Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd v Lander No 2
[2022] QCATA 178
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- Unreported Judgment
- Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd v Lander No 2[2022] QCATA 178
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Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd v Lander No 2[2022] QCATA 178
Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd v Lander No 2[2022] QCATA 178
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: | Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd v Lander No 2 [2022] QCATA 178 |
PARTIES: | GOLD COAST TREE HOUSES PTY LTD (applicant) v JILL LANDER (respondent) |
APPLICATION NO/S: | APL366-21 |
MATTER TYPE: | Appeals |
DELIVERED ON: | 16 November 2022 |
HEARING DATE: | On the papers |
HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
DECISION OF: | Member Lumb |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – LEAVE TO APPEAL – where leave for legal representation sought by corporate respondent to minor civil dispute – where leave for legal representation was refused – where corporation appointed Australian legal practitioner by enduring power of attorney – where respondent applies for leave to appeal the decision – whether corporation entitled to be represented by Australian legal practitioner – whether Tribunal erred in refusing leave Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32D Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9, s 124 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s 32 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 43, s 142 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), r 54 Berry v Treasure & Anor [2021] QCATA 61 Bhandari & Ors v Morgan Conley Solicitors Pty Ltd [2022] QCAT 282 Drane v Taylor (No 2) [2022] QCATA 157 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Saxer v Hume [2022] QCATA 25 |
APPEARANCES: | This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). |
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
- [1]By an Application for leave to appeal or appeal filed by the Applicant on 20 December 2021 (the Appeal Application), the Applicant (GCTH) seeks leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision made by the Tribunal (constituted by an Adjudicator) on 9 December 2021 (the Decision).
- [2]The Respondent to the Appeal Application (Ms Lander) is the applicant in an Application for minor civil dispute – consumer dispute filed in the Tribunal on 13 January 2021 (the MCD Application).[1] GCTH is the first respondent to the MCD Application.
- [3]The Decision was in the following terms:[2]
Application by JESSICA MARSHALL & HOMEAWAY STAYZ Pty Ltd to be legally represented by the Attorney for Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd, appointed by Enduring Power of Attorney dated 8/12/21 is refused.
- [4]By a further interlocutory decision made by the Tribunal on 14 December 2021 (the subsequent decision), it was ordered:
- The name of the first Respondent is amended to Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd.
- The name of the second Respondent is amended to Stayz Pty Ltd.
- The first Respondent is to file its appeal against the decision of the Tribunal of 9 December 2021 on or before 6 January 2022.
- If no appeal is filed on or before that date the application will be relisted for hearing at the next available date.
- If the appeal is lodged pursuant to paragraph 4 the application will be adjourned to a date to be fixed pending the outcome of the appeal.
- [5]The Appeal Application was filed within the time provided for by paragraph 3 of the subsequent decision. The Appeal Application challenges the Decision only insofar as GCTH is concerned.
- [6]The progress of the MCD Application awaits the determination of the Appeal Application.
- [7]GCTH also filed an Application for miscellaneous matters in the Appeal Application which was the subject of a previous decision of the Appeal Tribunal.[3]
- [8]In addition, in the Appeal Application, Ms Lander filed an Application for miscellaneous matters on 9 September 2022 (the 9 September application). This raises a discrete matter and is addressed later in these Reasons.
The dispute the subject of the MCD Application
- [9]By the MCD Application, Ms Lander seeks a refund of $2,909.40 together with payment of a filing fee of $125.40. The primary amount claimed is said to comprise the cost of seven nights holiday accommodation at a retreat operated by GCTH in the Gold Coast hinterland. Ms Lander claims the primary amount by reason of what she says was a ‘forced cancellation’. The stay appears to have come to an end after two days. This was the result of a dispute between Ms Lander and the sole director of GCTH (Ms Milgrom), the catalyst for which appears to have been that one of Ms Lander’s dogs was off leash within the grounds of the retreat. The grounds of Ms Lander’s claim include (but are not limited to) an alleged failure to comply with statutory guarantees under the Australian Consumer Law, including that GCTH did not provide services with due care and skill and that the services were not fit for the disclosed purpose (of being pet friendly and pet tolerant).
