Copley v Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd
[2017] QCATA 141
To print this judgment please return to the case and click on the PDF icon
next to the
case name. For court use, a full PDF copy is required or preferred.
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
Please Note: You are about to print a copy of the onscreen
version of
this judgment. For court use, a full PDF copy of the judgment is required or preferred. Please
return to
the case for PDF printing options.
- Unreported Judgment
- Copley v Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd[2017] QCATA 141
- Add to List
Copley v Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd[2017] QCATA 141
Copley v Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd[2017] QCATA 141
CITATION: | Copley v Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd [2017] QCATA 141 |
PARTIES: | Gregory Copley (Applicant/Appellant) |
| v |
| Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd (Respondent) |
APPLICATION NUMBER: | APL253-17 |
MATTER TYPE: | Appeals |
HEARING DATE: | 4 December 2017 |
HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
DECISION OF: | Member I. Hanger AM QC |
DELIVERED ON: | 4 December 2017 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
ORDERS MADE: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 142(3)(a)(i) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), r 81 Breezeway Developments Pty Ltd v ADG Hydraulics Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 69 Green & Ors v Pearson [2014] QCA 110 |
APPEARANCES: |
|
APPLICANT: | Gregory Copley |
RESPONDENT: | Mr Rogers |
REASONS FOR DECISION
- [1]The originating application is a proceeding against the respondent for fees outstanding for work done. It is a minor civil dispute.
- [2]This is an application for leave to appeal against a decision of a delegate of 5 July 2017 in which the delegate declined to order Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd (Storm) to disclose certain documents.
- [3]Section 142(3)(a)(i) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QCAT Act) provides, inter alia, that an appeal against a decision in a proceeding for a minor civil dispute may be made only if the party has obtained the appeal tribunal’s leave to appeal.
- [4]Mr Copley therefore needs leave to appeal. Rule 81 of QCAT Rules 2009 provides:
- (1)A party to a proceeding for a minor debt claim can not require another party to the proceeding to disclose documents in the possession or under the control of the other party and directly relevant to an allegation in issue in the proceeding, unless the tribunal orders otherwise.
- (2)However, all parties to the proceeding must make all relevant documents available at the hearing of the proceeding.
- [5]Rule 81 involves the exercise of a discretion by the delegate on a matter of practice and procedure. The Queensland Court of Appeal in Green & Ors v Pearson [2014] QCA 110 referred, with approval, to Liao v New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 71 in which it was said:
The discretionary nature of the decisions means that appellant intervention is warranted only on grounds identified in House v R [1936] 55 CLR 499 at 504-5 including that the decision is affected by extraneous or irrelevant matters or the judge mistakes the facts, acts on a wrong principle or does not take into account a material consideration or the decision is unreasonable or plainly unjust. The fact that matters of practice and procedure only are involved means that the appellate court should exercise the ‘added restraint’ that those circumstance attract ... and be ‘extremely reluctant to interfere’.
- [6]The clear intention of the QCAT Legislation was to minimise costs formality and the undue delay involved in civil litigation. Hence Rule 81 was clearly designed to minimise the cost of disclosure in small claims. It is legitimate to take that into account (Green & Ors v Pearson [2014] QCA 110).
- [7]Hence, Mr Copley requires leave to appeal. The appeal is against the exercise of a discretion.
- [8]Mr Copley, who appeared for himself, asked for eight categories of document details of which be set out in a document headed “A” as follows:
- I, Gregory Charles Copley Applicant/Respondent to this Application requires DARREN ROGERS Principal of Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd to provide a List of all Documents held in his possession and which are relevant to the Claim, and issues in question in the cause.
- As to paragraph seven (7) of Mr Rogers Affidavit sworn on 20 February 2017, the Applicant/Respondent requires all documents relating to DAVID COLIN MCGRATH and more particularly all documents relating to the Assignment of the Debt and or Commercial Arrangement to Mr McGrath or the company he represents namely COLLECTIONS & RECOVERY OPTIONS PTY LTD or previous entity used by Mr Rogers namely INVESTREND DEBT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD. The documents required are relevant to the Interest Claim and are part of the issue in question in the cause.
- At paragraph seven (7) Mr Rogers swears that ‘CRO had difficulty locating Copley’s address’ and further swears ‘Copley was finally located’. These claims are lies and go to the credibility of Mr Rogers the principal of the Respondent/Applicant Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd and importantly Mr Rogers has used these inaccurate claims to justify his claim for $1,773.84 in Interest as documented in paragraph 69 and pages 144 and 145 of Mr Rogers Affidavit.
- As to paragraph three (3) the Applicant/Respondent requires a specific list of all the documents that are in the possession of the Respondent/Applicant Mr Rogers principal of Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd relevant to the claim for Interest.
- As to Investrend Debt Solutions Pty Ltd advices dated 4 October 2013 and being Annexed ‘Q’ page number 29 of the Applicant/Respondent affidavit sworn and filed on 13 March 2017 the Applicant/Respondent requires the Respondent/Applicant Mr Rogers principal of Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd to produce all correspondence and written communications he received from and made to Investrend Debt Solutions Pty Ltd during the course of their business transactions and interactions.
- As to paragraph five (5) the Applicant/Respondent specifically requires production of the letter forwarded to Mr Rogers from Investrend as stipulated in paragraph two (2) of Annexure ‘Q’ of the Affidavit sworn and filed on 13 March 2017 by the Applicant/Respondent.
- In correspondence dated 7 March 2013 Mr Rogers threatened to refer this matter to the Queensland Police if the applicant/Respondent did not comply with Mr Rogers threat and as the Co Respondent to my Planning & Environment Court Appeal is an inspector in the Queensland police and is the nephew of Mr Rogers clients PETER JOHN FLYNN & LINDSAY MARGARET FLYNN I require production of the document or documents to Queensland police in reply to Mr Rogers as they are relevant to the Claim and issues in question in the cause.
- As to Exhibit ‘DR7’ of Mr Rogers affidavit sworn 20 February 2017 the Applicant/Respondent requires all documents supporting the hours charged for ‘joint experts report’ and more particularly production of any documents relevant to Mr Rogers participation in the ‘expert conclave meeting’ while acting as principal of Storm Water Consulting Pty Ltd.
- [9]The applicant’s case is for fees rendered for professional services by an engineer. The documents other than requested in paragraph 8 are clearly irrelevant to the claim in respect of monies owing for professional services. The documents referred to in paragraph 8 are probably relevant, but given the wording of Rule 81 and the principle of law referred to above, there is clearly no error in the exercise of the delegate’s discretion.
- [10]I turn now to consider the application for leave to appeal. The matter for consideration are set out in the decision of Justice Wilson in Breezeway Developments Pty Ltd v ADG Hydraulics Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 69, where his Honour said:
Leave to appeal will ordinarily only be granted where there is some question of general importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal, would be to the public advantage; or, there is a reasonably arguable case or error in the primary decision and reasonable prospect of the applicant would obtain further substantive relief. Another question sometimes asked is: is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant, caused by some error?
- [11]There is no reasonably arguable case of error in the primary decision. There is no reasonable prospect that the applicant would obtain further substantive relief and there is no substantial injustice to Mr Copley.
- [12]I dismiss the application for leave to appeal, but also having considered the matter I am satisfied that there is no incorrect exercise of the decision maker’s discretion under Rule 81.