Weston v Pini Pty Ltd[2025] QCATA 14

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. [1]
   This is an application for leave to appeal and/or appeal against the decision of the Tribunal to dismiss the claims made by Francis Weston and Rosepark Stud Pty Ltd ('the applicants’) against the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (‘the second respondent’) and to order the applicants pay to Pini Pty Ltd (‘the first respondent’) the sum of $10,300.
2. [2]
   As that decision was made in a proceeding for a minor civil dispute, the applicants must first obtain the Appeal Tribunal’s leave to appeal.^[1]
3. [3]
   As a general proposition, when leave to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal is required, it will be granted only where there is a reasonable argument that the decision was attended by error and an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by that error, or where the appeal raises a question of general importance upon which further argument and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal would be to the public advantage.^[2]

The background

4. [4]
   The applicants brought a claim seeking to be relieved of an obligation to pay money to the first respondent for the service of four (4) mares by a stallion owned by the first respondent and for costs charged by the first respondent for their subsequent agistment.
5. [5]
   The applicants disputed the money was owed, essentially because they say there was no agreement to pay for agistment and it was not their fault the mares had not been returned, and that agistment fees had been incurred.
6. [6]
   It is not entirely clear what the applicants claimed against the second respondent. Doing the best we can, it appears the applicants blamed the second respondent regulator for the deterioration in the relationship between the applicants and the first respondent because the regulator did not do enough to prevent a third party licensed trainer from damaging their business reputation and causing the first respondent to refuse to return the mares until the service invoices had been paid, thereby leading to the agistment costs incurred. The applicants also wanted the Tribunal to make directions enabling the applicants to be able to safely train the horses under their licence.

The decision

7. [7]
   The adjudicator found in favour of the respondents, dismissing the applicants’ claims and ordering they pay the first respondent $10,300. In arriving at that decision, the learned adjudicator found:

   1. The tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with regulatory matters involving the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission in a minor civil dispute proceeding and the claim against them was dismissed;
   2. The parties disagreed as to the terms of the agreement between them;
   3. The service fees were not paid in full, and the first respondent retained the horses and did not provide the service certificates to the applicants;
   4. The first respondent then invoiced the applicants for agistment fees which were also not paid in full;
   5. A settlement agreement was entered into whereby the parties agreed that Mr Weston would pay $12,300 over time by way of monthly instalments and the first respondent would return the horses.
   6. Mr Weston paid the first monthly instalment of $2,000 and the horses were returned but Mr Weston has not paid anything since;
   7. The settlement agreement was binding and the adjudicator could not ‘look behind that’;
   8. Accordingly, the applicants were ordered to pay the first respondent $10,300 within 14 days.

Grounds of appeal

8. [8]
   The applicants have not addressed the issue of leave to appeal.
9. [9]
   The grounds of appeal are not clear. We propose to consider the points raised by the applicants, discerning as best we can what amounts to grounds of appeal and whether leave to appeal should be given.

Dismissal of claim against second respondent on basis of lack of jurisdiction

10. [10]
    The types of matters that can be heard as minor civil disputes are defined in Schedule 3 to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’). The type of claim made against the second respondent does not fall within any of those categories.
11. [11]
    The applicants seem to suggest in later submissions that the matter should have been heard by a Senior Member with authority to hear their claim against the second respondent.
12. [12]
    The matter was brought as a minor civil dispute. The claim against the second respondent was not a minor civil dispute. It was also misconceived. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear what essentially is a complaint made by a person against the second respondent. There was no scope in those circumstances to order that part of the claim be transferred to be heard and determined by a Member of the Tribunal.
13. [13]
    Accordingly, the adjudicator did not err in dismissing the claim against the second respondent.

Advising applicants that they would have succeeded if they had brought claim earlier

14. [14]
    The applicants claimed the adjudicator indicated they would have been successful if they had come to the Tribunal earlier.
15. [15]
    The transcript shows that the adjudicator merely asked the applicants rhetorically why they did not come to the Tribunal when the first respondent allegedly first refused to return the horses, presumably, rather than wait until the agistment fees had been incurred.^[3] Mr Weston replied that they did but that it was “sent out the door”.
16. [16]
    The applicants in their appeal submissions say they could not bring the claim at the time due to COVID and that they had been advised they could not make that application in QCAT.
17. [17]
    The adjudicator did not err in asking the question that he did.
18. [18]
    We find no discernible ground of appeal.

Failure by the adjudicator to produce written evidence which the adjudicator appeared to have but which had not been provided to the applicants

19. [19]
    The applicants do not point to any evidence which they say was deliberately not disclosed by the adjudicator to them. This claim is completely unsupported and no error is established.

Adjudicator’s comments that workplace safety is not an issue for the second respondent and that the applicant was a disqualified person

20. [20]
    The adjudicator said, in response to Mr Weston saying that all he was asking for from the second respondent was for it to be safe for them to go back on racecourse:

I don’t think Ms Farthing or Ms Ballard could even guarantee you that…it’s not up to them to do those things. They’ll make you safe in all sorts of regards, but not in relation to criminals.^[4]

21. [21]
    There is no error in making such a comment.
22. [22]
    There is no statement made by the adjudicator to the effect that Mr Weston was a disqualified person. Mr Weston had said that he could not train his horses under his licence and the adjudicator asked him whether he had been charged by the second respondent to which Mr Weston replied, “Absolutely not, for nothing”.^[5]
23. [23]
    There is no error in asking the question.

Request for adjudicator to read applicant’s submissions rather than require him to read them out was not addressed

24. [24]
    In a document described as “further appeal submissions” the applicants argue that Mr Weston has severe post-traumatic stress disorder and had requested to have the adjudicator read his submissions into the record rather than have him address the Tribunal. The applicants say the request was not addressed by the adjudicator and instead the adjudicator insisted the affected person outline his case.
25. [25]
    Even if we accept that the adjudicator did not address the request for Mr Weston to be excused from addressing the Tribunal orally, there is no basis for concluding that this had any impact on the outcome of the proceeding. The adjudicator had access to the written submissions and would, in the ordinary course, have taken them into account. Appearing before the adjudicator was important to enable the adjudicator to seek clarification from the applicants but also to ensure procedural fairness.
26. [26]
    The adjudicator has not erred in this respect.

Conclusion

27. [27]
    We conclude, for the reasons above, there is no reasonable argument of error raised by any of the grounds of appeal.
28. [28]
    Accordingly, leave to appeal is refused. The application for leave to appeal or appeal is dismissed.