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Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2023] QCATA 81

Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2023] QCATA 81

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2023] QCATA 81

PARTIES:

michelle margaret tanna

(appellant)

v

queensland Building and Construction commission

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL165-21

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S

GAR108-20

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

3 July 2023

HEARING DATE:

14 February 2023

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member King-Scott

ORDERS:

Appeal dismissed 

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – where applicants claimed building work was defective – where Queensland Building and Construction Commission declined to give direction to rectify to builder – where applicants sought internal review of decision not to give direction to rectify – where internal review decision confirmed original decision – where tribunal decided that building works had been completed more than 6 years and 6 months prior to applicants filing applications to review QBCC decisions – consideration of s 72A(4) of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) – where no discretion to extend time to give direction to rectify in the absence of an application by the QBCC

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 QLD s 38

Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Act 2003(Qld) (repealed)

Professional Engineers and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld)

Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1990 (Qld) s 47, s 72, s 72A(4), s 86(1)(e), s 86A(1), s 86B, s 86C, s 87, s 86E(a), s 86E(b)

Queensland Building Tribunal Act 2000 (Qld) (repealed)

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 24(1), s 24(2)(b), s 47

Andrews v Queensland Building Services Authority [2008] QCCTB 105

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990)170 CLR 321

Australian Coal & Shale Employees Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621

Body Corporate for Alto Gladstone v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2020] QCATA 6

D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91

Dunmoor Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 39

Gardiner v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 326

Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55

Hogg v QBSA & Majestic Pools and Landscapes Pty Ltd [2002] QBT 157

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Jorg & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] QCATA 134

Jorg & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCAT 528

Mai v Queensland Building and Construction [2022] QCAT 296

McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QSC 57

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Murtagh v QBCC [2018] QCAT 258

O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210

Oracle Building Corporation Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCAT 69

Owners of “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404

Queensland Building and Construction Commission v Group Kildey Pty Ltd [2016] QCATA 10

Queensland Building and Construction Commission v Groupline Constructions Pty Ltd [2020] QCA 245

Rucker v Stewart [2014] QCA 32

Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] QCAT 170

PPEARANCES &

REPRESENTATION:

 

Applicant:

P Zappia KC direct brief

Respondent:

K Joyce (in house solicitor) for the Commission at hearing

M Black of Counsel for written submissions

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

  1. [1]
    On 15 September 2016 the Appellant (Michelle Margaret Tanna) purchased her house in Indooroopilly from a previous owner. The construction of the house had been completed in or about 11 April 2013. On 30 August 2019 she had the house inspected for termites. That inspection confirmed the existence of termites. She was informed that the infestation may have arisen because of a defect with the building work in that the ground floor retaining wall did not have an adequate barrier to prevent termite infestation.
  2. [2]
    Following advice from the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (the Commission) The Appellant contacted the builder. On 15 September 2019 the builder responded and denied any liability. On 19 September 2019 the Appellant  lodged a complaint with the Commission.
  3. [3]
    On 23 September 2019, the Appellant emailed the Commission and provided further information relating to her complaint, at the same time she requested that the Commission treat the matter as a matter of urgency. In the interim period, she had telephoned the Commission on a number of occasions to determine what was happening with her complaint.
  4. [4]
    A building inspection was conducted by the Commission on 13 December 2019 and a report produced dated 16 December 2019. 
  5. [5]
    On 11 October 2019 the time for the Commission to issue a rectification order to the builder expired. No rectification order had issued.
  6. [6]
    Following an inspection on 13 December 2019, the Commission, in a report dated 16 December 2019,[1] determined that it would not issue a direction to rectify on the basis that the statutory time limit had expired. The Appellant was formally advised of the decision on 8 January 2020.[2]
  7. [7]
    The Appellant sought an internal review of that decision. On 25 February 2020 the Commission decided not to direct rectification because it was more than 6 years and 6 months since the work was carried out.[3] The Appellant’s claim under the Home Warranty Scheme was also refused on the basis that the defects became evident on 25 August 2019 which was outside the policy period.
  8. [8]
    The Appellant filed an external review application in this Tribunal.
  9. [9]
    The Commission applied to dismiss the application to review principally on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the matter as the decision was not a reviewable decision.
  10. [10]
    The application was heard on the papers, the Tribunal summarily dismissed the Appellant’s application to review under s. 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) on 10 May 2021.[4]
  11. [11]
    The Appellant now appeals that decision.
  12. [12]
    I was informed at the outset of the appeal that the appeal involved only a question of law and leave was not required.
  13. [13]
    At the conclusion of the hearing, I gave the parties an opportunity of providing further written submissions. Both parties have provided additional written submissions.

Legislation

  1. [14]
    Section 72 of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1990 (Qld) (QBCC Act) is the source of the Commission’s power to issue a direction to rectify.
  2. [15]
    Section 72A sets out the powers and limitations of directions to rectify or remedy and includes:
  1. (4)
    A direction to rectify or remedy cannot be given more than 6 years and 6 months after the building work to which the direction relates was completed or left in an incomplete state unless the tribunal is satisfied, on application by the commission, that there is in the circumstances of a particular case sufficient reason for extending the time for giving the direction and extends the time accordingly.
  1. [16]
    Section 86E defines for the purpose of sub-division 2:

In this subdivision—

reviewable decision means—

  1. (a)
    a reviewable decision within the meaning of subdivision 1, other than a decision that was the subject of an internal review under subdivision 1; or
  1. (b)
    an internal review decision within the meaning of subdivision 1.
  1. [17]
    Section 86F sets out various decisions of the Commission under the QBCC Act that are not reviewable decisions under subdivision 2 which relates to external reviews. It is not necessary for me to detail those decisions suffice to say that the section does not include any decisions relevant to the issues here.
  2. [18]
    Under s. 86 (1)(e) of the QBCC Act a decision, by the Commission, to give a direction to rectify or a decision not to give a direction to rectify is reviewable.
  3. [19]
    A person who is given notice of a reviewable decision may elect to apply for an internal review of the decision under s. 86A(1) or may apply to QCAT for a review of the decision under s. 87 of the QBCC Act.

