) (No 4) [2018] FCA 426

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

Self-represented

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    This proceeding involves a dispute about the purchase of a Holden Colorado utility by Mr and Mrs Sheppard from Galaxy Autos. The Sheppards say that approximately three months after purchase the vehicle broke down. The Colorado has not been operable since that time. The Sheppards say that there has been a major failure by Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos (‘Galaxy Autos’) to comply with the consumer guarantees found in the Australian Consumer Law. They seek to recover damages which include the purchase price of the Colorado.

What do the parties say?

  1. [2]
    The parties filed statements of evidence although the written evidence was confined to responding to a report by an expert assessor engaged by the Tribunal to report on the Colorado. Mr and Mrs Sheppard gave evidence at the hearing. Mr Piryani gave evidence for Galaxy Autos. The oral evidence of the parties traversed a much broader range of issues than the written evidence.
  2. [3]
    In addition to the evidence by the parties, before the Tribunal was a report by an assessor engaged by the Tribunal, Mr Kovalev. Mr Kovalev also gave evidence at the hearing.
  3. [4]
    Ms Sheppard’s evidence is that Mr Sheppard required a utility for work purposes. Mr Sheppard found the Colorado on the website carsales.com.au. The diesel powered vehicle was a 2013 model and had travelled just over 150,000 kilometres. The Sheppards had obtained pre-approval from a lender for the purchase of a vehicle. Mr Sheppard attended at Galaxy Autos and inspected the Colorado on 11 May 2023. Mrs Sheppard says that Mr Sheppard spoke with Mr Piryani who advised Mr Sheppard that the Colorado was in mechanically perfect condition and came with a 15 month warranty. Mrs Sheppard says that Mr Sheppard agreed to purchase the vehicle, completed the transaction and drove the Colorado home. Mrs Sheppard says that the day after Mr Sheppard purchased the Colorado they noticed that the driver’s side window winding mechanism was faulty. They also noted that the fuel cap was broken and the wiper water nozzles were not working. Mrs Sheppard says that the Colorado was returned to Galaxy Autos on 14 May 2023 and left with the dealer until it was picked up by Mr Sheppard on 26 May. When Mr Sheppard arrived at Galaxy Autos to collect the vehicle it was apparent that the issues about which the Sheppards had complained had not been attended to. After an unsuccessful attempt by Galaxy Autos to address the issue with the window and the replacement of the fuel cap, Mr Sheppard drove the Colorado home. Thereafter, says Mrs Sheppard, Mr Sheppard drove the Colorado on ten occasions from the Gold Coast to Toowoomba. Mrs Sheppard says on 17 August 2023 Mr Sheppard was driving the vehicle when it broke down. Mrs Sheppard says that Mr Sheppard telephoned her to advise her of what had happened. Mrs Sheppard immediately contacted Mr Piryani who advised her to contact the warranty provider. Mrs Sheppard was advised by the warranty provider to have the vehicle transported to an approved repairer which was subsequently done. Mrs Sheppard was advised by the repairer that it did not appear that the vehicle failure was the result of anything Mr Sheppard had or had not done and that it was unusual for a Colorado to fail in the manner the vehicle had. The repairer advised the Sheppards that the Colorado’s engine required replacement which would cost $10,770. The repairer advised that in order to provide a report to the warranty provider about the cause of the engine failure the engine would need to be dismantled at a cost of $3,500.
  4. [5]
    On 24 August 2023 Mrs Sheppard sent an email to Mr Piryani advising that the Sheppards intended to return the Colorado to Galaxy Autos and seeking a refund of the purchase price paid. Mrs Sheppard says that she spoke with Mr Piryani who advised that he did not want the Colorado returned. Mrs Sheppard then made arrangements to have the Colorado transported back to their home.
  5. [6]
    Mrs Sheppard says that on 28 August 2023 Mr Piryani sent an email in which he advised that if the Sheppards purchased a replacement engine, Galaxy Autos would fit the engine at no cost to the Sheppards. This reflected Mr Piryani’s earlier verbal advice to Mrs Sheppard.
  6. [7]
    Mr Sheppard’s evidence largely reflected that given by Mrs Sheppard. Mr Sheppard said that between the time he picked up the Colorado from Galaxy Autos on 26 May 2023 until the vehicle broke down, no issues were experienced. Mr Sheppard said that on 17 August 2023 he was driving the Colorado home from work when he noticed a tapping sound. After becoming aware of the noise, Mr Sheppard drove a further 100 metres to 200 metres and found a place to pull over at which point the tapping sound became a loud knocking noise and the engine stopped. Mr Sheppard inspected the engine and noticed a burnt oil smell and steam coming out of the engine area. He was thereafter unable to start the engine again.
  7. [8]
    Mr Piryani’s evidence is that after the Colorado broke down he spoke with Mrs Sheppard and advised her that the dealer warranty had expired but that Galaxy Autos would fit a replacement engine at no cost if the Sheppards provided the engine. Mr Piryani agrees that Mrs Sheppard sought a refund of the purchase price paid. Mr Piryani says that when the Colorado was sold to Mr Sheppard the vehicle had travelled 150,930 kilometres and the service sticker on the vehicle windscreen noted that the next service was due at 150,000 kilometres. Mr Piryani says that the Sheppards failed to have the vehicle serviced after purchase. He says that having the 150,000 km service carried out was not an obligation imposed on Galaxy Autos and was the responsibility of the Sheppards. Mr Piryani says that the service history of the Colorado was available and known to Mr Sheppard. Mr Piryani agreed that the vehicle was described by Galaxy Autos in the online listing as being in perfect mechanical condition. Mr Piryani says that the fact Mr Sheppard continued to drive the Colorado for 7,000 kilometres past the scheduled service interval could have contributed to the engine failure.

