Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QCHC
  3. 2021
  4. MEE v Director of Child Protection Litigation - [2021] QCHC 14

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

MEE v Director of Child Protection Litigation[2021] QCHC 14

MEE v Director of Child Protection Litigation[2021] QCHC 14

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

MEE v Director of Child Protection Litigation & Ors [2021] QChC 14

PARTIES:

In each of files D176/2020 and D177/2020:

MEE

(appellant)

V

DIRECTOR OF CHILD PROTECTION LITIGATION

(first respondent)

and

WRS

(second respondent)

and

TSX

(third respondent)

and

TAX

(fourth respondent)

FILE NO:

Maroochydore D176/2020 & D177/2020 

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Childrens Court conducted by a Magistrate at Maroochydore.

DELIVERED ON:

25 June 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 June 2021 at Maroochydore.

JUDGE:

Byrne QC DCJ

ORDERS:

  1. In each appeal, the appeal be considered solely on the basis of the material before the Magistrate below.
  2. In each appeal, appeal dismissed.
  3. In each appeal, the decision of the Magistrate below is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – CHILD PROTECTION ACT 1999 – ERRORS OF LAW – where separate child protection orders granting longterm guardianship of the appellant’s two children to the third and fourth respondents were made in the Childrens Court conducted by a Magistrate – where the appellant appealed against the decisions of the learned Magistrate – where the appellant failed to appear at the hearings below and the present appeals – where both children are experiencing significant health issues requiring particular care – where the appellant and second respondent (father) have a long-standing history of drug and other illicit substance use,  a history of perpetration of domestic violence and a history of unsuitable housing arrangements – where assessments of the suitability of other family members of the children as long-term guardians had been undertaken – where the third and fourth respondents were assessed as being suitable long-term guardians in the material before the learned Magistrate – whether each child is in need of protection – whether each child has suffered significant harm or if left with the appellant and second respondent is at risk of suffering significant harm – whether the third and fourth respondents are suitable persons to assume long-term guardianship of the children 

APPEAL – CHILD PROTECTION ACT 1999 – ERROR OF FACT – where the appellant alleges the material relied upon by the first respondent at the hearing below was “not true and correct” – where the material before the learned Magistrate at the hearings below was uncontested – where the appellant contends documentation filed at the present appeals demonstrates she has been alcohol free and undergone counselling – where such documentation was not before the learned Magistrate at the hearings below – whether the learned Magistrate erred in having regard to the uncontested material before her in the hearings below

LEGISLATION:

Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld)

CASES:

AF & MJ v Department of Communities, Child, Safety and Disability Services and Ors [2016] QDC 227

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) v CAR and Anor [2010] QCA 105

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1

HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40

Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors [2016] QChC 16

McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612

Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679

COUNSEL:

No appearance for the appellant

Ms J. Reedy (sol) for the first respondent.

No appearance for the second respondent.

Mr R. Slade Jones for the third and fourth respondents.

SOLICITORS:

No appearance for the appellant.

Office of the Director of Child Protection Litigation for the first respondent.

No appearance for the second respondent..

Life Law Solutions for the third and fourth respondents.

Introduction

  1. [1]
    On 12 August 2020, separate child protection orders granting long-term guardianship to the chief executive, Department of Child Safety Youth and Women (“chief executive” and “the department” respectively) were made in respect of two brothers, WHW and WTM under the Child Protection Act 1999 (CPA). 
  2. [2]
    The nomination of the chief executive as the long-term guardian was erroneous and on 23 September 2020 that order was revoked and child protection orders granting long-term guardianship to the third and fourth respondents were made in respect of each of the brothers.
  3. [3]
    The appellant in each appeal is the boys’ mother and she appeals only against the later set of orders. 
  4. [4]
    The second respondent is the boys’ father. He has played no active role in these appeals, but the appellant asserts that he supports the appeals. 
  5. [5]
    Given the concurrence of nearly every issue in these matters, it is convenient to deal with both appeals together.