Decision under appeal

  1. [20]
    The learned Member made the following relevant findings: [5]
    1. (a)
      The review decision is the Commission’s decision of 25 February 2020.
    2. (b)
      The time limit in which to give a direction to rectify to the builder for the purposes of s 72A(4) of the Act expired six years and six months from 11 April 2013 being the date the work was completed by the builder;
    3. (c)
      The reason for not issuing a direction to rectify and disallowing the claim under the statutory insurance scheme was because the relevant time limit of six years and six months since the building work was completed had passed.
    4. (d)
      The Appellant complained to the Commission about the building work performed on her property by the builder before the time limit of six years and six months expired on 11 October 2019;
    5. (e)
      There is no power for the Tribunal to extend the time limit unless as provided under s 72A(4) of the QBCC Act, the Commission has applied to the Tribunal to extend it. Indeed, a decision by the Commission not to seek an extension of time is not a reviewable decision for the purposes of s 86 of the QBCC Act.
    6. (f)
      There is no discretion to extend the time limit under s 72A(4) of the QBCC Act unless the Commission has made the application. In the present matter, the Commission has not applied to the Tribunal to extend the relevant time limit under s 72A(4) of the QBCC Act.
  2. [21]
    The learned Member then said:

I am satisfied it is appropriate in the circumstances of this matter to dismiss the application to review under s 47 of the QCAT Act on the basis that the application is misconceived or lacking in substance because I have found that the time limit for issuing a direction to rectify has expired and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the time limit unless the Commission has applied to do so. In exercising my discretion under s 47 of the QCAT Act, I have also considered the objects of the QCAT Act that include, amongst other things, to have the tribunal deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick.[6]

Appellant’s case

  1. [22]
    It is submitted that the learned Member made 3 fundamental errors in reaching her decision. They are:
    1. (a)
      The learned Member failed to address Ms Tana’s submission that the Commission, in fact, made a decision not to give a direction before 11 October 2019, before the time period expired;
    2. (b)
      The learned Member erred in finding that the Commission’s decision not to apply for an extension of time was not a reviewable decision;
    3. (c)
      That it being accepted that the decision of the 25 February 2020 was a reviewable decision the tribunal had the power to amend that decision and order rectification and require that it take effect as at 11th of October 2019, that is, within the time limit.

Error 1

  1. [23]
    Mr Zappia KC, who appeared for the Appellant, submitted that the Commission made a decision, albeit on an informal basis, before the expiration of the time limit. That was a factual matter that warranted an examination of the evidence to determine if, in fact, a decision was made. This he said was not addressed by the Tribunal below.
  2. [24]
    Developing the point Counsel argued that the Commission was aware of the defects of the defective work and the supporting evidence; they were aware of the builder’s refusal to rectify the works; they were aware of the statutory time limit to issue a direction by the 11th of October 2019 and although they were specifically asked to issue a direction urgently - they didn’t and that was the decision the Commission made.
  3. [25]
    The Commission may have had a reason for not making a formal decision. It may have wanted to investigate the complaint further before deciding on an extension of time application to the Tribunal. It is submitted, that the reason does not matter, for even if it was an interim decision, it was still a decision.

Error 2

  1. [26]
    The Tribunal erred in deciding that a decision by the Commission not to apply for an extension of time was not a reviewable decision.[7]
  2. [27]
    It is submitted that it is a reviewable decision because it falls within s. 86(1)(e) of the QBCC Act.
  3. [28]
    Counsel referred to the Commission’s letter of 13 March 2020 to the Appellant responding to her complaint about the internal review decision not to extend time.[8] There the author said:

On 24 February 2020, Mr Stick decided not to apply to extend the statutory timeframe as he did not consider there was sufficient reason to make the application - As such, the internal review decision was not to give a direction.

  1. [29]
    Counsel for the Appellant argued that by necessary implication a decision to extend or not to extend time is reviewable under s. 86(1)(e). He submitted that such a decision is a necessary step of a decision by the Commission to give a direction after the time period of 6 years and 6 months. Being intertwined with a decision to give or not to give a direction, a decision to apply or not to apply for an extension of time is part of s. 86(1)(e) and is just a step along the way to reaching that conclusion. Counsel referred to this as an extended jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
  2. [30]
    The policy of the law, he submitted was not to fragment administrative functions and decisions to allow challenges along the way, it was to wait for the ultimate decision which could then be challenged. There was no need for the legislature to expressly state that a decision to extend time or not was reviewable because under  s. 86(1)(e) a decision to give or not to give a direction was reviewable. That decision he said could be made after six years and six months. Section 86(1)(e) was not confined only to decisions made before the expiration of the time period, it was, he said, at large.
  3. [31]
    Counsel submits the decision not to apply to extend time was a step along the way to the ultimate decision not to issue a direction to rectify.
  4. [32]
    The second part of Counsel’s argument is that the Tribunal has power to review a decision to give or not to give a direction under s. 86(1)(e) whether made with in the six years and six months or after. Counsel relied upon the acceptance by the Commission that the decision of 25 February 2020 was a reviewable decision and that it was open to the Tribunal to set aside the decision (made on internal review) and substitute it with a direction to rectify to the builder.[9] If the Tribunal had the power to review the decision of 25 February 2020 not to give a direction to rectify Counsel submitted, on the above authorities and as a fundamental rule of construction, that it also had the power to review the decision not to extend time. Section 24 of the QCAT Act gave the Tribunal power to amend the decision, set it aside and substitute its own decision.
  5. [33]
    The only way the Tribunal can exercise that power in respect of a decision made after the six years and six months is by reviewing and amending the antecedent decision not to apply for an extension of time, otherwise that power has been curtailed.
  6. [34]
    He continued that it must be accepted that the Tribunal has the power to review such a decision and, under the Act, it has a power to amend the decision and substitute it. It must therefore follow that it has the power to review any decision made by the Commission for an extension of time. It is, he submitted, the application of fundamental principles of statutory construction that every legislative power carries with it the authority to do what  is necessary to effectuate that power.
  7. [35]
    He referred to a passage from the decision of D’Emden v Pedder[10] where the High Court said:

