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O'Donohue v Nominal Defendant[2000] QDC 255

O'Donohue v Nominal Defendant[2000] QDC 255

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

O'Donohue v Nominal Defendant [2000] QDC 255

PARTIES:

DEAN PETER O'DONOHUE

Plaintiff

and

JOHN GIRGENTI

First Defendant

and

THE NOMINAL DEFENDANT QUEENSLAND

Second Defendant

and

ALAN WAYNE DROVANDI

Third Defendant

and

FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED

Fourth Defendant

and

WESTFARMERS FEDERATION INSURANCE LIMITED

Third Party

FILE NO/S:

D155 of 1997

DIVISION:

Civil Jurisdiction

PROCEEDING:

Chamber matter

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

8  September 2000

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 August 2000

JUDGE:

Judge Forde

ORDER:

1.
DECLARATION THAT THE SUGAR CANE HARVESTER IS NOT AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE AS DEFINED IN THE MOTOR ACCIDENT INSURANCE ACT 1994

2.
FIRST DEFENDANT TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE SECOND DEFENDANT TO BE ASSESSED

3.
LIBERTY TO APPLY

CATCHWORDS:

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – “SUGAR CANE HARVESTER” Whether it is an uninsured vehicle within the meaning of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994

Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld)  ss. 3,4,5,31,52

Main Roads Regulations 1933, 1987

Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991 ss. 2,12,34 and definitions “agricultural implement” “Motor vehicle”

Traffic Act 1949

Traffic Regulation 1962 ss. 68, 206, 184

Transport Legislation Amendment (No. 1) No. 170 1998 s. 5

Statutory Instruments Act 1992 s. 37

Australian Alliance Assurance Co v. Attorney-General (Qld) (1916) St.R.Qd. 135

Brisbane City Council v. Attorney-General (Qld) (1908) 5 CLR 695

Brunner v. Eldar Trading Pty. Ltd. (1989) 1 Qd. R. 19

F.A.I. General Insurance Company Limited v Spannagle & Ors. (Supreme Court of Qld 8953/99 unreported 14.01.00)

Mason v. Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1987) 1 Qd. R. 190.

COUNSEL:

Mr S. Williams QC for the first defendant

Mr K.N. Wilson for the second defendant

SOLICITORS:

Le Mass Solicitors for the first defendant

Biggs and Biggs for the second defendant

Introduction

  1. [1]
    On 9th August, 1996, a collision occurred on the Captain Cook Highway north of Cairns. That collision involved a Mercedes Sedan driven by Janice Sylvie O'Donohue (the deceased), and a cement truck driven by Alan Wayne Drovandi, the third defendant.  Dean Peter O'Donohue, the plaintiff, sues for damages for loss of dependency and loss of consortium.  It is alleged in the plaintiff’s action that the collision and moreover the death was caused or contributed to by the negligence of the first defendant, John Girgenti, who was driving a sugar cane harvester (“the harvester”) along or beside the highway.  In the Statement of Agreed Facts, this allegation  is admitted for the purposes of this application.  The plaintiff alleges that this harvester was an “uninsured motor vehicle” as that term is defined in the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (“the MAIA”).
  1. [2]
    The Nominal Defendant Queensland, the Second Defendant, (“the Nominal Defendant”), was joined in the action pursuant to s. 52 of the said MAIA.  The basis for this joinder was that the harvester was unregistered and uninsured at the material time.  Westfarmers Federation Insurance Limited, the Third Party,  is the public risk insurer of the First Defendant.  The issue for determination on this application is whether the harvester is an “uninsured motor vehicle”. The resolution of this question will determine the need for the Nominal Defendant to remain in the action.  An order was made on 14th April, 2000, excusing the Plaintiff and the Third and Fourth Defendants from appearing on this application.  The Statement of Agreed facts stated that if the harvester was required to be insured pursuant to the MAIA, then the Nominal Defendant is deemed to be the insurer of the harvester pursuant to s. 31 of the MAIA.