Nature of the appeal

  1. [6]
    The appeals are brought pursuant to s 117(2) of the CPA. Pursuant to s 120 of the CPA the appeals must be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the Court below, however, the appellate Court may order that the appeals be heard afresh, either in whole or in part. 
  2. [7]
    Bowskill QC DCJ (as her Honour then was) considered the operation of s 120 of the CPA in Jennifer Glover, Separate Representative v Director, Child Protection Litigation & Ors and observed:[1]

“[77] The sense in which “rehearing” is used here is that the appellate court rehears the matter, as at the date of the appeal, not in the sense of a completely fresh hearing, but on the basis of the record of the evidence before the court below, subject to the discretion conferred by s 120(3). The appellate court is obliged to give the judgment which in its opinion ought to have been given at first instance, observing the natural limitations that exist in the case of any appellate court proceeding wholly or substantially on the record. Within those constraints, the appellate Court is required to conduct a real review of the evidence and proceedings below, and the Childrens Court magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due respect and weight to the Magistrate’s conclusions. The powers of the appellate court are, however, exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error. 

[78] As to the principles governing the exercise of the discretion under s 120(3), I note that Shanahan DCJ, now the President of the Childrens Court, has previously observed that “[t]he clear intention of the legislation is that an appeal is to be heard on the record unless there is good reason shown for the Judge to order that it may be heard afresh”. (footnotes omitted)

  1. [8]
    Further, as the appeals are conducted by way of re-hearing, it is necessary for me to consider the evidence and make up my own mind about the effect of it, particularly where any inferences are to be drawn from primary facts.[2] The onus is upon the appellant to show that there is some relevant error in the decision under appeal.[3]
  2. [9]
    As the decisions the subject of the appeals in issue were made by the Childrens Court constituted by a Magistrate, the appellate court is the Childrens Court constituted by a Judge.[4]
  3. [10]
    Pursuant to s 121 of the CPA, the appellate Court may:
    1. (a)
      confirm the decision appealed against; or
    2. (b)
      vary the decision of appealed against; or
    3. (c)
      set aside the decision and substitute another decision; or
    4. (d)
      set aside the decision appealed against and remit the matter to the Magistrate or Childrens Court that made the decision.
  4. [11]
    There is no further avenue of appeal from the decision of this court sitting on appeal.[5]

Grounds of appeal

  1. [12]
    The grounds of each appeal are in identical terms and can be distilled from a hand written document attached to the respective Notices of Appeal. The grounds are identical in each instance, and are to the effect:
    1. Orders seeking the revocation of the order granting long-term guardianship to the third and fourth respondents, resulting in long-term guardianship being granted to the chief executive.
    2. Complaints that since the making of the order, the third and fourth respondents have reduced contact between the children and the appellant from once weekly to once monthly.
    3. An assertion that the reduction in contact visits is not in the best interests of the young children.
    4. An assertion that if the care of the children is not given back to the department, the appellant will not be “able to get my boys home”. 
    5. An assertion that there are no safety issues between the appellant and the children, and therefore the order should be revoked.
  2. [13]
    The appellant also filed a brief written outline of argument in each appeal.

Legislative framework

  1. [14]
    Although at the second hearing below it was contended that the amendment of the order to favour guardianship on the third and fourth respondents was empowered by the slip rule,[6] I doubt that can be correct. However, that need not be further considered as the learned Magistrate considered the material afresh and so any concern about the application of r 78 of the Childrens Court Rules 2016 does not arise. 
  2. [15]
    The legislative framework that confronted the Magistrate, and hence this Court on the re-hearing, commences with ss 59 of the CPA, which relevantly provides:

“59  Making of child protection order

  1. (1)
    The Childrens Court may make a child protection order only if it is satisfied—
    1. the child is a child in need of protection and the order is appropriate and desirable for the child’s protection; and
    2. there is a case plan for the child—
      1. that has been developed or revised under part 3A; and
      2. that is appropriate for meeting the child’s assessed protection and care needs; and
      3. for a long-term guardianship order or a permanent care order for the child—that includes living arrangements and contact arrangements for the child; and
    3. …
    4. … 
    5. the protection sought to be achieved by the order is unlikely to be achieved by an order under this part on less intrusive terms.
  2. (2)
    Before making a child protection order, the court may have regard to the following matters—
    1. …
    2. a decision by the chief executive to end intervention under part 3B because the intervention was no longer appropriate to meet the child’s protection and care needs.
  3. (3)
    When deciding whether a case plan is appropriate under subsection (1)(b)(ii), it is not relevant whether or not all persons who participated in the development or revision of the plan agreed with the plan.
  4. (4)
    The court must not make a child protection order unless a copy of the child’s case plan and, if it is a revised case plan, a copy of the report about the last revision under section 51X have been filed in the court.
  5. (5)
    Also, before making a child protection order granting custody or guardianship of a child to a person other than the chief executive, the court must have regard to any report given, or recommendation made, to the court by the chief executive about the person, including a report about the person’s criminal history, domestic violence history and traffic history.

Note—

Section 95 deals with reports about the person’s criminal history, domestic violence history and traffic history.

  1. (6)
    In addition, before making a long-term guardianship order or a permanent care order for a child, the court must be satisfied—
    1. there is no parent able and willing to protect the child within the foreseeable future; or
    2. the child’s need for emotional security will be best met in the long term by making the order.
  2. (7)
    Further, the court must not grant long-term guardianship of a child to—
    1. a person who is not a member of the child’s family unless the child is already in custody or guardianship under a child protection order; or
    2. …
  1. [16]
    The Court may make a long-term guardianship order in favour of a person other than a member of the child’s family, if that person is suitable and has been nominated by the chief executive.[7]
  2. [17]
    In considering this application, and the subsequent appeal by way of re-hearing, the Court must have regard to the paramount and other principles in ss 5A, 5B, 5BA and 5D of the CPA. The main principle to be remembered is that the safety, wellbeing and best interests of the child are paramount. 
  3. [18]
    Before an order can be made, a court must be satisfied that the child is “in need of protection”,[8] which then invites consideration of the concepts of “harm”,[9] significant harm”[10] and “unacceptable risk”.[11] When considering whether a child is “in need of protection”, the main focus is upon the child’s needs and whether an order is required to meet them, rather than upon the parents’ actions, omissions or incapacity which may have led to the harm or risk of harm.[12] The concept of “unacceptable risk” was considered by the High Court in In the Marriage and M[13] and I am mindful of what was there said and have applied it in my consideration of this matter. These concepts are broad in their potential application, and deliberately so.
  4. [19]
    I agree with Morzone QC DCJ in AF and MJ v Department of Communities, Child, Safety and Disability Services & Ors,[14] where he said:

“It seems to me that the concept should be broadly considered such that risks can be actual or potential abuse or neglect. Each area of abuse must be considered on the basis of whether the current and future risk is unacceptable and this requires a consideration of the child's exposure to actual and potential risk in the context of the particular case.”

