Palmer v Madrone Pty Ltd[2025] QCATA 56

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. [1]
   The respondent is the owner of a residential property situate at 109 - 113 Coondooroopa Drive, Macleay Island (‘the Property’). The directors of the respondent are family members of the applicant, critically the director is the applicant’s son. The Property is held by the respondent in its capacity as the trustee of the Cloud Nine Trust of which the applicant is a beneficiary, as are other family members. The respondent let the Property to the applicant by way of form 18a general tenancy agreement signed by the applicant and the respondent's property manager on 9 May 2023 (‘the tenancy agreement’). The tenancy agreement specified that it was for a fixed term commencing 1 June 2023 and ending 31 May 2024. There was no option within it to renew the agreement for a further term.
2. [2]
   It is common ground that the respondent issued a notice to leave the Property to the applicant on 7 January 2024 for, amongst other things, the fact that the term of the tenancy agreement had ended and purported to do so pursuant to section 291 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) (‘the RTRA Act’). The respondent also issued the notice to leave for a change of use of the Property in accordance with section 290E of the RTRA Act. The respondent asserted that it had decided to sell the Property because it had become impractical to manage and considered it will be almost impossible to effectively market and sell the Property until the applicant vacates the Property. There were also other various non- remedied alleged breaches of the tenancy agreement which raised contested factual issues. The applicant did not vacate the Property despite the notice that he does so.
3. [3]
   On 19 August 2024, this Tribunal ordered that the tenancy Agreement between the parties be terminated as from midnight on the 13 September 2024 on the grounds of failure to leave and that a Warrant of Possession issue authorising a police officer to enter the premises. The applicant appeals that decision and seeks orders staying the decision.
4. [4]
   The respondent’s position here and at the hearing below was that the only basis relied upon to entitle it to possession was the end of the lease term had arrived, and that arose because it was not argued otherwise below or before me that the other alleged bases, which included those other various non- remedied alleged breaches were relied upon.
5. [5]
   The background to the dispute concerns a broader ongoing dispute over many years within the applicant’s family being conducted in the Supreme Court in relation to the applicant’s deceased parents will. The details about what occurred in that litigation are sparse to the point of being absent.
6. [6]
   The matter came before the Tribunal on 14 June 2024 after the respondent filed an application for a termination order (‘the application’) seeking in effect that the tenancy agreement be treated as at an end. Then on 16 July 2024, the applicant filed an application for leave to be represented and an application for miscellaneous matters.
7. [7]
   On 22 July 2024, the Tribunal made directions allowing the applicant to be legally represented. On 23 July 2024, there was a hearing in which the applicant sought and was granted an adjournment, and was again given leave to be represented and the parties were directed to file and serve any further documents by 16 August 2024 with a hearing to be on 19 August 2024. There is a transcript of the hearing that day.
8. [8]
   Before the hearing on 19 August 2024, the applicant filed submissions in resistance to the application in which he contended, inter alia (using his language) that:

   1. “The use of a Tenancy Agreement has only been used in an onerous and oppressive way by the same lawyers who were against him in the Supreme Court. Where it has been very much possible not to have a Tenancy Agreement at all similar to how things are done for his sister, and doesn't at all align with the equity he has provided for his entire family after his assets from his working days were kept in trust”;
   2. “Some relevant case law, specifically the case of King v King, was suggested to be very relevant, which further indicates that this matter should not be a tenancy matter at all. Due to the substantial equity (he) worked for over his entire working life, which makes up the vast majority of the equity and assets in his family trust”;
   3. He “has been pursuing remedies for errors and mishandling of the Ross Leslie Palmer Testamentary Trust, and Cloud Nine run by Madrone, and seeks to apply for better and further provision under the Trusts Act”;
   4. When (he) “went to the trouble of moving to the house it took 3 or 4 months and was done at great cost, by friends and helpers, and the move was done with the promise from (his) daughter that he would be there for life, i.e., finally he had a place to stay that wasn't subject to the insecurities of being subject to a formal or intrusive landlord”;
   5. “The Trust and his sons had purchased the home for (him) to live in, with his family Trust money, similar to how others in the trust, like his sister and other son(s) were provided with secure accommodation for life, which wasn't in any way interfered with”.
9. [9]
   On 19 August 2024, the Tribunal made a decision after a hearing on that date, but without providing separate written reasons that:

   1. The Residential Tenancy Agreement between the parties be terminated as from midnight on the 13 September 2024 on the grounds of failure to leave.
   2. A Warrant of Possession to issue authorising a police officer to enter the premises at 109-113 Coondooroopa Drive, Macleay Island, Queensland, 4184.
   3. The Warrant shall take effect on 16 September 2024 at 08:00 AM and will remain in effect to expire at 12:00 AM on 30 September 2024.
   4. The Warrant to be executed as soon as reasonably practical after taking effect.
   5. Entry under the warrant shall only be between the hours of 8:00 AM and 6:00 PM.
10. [10]
    On or about 16 September 2024, the Applicant filed an application for leave to appeal or appeal the decision of the Tribunal in proceeding 4178-24 dated 19 August 2024.
11. [11]
    In that application he sought orders:

    1. That the operation of the original decision is stayed pending the final outcome of the appeal;
    2. That the appeal proceedings are also stayed to allow him to take action to prosecute his claim for an equitable interest (as beneficiary of the trust) so that the real dispute between the parties may be resolved;
    3. If not resolved that the proceedings are returned to QCAT for hearing with both parties legally represented;
12. [12]
    Oral reasons were given 19 August 2024 and they were as follows:

The orders I'm going to make today is in relation to the end of the lease, the form 12 that was given 7th of the 1st 2024 with the lease ending 31st of May 2024. The decision I'll make today is the tenancy be terminated. I'll give you four weeks, sir. So, we'll say the 14th of September 2024. That's when I'm terminating this tenancy, and I'll give a warrant of possession on the 16th of September 2024.

If you are going to pursue what you believe might be some rights that you have -which I'm not satisfied that I have that information before me, but you're within your rights to lodge, you know, with any court in relation to any equitable interests you might claim to have, but I'm not satisfied on what I've got today.

13. [13]
    In the argument before me, the applicant says that he is asking the Appeal Tribunal to intervene in the outcome first because he does not believe he received a fair hearing below and secondly because the Adjudicator made an error in law in regard to the relevance of the principles set out in King v King [2010] QCATA 84 (‘King v King’) and failed to give reasons for not applying these principles. He submits that there is a reasonably arguable case of error which, if uncorrected, will result in substantial injustice to him and that there is a question of general importance that should, in the public interest, be reconsidered on appeal.
14. [14]
    King v King had its own associated litigation which proceeded in the Supreme Court in King v King & Ors [2012] QCA 39 [2012] 2 Qd R 448.
15. [15]
    As to his second contention about the significance of the decision in King v King the applicant submits as follows:

    1. 3.15 Section 4(d) of the QCAT Act requires the Tribunal to ensure like cases are treated alike. By section 13 of the QCAT Act, the Tribunal must make orders that are fair and equitable to the parties, including dismissing the application if appropriate.
    2. 3.16 It is my submission that the Adjudicator at the hearing on 19 August failed to ensure a like case was treated alike and failed to make a decision that was fair and equitable to the parties in order to resolve the dispute.
    3. 3.17 My submissions prior to the hearing included a reference to the principles in King v King whereby the Tribunal might decide to suspend proceedings because the balance of convenience favours the tenant remaining in occupation while other interests and disputes are resolved in another jurisdiction.
    4. 3.18 I made comments during the hearing to the effect that I believe the trustee is in breach of its duties, and that I believe I can prove an equitable interest. In addition, in the Form 40 dated 8 August, I stated: "Trustee Duty: Trustees must act in the best interests of beneficiaries, especially vulnerable ones, under the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), Section 5."
    5. 3.19 I raised King v King on two occasions during the hearing on 19 August and asked the Adjudicator to consider it. For example: At 13:50 of the audio transcript:

Mr Palmer: I've dug up some case law. In fact, you need to look at King v King.

