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Sugiyama Corporation v Boland[2003] QDC 426

Sugiyama Corporation v Boland[2003] QDC 426

    DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sugiyama Corporation v Boland & Anor [2003] QDC 426

PARTIES:

BY COUNTERCLAIM:

SUGIYAMA CORPORATION

Plaintiff

and

CHRISTINE MARY BOLAND

First Defendant

and

SC NO 2 HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 098 660 345)

Second Defendant

christine mary boland

Plaintiff

and

SUGIYAMA CORPORATION

Defendant

FILE NO:

907/2002

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application for summary judgment  

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Southport

DELIVERED ON:

10 April 2003

DELIVERED AT:

Southport

HEARING DATE:

17 March 2003

JUDGE:

Alan Wilson SC  DCJ

ORDER:

Dismiss the Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment

CATCHWORDS:

PRACTICE – PROCEDURE – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – application for summary judgment – whether need for trial

TAXES AND DUTIES – STAMP DUTIES – GENERALLY – whether unstamped contract of sale may be relied upon – undertaking to present for assessment of duty

Duties Act 2001, s 487

Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000

Cases considered:

Caxton Street Agencies Pty Ltd v Korkidas & Anor  [2002] QSC 210

CSR Limited v Casaron Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 021

Fight Vision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, at 491

FoodCo Management Pty Ltd v Go My Travel Pty Ltd (2002) 2 Qd R 249

Hoggett & Ors v O'Rourke & Anor (2000) QSC 387

M P Management (Aust) P/L v Churven & Anor (2002) QSC 320

National Australia Bank Ltd v Hart (2002) QSC 51

National Australia Bank Ltd v Troiani (2002) QCA 196

Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365

Pavey & Matthews Proprietary Limited v Paul (1986) 162 CLR 221

Peldan v Romano (2001) QSC 463

Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91

Verwayen v Commonwealth (1990) 170 CLR 394

Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster (1972) 126 CLR 57

COUNSEL:

Dr C Jensen for the applicant plaintiff 

Mr D A Quayle for the respondent first and second defendants

SOLICITORS:

Nakano Kaneshiro Lawyers for the applicant plaintiff

Hickey Lawyers for the respondent first and second defendants 

  1. [1]
    Under some contractual documents executed in August 2002 the first defendant agreed to sell her dwelling at Sanctuary Cove to the plaintiff for $2.8m. The second defendant was the real estate agent involved in that transaction. The sale was never completed and the plaintiff now sues for the return of its deposit of $140,000.00 and some other expenses, relying on the defendants’ alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Property Agents & Motor Dealers Act 2000 (PAMD) which require that these contracts now contain a warning statement alerting the purchaser to certain rights, and a “cooling-off” period.  In this application the plaintiff sought summary judgment under UCPR r 292 for the amount of the deposit and some expenses which are claimed, under the PAMD, as a statutory debt (plus interest under the Supreme Court Act 1995, s 47).
  1. [2]
    For the plaintiff to obtain summary judgment under r 292 the Court must be satisfied that the defendants have no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, and there is no need for a trial. Although the plaintiff bears the onus of proof on the application[1], there is an evidentiary onus on the defendants to show some basis for arguing that there is a real prospect of a successful defence, within the meaning of the rule[2].  The relevant principles and authorities are, with respect, conveniently collected by Holmes J in CSR Limited v Casaron Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 021, and Caxton Street Agencies Pty Ltd v Korkidas & Anor [2002] QSC 210. Of particular relevance here is the principle that notwithstanding the more robust approach to applications of this kind under the UCPR suggested in cases like McPhee v Zarb [2002] QSC 004 (in contrast with the former Rules of both the Supreme, and District Courts),  the newer rule is not intended to dispense with the need for a trial when the defendant persuades the court that there are issues of fact and matters of law which reasonably call for a full hearing; and shows there are realistic, as opposed to fanciful, prospects the defence will succeed[3].
  1. [3]
    It sometimes occurs, of course, in applications of this kind that respondents attempt to multiply or cloud the issues and thereby induce the court to refuse judgment out of concern that amongst a plethora of arguments are some which might have merit, or in the hope that in resultant confusion the court will be, simply, bamboozled. The plaintiff’s counsel, Dr Jensen, said the defendants’ submissions here could be categorised in this way (he described them, colourfully, as ‘an aquarium of red herrings’) but for the reasons which follow I do not think that was a fair description or, ultimately, correct.
  1. [4]
    The events surrounding the parties’ attempts to contract are more complex than usual. Two forms of contractual document were executed by the parties. The first did not have a Warning Statement attached to it, as the PAMD requires.  The second may have (the parties disagree about this point); and, in any event, one was delivered to the purchaser in the course of the dealings between the parties, after the purchaser had signed the first contract.  This confusion can be explained, to a degree, by the fact that the plaintiff is a Japanese corporation and some of the documents were transmitted by facsimile between Australia, and Japan.
  1. [5]
    All of the evidence received on the hearing of the application was in affidavit form, and none of the deponents was cross-examined. The second defendant is a real estate agent, and its human actors in connection with this matter were Mr Champion, and Ms Ishida. The first defendant appointed the second defendant to act as its agent in the sale of her Sanctuary Cove property in April or May 2002. Mr Shigeru Sugiyama is a principal of the plaintiff corporation and, in July 2002, he inspected that property on a number of occasions. The plaintiff’s local solicitor is Mr Kaneshiro.
  1. [6]
    On 18 July 2002 Mr Champion sent the plaintiff a draft contract, by facsimile, showing a purchase price of $2.8m, a 5% deposit and settlement within 30 days. That document contained some nine pages. On 1 August 2002 Mr Kaneshiro sent a message to Mr Champion by email to the effect that he had received no further instructions from Mr Sugiyama, and he assumed the plaintiff’s purchase of the property would not proceed. With no further warning to the second defendant, however, the plaintiff apparently signed the nine-page document and sent a facsimile copy of it to Mr Kaneshiro late on 19 August 2002, and he sent that document by facsimile to the second defendant’s office at 9.40am on 20 August. At about 10am on that day Ms Ishida sent a PAMD Warning Statement by facsimile to the plaintiff.  At 12.33pm the plaintiff faxed that document, signed by it, to Mr Kaneshiro who, in turn, sent it by fax to Ms Ishida that evening.
  1. [7]
    On the morning of 21 August 2002 the first defendant went to the second defendant’s office and, at Mr Champion’s request, signed a new copy of the contract, in a longer form – but also, at the same time, the facsimile copy of the shorter contract document sent from Japan two days earlier.
  1. [8]
    The new, longer contract was sent to Japan by Ms Ishida in its original form, by courier, and it was signed by the plaintiff. On 23 August Mr Kaneshiro received the first, shorter “facsimile” contract signed by the plaintiff on 19 August, and the first defendant on 21 August, and the Warning Statement signed by the plaintiff on 19 August. On 3 September Mr Kaneshiro received the second, longer ‘original’ contract, from Japan, signed by the plaintiff. On 20 September that second contract was stamped, and duty of $102,000.00 paid. This second contract provided for settlement within 30 days, ie on or around 20 September but on 16 September the first defendant’s solicitor was told by the second defendant, and apparently accepted, that the agreed date for completion was in fact 60 days from the date of the contract. Nevertheless, on 23 September the plaintiff’s solicitor asked the first defendant’s solicitor to obtain instructions to bring settlement forward to 8 October, and he did so. On 30 September, however, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the first defendant’s solicitor advising that the plaintiff exercised its rights under PAMD s 367 to “Terminate the contract dated 21 August 2002”, and sought the refund of the deposit.
  1. [9]
    The significant matter about which the witnesses disagree is whether the second contract, sent to the plaintiff after the first defendant had signed it on 21 August, had a PAMD Warning Statement attached to it.  The plaintiff says this does not, in fact, matter: the absence of any Warning Statement with the first contract is, it is asserted, fatal for the defendants.  For the defendants it is argued, however, that the parties never intended the first document to be their contract; or, in the alternative, that it was “novated” to the second – and a triable issue arises as to whether or not the latter was accompanied by a Warning Statement.  Mr Quayle of counsel, for the defendants, properly conceded that if the first document is the “contractual artefact” to which all that followed relates then, absent estoppels and the operation of the doctrines of election and waiver (discussed later) PAMD ss 366 and 367 would be engaged in the plaintiff’s favour, because it is not in dispute that a Warning Statement was not signed by Sugiyama before he signed that document and faxed it to Kaneshiro late on 19 August.
  1. [10]
    PAMD Chapter 11, Part 1 provides, relevantly:

363  Purposes of ch 11

The purposes of this chapter are –

  1. (a)
    to give persons who enter into relevant contracts a cooling-off period; and
  1. (b)
    to require all contracts for the sale of residential property in Queensland to include consumer protection information, including a statement about whether or not the contract is subject to a cooling-off period.

364  Definitons for ch 11

In this chapter –

…

“relevant contract” means a contract to buy residential property in Queensland that arises out of an unsolicited invitation to attend a property information session.

…

365  When a buyer is bound under a relevant contract

A buyer is bound under a relevant contract when the buyer gives the seller under the contract or the seller’s agent –

(a)a copy of the contract signed by both the buyer and the seller; and

(b)a notice in the approved form signed and dated by the seller declaring the date on which the seller signed the contract.

366  Warning statement to be attached to contract

  1. (1)
    A contract for the sale of residential property in Queensland must have attached, as its first or top sheet, a statement in the approved form (“warning statement”) containing the information mentioned in subsection (3) or (4).
  1. (2)
    The seller of the property or a person acting for the seller who prepares a contract for the sale of residential property in Queensland commits an offence if the seller or person prepares a contract that does not comply with subsection (1). 

Maximum penalty – 200 penalty units.

  1. (3)
    The warning statement for a relevant contract must state the following information –
  1. (a)
    the contract is subject to a cooling-off period;
  1. (b)
    when the cooling-off period starts and ends;
  1. (c)
    a recommendation that the buyer seek independent legal advice about the contract before the cooling-off period ends;
  1. (d)
    what will happen if the buyer terminates the contract before the cooling-off period ends;
  1. (e)
    the amount or the percentage of the purchase price that will not be refunded from the deposit if the contract is terminated before the cooling-off period ends;
  1. (f)
    if the seller under the contract is a property developer, that a person who suffers financial loss because of, or arising out of, the person’s dealing with a property developer or the property developer’s employees can not make a claim against the claim fund.
  1. (4)
    The warning statement for a contract that is not a relevant contract must state the following –
  1. (a)
    the contract is not subject to a cooling-off period;
  1. (b)
    a recommendation that the buyer seek independent legal advice about the contract before signing the contract;
  1. (c)
    if the seller under the contract is a property developer, that a person who suffers financial loss because of, or arising out of, the person’s dealings with a property developer or the property developer’s employees can not make a claim against the claim fund.
  1. (5)
    A statement purporting to be a warning statement is of no effect unless –
  1. (a)
    before the contract is signed by the buyer, the statement is signed and dated before a witness by -

(i) the seller of the property or someone acting for the seller; and

(ii) the buyer; and

  1. (b)
    the words on the statement are presented in substantially the same way as the words are presented on the approved form.

Example for subsection (5)(b) –

If words on the approved form are presented in 14 point font, the words on the warning statement must also be presented in 14 point font.

