Dun v Kings Parking Operations Pty Ltd
[1997] QDC 340
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- Dun v Kings Parking Operations Pty Ltd[1997] QDC 340
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Dun v Kings Parking Operations Pty Ltd[1997] QDC 340
Dun v Kings Parking Operations Pty Ltd[1997] QDC 340
IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD AT BRISBANE QUEENSLAND |
|
[Before Brabazon Q.C., D.C.J.]
[Geoffrey Douglas Dun v. Kings Parking Operations Pty Ltd]
No. 11197 of 1996
BETWEEN:
GEOFFREY DOUGLAS DUN | Plaintiff |
AND
KINGS PARKING OPERATIONS PTY LTD ACN 000 826 353 | Defendant |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - JUDGE BRABAZON Q.C.
Judgment delivered: 1st August 1997
Counsel: | Mr Traves for the defendant/appellant |
| Mr Holyoak for the plaintiff/respondent |
Solicitors: | Messrs Barry & Nilsson for the defendant/appellant |
| Messrs McInnes Wilson and Jensen for the plaintiff/respondent |
Hearing Date: | 7 July 1997 |
IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD AT BRISBANE QUEENSLAND | No. 197 of 1996 |
BETWEEN:
GEOFFREY DOUGLAS DUN | Plaintiff |
AND
KINGS PARKING OPERATIONS PTY LTD ACN 000 826 353 | Defendant |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - JUDGE BRABAZON Q.C.
Delivered the 1st day of August, 1997
This is a dispute between the owner of a motor vehicle and the operator of a carpark. The vehicle was apparently stolen from the carpark. The owner proceeded against the operator in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane. He succeeded in recovering a judgment for damages for $10,396.05, together with interest of $986.28 and costs of $5,775.15 - a total award of $17,167.48 was made by Ms D.M. Fingleton, S.M., on 7 March 1997.
The Issues
The Magistrates Court Plaint contained a statement of claim, setting out the owner's case. In substance, his case was this:
- (a)on 22 January 1996 there was an agreement between the owner and the carpark operator that the owner would deliver his motor vehicle to the operator to be kept safely garaged and maintained in its carpark, once the owner handed over the daily parking fee;
- (b)a relationship of bailment existed between the parties;
- (c)it was an express or implied term of the agreement that the carpark operator would keep the motor vehicle safely garaged in the carpark, and would take proper care of it, and hold it until redelivering it to the owner;
- (d)the carpark operator also was subject to the implied warranty imposed by s.74 of the Trade Practices Act, that its services would be rendered with due care and skill;
- (e)because of the duties of a bailor, and because of the statutory duty, the carpark operator was in breach of its duty to the owner by failing to safeguard the motor vehicle, when it was stolen.
In its defence, the operator denied that a bailment had been created, saying that the owner only had a licence to leave his vehicle at the carpark. It admitted that s.74 applied. An amendment to the defence raised a defence of volenti, on the basis that the owner was folly aware of the limitations of the carpark.
The learned Magistrate had the benefit of submissions by counsel. She reserved her decision. On 17th March she delivered careful and comprehensive reasons for judgment. She found that the relationship of bailor/bailee existed between the parties and that the operator had failed to discharge its duty as a bailor. She found that the operator was also in breach of the warranty implied by s.74 of the Trade Practices Act, in that insufficient care had been taken to safeguard the vehicle. She found that the defence of volenti did not apply. She therefore found in favour of the vehicle owner.
The operator now appeals against that judgment. In turn, I have had the benefit of careful submissions from counsel. These were the issues raised by the appeal;
- (a)was the car left under a licence to do so, or was it the subject of a bailment for safekeeping? If there were such a bailment, then it is conceded that the judgment must stand;
- (b)did the statutory duty imposed by s. 74 give rise to an obligation to take care, to prevent the theft of the vehicle?;
- (c)if so, then, as a matter of causation, was there a sufficient link between a breach of that duty and the theft of the vehicle?;
- (d)(it was agreed that s. 74 does apply, as a “service” was being provided by the defendant corporation.)