- [10]GCTH opposes the relief sought in the MCD Application.
The Application for leave to be represented
- [11]The Application for leave to be represented was filed in the Tribunal on 8 December 2021 and identified the basis for leave to be represented in Part B of that application. It was stated (relevantly for the purposes of the Appeal Application):
… Shane Ellis is the lawyer for the company [a reference to GCTH] and the duly authorised Power of Attorney (POA) for the company. (See POA attached) He is instructed to represent the company in this matter & has been also requested pursuant to the POA to do so. He is well versed in the facts & authorised to appear on this matter.
- [12]The signed power of attorney was headed ‘Enduring Power of Attorney – short form (Queensland)’ (EPOA) and was in Form 2 (Version 4) of the forms approved under the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) (the POAA). The EPOA was signed on 8 December 2021. Mr Ellis is a practising lawyer at the Gold Coast, Queensland. The ‘person’ identified as appointing Mr Ellis as attorney was GCTH.
- [13]It appears that the copy of the EPOA provided to the Tribunal on 8 December 2021 omitted pages 4 and 5 of the document (although a complete copy was subsequently provided). Under the EPOA, Mr Ellis was stated to be appointed to make decisions about financial matters only.
Leave to appeal
- [14]An appeal against a decision by the Tribunal in a proceeding for a minor civil dispute may be made only if the party has obtained the Appeal Tribunal’s leave to appeal (s 142(3)(a)(i) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (the QCAT Act). I consider that leave is also required under s 142(3)(a)(ii) of the QCAT Act because the Decision was not the Tribunal’s final decision in the proceeding.
- [15]As to the Tribunal’s approach to an application for leave to appeal in matters involving minor civil disputes, I respectfully adopt the following observations of Judicial Member DJ McGill SC:[4]
… As a general proposition, when leave to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal is required, it will be granted only where there is a reasonable argument that the decision was attended by error and an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by that error, or where the appeal raises a question of general importance upon which further argument and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal would be to the public advantage. In deciding whether grounds for leave to appeal have been shown, it is relevant to consider that the proceeding was a minor civil dispute, and the obligation on the Tribunal was to make orders it considered to be fair and equitable to the parties to the proceeding in order to resolve the dispute: the QCAT Act s 13(1). The Tribunal was also required to comply with the QCAT Act s 28 and s 29.
(citation omitted)
- [16]
There is no automatic right of appeal against minor civil dispute decisions. I respectfully adopt and endorse the following observations by the former President, Justice Alan Wilson, in Durrand v Karaolis:
The Queensland Parliament has made it clear, in the QCAT Act, that so far as possible minor civil disputes of this kind are to be resolved by a simple procedure which is speedy, inexpensive and final. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that before a party can appeal a decision in this jurisdiction it must obtain leave from the Appeal Tribunal … In other words, there is not an automatic right to appeal these decisions; rather, an applicant must first establish that it has a right to a grant of leave.
(citation omitted)
Grounds of appeal
- [17]The grounds of appeal stated in the Appeal Application (Part C) are as follows:
Jessica Lee Milgrom is (the Sole Director of Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd) and Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd ACN 636 173 852 is the party to the accommodation agreement between the parties in this matter.
Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd ACN 636 173 852 is a legal person at law
A company can only act through its duly appointed officers. It is lawfully able to be, & entitled to be represented in any tribunal or court by its Directors and Attorneys. S124 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) grants companies the legal capacity and powers of an individual, both in Australia and overseas. A company is authorised to appoint an attorney or agent on terms determined by the company. The attorney or agent can be either another company or an individual. Shane Stuart Ellis is the duly authorised attorney for the company and is entitled at law to represent the company in any tribunal or court in Australia, and in these proceedings.
The Corporations Act, 2001 (Cth) is a Federal Act of parliament & it is binding in Queensland and throughout all states & territories of Australia. QCAT is bound to follow Australian laws that apply in its jurisdiction. The Corporations Act, 2001 (Cth) is binding on QCAT.