The evidence of the independent assessor

  1. [9]
    Mr Thomas Kovalev inspected the Colorado and provided a report.[1] In the report Mr Kovalev says:
    1. The engine of the Colorado failed 3 months and 13 days after purchase by Mr Sheppard during which time the vehicle had travelled 6,079 kilometres;
    2. No service records for the vehicle were available until 90,000 kilometres;
    3. The 105,000 kilometre service was carried out at 2,312 kilometres over the recommended interval;
    4. The 120,000 kilometre service was not carried out;
    5. The 135,000 kilometre service was carried out at 7,394 kilometres over the recommended interval;
    6. The 150,000 kilometre service had not been carried out;
    7. At the time of engine failure, the Colorado had 7,708 kilometres over the recommended interval;
    8. It is likely that internal engine failure has occurred;
    9. The likely cause of the engine failure is one or more of the big end bearings failing which caused the connecting rod to seize on the crankshaft and or caused the connecting rod to fracture;
    10. The type of failure would be deemed premature and was likely due to insufficient servicing, specifically the lack of regular oil changes;
    11. The engine oil’s lubricating and viscosity were likely compromised considering the vehicle had travelled 7,708 kilometres over the recommended service interval, contributing to the engine failure;
    12. Another contributing factor to the engine failure would likely be the history of irregular oil changes which accelerated engine wear;
    13. If the vehicle had undergone regular oil changes in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations for all prior service intervals, with only the last service overdue by 7,708 kilometres, the engine would not have failed;
    14. The engine would need to be removed and dismantled to determine the exact cause of failure.
  2. [10]
    Mr Kovalev’s oral evidence at the hearing was that the worn componentry in the engine leading to the ultimate engine failure would have been present when Mr Sheppard purchased the Colorado. Mr Kovalev characterised the engine failure as catastrophic and said that the type of engine failure experienced by the vehicle was not normal for that particular type of motor.
  3. [11]
    I found both the Sheppards and Mr Piryani to be witnesses doing their best to recall events truthfully and accurately. Where the evidence of the parties diverges, I prefer the evidence of the Sheppards who had carefully documented the relevant events and had a more detailed recollection of events, particularly Mrs Sheppard.

Consideration

Was the Colorado of acceptable quality?

  1. [12]
    The Sheppards’ claim may be understood as being one arising out of a major failure by Galaxy Autos to comply with the consumer warranties contained in the Australian Consumer Law and particularly the warranty that goods are of acceptable quality.
  2. [13]
    Section 50A of the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) vests the Tribunal with jurisdiction in relation to motor vehicles in respect of certain actions under the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’). The ACL is schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).
  3. [14]
    Section 54(1) of the ACL provides that, where a person supplies goods in trade or commerce, the goods are guaranteed to be of ‘acceptable quality’.  The time at which goods are to be of acceptable quality is the time at which the goods are supplied to the consumer.[2] Information available after the time of supply may be taken into account in deciding whether the goods were of acceptable quality at the time of supply.[3] Where the supplier claims that the failure arose after the goods were supplied, the onus is on the supplier to prove that this is the case.[4] Section 54 is not a guarantee of perfection.[5]
  4. [15]
    It is not contentious that the Colorado is within the meaning of ‘goods’ for the purposes of the relevant provisions of the ACL. Nor is it contentious that Galaxy Autos was a ‘supplier’.
  5. [16]
    Section 54(2) and s 54(3) of the ACL provide:
  1. Goods are of acceptable quality if they are as:
  1. fit for all the purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied; and
  1. acceptable in appearance and finish; and
  1. free from defects; and
  1. safe; and
  1. durable;

as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods (including any hidden defects of the goods), would regard as acceptable having regard to the matters in subsection (3).