367 Buyer’s rights if warning statement not given

  1. (1)
    This section applies to a contract for which a warning statement must be attached
  1. (2)
    If a warning statement is not attached to the contract or is of no effect under section 366(5), the buyer under the contract may terminate the contract at any time before the contract settles by giving signed, dated notice of termination to the seller or the seller’s agent.
  1. (3)
    The notice of termination must state that the contract is terminated under this section.
  1. (4)
    If the contract is terminated, the seller must, within 14 days after the termination, refund any deposit paid under the contract to the buyer.

Maximum penalty – 200 penalty units.

  1. (5)
    If the contract is terminated, the seller and the person acting for the seller who prepared the contract are liable to the buyer for the buyer’s reasonable legal and other expenses incurred by the buyer in relation to the contract after the buyer signed the contract.
  1. (6)
    If more than 1 person is liable to reimburse the buyer, the liability of the persons is joint and several.
  1. (7)
    An amount payable to the buyer under this section is recoverable as a debt.
  1. [11]
    The defendants raise a preliminary issue: that duty has not been paid on the first contract so the plaintiff is therefore prevented, under s 487 of the Duties Act 2001, from using or relying upon it, or presenting it as evidence in these proceedings.  Under that section, unless a relevant instrument is properly stamped it is not available for use in law or equity for any purpose, and must not be received in evidence in a legal proceeding, other than a criminal proceeding.  The Court may, however, receive the instrument in evidence if, at a later time, it is given to the Commissioner as required by arrangements approved by the Court.  The plaintiff contended that this is not a case in which it relies upon the document itself but, rather, its lawful termination pursuant to statute; and, says this is, in effect, a form of restitutionary claim which falls within the kind of exception discussed in Pavey & Matthews Proprietary Limited v Paul (1986) 162 CLR 221; but the plaintiff’s own statement of claim specifically pleads and relies upon the first contract as the foundation for the alleged statutory debt, and its claim seems to me to fall squarely within the orbit of s 487. What the plaintiff seeks here is, on any view, a statutory remedy which depends for its existence upon a “relevant contract” as defined in PAMD s 364, with or without a warning notice under s 366 attached.
  1. [12]
    The plaintiff also sought to overcome any difficulty this objection created by offering, in the course of the hearing, an undertaking to produce the first contract to the relevant authority. It did not go so far as to offer to pay duty and the defendant sought to make something of that, but even an undertaking of that kind would not, it seems to me, surmount the difficulty the plaintiff now confronts, for the reasons given by Holmes J in Hoggett & Ors v O'Rourke & Anor (2000) QSC 387, at p 6:

[19] The question arises then as to what steps should be taken in relation to the action and the applicant’s claim. I do not think that an undertaking to pay stamp duty, at whatever stage offered, would resolve the applicant’s difficulties. S 4A(2) enables the admission in evidence of an unstamped document on such an undertaking, but it does not overcome the fundamental problem that such a document may not be relied on as founding a cause of action. If, of course, stamp duty were paid, the agreement would be available for that purpose.