- [18]The orders sought (in Part D) are, relevantly, as follows:
The attorney for Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd ACN 636 173 852, Shane Ellis be permitted to appear on behalf of the company in these proceedings being a duly appointed officer of the company …
Threshold Issue
- [19]By amended appeal submissions filed on 25 March 2022 (amended appeal submissions), GCTH submitted that the Decision was ‘factually incorrect and wrongly made at law’ (on the basis that each of the respondents was wrongly named) or, in the alternative (‘to save a re-hearing having to take place’), the decision sought to be overturned is the original decision read as if it named the correct applicant, GCTH (in accordance with the subsequent decision). In circumstances where GCTH participated in the proceeding leading to the making of the subsequent decision,[6] and that the subsequent decision contemplated that GCTH could file an application for leave to appeal or appeal in the correct name, I consider that it is appropriate that the Appeal Application proceed on the alternative basis proposed by GCTH.
Submissions
- [20]By the amended appeal submissions, GCTH, in its ‘Final Submission’, submitted that it is ‘fair & reasonable and in the interests of justice’ for Mr Ellis to appear as attorney to represent GCTH in the MCD proceeding.
- [21]The amended appeal submissions incorporate the content of the grounds of appeal, refer to rule 54 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) (the Rules), and also refer to various matters involving Ms Milgrom as demonstrating why it is in the interests of justice that the company be represented by Mr Ellis. Those stated reasons are that Ms Milgrom was ‘time poor’, frequently ‘very tired’ from attending to her business responsibilities and those as a mother and single parent of a young baby, and that Ms Milgrom suffers from dyslexia and the more tired and stressed she is the more difficult it is for her to read material and understand and comprehend its content. A further factor relied upon by GCTH was the contention that Ms Lander ‘has legal experience and experience in appearing in breach of contract matters’. This is said to be evidenced from texts she sent to Ms Milgrom.
- [22]In her written response filed on 24 March 2022, Ms Lander makes various submissions including the following:
- (a)that s 43(1) of the QCAT Act states that ‘the main purpose of this section is to have parties represent themselves unless the interests of justice require otherwise’ and that this purpose appears to be aligned with the objects set out in s 3(b) of the QCAT Act, namely the Tribunal ‘deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick’;
- (b)that Ms Milgrom showed no signs of dyslexia during repeated messaging of Ms Lander during her stay at the property;
- (c)that any dyslexia suffered by Ms Milgrom would not constitute an ‘incapacity’ at all much less one justifying GCTH being represented by a lawyer;
- (d)that Ms Milgrom ‘can have any support person she would like at the QCAT proceeding (including a disability support person if she has one) to assist who is not a lawyer’;
- (e)Mr Ellis was appointed as a power of attorney less than a week before the hearing was due to be heard by the Tribunal;
- (f)that Ms Lander was not, and never has been, an enrolled law student or a lawyer.
- (a)
Consideration
- [23]Before addressing the arguments raised, it is necessary to address the relevant principles in relation to the obtaining of leave to be represented.
Relevant principles
- [24]In my view, the principles relevant to the issue of giving leave for representation (and the related issue of appearing at a hearing) can be summarised as follows:
- (a)the question of whether a party may be represented by someone else in a proceeding in the Tribunal is governed by s 43 of the QCAT Act;
- (b)the primary position established under s 43 is that parties to proceedings are to represent themselves;[7]
- (c)a party is entitled to be represented by someone else if the circumstances provided for in any of s 43(2)(b)(i), (ii) or (iii) apply;
- (d)otherwise, a party requires the leave of the Tribunal to be represented (see s 43(2)(b)(iv));
- (e)s 43 provides for the situation where a person acts generally in a proceeding on behalf of a party, and is not limited to who speaks at a hearing;[8]
- (f)the grant of leave under s 43 permits the representative to provide written submissions, sign, file and serve documents, act as the channel of communications for the party, and speak at an oral hearing;[9]
- (g)a party who has not obtained leave to be represented is still entitled to have the assistance of a lawyer in preparing submissions and other documents,[10] but such assistance does not extend to performing the tasks identified in subparagraph (f) above;
- (h)the appearance at a hearing of a party that is not an individual (and that has not obtained leave pursuant to s 43) is governed by Division 1 of Part 7 of the Rules;
- (i)in the case of a corporation that has not obtained leave to be represented, the corporation may appear through an officer of the corporation who is an Australian legal practitioner only with the Tribunal’s leave unless all of the officers of the corporation are Australian legal practitioners.[11]
- (a)
The Grounds raised by GCTH
- [25]The language of the grounds of appeal suggests that GCTH contends that it was ‘entitled at law’ to be represented by Mr Ellis, that is, as of right. However, the amended appeal submissions do not put that argument explicitly and the ‘Final Submission’ does not state that to be its position. The amended appeal submissions do not articulate the materiality of s 124 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) to the issue of representation and any interaction between that provision and the relevant provisions of the QCAT Act or QCAT Rules. Otherwise, GCTH relies upon factual matters as justifying the grant of leave for representation.