Arguments on behalf of  the Nominal Defendant

  1. [3]
    The initial question for determination, it was submitted, was whether the harvester was a “motor vehicle” as defined in the MAIA. In some ways this is a threshold question, as it was submitted that unless s. 5(1) is satisfied, the legislation does not apply.  Section 5 provided as follows as at the date of the accident:

“Application of this Act

5.(1)  This Act applies to personal injury caused by, through or in connection with a motor vehicle if, and only if, the injury –

  1. (a)
    is a result of –
  1. (i)
    the driving of the motor vehicle; or
  2. (ii)
    a collision, or action taken to avoid a collision, with the motor vehicle; or
  3. (iii)
    the motor vehicle running out of control; or
  4. (iv)
    a defect in the motor vehicle causing loss of control of the vehicle while it is being driven; and
  1. (b)
    is caused, wholly or partly, by a wrongful act or omission in respect of the motor vehicle by a person other than the injured person.  (Amended from 1st September, 1994 by Motor Accident Insurance Legislation Amendment 1996).

    (2)  However, this Act does not apply to personal injury caused by, through or in connection with –

  1. (a)
    an uninsured motor vehicle; or
  2. (b)
    a backhoe, bulldozer, end-loader, forklift, industrial crane or hoist, or other mobile machinery or equipment; or
  1. (c)
    an agricultural implement; or
  2. (d)
    a motor vehicle adapted to run on rail or tram tracks; or
  3. (e)
    an amphibious vehicle; or
  4. (f)
    a motor vehicle of a class prescribed by regulation;

unless the motor vehicle accident out of which the injury arises happens on a road.”

  1. [4]
    Section 5(2) was amended by the 1996 Amendment Act to commence on 6th December 1996 (1996 SL No. 362) i.e. after the accident.  The effect of the changes were not the subject of any significant argument except that consequential amendments seem to narrow the application of the MAIA (paras 20-22 of Mr Wilson’s written submissions).  Section 5(2) was replaced by s. 5(3) on 6 December 1996.  Reference was made by counsel for the Nominal Defendant to other sections viz. 20, 23, 37 and 52 to illustrate this threshold point.  The following definitions are also relevant:

‘“mobile machinery or equipment” has the meaning given by the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991’

‘“motor vehicle” means a vehicle for which registration is required       under the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991 or the Motor Vehicles Control Act 1975, and includes a trailer.’

  ‘“motor vehicle accident” means an incident in which personal injury is caused by, through or in connection with a motor vehicle.’

‘“motor vehicle accident claim” means a claim for damages based    on a  liability for personal injury arising out of a motor vehicle    accident and, for a fatal injury, includes a claim on behalf of   the deceased’s dependants or estate.’

‘“trailer” means a vehicle without motive power designed to be hauled    by a motor vehicle.

‘“uninsured motor vehicle”  means a motor vehicle for which there is no CTP insurance policy in force, other than a motor vehicle owned by a self-insurer or a trailer.’  insurer or a trailer.’

  1. [5]
    The argument on this aspect is that if the harvester was not a “motor vehicle” as defined, s. 5(1) MAIA can never be satisfied and there cannot be a “motor vehicle accident”, nor could the harvester therefore be an “uninsured motor vehicle”.  The Nominal Defendant is involved only when a motor vehicle is not insured and a self-insurer is not the registered owner or when a motor vehicle cannot be identified:  Sections 31(1) (c) and (d).
  1. [6]
    A harvester does not come within the definition of a “trailer” and the Motor Vehicles Control Act has no application.  The contrary was not contended. It is common ground that the accident occurred on a road within the meaning of the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991 (“the Transport Regulation”) or the Traffic Act 1949.  An “agricultural implement” is defined in the Transport Regulation as follows:

“means an implement, with or without motive power, that is designed for off-road use and used solely for primary production”

