Frost v Sanderson[2021] QCATA 55

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. [1]
   The matter presently before me is an Application for Leave to Appeal or Appeal filed by the Applicant, Julie Frost, in respect of a decision and directions made by Member Traves in ADL040-19 on 5 September 2019. The current file number of the appeal which was lodged by Ms Frost on about 29 September 2019 is APL260-19. 
2. [2]
   By way of brief background, it can be noted that in early 2019, Ms Frost lodged with the then Anti-Discrimination Commission of Queensland a number of complaints against members of the Queensland Police Service. On 29 March 2019, the Anti-Discrimination Commission advised the named Respondents that it had accepted complaints from Ms Frost under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (“AD Act”), and that these complaints alleged discriminatory conduct, public interest disclosure reprisal and victimisation.
3. [3]
   The parties subsequently attended a conciliation conference but the matter did not settle. As a consequence of the matter not settling at conciliation, the Applicant’s complaints were referred to QCAT in accordance with s 166 of the AD Act. On 7 August 2019, the referral then became the matter which is the proceeding in number ADL040-19. 
4. [4]
   On 7 August 2019, Ms Frost lodged an application with the Tribunal seeking, amongst other things, the disclosure of a large number of documents alleged to be held by the Queensland Police Service.
5. [5]
   That application came before Member Traves on 5 September 2019. Member Traves, at that time, made directions and also gave very brief reasons for her decision to make the directions. It is worth quoting those reasons in full:

1. An application for production of documents was filed by the applicant on 7 August 2019.
2. It does not appear to have been served. In any event, applications for production are ordinarily to be made after the filing of contentions and responses so that the relevance of the documents requested can be assessed by reference to the contentions.
3. Directions were made on 5 September 2019 requiring the applicant to file contentions by 3 October 2019 and the respondents to file their response by 31 October 2019. Accordingly, the application for notice to produce is premature and is adjourned to be progressed and determined on the papers in accordance with the directions made on 5 September 2019.

The learned Member then made a suite of completely conventional directions for the further progression of the matter.

6. [6]
   As noted, on about 29 September 2019, the Applicant filed an Application for Leave to Appeal or Appeal against that decision and directions of Member Traves.
7. [7]
   The Application for Leave to Appeal or Appeal fails to identify any proper or appropriate grounds of appeal against the decision made by the learned Member. According to the document filed by Ms Frost, the grounds of appeal are as follows:

Special circumstances/gag order. Decision and pattern of conduct managing the case placed the life of the applicant in danger. Urgent applications deliberately delayed until they are meaningless. Threat of assassination by [name of individual redacted] or solicited associate can be mitigated by placing his use of QPS for the benefit of Bond University to kill or silence paedophile ring & corruption whistle-blowers into court. Nature of claim requires evidence before or with claim.

8. [8]
   It will be noted from the reasons given by the learned Member on 5 September 2019 that the learned Member did not, on that day, finally determine the application for production of documents. What she did was make completely conventional directions for the orderly progression of the hearing and determination of that application. In fact, the application was not determined until the decision of Member Fitzpatrick on 28 July 2020, at which time the application was dismissed on the basis that it comprised nothing more than a fishing expedition.
9. [9]
   In any event, returning to the appeal with which I am presently concerned, the appeal is against the making of directions by a member of the Tribunal which are patently procedural in nature.
10. [10]
    It is well accepted that appeal courts and bodies should exercise particular caution when reviewing primary decisions related to practice and procedure. Should authority for that proposition be required, it is sufficient to refer to the judgment of the High Court in Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc.^[1] In the course of the reasons for judgment of the plurality in that case, their Honours repeated with approval an oft-cited statement of Sir Frederick Jordan in In re the Will of F.B Gilbert (dec.)^[2] where he said: 

… I am of opinion that, … there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal.^[3]

11. [11]
    A fortiori in matters before this Tribunal, where the processes adopted by the Tribunal are required to achieve the objective of minimising costs to parties and affording quick and efficient justice.
12. [12]
    In the present case, the Applicant has comprehensively failed to identify any appellable or arguably appellable error in the exercise of the discretion by Member Traves in the making by her of the procedural directions on 5 September 2019.
13. [13]
    On 18 August 2020, the Appeal Tribunal directed in respect of this appeal on its own motion that Ms Frost show cause why the Application for Leave to Appeal or Appeal filed 29 September 2019 ought not be dismissed or struck out.
14. [14]
    Ms Frost has been afforded every opportunity today to show cause why the appeal ought not be struck out. She addressed the Tribunal for about forty-five minutes on a wide range of topics, including the history of her engagement with the Queensland Police Service and other bodies, her claims of victimisation by people within and associated with the Queensland Police Service and the justice system generally, and made wide ranging allegations of incompetence and corruption. Ms Frost’s discursive address to the Tribunal in the course of the hearing this morning included repeated allegations of corruption and bias against me personally, against Member Traves and against, indeed, sundry members of the Tribunal whom she accused of having engaged in gang bullying. What Ms Frost did not do in the course of her submissions was identify any error in the exercise of the discretion by Member Traves in making the procedural directions on 5 September 2019.
15. [15]
    As I have said, on 18 August 2020 directions were made in this appeal for Ms Frost to show cause why the Application for Leave to Appeal or Appeal filed 29 September 2019 ought not be dismissed or struck out. She has failed to do so.
16. [16]
    Accordingly, pursuant to section 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), I order that appeal number APL260-19 be struck out.