The Carpark
The carpark is to be found at Henry Street in the Brisbane C.B.D. As the photographs show, it is on a vacant block of land next to a street. The cars are parked right up to the edge of the gutter. There is no fence enclosing the carpark. On the other side it is bounded by a multi-story building. There are no physical entry or exit control points. Exhibit 11 shows a sign which announces it as a carpark, saying:
“Early Bird-$6.00
Casual Rates - $1 Each Hour Or Part Thereof - Max $10.00 Per Day No Free Parking Any Time”
Another sign, next to the above sign, says:
“See Attendant at Novotel - 15 metres (in the direction of an arrow)”.
That is a reference to the Novotel Hotel carpark, also operated by the defendant, the entrance to which is some little distance along the street.
Near the signs, there was an “honour box” - that is, a small locked box on top of a post, into which a motorist might place the parking fee when there was no attendant about. That was usually the case, as an attendant was present from early in the morning until 9.30 a.m. to collect parking money, before and after which the honour system applied.
The Plaintiff
Mr. Dun was a tradesman, who owned a Toyota Landcruiser utility. He had work to do in the city, and was in the habit of leaving his vehicle at the carpark while he was working. Sometimes he arrived when the attendant was at this carpark. Sometimes he arrived before the attendant came on duty. His practice was to pay for the day's parking when he arrived. The attendant was not on duty when he left, late in the day. He would pay the early bird rate of $6.00 per day. Usually, he was in the habit of complying with the honour system, by placing the $6.00 in the box. In that case, he used a small envelope which was supplied by the defendant, containing a record of the vehicle's registration number. He had made that arrangement with the attendant as he usually arrived early and left late, missing the attendant. He was told to put the parking fee in the envelope, and leave it in the box. It appears that a carparking ticket was not handed to Mr. Dun, when this system was used - it was not contained in or on the envelope.
On 22nd January 1996, Mr. Dun returned and found that his vehicle was missing. The learned Magistrate inferred that it had been stolen on that day. There is ample evidence to justify that conclusion.
The Carpark Ticket
Despite the above informality, it was common ground that a standard form of ticket or “claim check” represented the conditions of entry to the carpark. It is necessary to quote the entire document:
“If you are unwilling to park you vehicle on such conditions proceed immediately to the cashier and remove your vehicle. No charge will be made. Do not leave this Parking Permit in vehicle. Present this Parking Permit to cashier when leaving and pay fee. Check closing time on notices.
CONDITIONS OF USE OF CARPARK
- Authority to use the Carpark is a licence which the Proprietor has an absolute discretion to revoke at any time without notice.
- The Proprietor does not accept or take possession of any vehicle and takes no responsibility for the safe custody of any vehicle other than to warrant that its services will be rendered with due care and skill.
- The Proprietor may-
- (a)move or drive a vehicle in and around the Carpark if in the absolute discretion of the Proprietor it appears necessary or convenient to do so:
- (b)move or drive a vehicle from the Carpark if in the absolute discretion of the Proprietor the vehicle constitutes a safety hazard, obstruction or nuisance.
- Parking charges are made according to the time a vehicle is parking following one admission and are calculated at the time a parking permit is presented to the cashier on departure. The maximum charge fore the day or days a vehicle has been parked will be made if no parking permit is presented.
- The Proprietor may -
- (a)allow or suffer possession of a vehicle to be taken by any person who enters or drives the vehicle or who represents expressly or by implication that such person is entitled to take possession thereof whether or not such person is so entitled and whether or not such person produces a parking permit to the Proprietor;
- (b)restrain the departure of a vehicle if the person who enters or drives the same does not produce a parking permit to the Proprietor or pay the parking charges therefor.
- In the absence of breach of the Proprietor's warranty that its services will be rendered with due care and skill, the Proprietor shall not be liable for -
- (a)the loss of (including but not limited to removal by any authorised person) or any damage whatever to a vehicle or any accessories or articles attached thereto or contained therein however such loss or damage is caused or occurs including as a consequence of or arising in connection with any negligent act or omission of the Proprietor or of any employee servant or agent of the Proprietor that does not amount to a breach of the aforesaid warranty;
- (b)the death or injury of any person in or about the carpark however such death or injury is caused or occurs including as a consequence of or arising in connection with any negligent act or omission of the Proprietor or of any employee, servant or agent of the Proprietor;
- (c)any loss or damage suffered in consequence of any exercise or purported exercise of the rights conferred on the proprietor by these conditions.