- [26]For the following reasons, I consider that the appointment of Mr Ellis as an attorney for GCTH is not material to the issue of the grant of leave to appear on behalf of GCTH. For completeness, if that appointment was prima facie material, I observe that it would be open to question as to whether the appointment was valid. As noted above, the purported appointment was made pursuant to a Form 2 Enduring Power of Attorney. An enduring power of attorney is governed by s 32 of the POAA. This provides for authorisation of an enduring power of attorney by an ‘adult’. This reference is taken to be a reference to an ‘individual’ by virtue of s 32D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and ‘individual’ is defined in that Act to mean a natural person. GCTH is not a natural person. However, I consider it unnecessary to reach a conclusion as to the question of whether the appointment was invalid or the further question of whether the EPOA could take effect as a general power of attorney under the POAA.
- [27]As noted above, the issue of whether a party is entitled to leave to be represented by someone else is governed by s 43 of the QCAT Act. That section provides:
- (1)The main purpose of this section is to have parties represent themselves unless the interests of justice require otherwise.
- (2)In a proceeding, a party—
- (a)may appear without representation; or
- (b)may be represented by someone else if—
- (i)the party is a child or a person with impaired capacity; or
- (ii)the proceeding relates to taking disciplinary action, or reviewing a decision about taking disciplinary action, against a person; or
- (iii)an enabling Act that is an Act, or the rules, states the person may be represented; or
- (iv)the party has been given leave by the tribunal to be represented.
- (3)In deciding whether to give a party leave to be represented in a proceeding, the tribunal may consider the following as circumstances supporting the giving of the leave—
- (a)the party is a State agency;
- (b)the proceeding is likely to involve complex questions of fact or law;
- (c)another party to the proceeding is represented in the proceeding;
- (d)all of the parties have agreed to the party being represented in the proceeding.
- (4)A party can not be represented in a proceeding by a person—
- (a)who, under rules made under section 224(3), is disqualified from being a representative of a party to a proceeding; or
- (b)who is not an Australian legal practitioner or government legal officer, unless the tribunal is satisfied the person is an appropriate person to represent the party.
- (5)A person who is not an Australian legal practitioner or government legal officer and who is seeking to represent a party in a proceeding must give the tribunal a certificate of authority from the party for the representation if—
- (a)the party is a corporation; or
- (b)the tribunal has asked for the certificate.
- (6)The tribunal may appoint a person to represent an unrepresented party.
- (7)In this section—
Australian legal practitioner see the Legal Profession Act 2007.
government legal officer see the Legal Profession Act 2007.
- [28]In the present case, in my view, none of the circumstances set out in ss 43(2)(b)(i) to (iii) applies. The question that the Adjudicator correctly addressed was whether leave should be given for GCTH to be represented by Mr Ellis. In my view, the status of Mr Ellis, as an attorney of GCTH (if it be a valid appointment), does not place him in any different position to a corporation seeking leave to be represented by an Australian legal practitioner who is not an attorney of the corporation (in the context of an application for leave under s 43).
- [29]Insofar as the amended appeal submissions reference r 54 of the Rules, I will address that provision.
- [30]Rule 54 of the Rules provides:
- (1)A corporation may appear in a proceeding through an officer of the corporation who is authorised by the corporation to act for it in the proceeding.
- (2)However, the corporation may appear through an Australian legal practitioner only with the tribunal’s leave.
- (3)Subrule (2) does not apply if all of the officers of the corporation are Australian legal practitioners.
