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  4. McNeill v Gold Coast City Council - [2002] QDC 29

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McNeill v Gold Coast City Council[2002] QDC 29

McNeill v Gold Coast City Council[2002] QDC 29

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

McNeill v. Gold Coast City Council [2002] QDC 029

PARTIES:

JOHN DANIEL McNEILL                                  Plaintiff

And

GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL                       Defendant

FILE NO/S:

Southport No.469 of 1998

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Trial on plaint

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court Southport

DELIVERED ON:

8 March 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

4, 5 February 2002 

JUDGE:

Judge Robin Q.C.

ORDER:

Judgment for plaintiff for damages as assessed

CATCHWORDS:

Tort – Civil claim for damages for personal injury from assault and battery – plaintiff suffered neck injury and broken finger when ejected from public meeting – use by defendant Council’s contracted security guards of greater force than reasonably necessary prevented its establishing the defences under s 270, s 271, s 273 and s 277 of the Criminal Code – exemplary damages refused as plaintiff’s own actions on an earlier occasion provided justification for his exclusion – limited “aggravated damages” awarded as part of compensatory damages – claim for fracture of L3 noted in hospital records (and proved) to be old should never have been included – Griffiths v Kerkemeyer claim refused, as no physical inability to carry out tasks performed for plaintiff was shown.

 

White v. Connolly (1927) St R Qd 75

Grehan v. Kann (1948) QWN 40

Love v. Egan (1971) 67 QJPR 102

Fontin v. Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177

Lane v. Holloway (1968) 1 QB 379

Kirwood v. Bishop (4695 of 1988, 5 February 1992)

Hall v. Foneca (1983) WAR 309

Sinclair v. Caloundra Sub-Branch RSL Services Club Inc (2001) QDC 196

Rejfek v. McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517

Henry v. Thompson (1989) 2 Qd R 412

Loudon v. Ryder (1953) 2 QB 202

X.L. Petroleum (N.S.W.) v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448

Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1

Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1

COUNSEL:

Mr P Matthews for the plaintiff

Mr M O'Sullivan for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Bennett & Philp for the plaintiff

MinterEllison for the defendant

  1. [1]
    Mr McNeill, now 46 years old, sues the defendant Council for $250,000 damages for personal injuries sustained on 1 July 1995 “in consequence of an assault and battery committed by the defendant, its servants or agents”, together with interest.
  1. [2]
    The sums suggested to be appropriate by his counsel at the trial, Mr P Matthews, more modestly aggregated $73,061.65, if my arithmetic is correct; as pleaded and pursued, the claim included compensatory damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages.
  1. [3]
    The assault and battery are pleaded to have occurred on the date mentioned at about 4.30 pm upon the plaintiff entering a public hall immediately adjacent to the defendant’s Council Chambers at Nerang. The plaint, filed 11 June 1998, three weeks before the limitation period expired, alleges:-
  1. "6.
    The plaintiff was then and there confronted by a number of male persons whose names are not known to the plaintiff though who are hereinafter referred to as “the security personnel”.
  1. The plaintiff was then and there wrongfully assaulted and battered by the security personnel by his –
  1. (a)
    being grasped forcefully around the neck;
  2. (b)
    having his left arm twisted up behind his back;
  3. (c)
    being carried bodily from the public hall; and
  4. (d)
    being flung to the ground in the car park outside.
  1. The plaintiff thereby sustained personal injuries.

PARTICULARS

  1. (a)
    Burst fracture of the L3 vertebral body;
  2. (b)
    Injury to the cervical spine;
  3. (c)
    Fracture of the third finger of the left hand;
  4. (d)
    Abrasions, bruising and contusions.”

The original claim to a jury trial was not persisted in.

  1. [4]
    The defence, which was amended or sought to be amended more than once, disputes the extent or existence of injuries, loss and damage alleged and goes on:-
  1. “5A.
    As to the allegation in paragraphs 7 of the Plaint the defendant denies the assaults and battery alleged therein as the defendant believes the allegations to be untrue. The defendant states that an incident occurred between the plaintiff and one George Jones and a security officer) (henceforth “the security officer”), whose identify is unknown to the defendant, as follows:-
  1. (a)
    the defendant states that at all material times the said Jones was employed by the defendant as a Senior Development Control Officer;
  1. (b)
    the defendant states that the said Jones had immediately prior to the incident repeatedly requested the plaintiff, whilst he was on the premises of the defendant to leave the said property;
  1. (c)
    the defendant states that the plaintiff threw his right fist towards the head of Jones whereupon the said Jones grabbed hold of the arms of the plaintiff;
  1. (d)
    the plaintiff then struggled;
  1. (e)
    the security officer assisted the said Jones by seizing the plaintiff in a bear hug and pushing the arms of the plaintiff in a downwards motion;
  1. (f)
    the security officer then proceeded to walk the plaintiff a distance of approximately 10 metres from the door of the hall and then release the plaintiff.
  1. “5B.
    Further, the defendant pleads that the plaintiff by throwing his fist at the said Jones assaulted or attempted to assault him and that the said Jones had not provoked this assault. In the circumstances:-
  1. (a)
    it was lawful for the said Jones to make effectual defence against the assault or attempted assault by way of the actions pleaded in paragraph 5A hereof which actions involved force not intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm; and
  1. (b)
    that it was lawful for the said security officer to act in good faith in aid of the said Jones to use like force for the purpose of defending the said Jones.
  1. “5C.
    Further, or in the alternative, if the defendant is otherwise vicariously liable as pleaded in paragraph 13 of the Plaint for the assaults complained of by the plaintiff in paragraph 7 of the Plaint, then the defendant pleads that it is and was the owner of the said premises and that:-
  1. (a)
    it is or was in peaceful possession of the said premises aforesaid, and/or alternatively entitled to the control or management of the said premises; and
  1. (b)
    the aforesaid Jones and/or the said security officer (identify unknown) used such force as was reasonably necessary in order to remove therefrom the plaintiff who wrongfully remained thereon.
  1. “5D.
    Alternatively, if the defendant is otherwise vicariously liable as pleaded in paragraph 13 of the Plaint for the assaults complained of by the plaintiff in paragraph 7 of the Plaint, then the defendant pleads that in committing any assault upon the plaintiff the said Jones and/or the said security officer (identify unknown) used such force as was reasonably necessary:-
  1. (a)
    to prevent the continuation or renewal of a breach of the peace by the plaintiff witnessed by the said Jones and the said security officer, which force was reasonably proportioned to the danger to be apprehended from sch continuation or renewal; and/or alternatively
  1. (b)
    to prevent the repetition by the plaintiff of an act or insult of such a nature as to be provocation to the said Jones and/or the security officer for an assault, such force not being intended and not such as was likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to the plaintiff.”
  1. [5]
    The defendant’s witnesses supported the defendant’s pleaded version, which relies upon the following sections of the Criminal Code:-

