T v Oliver[2002] QDC 351

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   The Applicant, T, applies under section 24 of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (the “Act”), for compensation as a result of injuries  sustained as a result of the offence of unlawful and indecent assault for which the Respondent Wayne John Oliver was convicted upon indictment on 12 March 2002  at Gladstone.  The offence occurred on 26 September 2001.

2. [2]
   The Respondent was sentenced on the factual basis that he put his hand over the Applicant’s mouth, kissed her and touched her breasts and then thrust his pelvis into her pelvic region. The Applicant was 16 years of age at the time of the offence and the Respondent was 26 years of age. The Respondent was ordered to serve three (3) months imprisonment for the said offence.

History of the Applicant

3. [3]
   The Applicant started running away from home when she was 14. Her father died when she was quite young, and she did not have a good relationship with her mother. She eventually left home at the age of 16 years. The Applicant accepts that she did have problems prior to the said offence. She affirms that the matters she told the psychologist, Mr. Ryan are true and correct. She stated that her symptoms worsened after the said offence. She started to drink more alcohol and she has self harmed. She was admitted overnight to the Gladstone Hospital in December 2001 for treatment for self inflicted injuries. The Applicant had feelings of guilt and shame after the incident. Some of her friends blamed her for the incident. She began to suffer flashbacks of the incident.

Report of Mr. Ryan, psychologist.

4. [4]
   Mr. Ryan interviewed the Applicant on 12 June 2002, some fifteen (15) months after the said offence. He confirmed with her that she had suffered no physical injuries which were visible. She told Mr. Ryan that her mother and her mother’s de facto were emotionally abusive towards her throughout her childhood. This, she said, caused her to run away from home regularly from the age of 14 years. Her first relationship was when she was 14 and her second relationship involved emotional abuse. She was in that relationship for about a year.

5. [5]
   The Applicant attained an educational standard of Grade 9. She had about 18 weeks work experience since leaving school. She is now seventeen years of age having been born on 28 January 1985. She has used various drugs but she used alcohol on a daily basis. Her intake has increased since the offence.

6. [6]
   Mr. Ryan administered the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI). It is used to evaluate chronic and acute traumatic symptoms. He opined that she suffers from classic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. (PTSD: DSM-IV). The Applicant told Mr. Ryan that “throughout the greater part of her life leading up to the current sexual assault” she had suffered from teariness, depression, suicidal ideation, anger/irritability, feelings of hopelessness, worthlessness and confusion, thoughts of death and dying, sleep disturbances (nightmares, waking up in a panic, insomnia, broken sleep) and intrusive thoughts of abuse by her partner. Her symptoms were worsened by the subject sexual assault. Mr. Ryan opined that the trauma symptomatology exhibited by the Applicant prior to the subject offence was not sufficient to warrant a diagnosis of PTSD as is set out in the DSM-IV. This opinion was offered notwithstanding that in the five month period leading up to the subject sexual assault, the Applicant’s boyfriend subjected her to emotional abuse. Mr. Ryan expresses the further opinion that the Applicant would have also suffered a severe nervous shock by the “perceived” rape. The Respondent was not convicted of rape. Also, no specific symptoms for the period immediately after the said offence and prior to the diagnosis of PSTD are given. This assessment can only proceed on the basis of the offence and the particulars to which the Respondent has pleaded. Mr. Ryan accepts that it would be extremely difficult to separate out the current sexual assault trauma from her pre assault trauma.

Elements of DSM-IV (“Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” 4^th Ed. published by the American Psychiatric Association) (the”Manual”)

7. [7]
   The said Manual states (p. 424):

“The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury…”

There is no doubt that a  sexual assault falls into the category of a traumatic event.  It does not have to be actual rape to qualify as such an event.  In the present case it is necessary to repeat parts of the statement that the Applicant made to the police:

“11. I had almost got to Kent Street where the Motel is on my right side.  All of a sudden I knew someone was walking towards me from behind me.

A male voice said: ‘Hey, how are ya going?”

12. 12.
    I looked and saw a white fella. He was between 20 and 25 years old. He has blondy, orangy, brown hair, which was a bit longer than his shoulders. I know that he had light blue jeans on with a belt. I can’t remember his shirt. He’s taller than me and of medium build. I recognised this person to be a fella I know as Neil. I don’t know his last name.