Adjudicator: Yes, I've read King v King but I'm not certain how that applies to this case. There might be some provisions of the agreement that essentially the Tribunal would read down and say are not really valid. But there is a lease in place, you have been served pursuant to that lease to vacate the property. All the other issues are almost beside the point at this stage. But the situation sir is that you are going to have to move out. Unless you have got some other proceedings that will stop this which apparently aren't ongoing at the moment.

6. It is my submission that the Adjudicator on 19 August erred in his interpretation of King v King as follows: The Adjudicator asked during the hearing whether proceedings were currently underway in another jurisdiction, thus inferring that only the fact of current proceedings would be relevant to a consideration of the King v King principles.
7. 3.21 However, in the Appeal Tribunal decision of King v King, there were no current proceedings underway at the time of the hearing before the primary Tribunal or the Appeal Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal in King v King determined that it would make the orders that had been open to the primary Tribunal to make, namely, to suspend the proceedings in order to allow the tenant to commence a claim.
8. 3.22 I note that the Appeal Tribunal decision in King v King was made on 16 November 2010 giving the tenant "the opportunity to pursue his equitable claim in a court of competent jurisdiction" until 18 February 2011. The Appeal Tribunal foreshadowed directions that if the tenant did not do so, or if he was unsuccessful in that claim, the appeal would be further considered (paragraph 38). A similar timeframe should be afforded to me to take the appropriate steps.
9. 3.23 It was open to the Adjudicator at the hearing on 19 August to make orders in line with King v King as a fair and equitable decision.
10. 3.24 As determined in the King v King matter, the Adjudicator at the hearing on 19 August erred as follows:

[27] In a proceeding for a minor civil dispute, QCAT must make orders that it considers fair and equitable to the parties in order to resolve the dispute. It must ensure, so far as is practicable, that all relevant material is disclosed to enable it to decide the proceeding with all the relevant facts. The evidence given about whether John King's right to occupy arose from a residential tenancy agreement or some other arrangement was unsatisfactory. There were clearly other people who could have given relevant evidence on that matter. Whilst it may not have been appropriate for the question to be fully ventilated in a jurisdiction that could not recognise John King's purported interest, this did not mean that the learned adjudicator was entitled to entirely disregard John King's evidence.

11. 3.25 I further submit that the Adjudicator erred by not referring to his assessment about the non-relevance of King v King to my case in his reasons for decision.

16. [16]
    It is common ground that pursuant to section 28(3)(a) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’); in conducting proceedings, the Adjudicator was required to observe the rules of natural justice. In that regard, the applicant makes the submission that that the Adjudicator at the hearing on 19 August 2024 erred in law by failing to ensure natural justice and procedural fairness in the making of his decision, in that, the applicant below (the respondent here) was legally represented and he was not legally represented.
17. [17]
    It is also common ground that on 22 July 2024 prior to the first hearing on 23 July 2024 in which he sought and was granted an adjournment, he had applied for leave to be represented prior to any hearing in the matter, and this was permitted in a decision on the papers of 22 July 2024. At the first hearing on 23 July, it was established that his appointed representative Charles O'Brien was not available to act for him that day. The matter was adjourned to give him time to get legal representation. The then applicant was also given leave to be represented at that first hearing on 23 July.
18. [18]
    Another order allowing him non legal representation was made before the hearing and that order was made on 16 August 2024. He was also given leave to be legally represented in this appeal by an order made on 1 May 2025. He chose not to avail himself of such representation. Ahead of the hearing scheduled for 19 August, he says he sought an adjournment application dated 8 August 2024 and by email to the Tribunal on 12 August to allow him more time to prepare and find a representative. The hearing on 19 August proceeded with the applicant represented by a solicitor, and he was not represented. That was his choice not to do so.
19. [19]
    The applicant contends that at the hearing on 19 August the Adjudicator stated that, at the commencement of the hearing, that the Tribunal had phoned his representative Charles O'Brien expecting him to participate in the hearing. That does not appear in the transcript although at page 13 of the transcript the adjudicator did say they did try to call someone they thought was appearing but when called that person said they weren’t appearing for him.
20. [20]
    Later in the hearing, the applicant said:

I've been a self-represented litigant in the Supreme Court, setting up an organisation called Advocata and my own law firm, Law Fair. Right. So, I'm 75 years of age. I have been around. I know the law. I did get legal advice, which is different to legal representation. You made a big hoo and ha dance with it that Bernard Charles O'Brien didn't turn up. Well, the evidence doesn't show that. Mr Furgan is being deceitful. Right. He knows that his firm's in for huge trouble. Right. I need - but if I'm going to go through the same shenanigans that it's going to take two weeks, QCAT, right, transcripts, right… I want the transcript of today's hearing, and I want to order it up immediately

21. [21]
    In this appeal, he submits that there was a reasonable onus on the Adjudicator to turn his mind to the disparity that had arisen because he had been given leave to be represented, on the basis of which the applicant was subsequently given leave to be represented, yet the hearing on 19 August proceeded with only the applicant (respondent here) represented. He submits that if the Adjudicator had turned his mind to the disparity, he could have explored any detriment to the applicant if the matter was further adjourned. He says he could easily have demonstrated no detriment to the applicant and that none of these proper lines of enquiry were explored.
22. [22]
    The fact is though that he did not specifically ask for another adjournment that day, and he had been given one a month earlier so he could arrange representation. Moreover, he said that he knew the law and had some legal experience. Prima facie, he was capable of making submissions on the law and the evidence in those circumstances.
23. [23]
    In my view, he has not demonstrated that there was any such obvious disadvantage to him in not being represented. The legal issue was a simple one, and his reliance on the outcome in the decision in King v King showed that he was conscious of his interests, in that context.
24. [24]
    As the Court of Appeal held in Sanderson v Bank of Queensland Limited [2016] QCA 137:

[22] Clearly the duty of courts to ensure that any trial is fair extends to civil as well as criminal cases. Clearly also the absence of legal representation for a party is likely to be relevant, in an individual case, to the discharge of the court’s duty to ensure that the trial is fair. The obligation of a trial judge to take appropriate steps to ensure that an unrepresented litigant receives a fair trial was explained by Beazley JA in Hamod v New South Wales, in terms which I would respectfully adopt and which were recently adopted by the Full Court of the Federal Court in AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The Full Court there considered an argument that an unrepresented applicant seeking judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal had been denied procedural fairness by the Federal Circuit Court denying him “a fair hearing, the right to legal representation or equality of arms”. The appeal was allowed by the Full Court but not on the basis of that argument, which the court found was unnecessary to decide, save that their Honours said that they rejected the contention that the applicant had a right to publicly funded legal representation as an aspect of the requirements of procedural fairness or, alternatively, that he was entitled to have the proceedings stayed.3 The Court (Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ) said:

“The fact that the applicant was unrepresented is a factor which may be taken into account, along with others, in determining whether there has been a denial of procedural fairness but we doubt that this factor alone would ever warrant a finding of procedural unfairness in a hearing of the present kind.”

[23] It follows that the equality of arms principle does not entitle the present applicants to legal representation or of itself, provide a basis for permanently staying or dismissing this proceeding if they remain unrepresented. The question is whether this proceeding can be fairly determined in all the circumstances, including that the applicants are without legal representation. (citations omitted)

[27] The applicants are impecunious. But that circumstance, considered with their personal circumstances and their lack of legal representation, ought not to preclude a fair trial of this proceeding. In this case, as in many others involving unrepresented litigants, the task of the trial judge (or a judge in a pre-trial hearing) would be burdensome but not unusual.

