Suncorp General Insurance Limited v Beck
[1998] QDC 173
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- Unreported Judgment
- Suncorp General Insurance Limited v Beck[1998] QDC 173
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Suncorp General Insurance Limited v Beck[1998] QDC 173
Suncorp General Insurance Limited v Beck[1998] QDC 173
DISTRICT COURT | No 3416 of 1997 |
CHAMBERS
JUDGE ROBIN QC
SUNCORP GENERAL INSURANCE LIMITED (ACN 075 695 966) | Plaintiff |
and
STEPHEN ARTHUR BECK | Defendant |
BRISBANE
DATE 22/06/98
ORDER
CATCHWORDS: | Practice and procedure – discovery – legal professional privilege – plaintiff insurer claiming from its insured its own solicitor/client costs and damages and costs it paid as defendant by election under a judgment in another action based on motor vehicle accident in which insured driver had a high blood alcohol concentration – insured claimed he had been improperly excluded from any voice in that action despite volunteering relevant assistance – itemised discovery ordered against insurer of documents discovered in bundles in the affidavit of documents schedule setting out documents for which privilege was claimed – Motor Vehicles Insurance Regulations 1968, regulation 17 – directions given to expedite challenges to claims of privilege. |
HIS HONOUR: There are cross-applications before the Court in these unusual proceedings in which the plaintiff insurer seeks from the defendant damages and party and party costs paid by it in a personal injuries action brought by the passenger in another vehicle with which one being driven by the defendant collided.
The claim is also for all costs which the plaintiff has had to bear and is made pursuant to regulation 17 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Regulations 1968.
It seems that Mr Beck had a high concentration of alcohol in his blood at the relevant time. He complains that the conduct of the other proceedings by the present plaintiff excluded him in such a way that the plaintiff ought to fail or alternatively have much more limited success than it would wish.
His application seeks further and better discovery, in particular in respect of the discovery made in part two of schedule 1. The plaintiff has conceded that more particularity was called for and after the filing of the defendant's application, filed a further affidavit of documents.
It contains a dozen items, only four of which refer to individual documents and give their dates. The other items give no dates whatever and refer to collections or bundles of documents as “correspondence” and the like.
Mr Matthews says this is insufficient, referring to Braegrove Proprietary Limited v. Bendeich [1993] 2 QdR 239. While discovery of material in this way is frequently encountered and will often be sufficient, in my opinion it is not in this unusual proceeding in which it may, if one may speculate, emerge that Mr Baker was trapped or “set up” in some way.
I think that more particular discovery identifying particular documents by their dates which may provide useful information is appropriate. Claims like the present are not without precedent, but perhaps for practical reasons appear to be rare.
I think their existence, particularly in the early years when matters which now stand to affect Mr Beck's interest very greatly were occurring, would not have been known among the general public, whose ignorance of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Regulations might be deprecated by some.
The defendant requires leave to bring his application, which is four days late, having regard to the timing of a certificate of readiness tendered by the plaintiff. I have already said enough to indicate I think this is an action of importance not only to Mr Beck, but more generally to the community and leave should be granted. This means there ought to orders in terms of paragraph 1 and 2 of the defendant's application filed on 3 June 1998.
In respect of the issue of costs, it is not so clear to me that the defendant ought to have his costs at this stage. The chronology presented by Mr Munro indicates that these issues were raised in December 1997 when the plaintiff challenged the defendant to make this application. None was made until the tendering of a certificate of readiness by the plaintiff on 6 May 1998. In the interim, interrogatories were administered by the plaintiff and answered.
There is a cross-application by the plaintiff seeking to have the action set down notwithstanding that the defendant has not signed the certificate of readiness. It cannot proceed now because further interlocutory steps are to be taken and a new certificate of readiness will have to be tendered.
The plaintiff's application, which was filed on 10 June 1998, has to be dismissed in the circumstances. My inclination is to make the costs of both applications each party's costs in the cause.
In addition to the orders already foreshadowed I propose to give directions to expedite the further progress of the action.
Mr Munro asserts his client is anxious to get the matter on, so it seems unnecessary to fix any time limits against his client and I make that comment without passing any adverse comment on Mr Beck or his solicitors other than what I have already said.
I give the following directions:
- (a)any notice under rule 188 to be given by the defendant is to be given within two business days of his solicitor's receipt of the plaintiff's new affidavit of documents;
- (b)if it becomes necessary for the defendant to apply under rule 190 and/or rule 193, the defendant is to file his application within seven days of the plaintiff's refusal to produce documents, the application to be heard on the earliest date the Court can make available, subject to contrary agreement between the parties.
I adjourn the defendant's summons filed on 3 June to stand as a summons for directions to be brought on on seven days notice from either side to the other and to come on automatically on the hearing of any application under rule 190 and/or rule 193.