- The rights and discretions conferred on the Proprietor by these conditions may be exercised by any employee servant or agent of the Proprietor.
- The Trade Practices Act implies a warranty that the services rendered by the Proprietor will be rendered with due care and skill and nothing contained in these ‘Conditions of Use of Carpark’ is to be construed as in any way excluding or limiting that warranty. Subject thereto the Proprietor will not be bound by any variation of these conditions unless made in writing and signed by its duly authorised manager.”
The Question of Bailment
Both sides have found it convenient to rely on Palmer (2nd edition 1991), the leading text book on bailment. Chapter 5 deals with “Possession and Permission”. Both counsel's submissions, and the learned Magistrate's reasons, dealt with the question of bailment by referring to the considerations raised by the author. It will be convenient to follow the same pattern here. As the text says, the essence of bailment is possession. Without possession, there can be no relationship of bailor and bailee. Once a bailment arises, there is a common law duty of safekeeping. That duty may itself be affected by the terms of any contract.
A traditional definition of bailment appears in Halsbury 4th ed vol 2 at para. 1501:
“A bailment, properly so called, is a delivery of personal chattels on trust, usually on a contact, express or implied, that the trust shall be duly executed, and the chattels redelivered in either their original or an altered form, as soon as the time or use for, or condition on, which they were bailed shall have elapsed or been performed....The element common to all types of bailment is the imposition of an obligation, because the taking of possession in the circumstances involved an assumption of responsibility for the safekeeping of the goods...To constitute a bailment...the actual or constructive possession of a specific chattel must be transferred by its owner or possessor (the bailor) or his agent duly authorised for that purpose, to another person (the bailee) in order that the latter may keep the same or perform some act in connection therewith, for which such actual or constructive possession of the chattel is necessary, thereafter returning the identical subject matter in its original or an altered form.”
Mr. Palmer is also the author of the section on bailment in the “Laws of Australia” (Law Book Co.) at 8.5, p.9. There, he quotes Windeyer J. in Hobbs v. Peytersham Transport Co. Pty. Ltd. 124 C.L.R. 220 at 238:
“A bailment comes into existence upon a delivery of goods of one person, the bailor, into the possession of another person, the bailee, upon a promise, express or implied, that they will be redelivered to the bailor or dealt with in a stipulated way”.
It is necessary to turn to the various considerations, raised by counsel and the learned Magistrate.
- (a)Transfer of Access to and Control of the Vehicle
Here, the practice of the carpark was followed - the owner of a vehicle would park it, lock it, and take the keys. That is what Mr. Dun did on 22nd January. He had never handed the keys over to an attendant.
However, Condition No. 3 allowed the operator to move or drive the vehicle in and around the carpark, if that appeared necessary or convenient, and to move or drive the vehicle from the carpark, if it constituted a safety hazard, obstruction or nuisance.
As Palmer says at p.390, where the customer retains his keys, the general tenor of the authorities is to regard this factor as militating strongly but not conclusively against bailment, since other facts may exist which indicate control. There is then a mention of recent American decisions which favour a licence in those circumstances. See also, to the same effect, the Canadian decision in Hefferon v. Imperial Parking Co. 46 D.L.R. (3d) 642.
The learned Magistrate thought that Condition 3 was strongly in favour of the assumption of custody or possession. The better view is that it points to a residual power to control the vehicle, if the need arises, rather than to possession and custody. The dominant consideration is the owner's retention of the keys.
- (b)Procedures for Recovering the Vehicle
Here, there is a difference between the written conditions, and the practice of the carpark. For the “early birds”, the practice was to pay their money in the morning. That was Mr. Dun's practice. The question of a time-based charge did not arise. Therefore, Condition 4 did not apply, in this case.
There was also no prospect of enforcing Condition 5(b), which provides that the proprietor can stop a vehicle if the driver cannot produce a parking permit, or pay the parking charges. There was no practice of requiring the surrender of the ticket (which seems not to have been given to Mr. Dun, on this occasion) and as he paid in the morning, there was no prospect of restraining his vehicle.
Even if the attendant were present, Condition 5(a) allows the vehicle to be taken away by anybody whether or not the driver is so entitled, and whether or not the driver produces the parking permit to the proprietor. It is an attempt to exclude any possibility of a bailment arising - or, rather, to contradict one of the usual consequences of a bailment.