- (4)If the officer authorised to act for the corporation under subrule (1) is not an Australian legal practitioner, the corporation must give the tribunal a certificate of authority for the authorisation.
- (5)In this rule—
officer, of a corporation, means—
- (a)an officer within the meaning given by the Corporations Act, section 9 for a corporation; or
- (b)an employee of the corporation.
- [31]Mr Ellis is plainly not an employee of GCTH (see r 54(5)(b)).
- [32]As to r 54(5)(a), s 9 of the Corporations Act provides that ‘officer’ of a corporation means:
- (a)a director or secretary of the corporation; or
- (b)a person:
- (i)who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or
- (ii)who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial standing; or
- (iii)in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed to act (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person’s professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation); or
- (c)a receiver, or receiver and manager, of the property of the corporation; or
- (d)an administrator of the corporation; or
- (e)an administrator of a deed of company arrangement executed by the corporation; or
(ea) a restructuring practitioner for the corporation; or
(eb) a restructuring practitioner for a restructuring plan made by the corporation; or
- (f)a liquidator of the corporation; or
- (g)a trustee or other person administering a compromise or arrangement made between the corporation and someone else.
- [33]In my view, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that Mr Ellis falls within any of those categories, regardless of whether he was appointed as an attorney of GCTH.
- [34]It is also not apparent that s 43 of the QCAT Act or r 54 of the Rules is inconsistent with s 124 of the Corporations Act (and no such argument was expressly articulated by GCTH).
- [35]For the above reasons, I conclude that Mr Ellis was not ‘entitled at law’ to represent GCTH.
- [36]In my view, the Decision turned on the exercise of a discretion by the Adjudicator as to whether to grant or refuse leave for representation based on the evidence.
- [37]In my view, it cannot be concluded that the Adjudicator has committed the kind of error identified in House v The King.[12] To the contrary, I consider that it can be concluded that there was a sound basis for the refusal of leave.
- [38]First, having regard to the circumstances identified in s 43(3) of the QCAT Act:
- (a)GCTH is not a State agency;
- (b)in my view, the proceeding below is not likely to involve complex questions of fact or law; there is nothing unusual about the nature of the dispute;
- (c)Ms Lander is not represented in the MCD proceeding;
- (d)all of the parties have not agreed to GCTH being represented in the proceeding.
- (a)
- [39]Second, the proceeding is one within the minor civil disputes jurisdiction of the Tribunal and involves a claim of less than $3,000.00.
- [40]Third, as noted above, GCTH is entitled to have the assistance of Mr Ellis to prepare submissions and other documents (but not to appear at the hearing or act in the other ways identified in paragraph [24(f)] above).
- [41]Fourth, even if Ms Lander were an enrolled law student, I consider that this would not provide a basis for granting leave for GCTH to be represented by a practising lawyer. In my view, the imbalance between a practising lawyer and an enrolled law student would be greater than any potential imbalance between an enrolled law student and a person who has not engaged in legal studies.
- [42]Fifth, I do not consider that Ms Milgrom’s dyslexia in and of itself would have demonstrated the need for a grant of leave for representation by Mr Ellis. The material before the Adjudicator did not suggest that Ms Milgrom was so impacted by her dyslexia that she could not properly present the company’s case at the hearing. For completeness, I note Ms Lander’s position in relation to Ms Milgrom having a support person with her. However, this does not appear to have been raised as an alternative option before the Adjudicator.
- [43]In my view, the Appeal Application does not raise a question of general importance upon which further argument and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal would be to the public advantage nor is there a reasonable argument that the Decision was attended by error and that an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by that error.
- [44]For the above reasons, I consider that leave to appeal should be refused and the Appeal Application dismissed.
The 9 September application
- [45]By the 9 September application, Ms Lander sought the following directions:
1. QCAT Declaration form for video and photographs with USB and video Log attattchments [sic] including witness statements by First Respondent served on the applicant by mail on 06/09/2022 be struck out and not considered by QCAT in relation to matter MCDO/56/21.
2. That the hearing (when a date is provided) be held with all parties present in person to prevent interference from the first Respondents [sic] solicitor.