13. 13.
    I was at my mate, R’s place about two, three months ago in the afternoon. This was 6/10 View Street. This Neil fella came in and introduced himself. He met both me and A. I remember D and L were there too. I had nothing to do with him. I just met him. About an hour or an hour and a half later he left. He was trying to sell us yandi (cannabis) in satchel bags. He was by himself.

I said: ‘I remember you.  What are you doing?’

He said: ‘Come and sit down on these cement tables and chairs and have a cigarette.

14. 14.
    He gave me a Peter Jackson Extra Mild and I smoked it. He sounded drunk when he spoke to me.

He said: ‘You look nice tonight’.

I said:  ‘I’m trying to find my mates place.  We’re going up there to drink’.

He said: ‘What are you drinking?’

I said: ‘NIKOV’

He said: “I would love to tip that all over you and lick it off.”

15. 15.
    He started talking about A then.

He said: ‘I’d love to have you and A together’.

16. 16.
    I then thought that I had to cruise.

I said: ‘Yeah well, gotta cruise.  Gotta find this party’.

17. 17.
    I was starting to feel uncomfortable. He had started touching me on the legs and poking me in the ribs.

He was saying stuff like ‘You have a smile that attracts people.  You have the stars in your eyes’.

18. 18.
    He then made a phone call on a Telstra Savvy mobile phone. It’s a black phone with maroony, purple coloured nail polish on the top of it. I recognize this phone because I know that A had one exactly like it. I remember A had this phone at M’s the day I first met this Neil fella at View Street. I know that A told me the phone had gone missing. At that time A thought she’d lost it.

He said: ‘Mum, do you have money for a taxi cause I’ve got no money’.

He said: ‘Oh come on mum, I just need ten dollars just to get a taxi home’.

He said: ‘Thanks for the money, I’ll be home soon’.

19. 19.
    He hung up the phone.

He said:  ‘We’ll jump in the cab soon’.

I said: ‘No, I’m going up here to my mates place up the road’.

He said: ‘No, you’re not’.  In a standover voice.

20. 20.
    He then picked me up and had his hand over my mouth. He put me up on a grass, ledge bit. He starting touching me with one of his hands all over my breasts and body. He started kissing me and with his other hand started undoing his pants. His other hand was holding me down by my left shoulder. I couldn’t move.

I was saying: ‘No, look, I’ve gotta go.  I don’t want to do this.’

He said: ‘No it’s right.  I know you want to’.

I said: ‘No’.

21. 21.
    I was trying to push him off me. He’s undid his jeans with his left hand. He was still holding me down with his right hand and kissing me. I did not see his penis. I know that he used his left hand to help put his penis inside me. I know that he put it in about once. I don’t think he got it all the way in. I was trying really hard to push him off me. I remember feeling something hard against my right thigh.

I said: ‘Get off me’.

He said: ‘No, you want me.  You’ve always wanted me’.

I said: ‘You’re a fuckhead.  Get away from me.’

22. 22.
    I finally forced him off of me. I don’t think he came.

23. 23.
    I ended up getting my arms up and pushed him off me. He went off the ledge bit. I then ripped my pants up and took off up the street. I know that he was doing his jeans up when I took off. He didn’t say anything to me.

24. 24.
    I ran a bit and turned around to see if he was following me. I seen him stop at the phone box and sat down. This was the same phone box I had used earlier. I took off up the hill. I heard him running behind me. I was walking fast by now.

25. 25.
    By the time I got to Vincent’s house he had caught up with me. He started walking beside me. He gave me two Peter Jackson Extra Mild cigarettes. He put a Pre’Paid Mobile Communic8 silver bit of paper in my left pocket. This has a phone number on it.

He said: ‘Ring me later’ and kissed me on the left side of my cheek.

26. 26.
    I saw that he kept walking down towards the hospital. I went to the front door and knocked. Someone said: ‘Who is it?’

I said:  ‘It’s T’.

27. 27.
    I was crying. A opened the door for me. I was in the lounge room and told A what had happened.”