In other words where any power or control is expressly granted there is included in the grant to the full extent of the capacity of the grantor and without special mention every power and every control, the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective. This is in truth not a doctrine of any special system of law but a statement of a necessary rule of construction of all grants of power whether by unwritten Constitution, formal written instrument or other delegation of authority and applies from the necessity of the case to whom it is committed the exercise of powers of government.[11]

  1. [36]
    The principle was considered further in the decision of Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd [12] where the majority of the Court said:

In the next place every legislative power carries with it authority to legislate in relation to Acts, matters and things the control of which is found necessary to effectuate its main purpose and thus carries with it the power to make laws governing or affecting many matters that are incidental or ancillary to the subject matter.[13]

  1. [37]
    Counsel relied upon a passage from the decision of the High Court in Owners of “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Co Inc[14] where the Court said:

It is quite inappropriate to read provisions conferring jurisdiction or granting powers to a court by making implications or imposing limitations which are not found in the express words.[15]

  1. [38]
    Counsel submitted that there is nothing in this QBCC Act which says a decision on whether or not to apply for an extension of time is not reviewable. There is no express words saying that it’s not reviewable and it should not be implied just because it is  not found expressly in 86(1)(e). It is, he submitted, part and parcel of 86(1)(e).
  2. [39]
    The second limb of Counsel’s argument is that the decision was reviewable under s. 86E of the QCAT Act.
  3. [40]
    That section provides the definition of reviewable decision for sub-division 2 (external review):

In this subdivision —

reviewable decision means—

  1. (a)
    a reviewable decision within the meaning of subdivision 1, other than a decision that was the subject of an internal review under subdivision 1; or
  1. (b)
    an internal review decision within the meaning of subdivision 1.
  1. [41]
    Section 86B relevantly provides:

An internal review application must—

  1. (a)
    be made within the following period—
  1. (i)
    28 days after the applicant is given notice of the reviewable decision to which the application relates or otherwise becomes aware of the decision; or
  1. (ii)
    a longer period allowed by the internal reviewer, whether before or after the end of the 28-day period mentioned in subparagraph (i); and
  1. (b)
    be lodged at an office of the commission.
  1. [42]
    Section 86C relevantly provides:
  1. (1)
    If an internal review application is made under section 86B, the internal reviewer must, as soon as practicable but within the required period, make a new decision (the internal review decision) as if the reviewable decision the subject of the application had not been made.
  1. (2)
    For subsection (1), the required period is—

 (a) 28 days after the internal review application is made; or

(b) a longer period agreed to by the applicant.

  1. (3)
    However, if the internal reviewer does not decide the application within the required period, the internal reviewer is taken to have made an internal review decision at the end of the required period that is the same as the reviewable decision.
  1. [43]
    Counsel argued that the new decision is the decision of 25 February 2020 which was contained in the decision to disallow claim in the Internal Review Notice:[16]

Section 72(4) makes allowance for the QBCC to apply to QCAT to seek an extension. However QBCC is not aware of any sufficient reason in the current matter that would support an application for an extension.

  1. [44]
    Counsel referred to the Commission’s Statement of Reasons for what he submitted was the new decision:

The Commission is able to make an application to the tribunal to extend the time for giving a direction to rectify. However, in this case the Commission has elected not to make such an application to the tribunal.[17]

  1. [45]
    To deny that these decisions are not reviewable is according to Counsel to put artificial constraints on the powers and jurisdiction of the tribunal when it otherwise would be completely consistent with the objects of the QBCC Act.

Error 3

  1. [46]
    The Appellant relies upon the obiter comments of Member Cranwell in the decision of Mai v Queensland Building and Construction[18]. There Member Cranwell referred to s. 24(2)(b) of the QCAT Act that, relevantly, provided;

A decision of a tribunal upon review subject to any contrary order of the tribunal has effect from when the reviewable decision takes or took effect.

(his emphasis)

  1. [47]
    Member Cranwell said at paragraph [10]:

It seems to me that it would be open to Mr Mai to argue on the review, if the tribunal otherwise considers, that a direction to rectify should be given that the tribunal should order that its decision take effect from within the six years and six month period.  