Conditions such as those in 4 and 5 may be of importance in determining the relationship of the parties - see the decisions in Council of the City of Sydney v. West (1965) 114 C.L.R. 481 and Waltons Stores Limited v. Sydney City Council (1968) 2 N.S.W.R. 109. However, the relevant clauses in that case were different, as they insisted upon the presentation of the ticket before the vehicle was recovered from the carpark.
Here, the actual arrangements dominate the written conditions. In that sense, this case is very like the decision in Fred Chappell Ltd. v. National Carparks Ltd. - mentioned in Palmer at p.392. There, it was held that similar provisions did not outweigh the clear inference in favour of a mere licence, which was produced by other factors such as the open nature of the carpark, the relatively passive role of the attendants, the lack of any positive or systematic control over the collection of vehicles, the cheap rate for parking, and the fact that the attendants would attempt to move vehicles only in an emergency. As the judge said in that case: “As a matter of practice the ticket played a small part in the running of the carpark in the sense that it was not a prerequisite to the withdrawal of the vehicle that the ticket should be presented and stamped for payment made on the time basis.”
- (c)Fees and Charges
This was a relatively cheap carpark, judged by Brisbane CBD rates in 1996. The relative level of the fees is significant in assessing the extent of the operator's undertaking - Palmer at 394, B.G. Transport Service Ltd. v. Marston Motor Co. Ltd. (1971) Lloyds Rep. 371 at 378.
Where charges are calculated on a time basis, and collected at the end of the parking period, then that may be an indication of the right to retain possession of the vehicle up until the moment of payment. See Palmer at 393. The written conditions here assume that arrangement. However, in this carpark, the facts involving Mr. Dun's vehicle were otherwise. He paid the flat fee applying to “early birds” and he paid it on arrival. He was not asked to produce the ticket when he left.
- (d)The Geography of the Carpark
The physical layout and apparent absence of security of a carpark are material factors. This was an open carpark with ready access through at least half of its perimeter. There was nothing to stop any vehicle being driven over the small gutter into the street. An owner was given no information, or impression, about any form of security.
As in the Fred Chappell case, the open nature of the carpark points towards a licence rather than a bailment.
- (e)Staffing
Here, no attendant was present after 9.30 a.m. That meant that there was no checking of tickets on departure, or any possibility of the retention of keys by the operator.
Palmer discusses the question of staffing at p.402. The presence of attendants is likely to suggest a bailment. Here, there was usually no attendant because the carpark was run predominantly for “early bird” patrons. If the need arose, an attendant could be found at the Novotel carpark. That situation does not point to a bailment.
- (f)Tickets
Palmer reminds us, that the fundamental test must always be whether possession in the vehicle has been transferred to the operator, and that a refusal to accept the consequences of such a transfer can scarcely be said to gainsay its occurrence. Intention, when thus expressed, must be consistent with the physical facts and circumstances of the case. That is consistent with the general theme of the author, that tickets and other documentation are unlikely to be persuasive, in modern times, where other factors exist to indicate control. In short, the written terms agreed by the parties may or may not be decisive on the issue of bailment or not.
Here, as counsel for Mr. Dun submitted, the carpark operator was trying to have the best of both contractual worlds, by disclaiming responsibility for the safe custody of vehicles, and at the same time asserting a degree of control over them, to serve its own interests. However, it is impossible to ignore the basic assertions in the conditions, in Clauses 1 and 2 - that the arrangement is a licence, and that the proprietor does not accept possession of any vehicle, and takes no responsibility for its safe custody.
In this case, the written conditions, when considered with the way in which the carpark was actually operated, point to a licence rather than bailment.
- (g)Value of the Goods
Most motor vehicles are of some significant value. Invariably, their owners wish to recover them, rather than to abandon them, or have them stolen. Their expectations are to recover the vehicle. This is not one of those cases where a bailment did not arise, because the owner of the goods was indifferent about their fate.
- (h)Security
In fact, there was a measure of security in place at the time. Mr. Orr was the operations manager of the defendant's carparks in Brisbane. He visited every carpark at least once a day, checking on staff and the practices in each carpark. He checked occupancy, and ticketing, which meant checking on the staff, and also the possibility of drivers parking for nothing.