[28] Therefore there is no demonstrated basis for this court to interfere by making orders of the kinds which are sought by the applicants. (citations omitted)

25. [25]
    In my view he was not denied a fair hearing because he was not represented. That he was unrepresented is a factor which may be taken into account, along with others, in determining whether there has been a denial of procedural fairness, but I am not satisfied that this factor alone warrants a finding of procedural unfairness in that hearing.
26. [26]
    As to his second contention about the significance of the decision in King v King it is true that section 4(d) of the QCAT Act requires the Tribunal to ensure that like cases are treated alike and that by section 13 of the QCAT Act, the Tribunal must make orders that are fair and equitable to the parties, including dismissing the application if appropriate. In my view, neither of those provisions had any work to do in the present circumstances. Neither of them means that this Tribunal is obliged to arrive at the same or similar conclusions to those arrived at in cases which do not have corresponding facts and applicable legal principle.
27. [27]
    I reject the submission that King v King stands for the proposition that the Tribunal must suspend proceedings because the balance of convenience favours the tenant remaining in occupation while other interests and disputes are resolved in another jurisdiction. Critically, in this case, there are no interests and disputes which have been identified that are being pursued and are to be resolved in another jurisdiction.
28. [28]
    In King v King there were questions as to the existence of a legitimate tenancy agreement. Those and other critical distinctions were identified and distinguished in Fleger v Joubert [2024] QCATA 13.
29. [29]
    In King v King, the Appeal Tribunal found that the learned Adjudicator had not considered all relevant evidence in finding that a residential tenancy agreement exists where the ‘tenant’ was asserting a right to reside in the property for life and concluded:

[26] Although he could not determine the equitable claim, the learned adjudicator was required to take into account all relevant evidence. That included evidence:

1. That the arrangement between the parties was not, in truth, a residential tenancy;

2. That the document relied upon by the King siblings was not executed when it purported to have been executed; and

3. That the purpose of entering into the lease was to enable John King to obtain rent assistance.

[27] In a proceeding for a minor civil dispute, QCAT must make orders that it considers fair and equitable to the parties in order to resolve the dispute. It must ensure, so far as is practicable, that all relevant material is disclosed to enable it to decide the proceeding with all the relevant facts. The evidence given about whether John King’s right to occupy arose from a residential tenancy agreement or some other arrangement was unsatisfactory. There were clearly other people who could have given relevant evidence on that matter. Whilst it may not have been appropriate for the question to be fully ventilated in a jurisdiction that could not recognise John King’s purported interest, this did not mean that the learned adjudicator was entitled to entirely disregard John King’s evidence.

30. [30]
    King v King also turned on the fact that a residential tenancy agreement document relied upon by Mr King’s children as establishing the tenancy, had only been entered into to meet Centrelink requirements and there was some flavour of it being a ‘sham’ (although this was denied by Mr King). Mr King’s occupancy derived from a transaction intended to put the legal ownership of the home in the hands of his children, but the beneficial right to occupy in the hands of Mr King. The applicant’s right to occupy derived from the tenancy agreement, now expired. Such tenancies can be terminated in accordance with the RTRAA.
31. [31]
    In this case, there is no dispute that a written and signed tenancy agreement existed between the applicant and the respondent. Rent was paid, (albeit by trust distributions), a notice to vacate was issued, and legal processes were followed by the parties in a manner which was consistent with this arrangement being a legitimate residential tenancy. In King v King there was evidence that the tenancy agreement was not the source of the tenant's right to occupy the premises. The Appeal Tribunal in King v King did not decide whether or not a residential tenancy agreement existed (at [33]); rather, it granted the appeal because the Tribunal at first instance did not properly consider the evidence on this point which the tenant could reasonably have put forward at first instance. By comparison, here, the applicant has had an abundant opportunity to obtain legal representation and put forward any arguable case or serious question to be tried regarding the existence or non-existence of a legal or equitable interest in the Property which went beyond having rights under a residential tenancy agreement.
32. [32]
    As for his submission that that the Adjudicator on 19 August erred in his interpretation of King v King because he asked during the hearing whether proceedings were currently underway in another jurisdiction, thus inferring that only the fact of current proceedings would be relevant to a consideration of the King v King principles, it is correct to say that not only current proceedings but also arguable claims yet to be prosecuted might be relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant a stay, however I do not consider that the Adjudicator here concluded otherwise.
33. [33]
    In relation to his vaguely articulated claims that he had a life tenancy, when asked below what his plan was to move out, he said “I don't have a plan because my family promised this is going to be a life tenancy”.
34. [34]
    When asked what his evidence was for this he said;