  1. [48]
    Member Cranwell referred to his earlier decision in Jorg & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[19] in which he foreshadowed a similar approach but considered it inappropriate as the Jorgs had elected to pursue an internal review when an external review would have succeeded.
  2. [49]
    The Appeal Tribunal in Jorg’s case dismissed the appeal but disagreed with Member Cranwell that it would be open to the Tribunal to order its decision to take effect from a date within the 6 years and 6 month period. In considering the introductory words to s. 24 - which state - In a proceeding for a review of a reviewable decision … the Appeal Tribunal at [43] said:

The section assumes that the tribunal has jurisdiction in a particular review proceeding. The jurisdiction of a court, or in this case a tribunal, is not to be confused with its powers. Where, as here, an application to review a decision not to issue a direction to rectify is not filed within 6 years and 6 months of the completion of the building work and where, as here, there is no application by the commission to extend the time limit, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the decision. Section 24(2)(b) cannot be relied upon to create a jurisdiction that does not exist.[20]

The Commission’s case

  1. [50]
    At the hearing the Commission objected to the Appellant’s application to review multiple decisions relating to her complaint on the basis that the QCAT Act requires separate review applications to be filed in respect of each decision., and therefore, the Appellant’s application was invalid. [21]
  2. [51]
    The learned Member rejected the Commission’s objection finding that the application clearly identified the Commission’s decision of 25 February 2020 as the reviewable decision.[22]
  3. [52]
    The Commission’s case is that there was no decision made until the decision of 8 January 2020 which was the decision that was internally reviewed. However, there appears to have been a decision by Inspector Barrett on 16 December 2019,[23]although possibly not communicated to the Appellant. As both dates are after the expiry period nothing would seem to turn on this.
  4. [53]
    The Commission’s explanation that no decision had been made earlier was because a site inspection had to take place. That was necessary, it was submitted, because one of the objects of the QBCC Act was to achieve a reasonable balance between the interests of building contractors and consumers. 
  5. [54]
    The relief being sought in the Appellant’s application was a review of the decision of 25 February 2020 being the internal review decision not any earlier decision. That decision was after the expiry period.
  6. [55]
    In relation to the second error asserted by the Appellant being the tribunal’s finding that the Commission’s decision not to apply for an extension of time under s 72A(4) was not a reviewable decision under the QBCC Act, the Commission addressed the two related contentions in the Appellant’s submissions being:
    1. (a)
      that a s. 72A(4) decision was a “reviewable decision” because it is within the scope of s 86(1)(e) of the QBCC Act (the first contention);
    2. (b)
      a s. 72A(4) decision is alternatively a “reviewable decision” because it is within the scope s 86E (the second contention).
  7. [56]
    Mr Black of counsel provided written submissions on behalf of the Commission. I am grateful to him for providing a detailed history of the evolution of the respective sections. I reproduce that history hereunder:

The current versions of ss 72 and 72A were introduced by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 with effect from 1 July 2014. Immediately before the amendments, s 72 of the QBCC Act included s 72(8) in the following terms:

A direction cannot be given under this section more than 6 years and 3 months after the building work to which the direction relates was completed or left in an incomplete state unless the tribunal is satisfied, on application by the commission, that there is in the circumstances of a particular case sufficient reason for extending the time for giving a direction and extends the time accordingly.

That is, the provision for an “application” for an extension of time previously appeared in s 72(8) of the QBCC Act before being relocated to s 72A(4) (with some changes, but in substantively the same form).

The concept of a “reviewable decision” also has some history. Before July 2000, s 98 of the QBCC Act provided:[24]

98. Any of the following decisions of the authority is subject to review by the tribunal —

 (a) a decision to refuse an application for a licence;

 (b) a decision to impose or vary a condition of a licence;

 (c) a decision to suspend or cancel a licence;

 (d) a decision to direct rectification of building work;

 (e) a decision to disallow a claim under the insurance scheme wholly or in part;

 (f) another decision of the authority that adversely affects any person.

The reference to “authority” was a reference to what is now the Commission and the reference to the “tribunal” was a reference to the former Queensland Building Tribunal. At that time the QBCC Act adopted a broad and inclusive definition of reviewable decisions by referring to any “decision of the authority that adversely affects any person”.

With effect from July 2000, the Queensland Building Tribunal Act 2000 (the QBT Act; now repealed) commenced. The QBT Act removed s 98 of the QBCC Act and instead adopted its own definition of “reviewable decision”. Section 104(1) of the QBT Act provided that the “tribunal may review the following decisions of the authority” and then specified a list of decisions. That list included s 104(1)(e): “a decision to direct or not to direct rectification or completion of building work”. The Explanatory Notes for the QBT Act said:[25]

Clause 104 is an exclusive list of decisions of the Authority that are reviewable by the Tribunal under this division. Persons aggrieved at decisions other than reviewable decisions have access to judicial review under the Judicial Review Act 1991.

Section 104(1) of the QBT Act was later relocated to become s 86(1) of the QBCC Act and paragraph (e) was maintained in the same form.[26]

  1. [57]
    Mr Black of Counsel referred to the decision of Hogg v QBSA & Majestic Pools and Landscapes Pty Ltd [2002] QBT 157 (Hogg), by reference to s 72(8) of the QBCC Act (now s 72A(4)) and s 104(1)(e) of the QBT Act (now s 86(1)(e) of the QBCC Act), the applicant put the following argument (at [33](c) and (d)):

Section 104(1)(e) of the Queensland Building Tribunal Act 2000 permits the Tribunal to review a decision of the Authority “to direct or not to direct rectification or completion of building work”. In this regard a decision of the Authority whether to make application to extend the period of six years and three months is fundamental to the Authority’s decision to direct or not to direct rectification. As such it is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in terms of section 104(1)(e) to review the Authority’s decision in Section 72(8) whether or not it should bring an application to the Tribunal under that section.

Section 104 effectively makes reviewable by the Tribunal every substantive decision by the Authority, other than decisions referred to in Section 104(2). The subject decision is not a decision to which section 104(2) applies.