I am satisfied that the Applicant did not by her conduct directly or directly contribute to the offence (s. 25(7))

Diagnostic Features of PTSD

8. [8]
   Persistent symptoms of anxiety or increased arousal that were not present before the trauma may be present (Manual p. 425). There may also be increased risk of Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, social Phobia, ‘Specific Phobia, Major Depressive disorder, Somatization Disorder and Substance-Related Disorders (Manual p. 425). There is a further comment that it is not known to what extent these disorders precede or follow the onset of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” (p. 425). The said Manual records that the duration of the symptoms varies but that in half of the cases there is complete recovery occurring within three months (p. 426). Given the nature of this particular assault, the pre-existing symptoms of the Applicant and the nature of the ongoing symptoms, the subject offence has, I find, exacerbated her symptoms to a moderate extent. However, the applicant is entitled to be compensated where the subject offence materially contributed to her psychological injury: SAM v SAM [2001] QCA 12.  

Differential diagnosis

9. [9]
   It cannot be said that all psychopathology that occurs to a person exposed to an extreme stressor should be necessarily categorised and attributed to PTSD. Symptoms which are present prior to the exposure to the traumatic event such as avoidance, numbing and increased arousal do not meet the criteria to enable a diagnosis of PTSD (Manual p. 427). Mr. Ryan opines that the Applicant’s condition prior to the sexual assault could be referred to as Chronic Dysthymic Disorder or Depressive Personality Disorder. A leading text states that the diagnosis of PTSD does not exclude such conditions as Major Depressive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder or phobic disorders (“Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry” Third Ed. by Kaplan et al Vol.2 p. 1524.) These can be diagnosed in addition to PTSD when the full criteria for them are met. Symptoms of depression , anxiety or phobia do not dominate the clinical findings in PTSD. One other condition which is not often discussed in applications of this nature is compensation neurosis. The symptoms of this diagnosis often subside after the resolution of the compensation case (Kaplan et. al. p. 1524).  In a non adversarial climate, these matters are not explored with the psychologist or psychiatrist whose evidence is not challenged.

10. [10]
    For example, Acute Stress Disorder can be distinguished from PTSD because the symptoms relating to the former occur within four (4) weeks of the traumatic event and resolve within that four week period (Manual p. 427). If the symptoms persist for more than say four weeks and otherwise comply with the criteria for PTSD then the diagnosis can be changed from the Acute Stress Disorder to PTSD. The said symptoms can include a decrease in emotional response, difficulty in experiencing pleasure in previously enjoyable activities, feeling guilty about pursuing usual life tasks, difficulty concentrating, or having difficulty in recalling events related to the traumatic event (Manual p. 429). Symptoms of despair and hopelessness may be experienced in Acute Stress Disorder which may meet the criteria for a Major Depressive Episode. A diagnosis of Acute Stress Disorder should not be made if the symptoms are an exacerbation of a pre-existing mental disorder. This seems to be relevant to the present case. The Applicant may have suffered an Adjustment Disorder or Generalized Anxiety disorder. A diagnosis of PTSD requires symptoms of more than one month (Manual p. 431-432). I find that the Applicant probably suffered from one of these disorders in the absence of a finding of PTSD by Mr. Ryan prior to the said offence. As will be discussed, this can be described as mental or nervous shock.

Mental and Nervous Shock and “adverse impacts of a sexual offence”

11. [11]
    Relevantly, the Act provides as follows:

   “Scheme for compensation for injury, death and expenses for indictable offence

19. (1)This part establishes a scheme for the payment of compensation to a person the “applicant” –

1. (a)
   for injury suffered by the applicant caused by a personal offence committed against the applicant: or…”

20. 20.
    “Injury” is bodily injury, mental or nervous shock, pregnancy or any injury specified in the compensation table or prescribed under a regulation”.

Court may make an order compensating someone injured by personal offence

24. (1)This section applies if someone (the “convicted person”)-

1. (a)
   is convicted on the indictment of a personal offence…

(2)The person against whom the personal offence is committed may apply to the court before which the person is convicted for an order that the convicted person pay compensation to the applicant for the injury suffered by the applicant because of the offence.”

Schedule 1 provides a compensation table with a maximum of $75,000.00 and the percentage referable to mental or nervous shock some 2% to 34% of that sum depending upon the seriousness of the condition.

Regulation 1A  of the Criminal Offence Victims Regulation 1995 provides:

“(1)For section 20 of the Act, the totality of the adverse impacts of a sexual offence suffered by a person, to the extent to which the impacts are not otherwise an injury under section 20, is prescribed as an injury.