Section 271 (paragraph 5B(a)):

“Self-defence against unprovoked assault

(1) When a person is unlawfully assaulted, and has not provoked the assault, it is lawful for the person to use such force to the assailant as is reasonably necessary to make effectual defence against the assault, if the force used is not intended, and is not such as is likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm.”

Section 273 (paragraph 5B(b)):

“Aiding in self-defence

In any case in which it is lawful for any person to use force of any degree for the purpose of defending himself or herself against an assault, it is lawful for any other person acting in good faith in the first person’s aid to use a like degree of force for the purpose of defending the first person.”

Section 277 (paragraph 5C):

“Defence of premises against trespassers: Removal of disorderly persons.

It is lawful for a person who is in peaceable possession of any land structure, vessel, or place, or who is entitled to the control or management of any land, structure, vessel, or place, and for any person acting by his authority, to use such force as is reasonably necessary in order to prevent any person from wrongfully entering upon such land, structure, vessel, or place, or in order to remove therefrom a person who wrongfully remains therein, provided that he does not do bodily harm to such person.” 

Section 270 (paragraph 5D):

“Prevention of repetition of insult

It is lawful for any person to use such force as is reasonably necessary to prevent the repetition of an act or insult of such a nature as to be provocation to the person for an assault, if the force used is not intended, and is not such as is likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm.”

Paragraph 5B of the pleading failed to expressly acknowledge the limitation of ss. 271 and 273 to force that is “reasonably necessary”.

  1. [6]
    While the position at common law may have been different, it has long been established that a defence of provocation as an excuse for an assault may be pleaded in civil as well as criminal proceedings in Queensland, having regard to the Criminal Code: White v. Connolly (1927) St R Qd 75. The onus lies on the defendant to establish the defence on the balance of probabilities: Grehan v. Kann (1948) QWN 40. See, in this court, Love v. Egan (1971) 67 QJPR 102, which applied Fontin v. Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177 and Lane v. Holloway (1968) 1 QB 379. I was satisfied in Kirwood v. Bishop (4695 of 1988, 5 February 1992) by reference to Hall v. Foneca (1983) WAR 309, that the defence of self-defence is similarly applicable (as would be that of aiding in self-defence under s. 273 of the Code); Judge McGill S.C. proceeded on the basis of the applicability of ss. 270 and s. 277 in Sinclair v. Caloundra Sub-Branch RSL Services Club Inc (2001) QDC 196.
  1. [7]
    Mr McNeill accepted none of the defence allegations, except for that in paragraph 5A(b), his Reply to Amended Defence (filed 21 November 2001) pleading that he:-

“(a) says that the said Jones without any or any adequate reason twice requested the plaintiff leave the premises;

  1. (b)
    in response to the said requests made by the said Jones, the plaintiff advised the said Jones he had been requested by one, Jim Higgs, an employee, servant or agent of the defendant, to attend the premises to collect some paperwork;
  1. (c)
    denies he threw his right fist towards or near the head of Jones as such allegation is false;
  1. (d)
    says the said Jones, without provocation, seized the plaintiff around his chest whereupon the plaintiff struggled in an attempt to free himself from the said Jones grasp;
  1. (e)
    says that the said security officer seized the plaintiff in what is commonly referred to as a “head lock” whilst simultaneously twisting the plaintiff’s left arm behind his back in what is commonly referred to as a “half nelson”;
  1. (f)
    says that the said Jones then proceeded to hold the plaintiff by his feet, and in company with the said security officer, lifted the plaintiff from the ground whilst restraining the plaintiff thereby making it impossible to him to move;
  1. (g)
    says that the said Jones and the sais security officer then proceeded to bodily remove the plaintiff from the defendant’s premises at the direction of one Councillor David Arbon;
  1. (h)
    says that once the plaintiff was bodily removed from the public hall, he was flung to the ground in the external car park.”
  1. [8]
    The Reply “says that the Plaintiff’s conduct was at all times appropriate” and asserts generally the unlawfulness of any exercise of force against him; he pleads that the force used against him “was not exercised in good faith”, “was intended and likely to cause either grievous bodily harm or bodily harm” , places in issue whether the force used “was necessary or reasonably necessary”, or “was reasonably proportional to any force used by (him)”; he denies any breaching of the peace or provocation.
  1. [9]
    Mr McNeill essentially swore up to the allegations in his Reply.
  1. [10]
    Thus, on the pleadings, and in the evidence, there was marked conflict regarding the nature of the incident. In my assessment, the recollections of all the witnesses have failed, and had failed by the time of the institution of the action and pleadings. It appears that the earliest intimation the defendant had of Mr McNeill’s claim was a letter before action sent in December 1996. In practical terms, there appears to be unfairness to the Council in having to meet a claim which had not been foreshadowed in any way based on an incident which apparently seemed unremarkable at the time, leading to no report being made or kept. I would accept that it has not been possible for the Council to identify “the security officer” referred to in its defence (something that might have been possible at a much earlier time); it seems likely there have been practical difficulties for the Council in obtaining useful assistance from Jim Higgs and Paul Murrain, both of whom I understand to have been overseas consultants, and one Jim Webb (also named in the evidence) and perhaps others. The difficulties may have been compounded given that the event in question happened early in the transitional period following the amalgamation of the Gold Coast and Albert local governments; the whole background to the incident and the personnel involved were on the Albert Shire Council side. While the Gold Coast City Council as a matter of law may bear responsibility for anything untoward that may have occurred, it may be inappropriate and misleading in a moral sense to hold it responsible.
  1. [11]
    It is as difficult for me as it was for the Judge in Sinclair to reach a confident view about the events that happened on 1 July 1995 which are described so differently in the pleadings. Although assault constitutes a criminal offence, imparting a dimension of added seriousness to Mr McNeill’s civil claim, the standard of proof he has to meet is that stated by the High Court in Rejfek v. McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521. As well as the irreconcilable accounts of witnesses, the court has available other information, particularly regarding the plaintiff’s physical condition after the incident, which is of help in arriving at findings.
  1. [12]
    One might wonder that the defendant’s witnesses, who included Mr Arbon, town planner for (not Councillor of) the Albert Shire, Mr Jones, Mr James Alexander (Chip) Kaufman, and Mr Lawton, would recall the incident at all. The explanation is that the Council, by Mr Arbon and his superior, the new Chief Executive Officer of the amalgamated local governments, Dr Danes, had both (with good reason) deliberately determined that Mr McNeill should be denied access to the “public hall” earlier on the day in question. There was evidence that an opinion had been obtained from the Council’s solicitor on that Saturday confirming that Mr McNeill might be singled out from other members of the public, and denied entry, so that he would become a trespasser when be asked to leave (which he concedes happened).
  1. [13]
    The reasons for the prima facie extraordinary conduct of the Council described in the pleadings are equally extraordinary, in my opinion. I have no way of knowing whether they came as any surprise to Mr Matthews or his instructing solicitors, but I am satisfied that, in Mr McNeill’s thinking, there was a clear connection between his own extraordinary conduct (about to be described) and the Council’s. At 2 or 3 am on the same day he had left the mutilated carcass of a kangaroo outside the door of the room occupied by Mr Kaufman at the Town and Country Motel, Nerang, this accompanied by aggressive shouting of a mistaken version of Mr Kaufman’s name and other comments which would probably be taken as threatening in the circumstances, accompanied by loud banging on the door. The kangaroo, which it must be accepted was “road kill”, had clearly been mutilated after being struck by a vehicle. Not only were the head and legs removed - an organ, which may have been the heart, had been cut out and placed on top of the body.
  1. [14]
    Mr McNeill represented himself as (and I accept he was) committed to fauna conservation and protection, if only as part of his desire to preserve the pleasant bushland and rural amenity of Coomera, where he resided on a leased area of 1,000 acres or so. After I had ruled that the pleadings were sufficient to allow Mr O'Sullivan (appearing for the Council) to get into evidence (initially in cross-examination of Mr McNeill) the kangaroo incident, as the basis of Mr Jones’ refusal of access, Mr McNeill gave an unimpressive account. His cross-examination contains the following:-