  1. The matters for the purposes of subsection (2) are:
  1. the nature of the goods; and
  1. the price of the goods (if relevant); and
  1. any statements made about the goods on any packaging or label on the goods; and
  1. any representation made about the goods by the supplier or manufacturer of the goods; and
  1. any other relevant circumstances relating to the supply of the goods.
  1. [17]
    Mr Kovalev is an assessor appointed pursuant to the provisions of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’).[6] Mr Kovalev has given expert evidence in the proceeding.[7] I accept the evidence of Mr Kovalev. I find that:
    1. The Colorado’s engine failed on 17 August 2023;
    2. At the time the engine failed Mr Sheppard had driven the vehicle 6,079 kilometres since purchase just over three months prior;
    3. Service records for the vehicle, only available after 90,000 kilometres, indicate that:
      1. the 105,000 kilometre service was carried out at 2,312 kilometres over the recommended interval;
      2. the 120,000 kilometre service was not carried out;
      3. the 135,000 kilometre service was carried out at 7,394 kilometres over the recommended interval;
      4. the 150,000 kilometre service had not been carried out;
    4. The likely cause of the engine failure was one or more of the big end bearings failing which caused the connecting rod to seize on the crankshaft and or cause the connecting rod to fracture;
    5. The type of failure would be deemed premature and was likely due to insufficient servicing, specifically the lack of regular oil changes;
    6. The engine oil’s lubricating and viscosity were likely compromised considering the vehicle had travelled 7,708 kilometres over the recommended service interval, contributing to the engine failure;
    7. A further contributing factor to the engine failure would likely be the history of irregular oil changes which accelerated engine wear;
    8. If the vehicle had undergone regular oil changes in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations for all prior service intervals, with only the last service overdue by 7,708 kilometres, the engine would not have failed;
    9. the worn componentry in the engine leading to the ultimate engine failure was present when Mr Sheppard purchased the Colorado;
    10. the fact the Sheppards did not undertake the 150,000 kilometre scheduled service after purchase and before the engine failure did not cause or contribute to the engine failure in circumstances where, had the worn componentry not been present at the time of purchase, the failure to undertake the service of itself would not have resulted in the failure of the engine;
    11. The engine failure may be characterised as catastrophic and the type of engine failure experienced by the Colorado was not normal for that particular type of motor.
  2. [18]
    I take into consideration the following matters:
    1. The vehicle was a 2013 Holden Colorado LT RG diesel manual 4x4 utility, model year 2014 which had travelled 150,930 kilometres. The Colorado, while an older model vehicle, did not have excessive mileage, particularly for a diesel powered vehicle;
    2. The Sheppards paid $22,450.00 for the Colorado in addition to trading in their motor vehicle for an agreed allowance of $3,000. This was not an insubstantial sum;
    3. Galaxy Autos represented the Colorado to be in mechanically perfect condition.
  3. [19]
    The test as to whether goods are of acceptable quality is an objective one, being taken from the perspective of a reasonable consumer.[8] For goods to be of acceptable quality the goods must satisfy all of the matters at s 54(2) of the ACL. I find that a reasonable consumer, having regard to the matters referred to above, and fully acquainted with the true state and condition of the Colorado including the hidden defects in the engine would not regard the Colorado as being of acceptable quality. I find that at the time of supply, the Colorado was not free from defects and not durable. I find that Galaxy Autos breached s 54(1) of the ACL. 

Was there a ‘major failure’ by Galaxy Autos to comply with a consumer guarantee?