2. (2)
   An “adverse impact” of a sexual offence includes the following –

1. (a)
   a sense of violation;

2. (b)
   reduced self worth or perception;

3. (c)
   post-traumatic stress disorder;

4. (d)
   disease;

5. (e)
   lost or reduced physical immunity;

6. (f)
   lost or reduced physical capacity (including the capacity to have children), whether temporary or permanent;

7. (g)
   increased fear or increased feelings of insecurity;

8. (h)
   adverse effect of the reason of others;

1. (i)
   adverse impact on lawful sexual relations;

10. (j)
    adverse impact on feelings;

11. (k)
    anything the court considers is an adverse impact of a sexual offence.”

The amount which is allowed in respect of an assessment under the regulation is $75,000.00.

12. [12]
    A discussion of how these provisions overlap occurred in the case of JI v AV [2001] QCA 510.   In her reasons Atkinson J. stated:

“[57]Many of the specified adverse effects in s 1A fall squarely within the definition of injury in s 20 of bodily injury or nervous or mental shock. It has been accepted, for example, that ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’, found in s 1A(2)(c) of the COVA Regulation, is within the definition of mental or nervous shock. It follows that post traumatic stress disorder, for example, is said to be compensable under s 20 and s 1A. The same could be said of many of the specified adverse effects in s 1A and the definition of injury in s 20. The only way of avoiding such an interpretation is by the construction given to the section by the trial judge, ie that its purpose is to avoid double compensation by providing that if the injury is one that falls within s 20, as bodily injury, mental or nervous shock, pregnancy or injury specified in the compensation table, then it should be compensated according to that section. Only additional adverse effects of sexual offences fall to be compensated under s 1A of the COVA Regulation.

[58]An apparent injustice, however, arises from this interpretation. The maximum compensation available for a person who suffers from mental or nervous shock as a result of that offence is only $25,500, whereas the maximum compensation available for other adverse impacts not amounting to mental or nervous shock, such as adverse impact on feelings, is $75,000. Victims of sexual offences suffering the most serious mental or nervous shock could therefore only be awarded the maximum of $25,500.

[59]The courts have interpreted mental or nervous shock in the compensation table broadly. It does not require a diagnosed psychiatric illness. As Thomas JA held in Ferguson v Kazakoff, compensation for mental or nervous shock is not limited to cases where there is a diagnosable mental disorder or psychiatric illness resulting from the criminal offence, although it must be more than fear, fright, unpleasant memories or anger, or other adverse impact on feelings.

[60]Victims suffering adverse effects not amounting to bodily injury or even mental or nervous shock must have their compensation scaled against a maximum of $75,000.

[61]It follows that if the interpretation contended for the respondent is correct, a person with a less serious injury, such as hurt feelings, would be entitled to have his or her compensation assessed against a higher maximum than a person with a similar but more serious injury, such as anxiety disorder, which is within the definition of mental or nervous shock.

[62]All of the adverse effects of a sexual offence not otherwise an injury under s 20, constitute an injury prescribed under a regulation. Having been prescribed in s 1A of the COVA regulation, they become a bodily injury under s 20 as they are an ‘injury ... prescribed under a regulation’. The phrase in s 1A of the COVA Regulation ‘to the extent to which the impacts are not otherwise an injury under section 20’ must have been inserted to avoid double compensation for the same injury. If it is so limited, then an applicant must be compensated for the mental or nervous shock suffered under s 20 of the COVA and not s 1A of the COVA Regulation, with the entirely unsatisfactory consequence that a person with a less serious injury may receive more compensation than a person with a more serious injury.”

13. [13]
    With respect to Her Honour, I agree with those remarks. The problem for the judge at first instance is to attempt to apportion the symptoms to one or the other parts of the legislation in sexual assault cases and yet attempt to avoid double compensation. The diagnosis of PTSD is made in most of the cases of a sexual nature. However, such a diagnosis should not be made under one month. The victim may suffer mental or nervous shock within the first month of the traumatic injury. Thereafter, in an appropriate case, the symptoms may justify a diagnosis of PTSD. In addition to that diagnosis there may be a Major Depressive Disorder or some other phobia as discussed which can be categorised as a mental or nervous shock. In addition, there may be other symptoms provided for in Regulation 1A apart from PTSD. In many cases coming before the District Court, these symptoms are not separated clearly and in fact it would be difficult to do so. However, this should not prevent the Court from taking a robust approach: per Thomas J. in HV v LN [2000] QCA 472 para. [15].  Also, as commented upon by Thomas J. because proceedings are ex parte, it is not practicable to enforce the principle that the onus is upon the respondent to separate effects of the compensable and non-compensable conduct.  He rejected the approach taken by Lee J. in R v Tiltman ex parte Dawe, SC No.324 of 1995, 22 June 1995.  A similar comment can be made as to the different symptoms  covered by overlapping definitions under the Act:   A court is required to take a robust approach when determining which part of the Act applies and to assess the compensation accordingly.