“Can I put it to you that you mean to terrify Kaufman? - -  No, I didn’t want to  - -

That’s why you went to his room at about 1.30 in the morning, disturbed his sleep and left this animal on the doorstep. You meant to terrify him?  - - That was the last chance I had to make a point, with that kangaroo. And I didn’t – I even drove past the place before anything had even dropped into my head, that this is – this is your last chance, if you do something now. I never planned on going to Kaufman’s room at 1.30 in the morning. I was going home because I didn’t want to go nightclubbing with my friend. I wanted to go to bed.

And to further ram home the point, you decided to cut the head off the animal - - -?  - - That’s absolute nonsense and rubbish and I heard that through a chap called King, after this happened and he – he told me that I cut the heart out of  the kangaroo and smeared blood on the door and all sort of stuff.

And you cut the heart out of the animal and put it on top of the animal?  - - That’s lies. That is absolute non-truths. Someone else had done that.

You wanted to strike fear in their hearts. You meant business. That’s what you  - - ?  - - I didn’t do that. Did not do that. I did not touch the kangaroo in any way, shape or form, with any knife, I mean, I imagine it would be pretty hard work cutting it through a kangaroo to cut it’s heart out, or cutting it’s head off and making a mess like that. All I did was holding the kangaroo by its tail, take it and put it on the mat outside the doorstep. Those photographs you’ve got there have been taken after that kangaroo has been mutilated by somebody else. Not me. I – I don’t – I don’t cut things with knives.

Did you have that incident in your mind, when you arrived the next day on the Saturday at the Charrette?  - - Yeah, I did. Yeah

Would you have expected the people, the consultants to be upset by the incident?  - - I didn’t think they’d be really happy about it, but I didn’t have any kangaroo with its heart cut out or its head cut off and I – as I was well known to Kaufman, I was going to talk to him about it and tell him that the other guy wouldn’t look at it so I thought I better let you have it, because I had to throw it away by that time, or – or make it – make a point with it. Because I was going to talk to him about it, actually.

Well, you – you expected they wouldn’t be happy about it, is that the term you use?  Wouldn’t be happy about it?  - - No, he wouldn’t be – he wouldn’t be happy about it, no.

He would have been terribly upset by the incident. That’s what you would have expected? - -  He would – I reckon he would be – he might be terribly upset by the incident if he had a kangaroo with it’s head cut off and it’s heart cut out, yeah, but that wasn’t the case. That’s not true.

And you would have expected that the consultants would have talked to the Council, prior to your arrival ….? - - Yes.

You’d expect them to do that? - - Yeah.

And when you arrived at the – the meeting, on the – on the Saturday afternoon, evening, you saw security officers? - -  That’s right.”