  1. [58]
    The Queensland Building Tribunal rejected that argument (at [40]). The Tribunal reasoned that:
    1. (a)
      The original definition of reviewable decisions in the early version of the QBCC Act included a “catch-all” provision (ie, any adverse decision). However, by s 104(1) of the QBT Act “the Legislature has seen fit to reduce the instances in which a review can be brought to specific and defined decisions” (at [42]).
    2. (b)
      Whilst s 72(8) (now s 72A(4)) is “not expressed specifically in terms of a ‘decision’ required to be taken”, it “nonetheless deals indirectly with a quite separate type of ‘decision’ … to that subject of section 72(1), namely whether to bring an Application to the Tribunal to extend time for the giving of a Direction to Rectify” (at [43]). That is a “decision different in substance to that required in section 72(1)” (at [43]).
    3. (c)
      Had the “Legislature intended for the Authority’s ‘decision’ in Section 72(8), (that is not to bring an application to the Tribunal) to have been reviewable, it would specifically have addressed that matter in Section 104(1)” (at [44]).
    4. (d)
      The “Legislature could have left the matter [of any extension of time to give a direction] generally in the discretion of the Tribunal at the instance of either party”, but it “chose not to do so” (at [45]).
  2. [59]
    On that basis, he submitted that the Tribunal in Hogg concluded that a decision under what is now s 72A(4) about whether to make an “application” to the Tribunal was not a reviewable decision (at [47]).
  3. [60]
    The decision in Hogg was followed by the Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal in Andrews v Queensland Building Services Authority [2008] QCCTB 105 (Andrews) (at [14]-[18]), where Member Oliver added (at [19]):

… It would seem extraordinary that the Tribunal would be permitted to review a decision of the Authority which review, if successful, would effectively force the Authority to commence proceedings in the Tribunal. One would expect that in fairness to the recipient of the proposed direction they would have to be served with the application and have an opportunity to contest it. This could then lead to potential litigation, imposed on parties against their will resulting in the substantial cost. This would, in my view, be contrary to the objects of the CCT Act as set out in section 9.

  1. [61]
    The decisions in Hogg and Andrews were cited in Gardiner v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 326 (at [2]) for the proposition that a decision not to make an application for an extension of time under s 72(8) (now s 72A(4)) was not reviewable (albeit without detailed consideration).
  2. [62]
    Counsel submitted that the decisions in Hogg and Andrews are correct and ought to be followed. There was no relevant distinction, he submitted, between the legislation considered in those decisions and the current versions of ss 72A(4) and 86 of the QBCC Act. Further, for the reasons that follow, the Commission submitted that the conclusion in Hogg and Andrews were entirely consistent with the proper construction of the QBCC Act.
  3. [63]
    Counsel submitted that, upon a proper construction of s 86(1)(e) of the QBCC Act, a s. 72A(4) decision did not fall within the scope of that paragraph. Section 86(1)(e) refers, relevantly, to a “decision to give a direction to rectify” or a “decision … not to give the direction”. That language was clearly and expressly addressed to the decision about whether to give a Direction to Rectify. It strained the natural meaning of the words to construe s 86(1)(e) as extending to encompass a decision about whether to make an “application” to the Tribunal for an extension of time within which to give a Direction to Rectify.
  4. [64]
    Once the limitation period in s 72A(4) expired, a Direction to Rectify could only be given if an extension of time was applied for (by the Commission) and granted (by the Tribunal). However, Counsel submitted that the decision about whether to make an application for an extension of time was conceptually distinct from a decision about whether to issue a Direction to Rectify. He reasoned that:
    1. (a)
      The power to give a Direction to Rectify under s 72 of the QBCC Act arises if, relevantly, the Respondent is of the opinion that “building work is defective”. The power to give a direction is discretionary, but its focus is generally upon the fairness or reasonableness of giving the direction as between the builder and the owner.[27]
    2. (b)
      Section 72A(4) of the QBCC Act gives the Respondent a separate discretion to make an “application” to the Tribunal for an extension of time. The criteria by which that discretion is to be exercised are not specified, so the considerations informing the Respondent’s exercise of discretion would be confined only by the subject matter, scope and purposes of the Act.[28]
  5. [65]
    That conceptual distinction between a decision to give a Direction to Rectify under s 72 and a decision to make an “application” under s 72A(4) was consistent with the more general operation of s 72. In McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QSC 57, Dalton J (as her Honour then was) pointed out that a “decision to direct rectification is necessarily anterior to the giving of a direction for rectification” (at [18]). With reference to McNab, the Tribunal in Oracle Building Corporation Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCAT 69, held that a direction to rectify was not itself a reviewable decision (at [189]); rather, it was the anterior decision that a direction should be given that is the reviewable decision (at [186]).
  6. [66]
    In practice, he submitted, there could be a variety of circumstances which are sufficient to justify giving a Direction to Rectify but not sufficient to justify making an application to the Tribunal for an extension of time. Counsel gave an example: an owner might have identified a clear and obvious defect; have acted promptly to approach the Respondent; and shown that the builder could easily rectify the defect. If the limitation period had expired, the decision-maker might nevertheless decline to make an application for an extension of time on the basis that the modest cost of the rectification did not warrant making such an application. Such examples serve to illustrate the distinction between the two different decisions.
  7. [67]
    The Commission submitted that this conclusion was entirely consistent with the purposes of the QBCC Act. The limitation period fixed by s 72A(4) operated as part of the balancing of interests referred to in s 3. Section 72A(4) fixed a limitation period and then committed to the Commission the discretion to make an application to extend that period. It was submitted that the Legislature’s decision to not provide an avenue for merits review of that discretion was not inconsistent with any purpose of the Act; it was merely another aspect of the balancing of relevant interests.
  8. [68]
    In relation to the Appellant’s second contention the Commission submitted that a s. 72A(4) decision did not fall within the scope of s 86E of the QBCC Act. As outlined above, s 86E identifies two different classes of decisions that were to be a “reviewable decision” for the purposes of Subdivision 2 (of Pt 7, Div 3) dealing with external review by the Tribunal.
  9. [69]
    The first class of decision was identified in s 86E(a): “a reviewable decision within the meaning of subdivision 1, other than a decision that was the subject of an internal review under subdivision 1”. That class of decision simply adopted the meaning of “reviewable decision” within Subdivision 1, which directed attention to s 86(1). For the reasons already advanced, the Commission submitted that a s. 72A(4) decision was not a “reviewable decision” within the meaning of s 86(1) (and thus not within s 86E(a)).
  10. [70]
    The second class of decision is identified in s 86E(b): “an internal review decision within the meaning of subdivision 1”. As already noted, s 86C(1) (within Subdivision 1) establishes the meaning of “internal review decision”:

If an internal review application is made under section 86B, the internal reviewer must, as soon as practicable but within the required period, make a new decision (the internal review decision) as if the reviewable decision the subject of the application had not been made.

  1. [71]
    The thrust of the Appellant’s argument, according to the Commission, appeared to be that any decision made by the internal reviewer became the “internal review decision” and, thus, a “reviewable decision” for the purposes of s 86E(b). The Commission submitted that this argument should be rejected, because the “new decision” referred to in s 86C(1) is necessarily limited to the specific decision that is made in substitution for the “reviewable decision”.
  2. [72]
    According to the Commission that conclusion follows from the language of the QBCC Act:
    1. (a)
      Subdivision 1 (of Pt 7, Div 3) is headed “Internal review”. Section 86A(1) permits a person who is given notice of a “reviewable decision” to apply to “have the decision reviewed”. The “decision” that is to be “reviewed” can only be a “reviewable decision” identified within s 86(1).
    2. (b)
      Section 86C(1) requires the internal reviewer not merely to make a “new decision”, but to make a “new decision … as if the reviewable decision … had not been made”. The “new decision” is in that way directly linked to, and becomes a substitute for, the original “reviewable decision”.
  3. [73]
    In that context, it is submitted that what s 86C(1) permits and requires of the internal reviewer is a review and remaking of the original “reviewable decision” in question. Section 86C(1) does not more broadly empower the internal reviewer to embark upon the making of other decisions. Counsel submitted that the process is a review of an existing reviewable decision. He submitted that the review is borne of the original decision.
  4. [74]
    The conclusion that s 86E(b) and s 86C(1) does not extend beyond the scope of a “reviewable decision” in s 86(1) is confirmed by the history of the provisions. Sections 86C and 86E — along with the current scheme of Pt 7, Div 3 of the QBCC Act —were introduced by the Professional Engineers and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014. Prior to those amendments, the reviewable decisions listed in s 86(1) were subject to external review by the Tribunal but there was no mechanism for internal review. The intention of the amendments was said to be to “enable a dissatisfied person to apply for internal review of QBCC decisions that have the potential to go to” the Tribunal.[29] Counsel submitted that there was nothing in the Professional Engineers and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 or its Explanatory Notes to suggest that the introduction of ss 86C and 86E was intended to somehow broaden the scope of decisions that might be reviewable by the Tribunal.
  5. [75]
    Accordingly, it is the Commission’s submission the “internal review decision” referred to in s 86E(b) of the QBCC Act means the “new decision” that the internal reviewer made in substitution for the original “reviewable decision”. As such, an “internal review decision” can only be a decision that is within the definition of “reviewable decision” in s 86(1).

Resolution

Statutory Interpretation principles

  1. [76]
    The Acts Interpretation Act 1954 sets out the primary principle of construction in s. 14A(1):

In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation.

  1. [77]
    In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, the majority (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ) explained the purposive approach to statutory interpretation at [14];

The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.

(citations omitted)

Summary determination

  1. [78]
    Section 47 of the QCAT Act confers on the Tribunal the power to dismiss or strike out proceedings and relevantly provides that:
  1. (1)
    This section applies if the tribunal considers a proceeding or a part of a proceeding is—
  1. (a)
    frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or
  2. (b)
    lacking in substance; or
  3. (c)
    otherwise an abuse of process.
  1. (2)
    The tribunal may—
  1. (a)
    if the party who brought the proceeding or part before the tribunal is the applicant for the proceeding, order the proceeding or part be dismissed or struck out; …
  1. [79]
    In the Murtagh v QBCC[30] the Tribunal noted that:

Pursuant to s 47(2)(a) the tribunal may exercise its discretion to strike out or dismiss a proceeding or part of a proceeding brought by an applicant… The power should be exercised sparingly so that claims that are groundless or which lack merit are barred. If there is a real question to be tried then dismissal at an interlocutory stage is not appropriate.

Appeal principles

  1. [80]
    Leave to appeal was not sought, consequently, this appeal is confined to issues of law.
  2. [81]
    The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the learned Member’s discretion miscarried. The definitive authority is House v R[31]where the majority of the High Court comprising Dixon J (as he then was) Evatt and McTiernan JJ said:

The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.

  1. [82]
    It is necessary to show that the decision of the learned Member is wrong not that another Tribunal may have arrived at a different result. This was emphasised by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v. The Commonwealth[32]where His Honour said:

I shall not repeat the references I made in Lovell v. Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513, at pp 532-534 to cases of the highest authority which appear to me to establish that the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is satisfied that it is clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the presumption may exist where there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable, but even so it is sufficient that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance.