From my daughter. Yeah. Vanessa, who came. I found this property. I've been looking for a property here for five years, and I found this property. I assumed, right, that the Ross Leslie Palmer Testamentary Trust was going to buy the property, and it was for my daughter, Vanessa. They actually went behind my … bought it and contracted in January of 2023, and I wasn't able to move in until June, and that was - there's been a lot of skulduggery, legal skulduggery, in the Supreme Court. I'm about to file an application for directions. I'm still an executor of an estate. There's been a fraudulent settlement, right, involving two sets of law firms, where I was left out of it. I was offered a $300,000 bribe to indemnify an accounting firm. So, I'm looking at - I've filed documentation on QCAT matter King v King. This is not a residential tenancy matter. It's a breach of contract. In fact, they were paying the rent. The trust was paying the rent, not me.

35. [35]
    He announced during his opening address before me that he was about to file an application in the Supreme Court against the respondent’s lawyers. He described having obtained legal advice from a friend who is a solicitor who was going to represent him at the hearing but then decided not to attend. He described how Sarah Palmer from Chicago, who is one of the directors, had been attempting to get hurt to agree, do a new tenancy, but he had not been prepared to agree to that. Precisely why, was not clear, but it seemed to have something to do with formalities. In relation to the proposed tenancy agreement.
36. [36]
    Critically, he did not suggest that the tenancy agreement was a sham or not enforceable. Nor did he assert that in submissions in the hearing below.
37. [37]
    In the course of the hearing below, he referred to the agreement as being “not legal”, as he put it. He also referred to it being something which had been breached by the managing agent because he was not able to get things fixed by the managing agent. Elsewhere he referred to it as being a contract, which was “invalid”.
38. [38]
    It was stipulated by the parties that although the tenancy agreement specifically required the payment of a weekly rent that, in fact, there was some other arrangement in place, not evidenced in the agreement by which his rent was, in fact to be paid from distributions from the trust.
39. [39]
    It is concerning that if there was such an arrangement in place, not reflected in the terms of the tenancy agreement, it has the potential to throw doubt upon whether the tenancy agreement truly reflects the arrangements in place, that the evidentiary basis for that arrangement was not described in any of the material either at the hearing below or before me.
40. [40]
    In submissions before me, the applicant was invited to describe in detail why he said he should not be required to hand over possession. In response, he did not contend that it was because he had some interest in land comprised by the Property and which he was entitled to enforce and which entitled him to remain in possession. He said first that there had been a breach of fiduciary duty by some party. He expanded on this later by suggesting that the breach of duty meant that he had been denied funds, presumably from the trust. Secondly, she submitted that there had been a breach of the tenancy agreement in some way. Thirdly, he submitted that he is 75 years old, has health issues and needs a house to live in.
41. [41]
    Fourthly, he submitted that despite the passage of time since he had been required to deliver up possession, he now intended to file some kind of proceeding in the Supreme Court against his brother. His brother is not a respondent to this appeal. The claims against his brother, who is an accountant, involves what he says are 975 acts of fraud. He says that he has been involved in litigation his whole life and as an international corporate director was well experienced in litigation. He referred to the fact that the trust had bought units for other family members and that they had received larger distributions than he. Those matters do not overcome the difficulty he faces from the fact that the term of the tenancy agreement has expired.
42. [42]
    He referred the fact that he had refused to enter into a settlement deed to resolve these issues, and that before this tribunal, with other family entities. That demonstrates that the matter has not resolved as between the parties.