  1. [15]
    I accept the evidence of Ms Morris, Mr Kaufman’s partner, that the photograph exhibit 12 was taken, as she says, within minutes of Mr McNeill’s departure from the motel, and shows the kangaroo carcass in the condition it was in when he left it there. It must follow that if the mutilation was not done by him, he knew it had been perpetrated, and he may have known the identity of the perpetrator.
  1. [16]
    The “Charrette” was a part of an exercise organised by the Albert Shire Council to inform local people of, and give them the opportunity to participate in planning for a proposed satellite city based on the Coomera Station on the new Brisbane to Gold Coast railway. It had nothing to do with private development proposals, but with strategic planning for an area of some 5,000 hectares, which Mr McNeill understood would accommodate a city the size of Darwin. Expert consultants were brought in from far and wide, including Mr Murrain from England and the team leader, Mr Higgs. Mr Kaufman is an American town planner and architect who, about that time, had moved to Melbourne. Ms Morris was an urban designer. On the Council’s side, Mr Arbon was in charge. The Charrette involved the experts working on plans at tables around the public hall, where members of the public might joint them. As well, there were more formal meetings. At an early meeting, Mr McNeill had drawn attention to himself by vociferously raising issues and, in particular, requiring that a video he had be shown. He was frustrated in that, but was invited by the organisers to go on stage to present his point of view. I accept the evidence that he dominated the proceedings to the extent that many members of the public felt resentment that he was effectively excluding them. The “other guy” who “wouldn’t look at the kangaroo” was Mr Murrain, who had been invited to look at it in support of Mr McNeill’s contention that there would be much more such “road kill” if the satellite city project were to go ahead.
  1. [17]
    I accept Mr McNeill’s motivations as genuine. I accept he felt his arguments were getting nowhere, that destruction of the environment he cherished would inevitably follow from implementation of the Council’s proposals, that the status quo did not look like being preserved through his efforts at the Charrette. I am prepared to accept that it was a kind of desperation and a determination to show the depth of his passion that led to the kangaroo incident. At p. 197 of the transcript Mr Matthews unsuccessfully sought to get Mr Kaufman’s endorsement of his suggestion that people who objected to a new road proposed about the same time had been in the habit of “delivering road killed koalas to people” (at which point Mr McNeill could be heard to say, although the transcript doesn’t show it, “on politicians’ doorsteps”).
  1. [18]
    What matters in the present context is not what Mr McNeill may have had in mind, but what Mr Kaufman and those of the other consultants who became aware of the kangaroo incident would make of it in its context. Mr Kaufman gave an elaborate (and convincing) explanation of why he suddenly came to regard himself as at risk of suffering personal harm from Mr McNeill, whom he had come to know not only at the Charrette, but also in a chance encounter in the countryside one day in the vicinity of Mr McNeill’s place. Mr Kaufman gave an adequate explanation for his reaching a view that Mr McNeill regarded him (erroneously) as the leader of the Charrette team. I accept his evidence that (whether or not Mr McNeill had ever given vent to this misinformation) Mr McNeill had been described to him as a “Vietnam Veteran” - from which Mr Kaufman, possibly inappropriately influenced by some unfortunate stereotype, concluded that Mr McNeill might well be a good shot, and even presented a threat to him by shooting at the Charrette or while he was traversing the 200 metres or so between it and his motel (where he told me there were many places where a sharp-shooter might conceal himself). One reaction might be that Mr Kaufman had not been long enough out of the United States; that would be unfair, and overlook the impact of the dismembered kangaroo incident in the middle of the night, which has, one might think, echoes of the chilling “horse’s head in the bed” scene in “The Godfather”. The point is that those who are the target of such gestures have no way of knowing what they imply, if anything. The perpetrators cannot complain if the targets regard what has happened as hostile and threatening, even threatening a similar kind of harm to or fate for themselves. In this case Mr McNeill’s ill-considered gesture was taken seriously, to the extent that Ms Morris (presumably because she was regarded as someone who would not be attacked) changed desks with Mr Kaufman at the Charrette, so he could move somewhere less exposed.
  1. [19]
    There had been no security at the Charrette to that point. It was decided between Dr Danes and Mr Arbon that the Albert Shire Council’s security contractor should be asked to provide two men (which happened); Mr Lawton who was the Albert Shire Council’s Administrative Officer for Property in 1995 was asked to be at the Charrette, and attended for the first time, likewise Mr Jones. He was an ex-police officer whose position on 1 July 1995 was Senior Development Compliance Officer in the Planning Department, answerable to Mr Arbon. He attended for the first time.
  1. [20]
    There was no certainty Mr McNeill would attend the Charrette when it opened to the public on the afternoon of Saturday 1 July 1995, but he did so, about the time he said. (The passage of time allowed a couple of the defendant’s witnesses to be wrong by some hours in their estimates of the time. This was particularly so in respect of Mr Kaufman.) One of the difficulties was that the new security forces brought in did not know Mr McNeill. The burden of the evidence is that Mr Arbon identified him, but only after he had got inside the building, and pointed him out to others. It seems the most likely scenario, although Mr Arbon denied it. The only other witness who knew Mr McNeill was Mr Kaufman, who, for obvious reasons, would have been keeping a low profile, so to speak.
  1. [21]
    I think Mr McNeill’s version of what happened is a considerably over-blown one. I reach this view largely on the basis of inconsistency between his account of the injuries he suffered and less subjective accounts from a number of witnesses who saw him immediately after the alleged assault able to move about normally and speak effectively (he was able to drive himself to the hospital and did not need to call on the assistance of his companion on the day, Mr Lambert).
  1. [22]
    The hospital notes, exhibit 10, which were tendered by consent in circumstances where the court was left to make of them what it could, support Mr McNeill in some respects, but contradict him in others. The hospital doctor’s notes alongside a time of 7.00 pm indicate what he or she was told. I read them to convey the following regarding an “alleged assault”:

“Involved in physical altercation when a third male approached from behind placing him in choker hold with flexed forearm, virtually lifting him off the ground. Brought to ground while in hold landing on lower back. Fingers of left hand twisted in assailant’s grip. No loss of consciousness. Not hit in head, kicked. Immediately afterwards patient unable to phonate. Unable to swallow. Unable to “elevate Adam’s Apple”. Could only speak in whisper. Feels like “throat is vibrating” on deep inspiration. No shortness of breath.

Rapidly developed ability to quietly phonate and to swallow own secretions. Painful to swallow. Painful Adam’s Apple.