Was a reviewable decision made earlier than 11 October 2019?

  1. [83]
    The Appellant submitted that the Commission made a decision not to issue the direction to rectify on or before 11 October 2019. It is submitted that when the decision was made is a question of fact. The legislation does not assist in defining when a decision is made. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that this issue was not addressed by the Tribunal below.
  2. [84]
    The Appellant’s application for review was of the decision of 25 February 2020, which was the internal review decision. That was the decision before the Tribunal at first instance. The Appellant in her written submissions before the learned Member identified what she referred to as reviewable decisions on 11 October and 16 December 2019. The Commission rejected those decisions as not being reviewable decisions.[33]
  3. [85]
    Although I accept that the Commission was aware of the complaint and of other facts relied upon by Counsel, such as the nature of the defective work, the builder’s refusal to rectify the work and the urgency of the matter because of the pending time limit that does not mean that opinions expressed at the time by some or one of the Commission’s officers somehow crystallised into a reviewable decision. Those investigating the complaint may have formed opinions, but such opinions cannot be considered reviewable decisions until clothed with the authority of the Commission. Decisions made in those circumstances should not be elevated to decisions capable of being reviewed.
  4. [86]
    In my opinion, reviewable decisions must be made by a person or persons with authority to make them. The first decision that could be considered as such was the decision of 16 December 2019 made by Inspector Barrett.[34] That was not formally notified to the Appellant until 8 January 2020. Neither of those dates fall before the expiry period, to provide the Appellant with the relief sought.
  5. [87]
    It is instructive to consider the comments of Mason CJ (with whom Brennan and Deane JJ agreed) in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond[35]where His Honour said at 337:

The policy arguments do not, in my opinion, call for an answer different from that dictated by the textual and contextual considerations. That answer is that a reviewable “decision” is one for which provision is made by or under a statute. That will generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration. A conclusion reached as a step along the way in a course of reasoning leading to an ultimate decision would not ordinarily amount to a reviewable decision, unless the statute provided for the making of a finding or ruling on that point so that the decision, though an intermediate decision, might accurately be described as a decision under an enactment.

  1. [88]
    There was no evidence before the learned Member, or this Tribunal, of any decision, having been made before 11 October 2019, let alone one that could be described as  final or operative and determinative. The best argument that Counsel for the Appellant could make was that if allowed to go to a hearing evidence may be revealed that a decision may have been made. That, in my opinion, is not sufficient to establish a triable issue as submitted by the Appellant.
  2. [89]
    There is no basis for a finding on this issue that the learned Member’s discretion miscarried.

Was the decision by the Commission not to apply for an extension of time reviewable?

  1. [90]
    The learned Member found that a decision by the Commission not to apply for an extension of time under s. 72A(4) of the QCAT Act was not a reviewable decision.
  2. [91]
    Counsel for the Appellant argued that by necessary implication a decision to extend or not to extend time is reviewable under s. 86(1)(e). He argued that such a decision was a necessary step of a decision by the Commission to give a direction after the time period of 6 years and 6 months.
  3. [92]
    A body of authority is against such construction. The legislative history and evolution of s. 86(1)(e) and s. 72A(4) from earlier versions of the provisions militates against such a construction.
  4. [93]
    There is, as Mr Black of Counsel for the Commission submitted and expanded upon in his submissions, a conceptual distinction between the power under s. 72 to give a direction to rectify and a power to an apply for an extension of time under s. 72A(4). It is not necessary for me to repeat them here.
  5. [94]
    The distinction is demonstrated further in McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority (supra) where by Dalton J (as she then was) distinguished between the direction to rectify issued by the Commission and the decision to the direct rectification which preceded it.
  6. [95]
    In my opinion, the construction placed on s 86(1)(e) of the QBCC Act by the Appellant, is inconsistent with the statutory history of the provision, its context and purpose. Had the legislature intended that the extension of time was reviewable it would have expressly stated it to be so.
  7. [96]
    The second part of Counsel’s argument described as error 2 is that the decision was reviewable under s. 86E of the QCAT Act. Counsel argued that the decision of 25 February 2020 was the ‘new decision’ which included a decision not to apply to extend time. To preclude that as part of a reviewable decision was to put artificial constraints on the powers and jurisdiction of the tribunal.
  8. [97]
    The Commission rejects this argument as it says the new decision in s. 86C(1) is necessarily limited to the specific decision that was made in substitution for the reviewable decision. Section 86C(1) does not more broadly empower the internal reviewer to embark upon the making of other decisions.
  9. [98]
    I agree with this construction which is consistent with how the provision for internal review evolved through the amendments of the section by the Professional Engineers and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 and supporting Explanatory Notes.

Did the tribunal have power to amend that decision of 25 February 2020 and order rectification and require that it take effect as at 11th of October 2019 within the time limit?

  1. [99]
    Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the decision of Mai v Queensland Building and Construction[36] where Member Cranwell proposed that relief could be given under s. 24(2)(b), by making a decision to direct rectification to take effect at a time within the six year six month period.
  2. [100]
    The Commission’s case is that the Appellant’s argument fundamentally overlooks the fact that s. 72A(4) of the QBCC Act is jurisdictional and not procedural. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider an extension of time under s. 72A(4) of the QBCC Act.
  3. [101]
    I refer to the decision of Jorg & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[37]where the Tribunal said at [43]:

Section 24(1) of the QCAT Act begins with the words ‘In a proceeding for a review of a reviewable decision…’. The section assumes that the tribunal has jurisdiction in  a particular review proceeding. The jurisdiction of a court, or in this case a tribunal, is not to be confused with its powers. Where, as here, an application to review a decision not to issue a direction to rectify is not filed within 6 years and 6 months of the completion of the building work and where, as here, there is no application by the commission to extend the time limit, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the decision. Section 24(2)(b) cannot be relied upon to create a jurisdiction that does not exist.