Factual summary

  1. [20]
    The following summary of facts is taken from the material before the Magistrate.  It was essentially uncontested given the choice made by the appellant to not appear at either of the hearings below. Largely the same material was relied on at each hearing.
  2. [21]
    As earlier noted, the two children the subject of the orders are brothers and are the children of the appellant and the second respondent.
  3. [22]
    WHW was born on 25 November 2017 and so is presently three years old.  He was placed into the care of the chief executive on 28 November 2017, and then placed with the third and fourth respondents on 15 December 2017. He was the subject of a short-term child protection order commencing 18 March 2018 which was deemed to still be in effect at the date of the first order granting long-term guardianship to the department.[15]
  4. [23]
    WTM was born on 18 December 2018 and is currently two years old.  He was placed into the care of the chief executive on the day after his birth.  There is some dispute in the material as to whether he was placed with the third and fourth respondent at that time or on 10 June 2019.  That dispute is of no moment for present purposes.  WTM was born experiencing symptoms of drug withdrawal at birth.  He was the subject of a short-term child protection order commencing 22 May 2019 which was still in effect at the date of the first order granting long-term guardianship to the department.[16]
  5. [24]
    It can be seen that at no stage of either child’s life have they been in the primary care of the appellant or second respondent, apart from perhaps a few days at the most.  
  6. [25]
    The boys have two maternal half-brothers, aged eight and nine years who have each been placed under short-term child protection orders, with long-term guardianship proceedings pending.  The boys also have a total of five half-siblings of variously maternal and paternal descent aged between 22 years and 10 years.  There are no relevant proceedings concerning any of them.
  7. [26]
    Both of the boys have particular care needs due to health issues.  WHW has been assessed as experiencing a global developmental delay.  He receives NDIS funding covering speech therapy, physiotherapy and occupational therapy.  WTM was born with the condition hypertonia, evidenced by low muscle tone and reduced muscle strength.  As noted above, he was born experiencing symptoms of drug withdrawal.  He also suffers from motor delay and has a high arched palate, leaving him susceptible to reflux and aspiration of food.  There were paediatric reports and speech therapy reports concerning WHW, and paediatric and other medical reports concerning WTM before the Magistrate, all of which established the need for detailed and consistent specialist medical care for each child.
  8. [27]
    There was sufficient evidence before the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant has had a long-standing problem with drug and other illicit substance use for in excess of 18 years[17] and that there is a likelihood that the second respondent has experienced similar issues, albeit it is unclear of what duration.
  9. [28]
    The appellant was found guilty (with no conviction recorded) of drug-related offences on three occasions in 2014 and also convicted and fined on one occasion in 2017.[18] In the two years prior to 2020, the appellant was referred for the provision of 15 random drug tests.  She complied on three occasions, and two tests returned positive results for methylamphetamine.  One of the positive results was while she was pregnant with WTM.  She also admitted to a case worker whilst pregnant with WTM that she had consumed “ice” with the second respondent.  It is unclear if that is separate to the aforementioned positive test result or not.[19]
  10. [29]
    The appellant is said to have engaged with drug and alcohol services on a sporadic basis, but without any nett positive result. It was therefore assessed that any counselling received has been of limited impact.
  11. [30]
    However, the appellant filed an affidavit for the purposes of the appeals which annexed four drug test results between 1 October 2019 and 5 February 2020, each of which were negative for drugs other than methadone,[20] and a Certificate of Completion dated 18 March 2020 for a counselling program concerned with relapse prevention and associated issues.  
  12. [31]
    The second respondent has not been convicted for drug related offending.  However, he is known by the department to have a history of drug taking, despite his denials.
  13. [32]
    In the two years prior to March 2020, he too was referred 15 times for random drug tests.  He complied twice, and one test returned positive results for both methylamphetamine and methadone.  He is not known to be a registered participant in a methadone program.[21]
  14. [33]
    Each of the appellant and the second respondent have a history of perpetration of domestic violence.  She, in a previous relationship, towards a partner and him on a number of occasions towards the appellant since 2017.[22] He is presently the respondent to a domestic violence protection order naming the appellant as the aggrieved which is in force until April 2024.  It was issued as a result of his conduct towards the appellant in September 2018 when she was pregnant and which resulted in her hospitalisation.  He has been referred to programs to address domestic violence issues, but has largely declined to engage with them.[23]
  15. [34]
    The appellant and the second respondent have a history of unsuitable housing arrangements.  At the time of the application below they were said to be living in a commercial shed which belonged to the second respondent’s parents.  It was assessed as being an unsafe place for children.[24] An application to the Department of Housing was pending as at 27 March 2020, and no updated information was before the Magistrate, although I note that a different address was provided as the address for service on the Notices of Appeal.
  16. [35]
    Assessments of the suitability of other family members as long term guardians had also been undertaken.
  17. [36]
    The maternal grandmother considered that there were no child protection issues in existence and the appellant should be given “another go” at parenting her children.  She has not taken the opportunity to have contact with her grandchildren whilst they are under care.[25] She was considered by the department to be unsuitable as a carer.  
  18. [37]
    The boys’ step-siblings who were 17 years and older had only limited contact with the boys and hence were not considered suitable by the department. 
  19. [38]
    The paternal grandmother considered that she and her husband were not in a position to care for the boys given some personal circumstances and ongoing family conflict.  She considered the third and fourth respondents to be suitable guardians.[26]
  20. [39]
    The third and fourth respondents were assessed as being suitable long-term guardians.  There was material before the Magistrate showing that both children are well cared for and developing appropriately, notwithstanding the health issues that afflict each of them.  Further, the Magistrate spoke directly with one of them (the transcript does not clarify which one) to satisfy herself of their suitability over and above the filed material, which included the filed case plans.
  21. [40]
    The material before the Magistrate was unchallenged by the appellant and second respondent, each of whom did not attend the hearings below (nor the hearing of the appeals).  The material before the Magistrate shows a long history of non-engagement with the department prior to and after the decision was made by the department to pursue long-term guardianship.  Indeed, each failed to attend meetings when this issue was the subject of the meeting.