The doctor’s notes of the examination refer to a mild to moderate stridor on forced inspiration. There were no facial lacerations or scalp contusions. There was “no underlying cervical/thoracic spine bony tenderness” but L4 was “focally tender to palpation”. There was no thoracic tenderness. The doctor has drawn a diagram of Mr McNeill’s neck area, the only observation of anything untoward being tenderness about the left side of the trachea at a marked location. This is immediately followed by a notation of “no marked swelling” and that the trachea was not tender or swollen. There were “nil” skin markings. The hyoid was noted not to be tender and a tick appears against “mandible”, presumably indicating nothing untoward. A note was made that an “ENT” specialist had been summoned from Brisbane and of x-rays at 8.00 o’clock. There was no marked soft tissue swelling, no surgical emphysema, nothing abnormal detected in chest x-ray. In respect of the lower spine, the doctor noted “an old appearing wedge fracture of L3 (which) does not correspond to back tenderness”. By this time, Mr McNeill had no visible difficulty breathing, no stridor, was phonating strongly, had “nil hoarseness” and was swallowing secretions. The ENT specialist apparently saw Mr McNeill at 9.00 pm. On examination he was found to be well, with no stridor and his voice okay. There is a note of “superficial erythema” in relation to the neck, which I take to indicate some redness. Otherwise nothing untoward seems to have been noted. Mr McNeill was “triaged” at 6.25 pm and discharged by 10.15 pm. His “presenting problem” was an alleged assault described as his being “gripped around throat”.

  1. [23]
    Mr McNeill was back at the hospital at 1.15 am on 5 July 1995 complaining principally of neck pain, which was causing trouble sleeping, and also lower back pain, tenderness being noted on examination at L4-5, and S 1. There was some difficulty (not then sorted out) regarding availability of x-rays. Mr McNeill was concerned about the x-ray report, saying that no-one had told him what happened. Indicative of his state of his mind was his suggestion (noted by the doctor) there was a “cover-up since Council involved”. A week later Mr McNeill reported to the hospital again, presenting with neckache and wanting his swollen left ring finger checked. A review of x-rays originally taken showed an “old fracture of L3 as previously noted” and “un-displaced fracture of the left ring finger middle phalanx”. There was a note suggesting, as I read it, that neck and back pain were muscular, that there was inflammation but things were “settling”. The notes of this third presentation describe the assault in terms of “attempt to strangle and fell to floor landing on lower back.”
  1. [24]
    It is common ground that the incident at the Charrette started when Mr Jones verbally requested Mr McNeill to leave. I find he protested his right to be there, and would not go quietly. I am satisfied he knew, even without being told, that this was because of the kangaroo incident. I am unable to resolve whether Mr Jones or Mr McNeill was the first to perpetrate an “assault” (a term appropriate to refer to a threat or attempt by Mr McNeill to strike a blow as well as to the action attributed by him to Mr Jones of grabbing him by the front of his clothing). Mr McNeill has certainly not persuaded me that Mr Jones was the first. I find that the two were engaged in “scrapping” of some kind, which was appropriately summarised in the hospital notes as a physical altercation, to use Mr McNeill’s words, or the doctor’s understanding of them. I find that one of the Council’s security contractor’s men then became up behind Mr McNeill and held him in some fashion around the neck, also bending his left arm behind his back. Mr McNeill’s claim as to his left arm is supported by the clear evidence of the injury to his left ring finger. His account of the “head lock”, strangle hold, “choker hold” ( or whatever one may call it) is corroborated not only by Mr Lambert, but also by Mr Powell, the most “independent” liability witness. I was left unhappy at the lack of any satisfactory explanation as to how Mr Powell’s evidence came to be available to the plaintiff, and concerned that he apparently would not supply any statement to the Council’s solicitors (which might have promoted a resolution of this matter), but no reason emerged for rejecting Mr Powell’s account of seeing Mr McNeill forcibly ejected from the Charrette in a way which he found upsetting.
  1. [25]
    In the foregoing findings, I necessarily am rejecting the evidence of the defendant’s liability witnesses of a “bear-hug”, as the sole restraint of Mr McNeill and of Mr McNeill being the first to “get physical” by throwing a punch. I reject the evidence of those gentlemen without regarding any of them as attempting to mislead to the court, and allow the possibility that there might be some truth in it. There may have been a bear-hug, but that was not the whole story, in my view. The problem the Council witnesses faced was one of having to re-construct a long-forgotten event, which was probably not particularly memorable, once Mr McNeill was off the scene. If he swung a serious punch, it seems to me strange that such an unusual happening did not lead to some action taken against, or at least a report in relation to Mr McNeill.
  1. [26]
    I do not accept Mr McNeill’s evidence in relation to his feet being seized by Mr Jones or anyone else. Mr Powell did not see this, and in the circumstances, I think he could hardly have failed to notice if Mr McNeill was effectively carried. Mr Powell spoke in terms of Mr McNeill being “basically assisted out” – “he was taken backwards. He was physically ejected” (page 103). In cross-examination (p. 108-109) he said he “only saw one person lay a hand” on the plaintiff, who was “dragged out … held by the neck and pulled back out”.
  1. [27]
    In this regard, the only support Mr McNeill has (against the combined opposition of the Council’s witnesses, who might have had more reason to remember an ejection as dramatic as Mr McNeill describes) came from his friend Mr Lambert.
  1. [28]
    I don’t wish to suggest Mr Lambert’s evidence was consciously dishonest, but I regard it as the product of reconstruction, and discussion of the incident (which I don’t necessarily suggest was improper) with Mr McNeill. Mr Lambert appeared to dramatise the event to a greater extent that the plaintiff. I found it astounding that Mr Lambert, who knew the plaintiff had put a dead kangaroo in the back of his vehicle (because he saw it when he was picked up at Coolangatta Airport) and had been told that the carcass had been left on the doorstep of one of the consultants at the motel (and that the plaintiff had knocked on the door with the consultant there), didn’t consider this all might be related to the plaintiff’s being excluded from the Charrette (p. 118).
  1. [29]
    Finally, I reject the plaintiff’s claim of having been “flung” to the ground. He has not even Mr Lambert’s support for that proposition. Although in cross-examination (p. 121) Mr Lambert described the plaintiff as “thrown to the ground”, on his account the security officer who perpetrated the neck-hold “won’t let go”; his version in chief (p. 116) was “the guy holding his feet dropped him, I believe it was on the concrete, and the other guy went down with him holding his neck… the guy’s just kept hanging on to him.”
  1. [30]
    The plaintiff’s version is confusing. At p. 31, although he stated he “was dropped or thrown to the ground … I remember being hit on the ground with my back” he said “the other guy kind of twisted me down to the ground like a wrestle to the floor type of move.” This is more consistent with what the hospital notes record.
  1. [31]
    In this case I think there has been an opportunistic inflating of the plaintiff’s injuries which, for a time, seduced or misled orthopaedic experts in both camps. It seems to me the pleaded allegation of “being flung to the ground” was interpreted as describing Mr McNeill as being free-falling, if not subjected to even greater momentum by a throw. I cannot find this happened. I will assume that the pleaded claim of a “burst fracture of L3 vertical body” got there by some mistake or confusion. The hospital records could not be clearer that the fracture at L3 was an old one, which could not possibly have occurred on 1 July 1995, and that it did not correspond to back tenderness Mr McNeill complained of. It is concerning to the court to find such a claim pursued, and then find orthopaedic experts, no doubt in good faith, going along with it. The explanation apparently being given was an assumption that the hospital report came from a radiologist in training, who may not have had sufficient expertise. (See p.138 of the transcript, for example.) The hospital records indicate that the relevant doctor’s superior endorsed the report, but I may not take that into account, given specific objection taken by Mr Matthews. The putative trainee radiologist gave evidence. He turned out to be a radiologist from overseas with impressive experience and qualifications, working in Australia under supervision at the time only to satisfy the demands of local authorities if he was to become fully registered to practice in his speciality here. He has achieved that goal. I accept the evidence of Dr Mohamed, Dr Davis and Dr Bendeich, who resiled from an earlier view that the fracture was “new”. There can be no doubt it was “old” in the sense of months at least. Mr Matthews got Dr Davis to come back to about five years or below against an original estimate of one year to ten years range of age. If the shorter period is accepted, there is nothing in Mr McNeill’s recorded orthopaedic history (not completely uneventful) available to explain the fracture. I cannot accept that the onus of proof works to require the defendant to produce an alternative explanation for the fracture, in default of which it must be attributed to an alleged assault for which it may bear responsibility at law. The defendant has shown the fracture was not sustained on 1 July 1995. What emerges in relation to it reveals that it ought never to have become part of the claim.
  1. [32]
    The hospital records corroborate the plaintiff’s claim of a broken finger, which I find he sustained whilst being ejected from the Charrette, and confirm a minor neck injury, which I am satisfied was suffered in the same incident. The ear nose and throat specialist recorded the following notes:

“1-7-95.

ENT 9pm

ATSP Re Laryngeal Trauma

Allegedly strangled this pm

Imt difficulty swallowing and talking

? Stridor on admission.

O/E Now well

No stridor, voice ØOK

Dipphoynο

Neck superficial erythema

Mouth mild red oropharynx

Larynx mobile

Laryngeal crepitus non-tender

No surg emphysema

1DL VC mobile

Good airway

  1mp mild ST injury to neck

   See prn    (signature)

I take this to record the doctor’s being asked to see the patient regarding laryngeal trauma and that the patient had possible (not necessarily confirmed) stridor on admission. On examination at that time there was redness on his neck. The doctor’s impression was of a “mild soft tissue injury to the neck”; he had no continuing concerns but was prepared to see Mr McNeill again, as required.

  1. [33]
    In the end, the plaintiff has satisfied me that his claim should succeed. He was manhandled out of the Charrette on the afternoon of 1 July 1995 in a manner which remains unclear, but which included his being placed in a neck hold and having his arm twisted behind his back, resulting in two proved injuries. (Those are proved notwithstanding the completely inappropriate pleading of a burst fracture of the L3, (which did not happen) and of “abrasions, bruising and contusions” which gains little support from the hospital report.) Notwithstanding his dreadful conduct at the motel in the early hours of the morning, Mr McNeill is not shown to have done anything inappropriate at the Charrette in the afternoon before being told to leave and subsequently manhandled (to repeat my word); he had simply protested his right, as a member of the public, if not one with a special invitation from Mr Higgs extended before the kangaroo carcass dumping incident, to enter. I think it likely that Mr McNeill became obstreperous at some point. In my opinion, the defendant has failed to show that it was reasonable for Mr McNeill to be subjected to a degree of force sufficient to cause the injuries he suffered. The defendant had ample man-power available so that Mr McNeill could have been removed without being injured. The unidentified employee of the defendant security contractor who inflicted the injuries went too far in exercising the degree of force he employed.
  1. [34]
    In the result, each of the potential Criminal Code defences becomes unavailable: it is unnecessary to examine elements of the suggested defences other than those limiting them to use of force that is reasonable in the particular circumstances. Even assuming other things in its favour, the Council has been unable to prove (as it had to) that the force used was reasonable. Given the close proximity of Council personnel to events, I think it a reasonable inference they could have restrained the person concerned, at least made efforts (nothing along these lines appearing) to restrain him. In the circumstances, it is appropriate that the Council be held responsible.
  1. [35]
    As noted at the outset, Mr McNeill claims compensatory damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages. There has been, over the years, uncertainty as to the extent of overlap of the categories. In Fontin v. Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177, 187, Owen J said:-

“In an action for assault, as in many other cases of tort, the conduct and motives of the parties may be taken into account either to aggravate or mitigate damages. In a proper case the damages recoverable are not limited to compensation for the loss sustained but may include exemplary or punitive damages as, for example, where the defendant has acted in a high-handed fashion or with malice. But the rule by which the defendant in an action in which exemplary damages are recoverable is entitled to show that the plaintiff’s own conduct was responsible for the commission of the tortious act and to use this fact to mitigate damages has no application to damages awarded by way of compensation. It operates only to prevent the award of exemplary damages or to reduce the amount of such damages which, but for the provocation, would have been awarded.”

Of this case, Lord Denning said in Lane v. Holloway (1968) 1 QB 379, at 387:-

“… the High Court of Australia, including the Chief Justice, Sir Owen Dixon, held that provocation could be used to wipe out the element of exemplary or aggravated damages but could not be used to reduce the actual figure of pecuniary compensation. So they increased the damages to the full £2,850.

I think that the Australian High Court should be our guide. The defendant has done a civil wrong and should pay compensation for the physical damage done by it. Provocation by the plaintiff can properly be used to take away any element of aggravation. But not to reduce the real damages.”