  1. [7]
    It was agreed in argument that the word “motive” means “motor”. The harvester is described in the affidavit material as being either a track driven model or a rubber tyre model. Nothing turns on this difference. The harvester cuts the tops off the sugar cane and discards them to the side of the machine. It cuts the sugar cane off at ground level, conveys the sugar cane stalks through the machine, and cuts the sugar cane stalks into billets. Those billets are then cleaned and thereafter loaded into a trailer bin that travels along the side of the harvester when harvesting occurs. I find that the harvester has no application other than for primary production. There are occasions when the harvesters are driven on the roads. This would occur when the harvester is moving from one field to another or to a different farm or location. The definition of “primary production vehicle” in the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 is of no assistance.
  1. [8]
    Section 68(1)(c) of the Traffic Regulation 1962  provides that “a person shall not drive … a vehicle upon any road unless - it is otherwise constructed, equipped and loaded so that it complies with Schedule 1.  Section 68(1)(c) does not apply to a person driving an agricultural implement if the implement meets certain conditions in relation to size:  s. 206 of the Traffic Regulation 1962.  It may well be that the harvester can be moved lawfully if it has a permit but it is not covered by the MAIA.  Conditions may be imposed in relation to it:  Schedule 7.   Permits may be obtained to allow a type of vehicle which is not registered or insured to drive upon the roads: s. 184 of the Traffic Regulation; s. 34 of the Transport Regulation.  This latter provision relates to ‘unregistered vehicles’.  Counsel for the Nominal Defendant says that this regulation does not apply to the harvester as it is not a vehicle. A similar argument would apply to s. 20A of the MAIA which provides as follows:

“Temporary gratuitous insurance

  1. 20A.
  1. (1)
    This section applies if a person has been issued a permit under the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991, section 44A, authorising the use of an unregistered motor vehicle on roads.
  2. (2)
    A gratuitous CTP insurance policy in terms of the schedule under which the Nominal Defendant is the insurer is taken to be in force for the motor vehicle while the permit is in force.
  3. (3)
    However, subsection (2) does not apply for any period when a CTP insurance policy is otherwise in force for the motor vehicle while the permit is in force.”
  1. [9]
    The following definitions appear in the Transport Regulation:

‘“mobile machinery or equipment” means a vehicle constructed to transport and operate machinery or equipment that forms an integral part of the vehicle, other than—

a…

b…

c. a tractor.’

“motor vehicle” means a self-propelled vehicle, other than –

a.  a fire engine; or

b.  a power-assisted pedal cycle; or

c.  an aircraft; or

d.  an air cushion vehicle; or

e.  a vessel that operates only in water; or

f.  vehicle that operates only on rails.

  “vehicle” does not include –

  1. an agricultural implement; or
  2. …"
  1. [10]
    It was submitted, therefore, that a “motor vehicle” must be a “vehicle” which in turn cannot be an “agricultural implement”. It was also submitted that a harvester cannot be “mobile machinery or equipment” if it is an “agricultural implement” because it is not a “vehicle”. The ordinary meaning of “agricultural implement” in the Oxford Dictionary is:

“Agricultural” means of or pertaining to agriculture;  connected with husbandry or tillage of the ground.

“Implement” means the apparatus, or set of utensils, instruments etc. employed  in any trade or in executing any piece of work;  now chiefly in  agricultural implements”.

  1. [11]
    The definition in the Transport Regulation has a broader meaning as it includes a motor driven  implement used solely for primary production.   Such an implement is specifically excluded from the definition of “vehicle”.  Before the obligation to register and so to insure arises, what is being driven must be a “motor vehicle”.  Section 12 of the Transport Regulation provides:

“A person must not use, or permit to be used, on a road, a vehicle (being a motor vehicle or trailer) that is not registered under this regulation, unless the use of the vehicle is authorised—

(aa)…

(a)…

  1. (b)
    by a limited use permit or limited use plate…
  2. (c)
    …”
  1. [12]
    Counsel for the Nominal Defendant concedes that the harvesters can be driven lawfully, but uninsured, upon roads once a permit is obtained. Section 12 imposes an obligation to register a motor vehicle before it is used on a road: Brunner v. Eldar Trading Pty. Ltd. (1989) 1 Qd. R. 19, Mason v. Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1987) 1 Qd. R. 190.   Counsel for the Nominal Defendant says that a harvester is not a vehicle and therefore does not come within that  provision. The requirement to register and insure is confined to motor vehicles, and the MAIA is directed to providing “compulsory third-party motor vehicle insurance, and the scheme of statutory insurance for uninsured and identified vehicles…” : s. 3 MAIA.
  1. [13]
    It was submitted that the MAIA is inextricably linked to the Transport Regulation which continues in force to support the MAIA, notwithstanding that the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Act has been repealed: Reference was made to the decision of F.A.I. General Insurance Company Limited v Spannagle & Ors. (an unreported decision of Chesterman J. 8953/99 given on 14th January, 2000).  It was assumed in that case that the Transport Regulation continued in force.  The assumption was well founded: Transport Legislation Amendment (No. 1) No. 170 of 1998.  Section 5.  The Statutory Instruments Act 1992, s. 37 was also referred to.  This provision provides as follows:

“Words and expressions used in a statutory instrument have the same meanings as they have, from time to time, in the Act or statutory instrument (the “authorising law”), or relevant provisions of the authorising law under which the statutory instrument is made or in force.”

Arguments on behalf of the First Defendant

  1. [14]
    Senior counsel for the First Defendant submitted that the MAIA applies to the claim as the requirements of s. 5 of the MAIA are met including: (a) that the motor vehicle accident occurred on a road, and (b) that accident resulted in personal injury.  In discussing the various definitions, it was contended that there was no obvious intention to use the term “agricultural implement” in the same sense in each piece of legislation.  I do not agree with that contention, particularly in view of the provisions of s. 37 of the Statutory Instruments Act 1992 and the general references to definitions in the Transport Regulation by the MAIA.   The MAIA specifically relies upon parts of the Regulation in its definition section 2.  The fact that MAIA fails to define “agricultural implement” does not advance the argument when viewed historically and within the general scheme of the various Acts. 
  1. [15]
    However, the reasons advanced for the proposition that a different meaning ought to be given are as follows:

“6. Clearly the term ‘agricultural implement’ must bear a different meaning in each piece of legislation.  It is defined in the Regulation (Cl.2) as an ‘implement, with or without motive power, that is designed for off-road use and used solely for primary production’.  However, under the MAIA, it must be given a different meaning, for the following reasons:-

  1. (a)
    If it bears the same meaning as in the Regulation, the MAIA could never apply to it (as it is not a ‘vehicle’ and therefore not capable of registration under the Regulation);
  1. (b)
    Therefore, Section 5(3)(b) MAIA would be redundant.  That outcome should be avoided. Statutory Interpretation in Australia, Pearce, Second Edition, para. 16;
  1. (c)
    Its inclusion in S5(3)(b) MAIA evidences a clear legislative intention that the MAIA should apply to such an implement if the motor vehicle accident in which it is involved happens on a road.”

7. What is the meaning to be given to the term in the MAIA?

  1. (a)
    It is to be ascertained by exclusion of those objects otherwise identified in S5(3), and especially 5(3)(a);
  1. (b)
    It is governed by the fact that the harvester would fall within the definition of ‘other mobile machinery or equipment’ (S5(3)(a); S4 MAIA; Regulation 2), and is not excluded from that definition;
  1. (c)
    It is influenced by the specific exclusion from the definition of ‘mobile machinery or equipment’ of a tractor, the one agricultural implement which is usually identified as self-propelled.  Why exclude a tractor from that definition and not exclude other self propelled agricultural implements?  It could have been done very easily with the addition of those words to the definition;
  1. (d)
    In the absence of a statutory definition broadening its meaning (such as in the Regulation), it is a term which is usually used in reference to a passive (i.e. not mobile under its own power) implement such as a plough, a slasher, a hay rake, a set of off-set discs, a scarifier and so on.  Note the attached dictionary definition of ‘implement’.  Note also the distinction drawn between an ‘agricultural implement’ and an ‘agricultural vehicle’ by Diplock L.J. in Wilson –v- West Sussex County Council (1963) 2 Q.B. 764 at 782;

In Statutory Interpretations in Australia, Pearce, Second Edition, it is said (para 90) that:-

“If the word is defined in one statute in a somewhat unusual manner and not in another and the statutes are in pari materia this would tend to indicate that the legislature intended the word to have a different meaning in the two statutes.’”