A power to strike out the appeals?

  1. [41]
    Given the decision by the appellant to not attend to prosecute the appeals on the allocated hearing date, an issue arose as to whether this Court had power to strike out the appeals for want of prosecution. There is no express power in either the CPA or the Childrens Court Act 1992. It was argued that there was some form of power to regulate proceedings that justified summarily striking out the appeal, however that cannot be accepted.
  2. [42]
    The Childrens Court is created by the Childrens Court Act 1992. It is literally a creature of statute. As such its powers are limited to those expressly provided by statute and, by implication, everything necessary for the exercise of those expressly conferred powers.[27] Although the power to strike out for want of prosecution would be very desirable, it is not strictly necessary as an appeal such as this can be determined on the merits of the material before the court below, as has occurred here. That process is however considerably more time consuming than a summary striking out. Also, as occurred in this case, a party in addition to the first respondent can be put to the time and expense of engaging legal representation to respond to an appeal which was not actively prosecuted.
  3. [43]
    The absence of a power to strike out for want of prosecution is a legislative omission which the legislature should consider remedying. If s 229 of the Justices Act 1886[28] were to be used as a legislative template, consideration might be given to removing the requirement for a specific notice to be served (in addition to the notice of hearing) before the power to strike out is enlivened, while perhaps also allowing an avenue of disposition by way of the appeal being heard “on the papers”.
  4. [44]
    In this case I elected to determine the appeals on the merits of the material before the Court after being satisfied that the appellant had been given sufficient notice of the time and place of the hearing, and on satisfaction that she had not attended to any part of the Court complex.