14. [14]
    The judge hearing the application should not take a narrow view of the interpretation of “mental or nervous shock”: Beardsley v Loogatha [2001] QCA 438 paras 11 to 15 per Holmes J.  with whom McMurdo P. agreed.  Holmes J. quoted with approval the reasons of  Thomas JA in R v Kazakoff ex parte Ferguson (2001) 2 Qd R 320 at 324-325:

“[17]... the ordinary usage of the term has been to describe situations of injury to health, illness, or some abnormal condition of mind or body over and above that of normal human reaction or emotion following a stressful event.

[18]TheCriminal Offence Victims Actexpressly declares that compensation ‘is not intended to reflect the compensation to which the applicant may be entitled under common law or otherwise’. The scheme that the Act provides is for payment of compensation to a claimant, ‘for the injury suffered by the applicant because of the offence’. This supports the view that mental or nervous shock is not proved unless something equivalent to the meaning stated in para. [17] above is shown.

[19]By the same token it would in my view unduly limit the term if it were confined to conditions that are recognised as psychiatric disorders. Conversely it over-stretches the term to use it as a source of additional compensation for natural human emotions felt by people who cope adequately with the aftermath of an offence and are able to get on with their lives.

[20]I consider that if the legislature had intended that compensation be awarded for every mental consequence including consequential feelings of the complainant there would have been no specification in s. 20 requiring proof of mental or nervous shock. The legislature would have either adopted the civil system of damages for all effects of the offence, or have defined injury to include all results both physical and mental.

[21]It is extremely difficult to define the point at which mental consequences to a claimant from a crime become compensable as ‘mental or nervous shock’. I consider, however, that if nothing more is shown than fear, fright, unpleasant memories or anger towards an offender, of a combination of such reactions, the claimant has not shown that he or she suffered nervous shock. Unless the court is affirmatively satisfied that mental or nervous shock has been suffered compensation should not be awarded for such reactions. Some of the District Court decisions to which reference has been made go too far in awarding compensation in this respect. I am equally of the view that the decision in R v Horne, ex parte Hill is not appropriate to apply to the definition of ‘injury’ in s. 20 of the present Act. To limit compensation to cases where a diagnosable mental disorder or psychiatric illness results would give the term ‘mental or nervous shock’ too limited a meaning”.

15. [15]
    It is not necessary for the diagnosis to be of a specific mental condition. In the present case, the Applicant had premorbid or pre-existing symptoms which could be described generally as a mental condition. The subject offence aggravated those symptoms. The additional symptoms included self-mutilation and other symptoms which could be considered part of the PTSD symptoms. When attempting to define the nervous shock aspect, Mr. Ryan stated (p.10):

“…it is considered that the current sexual assault, which Miss T. perceived as rape, would have constituted a severe nervous shock.  It is also considered that this severe nervous shock resulted in a further significant diminishment in Miss T’s already severely impoverished level of life enjoyment, negatively impacting her psychosocial, emotional and sexual functioning.”

It must be reiterated that the offence was not rape but indecent assault.  Secondly, the extent to which the incident has affected her was to remove her condition from an existing mental disorder to PTSD. 

Other cases

16. [16]
    In the course of argument, reference was made to other cases where substantial awards were made both under item 33 of the said schedule being the item for severe mental and nervous shock and Regulation 1A. It is necessary to mention those cases in order to appreciate the difficulties facing the court which makes the assessment. The first of these is R v M District Court 5312 of 2001.  In that case, the complainant was the victim of procuring a sexual act by a false pretence and aggravated sexual assault.  The applicant and her co complainant were prostitutes who were victims of the offender posing as a policeman.  There were threats with a knife. The applicant had suffered symptoms indicative of PTSD prior to the offences.  She had been in a violent domestic relationship.  Some of these symptoms were also the basis for an award under Regulation 1A e.g. sexual dysfunction, anxiety and a damaged sense of self.  She stated that the symptoms had subsided prior to the said offences.  She was also suffering from a Panic Disorder as a result of the said offences.  The learned judge applied the principle in Re: JI v AV op. cit. as per Chesterman J. at p. 6:

“Impacts are an injury for the purpose of the regulation to the extent that the impacts are not an injury under s. 20.  They will be such an injury if they are mental or nervous shock.”