  1. [16]
    Reference to s. 5(3)(b) is the 1996 amendment. Section 5(2)(c) above was the operative law as at the date of the accident. When one considers those arguments, there is some appeal given that Counsel for the Nominal Defendant is unable to provide an explanation why s. 5(2)(c) (or 5(3)(b)) existed (or exists). For example, if an agricultural implement is excluded from the definition of “vehicle”, then why is it necessary to mention it particularly as excluded from the MAIA unless the motor vehicle accident occurs on a road?  It is contended for the First Defendant that the inclusion of “agricultural implement” in s. 5(2)(c) evinces a clear legislative intention that the MAIA should apply to same if the motor vehicle accident in which it is involved occurred on a road. 
  1. [17]
    In its original form in 1994, s. 5(2) which was the predecessor of s. 5(3) provided that the MAIA did “not apply to personal injury caused by, through or in connection with - (a) an uninsured motor vehicle…”.  The amendment in 1996 came into effect after the present accident.  It does illustrate the broad effect of the original legislation to exclude even “uninsured motor vehicles” from the purview of the MAIA unless the accident occurred on a road. There was no other relevant amendment to the original Act except that the MAIA would apply to uninsured vehicles both on roads and public places. (s. 5(2) No. 53/1996.)   There was a clear intention to exclude other items of equipment or vehicles from the MAIA unless the accident occurred on a road.  The MAIA would then become relevant for what purpose?  By placing an ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ into a different category, the legislature recognised that motor vehicles are used in ‘public places’ as distinct from a bulldozer or an agricultural implement which are generally used on private property.   However, it did recognize that such items of equipment or vehicles did travel on roads and when they did the MAIA applied, but for what purpose?  In order to give some meaning to s. 5(2)(c), is it necessary to accept the argument that the definition of an “agricultural implement” as defined in the MAIA has a different meaning to that described in the Transport Regulations?  If the legislature had intended otherwise, why was the definition of “agricultural implement” not defined by reference to the Transport Regulations as were other terms? 
  1. [18]
    The present problem with interpretation arises when regulations passed as part of one Act, the Transport Intrastructure (Roads) Act, are attempted to be used for the purposes of defining terms in another Act, the MAIA, when it is clear that the objects of each Act do differ.  The objects of the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Act 1991 under which the Transport Regulation was promulgated was “an Act to make provision for the development and management of road transport infra-structure and for other purposes".  The objects of the MAIA are quite different.  It is an Act “to provide for a compulsory third-party insurance scheme covering liability for personal injury arising out of  motor vehicle accidents, and for other purposes”.
  1. [19]
    The following principle seems apposite:

“If the word is defined in one statute in a somewhat unusual manner and not in another and the statutes are in pari materia this would tend to indicate that the legislature intended the word to have a different meaning in the two statutes”.  (Pearce, “Statutory Interpretation in Australia”, 2nd ed. para 9).

  1. [20]
    The distinction between an "agricultural implement” and an “agricultural vehicle” was made by Diplock L.J. in Wilson – v – West Sussex County Council (1963) 2 Q.B. 764 at 782.  Implement is defined  as “things that serve as equipment or outfit; the apparatus, instruments, etc. employed in any trade or in executing any piece of work; as agricultural implements..”(Oxford English Dictionary p. 1032).
  1. [21]
    It is argued by Counsel for the First Defendant that a harvester is included in the definition of “mobile machinery or equipment”. Even if one assumes for the purposes of the argument that a harvester is included in the definition of “mobile machinery or equipment”, it would mean that it is “a vehicle constructed to operate machinery” within the definition in the Transport Regulation.  The same Regulation defines “vehicle” to exclude an agricultural implement.  The same Regulation defines “agricultural implement” which would seem to include a harvester.  In the past,  the definitions of “agricultural implement” in the Traffic Regulation 1962 and the Main Roads Regulations 1987, had had a similar but not identical meaning to that used in the Transport Regulation.  Also, since 1933 under the Main Roads Regulations, an “agricultural implement” has been excluded from the definition of “mobile machinery or equipment”.  Although it is no longer excluded directly under the Transport Regulation in the definition of “mobile machinery or equipment”, it is excluded under the definition of “vehicle”.  Reference can be made to prior Acts for the purpose of interpreting current legislation, especially where they are part of a scheme of legislation: Pearce op. cit para 91.
  1. [22]
    In deciding this question, it has not been possible to give a meaning to give “full and accurate meaning to every word”: Pearce & Geddes “Statutory Interpretation in Australia” 4th Ed. para. 2.12;  Brisbane City Council v. Attorney-General (Qld) (1908) 5 CLR 695 at 720.  O'Connor J. quoted from the decision of  Income Tax Commissioners  v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 532 at 589:

“Nor is surplusage, or even tautology, wholly unknown in the language of the legislature.”

  1. [23]
    Counsel for the Nominal Defendant has submitted that s. 5(2)(c) [or s. 5(3)(b)] of the MAIA has no operative effect and that it was inserted by error. I have attempted to give an interpretation “that produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency”: Australian Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General (Qld) (1916)  St. R. Qd. 135 at 161.  One explanation for s. 5(2)(c) as it was constituted would be if an accident occurred in a paddock involving a harvester, and  personal injuries to a worker in the field were suffered through the fault of the driver or operator of the harvester,  then the MAIA would not apply.  If the accident happened on a road, then the MAIA applies if there is a motor vehicle accident.  This would have to involve either an insured or uninsured motor vehicle as defined.  Relevantly, the  personal injury would have to be “caused by, through or in connection with an agricultural implement”. It may be an unnecessary attempt to cover a situation when a “motive” agricultural implement was involved.  The practical consequence of such a scenario would be that the MAIA applied to the personal injury, but the harvester would not be insured or required to be insured under the MAIA.  Some fault would have to be attributed to the motor vehicle before the MAIA was operative.  Clearly the MAIA would not apply if the accident happened on the road and a motor vehicle was not involved or the accident was not “caused, wholly or partly, by the wrongful act or omission of a person other than the injured person.”  This was changed by the 1996 amendment to read “caused, wholly or partly, by a wrongful act or omission in respect of the motor vehicle by a person other than the injured person”.  The amendment was made after the subject accident.
  1. [24]
    Conclusions

I make the following findings:

  1. A sugar-cane harvester is an ‘agricultural implement’ within the meaning of that term as defined in the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991.
  2. A “motor vehicle” as defined by the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991 and for the purpose of the Motor Accidents Insurance Act 1994 as amended includes a self–propelled vehicle.
  3. A “vehicle“ as defined by the Transport Infrastructure (Roads) Regulation 1991 specifically excludes an “agricultural implement“.
  4. Therefore, a  sugar-cane harvester is not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the Motor Accidents Insurance Act and is not required to be insured for the purposes of that Act.       
  1. [25]
    Orders:
  1. It is declared that the sugar cane harvester is not an ”uninsured motor vehicle” as defined in the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994.
  1. Order that the First Defendant to pay the costs of the Second Defendant of this application to be assessed.
  1. Liberty to apply.
Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    O'Donohue v Nominal Defendant

  • Shortened Case Name:

    O'Donohue v Nominal Defendant

  • MNC:

    [2000] QDC 255

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Forde DCJ

  • Date:

    08 Sep 2000

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Australian Alliance Assurance Co Ltd v Attorney-General [1916] St R Qd 135
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1916] St R Qd 135
Cite 2 - [1916] St R Qd 135
Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General of Queensland (1908) 5 CLR 695
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1908) 5 CLR 695
Cite 2 - (1908) 5 CLR 695
Brunner v Eldar Trading Pty. Ltd. (1989) 1 Qd R 19
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 1 Qd R 19
Cite 2 - (1989) 1 Qd R 19
Income Tax Commissioners v Pemsel (1891) AC 532
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1891) AC 532
Mason v Nominal Defendant (Qld) (1987) 1 Qd R 190
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1987) 1 Qd R 190
Cite 2 - (1987) 1 Qd R 190
Wilson -v- West Sussex County Council (1963) 2 QB 764
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1963) 2 QB 764
Cite 2 - (1963) 2 QB 764

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Vonhoff v Jondaryan Shire Council [2001] QDC 921 citation
1

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