Consideration

  1. [45]
    The appellant complains only about the last of the two sets of orders made below.  The result of that is that if the appeals were to succeed the children would be placed back into the long-term guardianship of the chief executive.  That amounts to an implied admission, perhaps inadvertently, that an order granting long-term guardianship was appropriate, but contesting the suitability of the third and fourth respondents.  Nonetheless, I have considered the whole of the material which covers all issues concerning the granting of the orders, given the appeal is to be conducted by way of re-hearing.
  2. [46]
    I am satisfied on that material that each of the boys are a child in need of protection. The long-term and intrinsic nature of the appellant’s illicit substance use, the unresolved risk of exposure to domestic violence and the apparent ongoing issues concerning appropriate accommodation all, separately and in combination, point to the fact that each child has both suffered significant harm, or if left with the appellant and the second respondent are at an unacceptable risk of suffering significant harm.
  1. [47]
    WHW has been subject to a short-term child protection order for over two and a half years prior to the making of the subject order, and WTM for almost two years.  As far as the information before the Magistrate went, the appellant had not completed any of the required courses in domestic violence protection or illicit substance rehabilitation, and both she and the second respondent had failed to engage with the department concerning the resolution of the identified child protection issues.  It is fair to say that they have had a long-standing, difficult and fractured relationship with the department and, given the more recent failure to appear at any of the hearings, it may be inferred that they continue to refuse to meaningfully engage with the department.
  2. [48]
    Although the granting of the long-term guardianship order requires a high level of satisfaction,[29] the granting of such an order in these cases was appropriate, provided a suitable person or persons were granted the guardianship.  I am also satisfied that, in the circumstances, the necessary protection could not be achieved by a less intrusive order.  
  3. [49]
    The appellant asserts in written submissions that material relied upon by the first respondent at the hearing below was “not true and correct” and that documentation can be provided to demonstrate that she has been drug free and undergone counselling. It is assumed that is the material that has been filed for the appeals. None of that was before the Magistrate and the appellant elected not to appear at the hearings below to demonstrate these matters.  It can therefore not be said that the Magistrate erred in having regard to the uncontested material that was before her.  
  4. [50]
    In any event, the material speaks only of short-term drug abstinence, the completion of one course only and does not deal with issues of domestic violence preventative strategies, nor with the appropriateness of residential accommodation.  Further, none of it addresses any steps taken by the second respondent to deal with the identified child protection issues.  The material filed for the purposes of the appeals would not, if admitted on them, affect the outcome and there has been no good reason shown why it should be considered on the appeals. 
  5. [51]
    Further, the very fact that neither the appellant nor the second respondent appeared at either of the two hearings below, nor on appeal, speaks against a finding that each are able and willing to parent these children to the level required, particularly when seen in the context of a long-standing unwillingness to engage with the department to achieve reunification.
  6. [52]
    I am satisfied there is no other family member or members who is or are suitable to act as the boys’ guardian.  
  7. [53]
    The maternal grandmother’s refusal to accept that child protection issues exist in the appellant’s parenting situation properly disqualifies her from being granted guardianship.  The paternal grandmother has effectively asked not to be granted guardianship, and the intermittent nature of contact between the boys and their older step-siblings suggests that they would not be suitable.
  8. [54]
    On the other hand, the material clearly leads to a conclusion that the third and fourth respondents are suitable guardians.  I need not delve into the detail of the material, but it establishes that they are providing a nurturing, and presumably loving, environment in which the boys are each developing and achieving appropriate milestones in light of the health issues afflicting them.  They are in stable and appropriate accommodation and receive appropriate medical attention as well as experiencing appropriate social interactions.
  9. [55]
    The appellant complains that since the subject orders were made, contact visits have been reduced from once weekly to once per month. This seems to be the primary motivating reason for the appeals. The third and fourth respondents accept that this has occurred, even though there is no formal evidence of it.[30]
  10. [56]
    Given that only the broad assertion by the appellant is in written material and that she chose not to appear at the appeal hearing, the propriety of the reduction in the frequency of contact visits was not explored.  I am not prepared to assume that it has occurred for improper reasons. In any event, given it commenced after the hearing below, it is not a matter for complaint on appeal as it does not reveal error in the decision below.
  11. [57]
    Finally, as noted earlier, the Notices of Appeal provided an address for service different from that which had been put before the Magistrate as being the unsuitable accommodation referred to.  However, given the appellant chose not to appear at either of the hearings below, nor on appeal, the suitability of those premises cannot be assessed, nor whether it was an address occupied prior to either the hearings below.  No relevant error is established by the provision of this address in the Notices of Appeal.