For Queensland, the way in which the categories ought to be approached has been authoritatively determined by the Full Court in Henry v. Thompson (1989) 2 QdR 412, 415:-

“Authorities establish that it was appropriate to award damages under each of the heads: Pain and suffering, aggravated damages, and exemplary damages (Loudon v. Ryder (1953) 2 QB 202, X.L. Petroleum (N.S.W.) v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448 and Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1). The argument for the appellants was to the effect that the learned trial judge had erred in awarding too much, either looked at globally or under each heading; the award was so high that it showed that the must have added in the components for aggravated damages and punitive damages more than once. On the other hand counsel for the respondent submitted that the award was a proper reflection of the serious nature of the tort committed by the appellants and that, either looked at globally or under the separate heads, the award was within the range of what a reasonable jury could have awarded for so serious a wrong.

Lamb clearly confirms, if authority be necessary, the compensatory nature of aggravated damages. The court there said at 8:

“Aggravated damages, in contrast to exemplary damages, are compensatory in nature, being awarded for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, go beyond compensation and are awarded ‘as punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceedings for the future, and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself’.”

Whilst, as the court there noted, it may on occasions be difficult to differentiate between aggravated and exemplary damages, problems will be avoided if the differentiating factors referred to are kept in mind at the time of assessment.”

  1. [36]
    In my opinion, there is no case for exemplary damages shown here. Brennan J. in X. L. Petroleum at 471 described them as “intended to punish the defendant for conduct showing a conscious and contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s rights” - in language reflected in the plaint. As Kirby J. pithily put it, in the course of discussion of the overlapping of the three categories in Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1, 35:-

“Aggravated damages are given for conduct which shocks the plaintiff and hurts his or her feelings. Exemplary damages are awarded for conduct which shocks the tribunal of fact,  representing the community.”

  1. [37]
    On all the evidence, I am satisfied that the Council’s motives throughout were untainted in a way that would call for exemplary damages, but rather were concerned with protecting the safety and sense of safety of its consultants working at the Charrette, and with preserving an appropriate peaceful and orderly atmosphere at the Charrette for consultants and members of the public, so that it would work usefully. Mr McNeill’s attendance was seen as a threat to that. On his own account, the documents he was coming to collect on 1 July 1995 were sought by him in an exercise to demonstrate that consultants were not appropriately qualified. He had been disruptive on earlier days at the Charrette and his conduct at the motel led to the honest (and I think defensible) assessment that he should be kept out. Care was taken to obtain a legal opinion that the Council might pursue such a course. I have noted already Council’s officers’ failure (in a fast-moving incident) to restrain the security guard, but I am not prepared to regard that as endorsement by the Council of the modus operandi he unexpectedly employed. There are difficulties about awarding exemplary damages against a defendant who is only vicariously liable:  Sinclair, para.108, citing Kirwood v. Bishop.
  1. [38]
    As to aggravated damages, I must accept that they are compensatory. The only shame and humiliation pleaded by Mr McNeill concerns this occurring in front of his friend, Mr Lambert. I would think anyone thrown out of a public meeting at which he or she was not guilty of any obvious misbehaviour would be likely to feel humiliation. Elsewhere, the pleading says the plaintiff “developed symptoms of depression”. I accept that he felt low and miserable for some time. The humiliation he suffered pales into insignificance in comparison with that considered in Henry v. Thomspon. It would not have come about, but for the kangaroo incident. Mr Lambert knew about that incident and very little time would be needed for reflection to appreciate the close link between the kangaroo incident and what happened to Mr McNeill at the Charrette; that incident may fairly be taken as calculated to humiliate (and it may be to terrify) Mr Kaufman. The award for aggravated damages should be a modest one, to acknowledge that Mr McNeill himself by indefensible behaviour had brought about the situation, as he appreciated at the Charrette.
  1. [39]
    Mr McNeill suffers two separate conditions in his back which limit what he can do and reduce his amenity of life accordingly. Dr White saw him on 26 June 1998 and assessed him in a report four days later as having suffered soft tissue injuries to the cervical spine and a fracture of the lumbar spine consistent with the history given by him. He regarded the injuries as stable and stationary and productive of a 7.5% whole person impairment in consequence of the condition of the cervical spine and a 10% whole person impairment as a consequence of the condition of his lumbar spine. Dr Bendeich assessed a permanent disability resulting from the neck injury as 2% loss of bodily function, and that resulting from lumbar spine injury as 12% loss. Those experts are not terribly far apart, except that Dr Bendeich is now sure the lower back injury has nothing to do with the assault. He thought the on-going neck symptoms were essentially due to an underlying degenerative condition and that there could be some persisting effects of aggravation caused by the injury, accelerating the appearance of symptoms that would have come on in any event within a few years. Dr White’s approach was that there were no prior neck or lower back problems. Dr Cameron was prepared to accept that Mr McNeill suffered soft tissue injury to his cervical and lumbar regions in the assault, but believes he had completely recovered from those by the time he was examined on 8 June 1999. He attributed Mr McNeill’s present symptomatic discomfort at both sites to degenerative changes in his lumbar and cervical region. It should be noted that Mr McNeill suffered a number of relatively serious motor bike accidents in his earlier life. His present condition restricts his activities and will keep him out of heavy work, although generally speaking, he is fit for work. In the end, all he has proved on the balance of probabilities as resulting from the assault are a soft tissue injury in the area of the cervical spine, as assessed by Dr Bendeich, rather than Dr White, and the broken finger, which fortunately healed after strapping, and presumably, some weeks or months of pain and discomfort. There appears to have been some lower back tenderness; the redness observed around the neck corroborates claims of discomfort in that region, likewise the initially alarming features of some kind of choking incident, which were concerning enough to warrant bringing in a specialist from Brisbane, who effectively, fortunately, gave the “all clear”. Mr McNeill suffered discomfort for a few years, about which he consulted medical people, which otherwise he might have been spared. (I do not overlook Mr Kaufman’s evidence of encountering Mr McNeill horseriding at the end of June 1995. The plaintiff has not proved that his inability afterwards to ride is attributable to any injury on 1st July 1995.)
  1. [40]
    I assess Mr McNeill’s general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities in the sum of $6,000 and would add a further $1,000 for aggravated damages, producing a total of $7,000 “compensatory” general damages, which I would attribute wholly to the past, allowing interest for 6 and two-thirds years at 4% per annum, as suggested by Mr O'Sullivan, producing an amount of $1,870.
  1. [41]
    I set out in tabular form the claimed special damages, with the allowances made in the right hand column.
  Amount ClaimedAmount Allowed
Patent pain killing medication, including Panadol, 3 packets per week for 6 months From 1 July 1995 and thereafter as and when Required @ $3.50 per packet (estimate)  $500.00$200.00
Orthopaedic pillows X 2 105.0053.00
Pool passes @ $6.00 per week for 6 months 156.0050.00
Consultation fee – Dr Ziukelis (paid by Medicare)09.02.98111.10-
Consultation fee – Dr Ziukelis (paid by Medicare)23.02.98111.10-
X-rays – Gold Coast Medical Imaging (paid by Medicare)10.10.9582.6082.60
X-rays – Gold Coast Medical Imaging (paid by Medicare)26.06.98119.60-
Consultation fee – Dr Chetty (paid by Medicare)05.01.9620.8520.85
Consultation fee – Dr Peyton (paid by Medicare)23.03.9620.8520.85
Consultation fee – Dr Peyton (paid by Medicare)07.10.9537.3037.30
Consultation fee – Dr Peyton (paid by Medicare)01.11.9520.8520.85
Consultation fee – Dr Peyton (paid by Medicare)30.01.9620.8520.85
Consultation fee – Dr Peyton (paid by Medicare)29.03.9620.8520.85
Consultation fee – Dr Robinson (paid by Medicare)   
Consultation fee – Dr Watson paid by Medicare)23.10.9552.5052.50
Travelling to consult with the above(estimate of petrol costs incurred) 100.0075.00
TOTAL $1,531.35$707.15
  1. [42]
    I exclude the 1998 medical expenses as, in the circumstances, too remote in time, other items have been discounted because of the thinness of the evidence regarding them, and the impact of the lumbar spine condition, which cannot be linked with the assault. Interest attributable to those items which Mr McNeill has paid himself is allowed at $140. The above produces a total judgment of $9,717.15. I will hear the parties as to what orders ought to be made. If costs are allowed, they would presumably be limited to Magistrates Court costs.
  1. [43]
    (Mr McNeill persisted in claims for damages under other heads including past and future economic loss. There was little information to support these claims, partly because Mr McNeill’s main income producing activity has been acting as an entrepreneur promoting motor show or racing events. The assault happened in a period when he had for some reason or other been inactive. It is not shown that he was rendered incapable by any of the consequences of the assault of promoting events, or that any particular proposed event was abandoned . There was a claim for Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer damages (for which the parties agreed the rate should be $10.00 per hour). My understanding of such damages is that they represent the cost of buying in services which an injured plaintiff is physically incapable of performing for herself or himself. Mr McNeill is not shown to have suffered from the assault any relevant physical incapacity. There is evidence that psychologically he found it difficult to cope on his own. Some considerable time after the assault, (perhaps 3 months if the times estimated at pages 37 and 148 are correct) he moved in with his brother and his brother’s then wife, who is now Mrs Lergesner. He came because “he was depressed. Couldn’t look after himself so, basically, he just came to stay. I looked after him for a little while …. He stayed at my place for about 3 months. I just cooked his meals; I washed his clothes. He basically didn’t do much, just sort of stayed around the house … just lazing around and not doing anything. Very emotionally down.”  The only pain she spoke about was lower back pain, which, in my view, is not shown to be assault related. Mr McNeill lost the comfort and support of residence with his relatives when they sold their Helensvale property. They have since lost touch. While Mrs Lergesner showed commendable consideration and kindness, and provided a more congenial residence for Mr McNeill, I cannot be satisfied that there was any inability in him to do for himself those things that she as a sister-in-law did, when, in effect, he joined her family.
  1. [44]
    For the above reasons it would seem appropriate, as things presently stand, that the orders be as indicated in paragraph 42.
Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    McNeill v Gold Coast City Council