The company's carparks did not have security cameras or security screens. He either drove or walked through the carparks at random times. He also arranged for staff, when coming and going from the carparks, to walk through them to make their presence felt. They were on the lookout for anyone “hanging around the cars”.
His knowledge of this Henry Street carpark went back to 1988. Apart from the eight months from late 1994 to early 1995, when he was not involved with that site, he knew of no reports of stolen vehicles from it.
Apart from the random efforts of himself and his staff, there were no other security measures in place at the carpark. The patrons were not informed of the steps that he did take to keep an eye on security.
- (i)Bailment or Licence?
Palmer concludes the discussion of these arrangements this way:
“Certain features (of licence or bailment) appear regularly in the decisions but, taken overall, enjoy only a limited and variable significance. Often they are effective in establishing a bailment only when combined with other factors not, in themselves, conclusive. Consequently, the side of the line upon which a given case may fall is largely intuitive - a matter of impression.... What seems plain is that, in the ordinary run of events, the unattended hotel or restaurant carpark will clearly not produce a bailment, while the modern multi-storey carpark, with its careful checks on incoming and outgoing cars and cumulative fee in return for parking space and tickets to be presented before allowing departure, will almost invariably do so. Other cases will fall between the two.”
Here, the above factors all have to be given appropriate weight. The actual arrangements made between Mr. Dun and the carpark operator are more important than the written terms and conditions. Some of those terms and conditions did not apply to Mr. Dun's use in this particular carpark. The better view is that Mr. Dun had a mere licence to park on this land. There was no bailment, and, consequently, no duty of safekeeping at common law. The theft of the vehicle gave rise to no cause of action against the operator. The learned magistrate took a different view because of the weight which she placed on the written terms and conditions. This finding does not necessarily mean that the operator owed no duty to Mr. Dun to exercise reasonable care and skill in looking after his vehicle. The existence of such an obligation depends on the scope of the services offered by the operator. Here, the facts of the transaction shows that no such obligation was undertaken. See Palmer at 421-422.
- (j)The Trade Practices Act
“Section 74 provides that:
- (1)In every contract for the supply by a corporation in the course of a business of services to a consumer there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with due care and skill and that any materials supplied in connexion with those services will be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are supplied.
- (2)Where a corporation supplies services (other than services of a professional nature provided by a qualified architect or engineer) to a consumer in the course of a business and the consumer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the corporation any particular purpose for which the services are required to the result that he desires the services to achieve, there is an implied warranty that the services supplied under the contract for the supply of the services and any materials supplied in connexion with those services will be reasonably fit for that purpose or are of such a nature and quality that they might reasonably be expected to achieve that result, except where the circumstances show that the consumer does not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on the corporation's skill or judgment.
- (3)A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred under-
- (a)a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the purposes of a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by the person for whom the goods are transported or stored; or;
- (b)a contract of insurance.”
Section 68 of the Act provides that s.74 applies despite any efforts by the parties to contract out of its application.
It was common ground that this carpark operator supplied “services” within the meaning of s.74. But that inevitable concession does not answer the question here - see the extensive definition of “services” in s.4(1) of the TPA. That extensive definition makes unnecessary here, an inquiry as to whether or not a licensee or bailee supplies “services” to a consumer - as was done in Walsh v. Palladium Car Park 1975 V.R. 949 at 956-959. Where a bailment does not exist, the question is whether or not s.74 implies a warranty to the effect that the carpark operator will take due care to prevent the theft of motor vehicles. The relationship of licensor and licensee does not exclude the implication of such a warranty. This is not just a bare licence to occupy land. Indeed, the written conditions frankly recognise the warranty implied by the Trade Practices Act. Clause 2 itself warrants that the car parking services will be rendered with due care and skill. That warranty would seem to be co-extensive with the statutory warranty.
Counsel for the proprietor submits that it is necessary to focus on the service provided, and then to ask whether it is a necessary part of that service to take steps to prevent theft. That does appear to be the right approach. It avoids the danger of circular reasoning, or of assuming that the carpark operator necessarily warrants that steps have been taken to prevent theft.
Here, the basic nature of this carpark, the absence of an attendant, the absence of a fence, the absence of any apparent controls, and Mr. Dun's ignorance of any system of security can hardly have given him a reasonable expectation that the services should include the result of keeping cars safe from theft.