Conclusion

  1. [58]
    The appellant is to be congratulated for the steps she has taken to address the child protection issues that precipitated the making of these applications. If maintained over the long term they may be relevant as part of the foundation for an application to revoke the child protection order,[31] but unless it can be shown that a Magistrate erroneously discounted those efforts in concluding that the child protection order be granted, they will usually be irrelevant for the purposes of an appeal. They were not erroneously discounted as they were not before the Magistrate.
  2. [59]
    No relevant error has been established for the purposes of these appeals. In fact the material before the Magistrate, essentially uncontested as it was and bearing in mind the paramount consideration under the CPA, strongly favoured the granting of the orders sought.  

Orders

  1. [60]
    The orders I make are as follows:
  1. In each appeal, the appeal be considered solely on the basis of the material before the Magistrate below.
  2. In each appeal, appeal dismissed.
  3. In each appeal, the decision of the Magistrate below is confirmed.

Footnotes

[1][2016] QChC 16, [77], [78].

[2]Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [22]-[25]; Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679 at [43], [57]; McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612 at [47].

[3]Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]; McDonald v Queensland Police Service, ibid.

[4]Schedule 3 of the CPA, “definition of Appellate Court”.

[5]Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) v CAR and Anor [2010] QCA 105.

[6]Ts1-3 ll 22-24.

[7]Section 61(f)(ii) of the CPA.

[8]Section 10 of the CPA.

[9]Section 9 of the CPA.

[10]Section 10 of the CPA.

[11]ibid.

[12]AF & MJ v Department of Communities, Child, Safety and Disability Services and Ors [2016] QDC 227, [31].

[13][1998] 166 CLR 69, [76]-[78].

[14]supra at [34].

[15]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, Exhibit 3.

[16]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, Exhibit 4.

[17]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, Exhibit 30, p 136.

[18]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, Exhibit 7.

[19]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, [24(e)] and [24(h)].

[20]It is understood the appellant has been on the methadone program for an extended period of years.

[21]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, [57(2)].

[22]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, Exhibits 9 and 10.

[23]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, [48] – [50].

[24]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 27 March 2020, [64].

[25]Affidavit of Cavadee Ahfock dated 3 July 2020, Annexure p 12 of 47.

[26]ibid.

[27]HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40, [39], [83]; Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1, 19.

[28]See especially section 229(3) of the Justices Act 1886.

[29]Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361 – 363.

[30]Outline of third and fourth respondent, paragraph 2.

[31]Section 65 of the CPA.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    MEE v Director of Child Protection Litigation & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    MEE v Director of Child Protection Litigation

  • MNC:

    [2021] QCHC 14

  • Court:

    QChC

  • Judge(s):

    Byrne QC DCJ

  • Date:

    25 Jun 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
AF & MJ v Department of Communities, Child, Safety and Disability Services and Ors [1998] 166 CLR 69
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] 166 CLR 69
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 203 CLR 172
Cite 2 - (2000) 203 CLR 172
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Cite 2 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) v CAR [2010] QCA 105
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCA 105
Cite 2 - [2010] QCA 105
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Cite 2 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Gladstone 1 Pty Ltd v Williams [2016] QDC 227
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QDC 227
Cite 2 - [2016] QDC 227
Glover v Director, Child Protection Litigation [2016] QCHC 16
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCHC 16
Cite 2 - [2016] QCHC 16
Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 168 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (1989) 168 CLR 1
HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] HCA 40
Cite 2 - [2019] HCA 40
McDonald v Queensland Police Service[2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] 2 Qd R 612
Cite 2 - [2018] 2 Qd R 612
Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2016) 90 ALJR 679
Cite 2 - (2016) 90 ALJR 679

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
NJ v Director of Child Protection Litigation [2023] QCHC 162 citations
NWR v Director of Child Protection Litigation [2023] QCHC 113 citations
1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.