  1. [20]
    Section 259 of the ACL provides that if a supplier fails to comply with a consumer guarantee and the failure cannot be remedied or is a major failure, the consumer may reject the goods. By s 262(1)(a) a consumer is not entitled to notify a supplier that goods are rejected if the rejection period for the goods has ended. Section 262(b) sets out the meaning of ‘rejection period’.
  2. [21]
    A ‘major failure’ is defined in s 260 of the ACL as meaning:
  1. the goods would not have been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the failure; or
  1. the goods depart in one or more significant respects:
  1. if they were supplied by description—from that description; or
  1. if they were supplied by reference to a sample or demonstration model—from that sample or demonstration model; or
  1. the goods are substantially unfit for a purpose for which goods of the same kind are commonly supplied and they cannot, easily and within a reasonable time, be remedied to make them fit for such a purpose; or
  1. the goods are unfit for a disclosed purpose that was made known to:
  1. the supplier of the goods; or
  1. a person by whom any prior negotiations or arrangements in relation to the acquisition of the goods were conducted or made; and they cannot, easily and within a reasonable time, be remedied to make them fit for such a purpose; or
  1. the goods are not of acceptable quality because they are unsafe.
  1. [22]
    Not every failure in respect of goods will be a major failure.
  2. [23]
    Based on the findings I have made as to the condition of the Colorado when it was supplied, the failure by Galaxy Autos to comply with the guarantee under s 54 of the ACL was a major failure. The Colorado would not have been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the defects present in the engine of the Colorado. The nature of the defects in the engine of the Colorado leading to the catastrophic failure of the engine was so serious that no purchaser acquainted with the defects would have acquired the vehicle. The Colorado was described by Galaxy Autos as being in mechanically perfect condition. It was not. The true state of the engine departed significantly from this description. The Colorado is substantially unfit for the purpose for which motor vehicles are supplied, that is, as a mode of transportation. The Colorado cannot easily and within a reasonable time be remedied to make it fit for purpose. Clearly the entire engine of the vehicle requires replacement.

Was notice that the Sheppards rejected the Colorado given within the ‘rejection period’?

  1. [24]
    The Sheppards purchased the Colorado 11 May 2023. The Colorado broke down on 17 August 2023. On 24 August 2024 the Sheppards rejected the vehicle. The time between supply and rejection was approximately three and half months.
  2. [25]
    The ‘rejection period’ means the period from the time of the supply of the goods to the consumer within which it would be reasonable to expect the relevant failure to comply with a guarantee to become apparent having regard to:
  1. the type of goods; and
  1. the use to which a consumer is likely to put them; and
  1. the length of time for which it is reasonable for them to be used; and
  1. the amount of use to which it is reasonable for them to be put before such a failure becomes apparent.
  1. [26]
    The defect in the Colorado was not apparent until the vehicle broke down. The vehicle was then transported to the warranty provider’s preferred repairer who informed the Sheppards on 18 August 2024 that the engine had failed and required replacement.  The evidence is that the engine should not have failed. It was at this point that the Sheppards became aware that the guarantee of acceptable quality had not been complied with. The Sheppards gave notice to Galaxy Autos that they rejected the Colorado on 24 August 2024. I am satisfied that the Sheppards gave notice that they rejected the Colorado within the rejection period.
  2. [27]
    In the event of a notice of rejection following a major failure, s 263(2) of the ACL provides that the consumer must return the goods to the supplier. An exception to this requirement is found in s 263(2)(b) which provides that goods are not required to be returned if the goods cannot be returned, removed or transported without significant cost to the consumer because of the nature of the failure to comply with the guarantee to which the rejection relates, or the size, height, or method of attachment of the goods.
  3. [28]
    I find that the Sheppards attempted to return the vehicle to Galaxy Autos however Galaxy Autos rejected the attempt. That left the Sheppards with no choice but to return the vehicle to their home on the Gold Coast. The Sheppards would have incurred a significant cost in transporting the Colorado to Galaxy Autos even if the latter had not explicitly told the Sheppards not to return the Colorado to it. I find that the exception in s 263(2)(b) applies. Even if s 263(2)(b) did not apply, I find that it would be unreasonable to expect the Sheppards to return the Colorado to Galaxy Autos. Had they done so, Galaxy Autos would not only have the Colorado but also the Sheppards’ trade-in vehicle and the balance purchase price.[9]