(citations omitted)

  1. [102]
    Counsel for the Appellant’s response to the decision of Jorg (supra) is that the matters of construction he has relied upon were not considered or argued in Jorg (supra). In my opinion, the Appellants submissions on the construction of the various provisions of the QBCC Act does not overcome the jurisdictional bar to extending time in s. 72A(4) of the QBCC Act. 
  2. [103]
    There is a great deal of unfairness in the outcome for the Appellant, but, unfortunately, it is a matter that this Tribunal cannot rectify. In my opinion, the learned Member’s discretion has not miscarried. I dismiss the appeal.

Footnotes

[1]  Appeal Book p. 49

[2]  Appeal Book p. 63

[3]  Appeal Book p. 68

[4] Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] QCAT 170

[5] Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] 170  pp. 4 -5

[6] Ibid. paragraph [34]

[7] Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] 170 [29]

[8]  Appeal Book p. 77

[9] Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] 170 [8]

[10]  (1904) 1 CLR 91 

[11] Ibid p. 109

[12]  (1955) 93 CLR 55

[13] Ibid p. 77

[14]  (1994) 181 CLR 404

[15] Ibid. 421

[16] Appeal Book p. 69

[17]  Appeal Book p. 218

[18]  [2022] QCAT 296

[19]  [2020] QCAT 528

[20] Jorg & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] QCATA 134 at [43]

[21] Body Corporate for Alto Gladstone v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2020] QCATA 6 at [73]

[22] Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] 170 at [7]

[23]  Appeal Book p. 49

[24]  See Reprint No 6 (before the QBCC Act was renamed)  .

[25]  Explanatory Notes to the Queensland Building Tribunal Bill 1999, page .

[26]  The relocation was effected by the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Act 2003 (now repealed), Sch 1, s 12.

[27]  Examples are Queensland Building and Construction Commission v Groupline Constructions Pty Ltd [2020] QCA 245, [81]; Queensland Building and Construction Commission v Group Kildey Pty Ltd [2016] QCATA 10, [19]-[32]; Dunmoor Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 39, [61]-[62].

[28] Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-42; O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210, 216.

[29]  Explanatory Notes to the Professional Engineers and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014, page 3 .

[30]  [2018] QCAT 258

[31]  (1936) 55 CLR 499

[32]  (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627

[33] Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] 170 at [23]

[34]  Appeal Book p. 49

[35]  (1990)170 CLR 321

[36]  [2022] QCAT 296

[37]  [2021] QCATA 134

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

  • MNC:

    [2023] QCATA 81

  • Court:

    QCATA

  • Judge(s):

    Member King-Scott

  • Date:

    03 Jul 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Andrews v Queensland Building Services Authority [2008] QCCTB 105
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QCCTB 105
Cite 2 - [2008] QCCTB 105
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 321
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 321
Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1953) 94 CLR 621
Cite 2 - (1953) 94 CLR 621
Body Corporate for Alto Gladstone v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCATA 6
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QCATA 6
Cite 2 - [2020] QCATA 6
DEmden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1904) 1 CLR 91
Cite 2 - (1904) 1 CLR 91
Cite 3 - (1904) 1 CLR 91
Dunmoor Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 39
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCATA 39
Cite 2 - [2016] QCATA 39
Gardiner v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 326
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCAT 326
Cite 2 - [2011] QCAT 326
Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1955) 93 CLR 55
Cite 2 - (1955) 93 CLR 55
Cite 3 - (1955) 93 CLR 55
Hogg & Anor v QBSA & Anor [2002] QBT 157
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QBT 157
Cite 2 - [2002] QBT 157
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Jorg v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] QCATA 134
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QCATA 134
Cite 2 - [2021] QCATA 134
Cite 3 - [2021] QCATA 134
Cite 4 - [2021] QCATA 134
Jorg v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCAT 528
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QCAT 528
Cite 2 - [2020] QCAT 528
Lovell v Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1950) 81 CLR 513
Mai v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2022] QCAT 296
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QCAT 296
Cite 2 - [2022] QCAT 296
Cite 3 - [2022] QCAT 296
McNab Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QSC 57
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QSC 57
Cite 2 - [2013] QSC 57
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Cite 2 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Murtagh v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QCAT 258
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCAT 258
Cite 2 - [2018] QCAT 258
O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 168 CLR 210
Cite 2 - (1989) 168 CLR 210
Oracle Building Corporation Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCAT 69
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QCAT 69
Cite 2 - [2020] QCAT 69
Owners of Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1994) 181 CLR 404
Cite 2 - (1994) 181 CLR 404
Cite 3 - (1994) 181 CLR 404
Queensland Building and Construction Commission v Group Kildey Pty Ltd; Queensland Building and Construction Commission v JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd [2016] QCATA 10
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCATA 10
Cite 2 - [2016] QCATA 10
Queensland Building and Construction Commission v Groupline Constructions Pty Ltd(2020) 6 QR 390; [2020] QCA 245
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QCA 245
Cite 2 - [2020] QCA 245
Rucker v Stewart [2014] QCA 32
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCA 32
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
Tanna v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2021] QCAT 170
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QCAT 170
Cite 2 - [2021] QCAT 170
Cite 3 - [2021] QCAT 170
Cite 4 - [2021] QCAT 170

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Body Corporate for Infinity 1 Community Titles Scheme 45404 v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2025] QCAT 542 citations
Clark v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2024] QCAT 3292 citations
1

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