Ross v Quirk
[2001] QDC 176
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- Unreported Judgment
- Appeal Determined (QCA)
- Ross v Quirk[2001] QDC 176
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Ross v Quirk[2001] QDC 176
Ross v Quirk[2001] QDC 176
DISTRICT COURT | No D1439 of 2000 |
CIVIL JURISDICTION
JUDGE NOUD
ELIZABETH ROSS | Plaintiff |
and
TRISHA YOLAND QUIRK | First Defendant |
and
SUNCORP METWAY INSURANCE LIMITED | Second Defendant |
BRISBANE
..DATE 25/05/2001
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: In this matter I give judgment for the plaintiff against the second defendant in the sum of $87,134.61. I shall hear the parties as to costs. I publish my reasons.
...
HIS HONOUR: This is an application for costs at the conclusion of the case and Mr McManus has handed up to me an offer to settle dated 10 April 2000 which speaks for itself in the light of the amount of the judgment which I have just delivered. He has also handed to me, helpfully, rule 360 and persuasively put forward the plaintiff's arguments, if I may say so.
One hesitates before bringing a case within the qualification referred to in rule 360. I am referring to the words in that rule “unless the defendant shows another order for costs is appropriate in the circumstances.” But having listened to the arguments that have been advanced whilst conscious of the advantages that the plaintiff might otherwise have under the rule, I think that in the present case, it is appropriate that the costs be on the standard basis.
I am recognising in saying this that the situation is somewhat unusual if not exceptional. Mr Hastie for the defendants has pointed to the fact that certain medical reports were not in existence even at the time of the offer to settle and that the second defendant did not have the opportunity to peruse those.
Mr McManus for the plaintiff has pointed out that the matter had been going for 1.3 years before the date of the offer in the sense that there had been steps taken under the Motor Accident Insurance Act during that period of time and in conjunction with the submissions that Mr Hastie has made, he has referred to the fact that the offer to settle is very close to the awarded damages that was eventually made, only about $1,000 difference or something of that order.
So I think that it is somewhat exceptional, if I may say so, but I think the Court is entitled to control to some extent what is going on by orders as to costs and I have the feeling in relation to this matter that if the plaintiff was going to move along quickly as she proposed, make the offer and get the full advantage out of it, it would be better at that point, if I may say so, to more fairly apprise the other side of the case and, further, make allowance for the fact that a defendant in this position would need to know perhaps a little bit more detail about the case and time to do that.
The present case is such that I think there was undue speed in the sense that I have tried to explain. That is the view that I take on the present occasion. It might be borderline but nevertheless I have come to that conclusion relating to this. Therefore, an application for costs having been made and having considered the offer to settle and what flows from that, I order that the second defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the action to be assessed on the scale of District Court costs where the amount recovered is more than $50,000.