Damages

  1. [29]
    The final orders sought by the Sheppards include the return of the Colorado to Galaxy Autos and the repayment of the purchase price they paid, in addition to a number of other monetary claims.
  2. [30]
    Where the failure to comply with a consumer guarantee is a major failure, the consumer is entitled pursuant to s 259(3)(a) of the ACL to effectively rescind the purchase agreement and recover consideration which was paid.[10] Pursuant to s 259(4) a consumer is also entitled to recover damages for any loss or damage suffered by the consumer because of the failure to comply with the guarantee if it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure.
  3. [31]
    The Sheppards claim the following amounts:
    1. Tow truck fees  $     440.00
    2. Loan repayments $12,639.62
    3. Loan interest $  3,673.80
    4. Balance of loan to be paid out $15,572.62
    5. Value of vehicle traded in $  3,000.00
    6. Insurance on vehicle $  1,598.61
  4. [32]
    The purchase price paid by the Sheppards, including the trade-in vehicle allowance, was $25,450. The Sheppards are entitled to recover this amount subject to the return of the Colorado to Galaxy Autos. I will deal with this aspect in the final orders.
  5. [33]
    The towing fees claimed relate to the cost of the vehicle being towed to the approved repairer and, when Galaxy Autos advised it would not accept the return of the Colorado, the cost of the vehicle being towed to the Sheppards’ home. The amount claimed of $440.00 is allowed in full.
  6. [34]
    The Sheppards borrowed money to purchase the Colorado. They claim the total of loan payments made, interest paid on the loan and the amount of the remainder of the loan to be paid out. A consumer may recover damages for any loss or damage suffered by the consumer because of a failure to comply with a guarantee if it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such failure.[11]
  7. [35]
    The Sheppards traded in a Mazda motor vehicle when purchasing the Colorado. It is assumed that this motor vehicle was being used by the Sheppards, and very possibly by Mr Sheppard to travel to and from work. Presumably, had the Sheppards not purchased the Colorado, they would have continued to use the Mazda and not taken out a loan to fund the purchase of the Colorado. I am satisfied that it was reasonably foreseeable that the Sheppards would incur the expenses associated with the loan to purchase the Colorado and would suffer loss in circumstances where the vehicle became inoperable. The Sheppards are not entitled to recover the principal sum noting that they are entitled to recover the price paid for the Colorado. Allowing recovery of both amounts would be to double compensate the Sheppards. They are however entitled to recover the interest paid on the loan. In evidence is a loan transaction summary from the financier. The interest paid on the loan in the 2024 and 2025 financial years totals $3,673.80. Whilst I note that the Colorado could be driven for a period of approximately three months, this is offset by the time elapsed in the current financial year during which interest would have accrued. It is also not clear to me that the claim includes interest payment for the 2023 financial year. Taking all of these matters into consideration I allow the interest payments claimed in the amount $3,673.80.
  8. [36]
    The Sheppards also claim the amount of insurance payments to insure the Colorado. Before the Tribunal are certificates of insurance issued by the insurer for the 2024 and 2025 years. In the 2024 year to 10 September 2024 the insurance payments were $51.19 per month. The Colorado has not been operable since 17 August 2023. The insurance paid for the period from 10 September 2023 to 10 September 2024 was $614.28. The insurance paid for the period from 10 September 2024 until 3 September 2024 (being a period of 51 weeks) is calculated at $704.27. The total of these amounts is $1,318.55. This amount was effectively thrown away by the Sheppards on insuring the Colorado which could not be driven. The amount is however discounted by 50% on the basis that the Sheppards would otherwise have been required to pay insurance on another vehicle, presumably the Mazda, had they not purchased the Colorado. 
  1. [37]
    Lest it be said
  1. [38]
    Damages are assessed as follows:
    1. Refund of purchase price $25,450.00
    2. Towing charges $     440.00
    3. Interest paid on loan $  3,673.80
    4. Insurance paid $     659.27