  • Shortened Case Name:

    McNeill v Gold Coast City Council

  • MNC:

    [2002] QDC 29

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Robin DCJ

  • Date:

    08 Mar 2002

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1962) 108 CLR 177
Cite 2 - (1962) 108 CLR 177
Cite 3 - (1962) 108 CLR 177
Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 196 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (1998) 196 CLR 1
Grehan v Kann [1948] QWN 40
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1948] QWN 40
Cite 2 - [1948] QWN 40
Hall v Foneca (1983) W.A. R. 309
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1983) W.A. R. 309
Cite 2 - (1983) W.A. R. 309
Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1989] 2 Qd R 412
Cite 2 - [1989] 2 Qd R 412
Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 C.L.R 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1987) 164 C.L.R 1
Cite 2 - (1987) 164 C.L.R 1
Lane v Holloway (1968) 1 QB 379
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1968) 1 QB 379
Cite 2 - (1968) 1 QB 379
Cite 3 - (1968) 1 QB 379
Loudon v Ryder (1953) 2 QB 202
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1953) 2 QB 202
Cite 2 - (1953) 2 QB 202
Love v Egan (1971) 67 QJPR 102
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1971) 67 QJPR 102
Cite 2 - (1971) 67 QJPR 102
Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1965) 112 CLR 517
Cite 2 - (1965) 112 CLR 517
Sinclair v Caloundra Sub-Branch RSL Services Club Inc [2001] QDC 196
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] QDC 196
Cite 2 - [2001] QDC 196
White v Connolly [1927] St R Qd 75
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1927] St R Qd 75
Cite 2 - [1927] St R Qd 75
XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 155 CLR 448
Cite 2 - (1985) 155 CLR 448
Cite 3 - (1985) 155 CLR 448

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Glenella Estates Pty Ltd v Mackay Regional Council [2010] QPEC 1321 citation
Hodgens v Williams [2005] QDC 2571 citation
Willmington & Anor v Cassidy [2007] QDC 731 citation
1

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