43. [43]
    He referred to the fact that he had been a good father and supported his family. Taking that at face value, it too does not overcome the difficulty he faces from the fact that the term of the tenancy agreement has expired.
44. [44]
    He referred to the fact that other family members do not want all of this to happen to him and wanted it sorted out and that ultimately, he should have a stay of execution of the word and a stay of this appeal which he himself has brought so it can be sorted out within the family. Accepting that to be so, in my view there is no reason why all of the issues in dispute in this family cannot be sorted out. He referred to the fact that he was recently offered a new lease agreement over the property if he would drop this action. He submitted that his daughter had made clear that they wanted this action dropped, but he is not prepared to do so. There is nothing to prevent the parties from reaching a negotiated outcome to these disputes irrespective of what I decide.
45. [45]
    He says he would like to get legal advice. He has had plenty of time to get that advice, and again, there is nothing to prevent him from getting it except possibly for the fact that he is impecunious.
46. [46]
    Taking all of those propositions at face value, in my view, none of them provide a legal basis for granting him a stay of his own appeal and a stay, on top of the existing temporary stay of the warrant for possession. He has had ample opportunity in the past year and a half to bring any proceeding in another court that he intended to bring to establish his claims to some kind of proprietary interest in this property other than as a tenant for a fixed term.
47. [47]
    There is one final matter that should not go unmentioned. The applicant raised as one of his points that there had been a private conversation between the adjudicator and his brother, who appeared at the adjudication. Precisely how that sat within his submissions as a basis for the ground of a stay was not made clear. As the transcript reveals, there was in fact a conversation at the end of the hearing with Ryan Parker, who has announced an appearance at the beginning of the hearing as the director of the respondent. It is not clear that it occurred in the absence of the applicant, if that is what is suggested in saying it was a private conversation, nor that it was one to which the applicant was not a party.
48. [48]
    The Transcript reveals the following exchange occurred with the applicant identified as R L PALMER and the director Ryan Palmer as MR RA PALMER:

49. [49]
    Having regard to the fact that the adjudicator had already made a decision to issue orders in relation to whether possession should be delivered up, even though he had foreshadowed the making of orders that he do so, it was perhaps inappropriate for him to have an ex-parte communication with one of the parties, if that is what happened.
50. [50]
    It might have potentially founded a basis for his recusal, although I am confident that he meant well and was seeking to encourage the other party to reach a resolution with the applicant about all of their disputes. I would do the same here, to encourage the parties to reach a resolution of the matter.
51. [51]
    In the end, I do not consider that any injustice has flowed from the fact that such a communication occurred, but even were it otherwise, I have brought an entirely fresh mind to this set off issues in this appeal and have determined that there is no basis for granting him, the stay that he seeks.

Orders

52. [52]
    The application must fail and I therefore dismiss the application.
53. [53]
    The application to stay a decision filed on 10 September 2024 is refused.
54. [54]
    The interim order for a stay in paragraph 2 of the directions made on 16 October 2024 is vacated.
55. [55]
    The Warrant of Possession made on 19 August 2024 is re-issued to take effect on the date of these reasons.
56. [56]
    The Warrant of Possession shall remain in effect for 30 days to expire at 6:00pm from the date of these reasons.
57. [57]
    The Warrant of Possession is to be executed as soon as reasonably practicable after taking effect.
58. [58]
    Entry under the warrant shall only be between the hours of 8:00am and 6:00pm.