Total  $30,223.07

Costs

  1. [39]
    The Sheppards seek costs:
    1. Filing fees  $   379.50
    2. Assessor fees $   600.00
    3. Service postage fees $     17.75
  2. [40]
    Section 50C of the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) provides that QCAT may make an order under section 102(1) of the QCAT Act against a party to a proceeding under section 50A —
    1. only if the party is a respondent against whom the tribunal has made a final decision; and
    2. only to order the party to pay to the applicant the amount of any prescribed fee paid by the applicant on filing the application for the proceeding.
  3. [41]
    A ‘prescribed fee’ means a fee prescribed under a regulation.[12] Prescribed fees are set out in Part 3 of the QCAT Regulation 2009 and include the filing fee on the application. This means that the claim for costs is limited to recovery of the filing fee.
  4. [42]
    Section 102(1) of the QCAT Act provides that the tribunal may make an order requiring a party to a proceeding to pay all or a stated part of the costs of another party to the proceeding if the tribunal considers the interests of justice require it to make the order. By s 102(3) the tribunal may have regard to a number of matters in deciding whether to award costs. I find that:
    1. Galaxy Autos has not acted in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the Sheppards;
    2. The proceeding was not overly complex. Rather, the issues were clearly identified, straightforward and narrow in compass;
    3. Despite being successful I do not consider the relative strengths of the parties’ claims to be persuasive one way or the other in relation to the issue of costs;
    4. There is no evidence before the Tribunal about the financial circumstances of each of the parties and so this consideration is not persuasive either way;
    5. I have considered whether the success by the Sheppards in the proceeding will be eroded if they are not awarded costs. I do not consider this factor to be sufficiently compelling to justify an order for costs.
  5. [43]
    I make no orders as to costs.

Orders

  1. [44]
    I make the following orders:
    1. The Sheppards must, at their expense, return the Colorado motor vehicle the subject of these proceedings to Galaxy Autos within 7 days of the date of these orders.
    2. Galaxy Autos must pay to the Sheppards the amount of $30,233.07 within 14 days of the delivery up of Colorado.

Footnotes

[1]Report dated 23 April 2024.

[2]Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney (2003) 130 FCR 182. 

[3]Ibid.

[4]Effem Foods Ltd v Nicholls [2004] NSWCA 332.

[5]Knox v Tait Motors Pty Ltd t/as Tait Auto Group [2021] QCATA 87.

[6]QCAT Act, s 110.

[7]Ibid, s 111(1)(a).

[8]APS Satellite Pty Ltd (formerly known as “Sky Mesh Pty Ltd”) v Ipstar Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1898.

[9]See Hinterland Express Pty Ltd v Inchcape European Automotive Pty Ltd & Anor [2023] QCATA 130.

[10]Vautin v BY Winddown, Inc. (formerly Bertram Yachts) (No 4) [2018] FCA 426; Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd T/As Sports Auto Group [2015] FCA 1127; In Jarmain v Market Direct Group Pty Ltd t/as MDC Camper Trailers & Offroad Caravans [2022] QCAT 375 it was held that QCAT did not have the power to order the repayment of the purchase price. A contrary conclusion was reached in Sazdanoff-Haynes v MLS Wholesales Pty Ltd [2023] QCAT 37. The decision in Sazdanoff-Haynes v MLS Wholesales Pty Ltd is consistent with Vautin and Ferraro. In Howarth & Anor v Biscamoss Pty Ltd [2022] QCATA 72 it was held that QCAT has jurisdiction to make an order requiring the supplier to pay to the consumer a stated amount of money, namely the amount of the refund payable under s 263(4)(a).

[11]ACL, s 259(4).

[12]QCAT Act, schedule 3.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Sheppard v Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Sheppard v Piryani Pty Ltd t/as Galaxy Autos

  • MNC:

    [2025] QCAT 331

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Senior Member Brown

  • Date:

    02 Sep 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Effem Foods Ltd v Nicholls [2004] NSWCA 332
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] NSWCA 332
Cite 2 - [2004] NSWCA 332
Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd trading as Sports Auto Group [2015] FCA 1127
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] FCA 1127
Cite 2 - [2015] FCA 1127
Hinterland Express Pty Ltd v Inchcape European Automotive Pty Ltd [2023] QCATA 130
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QCATA 130
Cite 2 - [2023] QCATA 130
Howarth v Biscamoss Pty Ltd [2022] QCATA 72
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QCATA 72
Cite 2 - [2022] QCATA 72
Jarmain v Market Direct Group Pty Ltd t/as MDC Camper Trailers & Offroad Caravans [2022] QCAT 375
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QCAT 375
Cite 2 - [2022] QCAT 375
Knox v Tait Motors Pty Ltd t/as Tait Auto Group [2021] QCATA 87
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QCATA 87
Cite 2 - [2021] QCATA 87
Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney (2003) 130 FCR 182
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 130 FCR 182
Cite 2 - (2003) 130 FCR 182
Sazdanoff-Haynes v MLS Wholesales Pty Ltd [2023] QCAT 37
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QCAT 37
Cite 2 - [2023] QCAT 37
Vautin v BY Winddown, Inc (formerly Bertram Yachts) (No 4) [2018] FCA 426
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] FCA 426
Cite 2 - [2018] FCA 426

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.