- [46]With respect to direction number 1, that direction concerns material filed with the Tribunal on or about 5 September 2022 (the Material) in the MCD proceeding. Direction number 2 concerns a future hearing of the MCD proceeding.
- [47]By submissions dated 9 September 2022, GCTH seeks an order that the 9 September application be dismissed.
- [48]The basis upon which GCTH filed the Material in advance of a decision in the Appeal Application is unclear. In the amended appeal submissions filed on 25 March 2022 GCTH submitted that:
The MCDO proceedings have been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
- [49]In my view, this reflects the effect of order number 5 of the subsequent decision.
- [50]Regardless, in filing the 9 September application in APL366-21 (the Appeal Application proceeding), it appears that Ms Lander has failed to appreciate that the MCD proceeding and the Appeal Application proceeding are separate proceedings in the Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal is constituted to deal with the Appeal Application and any application directly concerning the Appeal Application (such as the application by GCTH the subject of the previous decision of the Appeal Tribunal).
- [51]In this respect, I respectfully adopt the following observations of Judicial Member D J McGill SC in Drane v Taylor (No 2):[13]
… I would add that the QCAT Act s 9, and the rest of Chapter 2 Part 1, make it clear that there is a difference between the Tribunal’s jurisdiction for minor civil disputes and the Tribunal’s appeal jurisdiction. An application for leave to appeal is a different proceeding from the proceeding for the minor civil dispute, not a continuation of the same proceeding, and it follows that a party to an application for leave to appeal from the decision in a minor civil dispute is not at that point a party to a minor civil dispute ...
(citation omitted)
- [52]In my view, it follows that the relief sought in the 9 September application should not have been sought in this Appeal Application proceeding. Such relief concerns the conduct of the MCD proceeding. For this reason, I consider that the 9 September application should be dismissed. For the avoidance of doubt, I note that the 9 September application has not been determined on the merits and the dismissal of it is without prejudice to any right which Ms Lander may have to apply for such relief in the MCD proceeding.
- [53]GCTH has also referred to another application said to have been made by Ms Lander dated 21 July 2022 and GCTH also seeks the dismissal of that application. The Appeal Tribunal has not been able to identify an application dated 21 July 2022 being filed in the Appeal Application proceeding. If an application dated 21 July 2022 was filed by Ms Lander in the Appeal Application proceeding, each party has liberty to apply to the Appeal Tribunal to have that application dealt with, consistently with these Reasons, by filing an Application for miscellaneous matters within seven (7) days of receipt of this Decision.[14] In the event that such an application is filed, directions will be made for the determination of that application.
Orders made
- [54]For the above reasons, I make the following orders:
- The Application for leave to appeal filed by the Applicant on 20 December 2021 is dismissed.
- The Application for miscellaneous matters filed by the Respondent on 9 September 2022 is dismissed.
- Liberty to apply in accordance with paragraph [53] of the Reasons for Decision.
Footnotes
[1] That proceeding shall be referred to as ‘the MCD proceeding’.
[2] The Adjudicator did not provide reasons for the Decision.
[3] Gold Coast Tree Houses Pty Ltd v Lander [2022] QCAT 100.
[4] See Saxer v Hume [2022] QCATA 25 at [2].
[5] [2021] QCATA 61 at [14].
[6] As appears from the second last paragraph on the first page of the amended appeal submissions.
[7] Bhandari & Ors v Morgan Conley Solicitors Pty Ltd [2022] QCAT 282, [24].
[8] Drane v Taylor (No 2) [2022] QCATA 157, [8].
[9] Drane v Taylor (No 2) [2022] QCATA 157, [11].
[10] Callil v Kosonen [2018] QCATA 62, [8]; Drane v Taylor (No 2) [2022] QCATA 157, [5].
[11] Rules 54(2) and (3) of the Rules. When read in context with the other sub-rules of r 54, I consider that r 54(2), on its proper construction, is concerned with an officer of the corporation who is an Australian legal practitioner.
[12] (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505.
[13] [2022] QCATA 157, [3].
[14] For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal observes that the principle set out in paragraph [24(g)] of these Reasons applies to the Appeal Application proceeding.