17. [17]
    Under item 33, the assessment was 25% viz. $18,750.00 and for the adverse impacts under Regulation 1A $25,000.00. The maximum under item 33 is 34%. When assessing the co-complainant in M v. M District Court 5315 of 2001, His Honour assessed damages at the maximum for item 33 and a similar amount for Regulation 1A.  In the latter case the offences included rape.  The applicant developed a Borderline Personality Disorder and also anxiety and a depressed mood, a Panic Disorder, and an eating disorder.  The symptoms in that case were clearly over and above the usual symptoms to be found in PTSD.   The diagnosis of severe nervous and mental shock was clearly open.  What is not as clear, except for the fact that the psychologist lists the various items in Regulation 1A, is whether the symptoms as found in severe mental and nervous shock can also encompass some of the other symptoms in Regulation 1A apart from PTSD.  A similar problem arises in the present case. 

18. [18]
    The problem being discussed is exemplified in a case of Wotton v. Pickles District Court Townsville 67 of 2002.  A finding was made that the applicant suffered “a severe nervous shock in relation to sexual assault manifested by the development of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder.”  As can be seen by an inspection of Regulation 1A, PTSD is one of the “adverse impacts” defined.  The learned judge made reference to the report of Mr. Ryan, the psychologist in the present case, to the finding of mental and nervous shock and to the adverse impacts.  He assessed the compensation under each at $15,000.00 and $37,500.00 respectively.  If the nervous shock was “manifested by the development of post-traumatic stress disorder” it can only mean that over time the symptoms developed into PTSD.  What is not clear from the reasons is that there was no  delineation of timing in the psychologist’s report of the different diagnosis.  It is important for that to occur because the assessment can be more generous under Regulation 1A.  The illogical aspect of the legislation in this respect was referred to by the Court of appeal in JI v AV op.cit.  The lack of definition in a chronological sense in the reports put before the Courts makes the assessment more difficult.  This course of events will continue until there is some adversarial system put in place.  The Court of Appeal has referred to this weakness under the present assessment scheme: HW v LO [2000] QCA 377.

Difficulties of Assessment

19. [19]
    It is inevitable that double compensation for some symptoms will occur under the present legislative scheme. This will be more apparent where there is no challenge to the medical evidence. Of course, that is the situation in most cases. A judge can only act upon the evidence before the Court unless it is clear that the facts relied upon by the expert witness have not been proved. and the opinion offered cannot be sustained. The cost of an adversarial system will add to the cost of administering the scheme. It may be that a Tribunal, consisting of a judicial officer assisted by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist could deal with these matters in a less formal and less expensive manner. The role of the Tribunal may be more inquisitorial.

Assessment

Nervous and mental shock 

20. [20]
    The Applicant would have been, according to Mr. Ryan, a “very emotionally disturbed individual prior to the current sexual assault”. Because of her vulnerable state, Mr. Ryan stated that “the current sexual assault, which Miss T. perceived as rape, would have constituted a severe nervous shock. It is also considered that this severe nervous shock resulted in a further significant diminishment in Miss T’s already severely impoverished level of life enjoyment, negatively impacting her psychosocial, emotional and sexual functioning.” I assess the compensation under item 33 at 15% of the total at $11,250.00.

Regulation 1A including PTSD

21. [21]
    Her prognosis is not seen as positive by Mr. Ryan. However, with psychotherapeutic intervention, her symptoms may be less severe or remit. Mr. Ryan was unable to separate the therapy needed to treat the symptoms caused by the sexual assault as distinct from the pre-existing emotional abuse by her boyfriend. It does indicate that the present offence is not the cause of all of her symptoms but has of course materially contributed to same. I assess the compensation under the Regulation at 20% of the total at $15,000.00.

Order

22. [22]
    It is ordered that the Respondent do pay to the Applicant the sum of $26,250.00 by way of compensation under Section 24 of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 for injuries sustained as a result of the offence of unlawful and indecent assault to which the Respondent pleaded guilty on 12 March 2002.