The circumstances do not show that a patron like Mr. Dun relied on the corporation's skill or judgment. See s.74(2). The conclusion may be different where a consumer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the carpark proprietor any particular purpose for which the services are required, or the result that the consumer desires to achieve. The mere fact of leaving the vehicle throughout the day does not show that a purpose of the parking is to have the vehicle secured from theft.
It was suggested that Mr. Dun had made his expectations expressly known to the carpark attendant. His evidence appears at p.31-32 of the transcript. There, cross-examination of Mr Dun by counsel for the carpark operator (not counsel who appeared in this appeal) revealed that there had been some comments made by Mr. Dun to the attendant about the safety of his vehicle. He asked the attendant if any vehicle had been stolen from the carpark. He was told that it had not. That made him feel that it was all right to park there. He also used some “reverse psychology” by saying to the attendant: “Could you arrange to get the car knocked off from here?” The attendant replied, in effect, that he could not do that. Mr. Dun's intention was to see what the reaction of the carpark attendant was. He would not have parked there, if the attendant had indicated that he could arrange for the vehicle to be stolen. By asking those questions, he hoped that the attendant would keep an eye on his vehicle. He used to say that to the attendants at all carparks.
That rather unusual conversation would not be enough to show that Mr. Dun was leaving his vehicle there for the particular purpose of having it kept safe from theft. Rather, he was making a query about the likelihood of theft, and received an accurate enough answer. The conversation did not go further than that. The service provided was the provision of space for the parking of cars. Due care and skill had only to be exercised in the context of that limited service. For example, if the adjoining multi-storey building was about to be demolished, then the exercise of due care and skill would demand that vehicles be kept away from debris which might fall on them. Likewise, in Drive Yourself Lessees v. Burnside (1959) S.R.(N.S.W.) 390, a carpark owner who was a licensor, was found liable when a vehicle parked under overhanging cliffs, and was damaged by a falling boulder.
The best discussion of the effect of s.74 can be found in Palmer at 920-925. As the author observes, the section adds little to the operation of the common law, in a case such as this.
It follows that no question of causation arises in this case.
The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order for costs in favour of Mr. Dun is set aside. It is ordered that his claim be dismissed. I will hear counsel on the question of costs.
Cases referred to by Counsel
B.G. Transport Service v. Marston Motor Co. [1970] 1 Lloyd's Law Reps. 371
Bonnington Castings v. Wardlaw [1956] A.C. 610
British Road Services Ltd. v. Crutchley & Co. Ltd. [1968] 1 All E.R. 811
Cottee v. Franklins Self-Serve Pty. Ltd. (unreported) C.A. 91/1995, judgment 28/11/1995.
Cowell v. Smith [1964] 3 All E.R. 895
Davis v. Pearce Parking Station Pty. Ltd. 91 C.L.R. 642
Drakos v. Woolworths (SA) Ltd. (1991) Aust Torts Reps 81-135
Drive Yourself Lessees Pty. Ltd. v. Burnside (N.S.W.) [1959] S.R. 390
James Buchanan Ltd. v. Hays Transport Services Ltd. [1972] 2 Lloyds' Rep 535
March v. E & M.H. Stramare Pty. Ltd. [1991] 171 C.L.R. 506
Minister of State for Territories & Local Government v. Gregory's (Properties) Pty. Ltd. (1987) 62 L.G.R.A. 169
Morris v. C.W. Martin & Sons Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 716
Nibali v. Sweeting & Dennev (W.A.) Pty. Ltd. (1989) Aust. Torts Reps. 80-258
Pitt Son & Badgery Ltd. v. Proulefco 153 C.L.R. 644
Port Sweetenham Authority v. Tu Wu & Co. [1979] A.C. 508
Scarborough & Wife v. Cosgrove [1905] 2 KB 805
The Council of the City of Sydney v. West [1965] 114 C.L.R. 481
Wallis v. Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty. Ltd. [1993-1994] 179 C.L.R. 388
Walsh v. Palladium Car Park Pty. Ltd. [1975] V.R. 949
Walton Stores Ltd. v. Sydney City Council [1968] 2 N.S.W.R. 109
Winks v. W.H. Heck & Sons Pty. Ltd. [1986] 1 Qd.R. 226