  1. [13]
    The plaintiff also submits that the submission of the first contract for assessment of duty is likely to be a formality, and no duty would be assessed on it because the second contract has already been assessed and a large sum of duty, over $100,000.00, paid by the plaintiff. That does not seem to me, with respect, to be germane when the plaintiff’s action hinges on a contract which it must attempt to present as evidence in this proceeding, and upon which it relies for its relief. It is also appropriate to record, for the sake of completeness, that this conclusion is reached notwithstanding that the plaintiff’s statement of claim does not plead due execution of the contract by the first defendant, as vendor. Under s 366(4) the Warning Statement is of no effect unless that statement is signed and dated by the buyer before the contract is signed but in the circumstances here, where the contract was later signed by the vendor, the rights to terminate and to the statutory relief sought here, will only arise when a contract which is, arguably, binding upon the parties comes into existence: s 367.  For this reason alone, the plaintiff’s application ought fail.
  1. [14]
    After the hearing had finished the plaintiff’s counsel, Dr Jensen, wrote to me and referred to the further decision of Holmes J in Caxton Street Agencies Pty Ltd v Korkidas [2002] QSC 210 in which her Honour held that s 487 has the same meaning and effect as s 4A in the former legislation, so an undertaking to stamp is also insufficient under the newer legislation, and the document must be stamped before it can be relied upon.  Dr Jensen said that, now accepting the force of the argument, his client would now move to stamp the first contract and asked that I refrain from delivering judgment until that had been done.  While obliged to counsel for his proper reference to further authority, and acknowledging the propriety of his request, I have proceeded to deliver this judgment because I am persuaded that, even absent the question about duty, the defendants ought not have summary judgment entered against them.
  1. [15]
    I am satisfied that the conduct of the parties evinces, on both sides, a clear intention that the first contract would simply become a nullity and be entirely replaced by the second, to which all parties would look for all their contractual obligations and rights. A number of facts point to this conclusion: the first document is, on its face, incomplete – eg, the standard residential conditions are missing; it was not accompanied by payment of the deposit; it was not signed by the stakeholder; and, of course, no attempt was made to stamp it (and, rather, the purchaser was content to present the second for assessment for duty, and pay duty upon it). It is true that some words appear, at p 5 of the first contract, suggesting the parties agree to be legally bound by facsimile, rather than original documents but the execution of the second contract is more, in my view, than a purely administrative exercise (as it was categorised in submissions for the plaintiff). While it is also true that each of the first defendant, and Mr Sugiyama for the plaintiff say they simply signed the second contract at the request of the second defendant’s representative, it is impossible to draw any inference from the circumstances already mentioned, and the fact the parties thereafter conducted themselves as though the second contract entirely governed their legal relations, but that the second contract involved a novation: that is, a consensual transaction by which all the parties to the first contract agreed that a new contract would be substituted for it. This is not an uncommon, or surprising event. Although intention is necessary, novation may be expressed, or implied[4].  The intention of these parties was clearly demonstrated by the express act of signing the second contract and, thereafter, treating it as the contract which reflected their legal relations.  To categorise these events as novation provides a satisfactory legal explanation for what occurred[5], and the fact that conclusion is convenient for the defendant’s purposes does not detract from their right to rely upon it and, in particular, its inherent proposition that the creation of the second contract involves, of necessity, an agreed rescission of the first.
  1. [16]
    Once that conclusion is reached the question whether a PAMD warning notice was sent to the plaintiff in Japan with the second contract, as Ms Ishida claims, gives rise to a clear triable issue which can only be tested by cross-examination.  Mr Sugiyama admits that he received that second contract signed by the vendor, and that he counter-signed it but does not say whether or not he received a Warning Statement with it but only that it “was not attached to the hard copy of the contract”.  This is, as counsel for the defendants contended, a curious way for the plaintiff to respond to this seminal issue.  This is a credit question which must be tested at trial, and after full disclosure and translation of any documents that passed between the plaintiff and its lawyers in Australia and (in light of the fact the plaintiff is a corporation) the plaintiff’s own internal arrangements with mail, etc.
  1. [17]
    The defendants also contended that the plaintiff’s conduct up to the time of purported termination under the PAMD involved a waiver of its rights to terminate under s 367(2), or gave rise to circumstances in which it was estopped from doing so because its conduct, in affirming the contract up to that time would make it unconscionable to release it.  The first point was addressed by Muir J in M P Management (Aust) P/L v Churven & Anor (2002) QSC 320.  There, the contract between the parties was conditional for a period of time while the purchaser sought finance and, the vendor argued, the purchaser’s subsequent notice that the contract had become unconditional necessarily involved a waiver of its statutory right to termination.  Muir J reviewed the relevant authorities including, in particular, Verwayen[6] and concluded, at para [46]:

…There is no inconsistency between acknowledging the existence of the contract and taking a step under or in reliance on it on the one hand and the maintenance of the right to terminate conferred by section 367(2), on the other.  That provision gives a buyer the right to terminate “the contract at any time before the contract settles”, irrespective of the nature and extent of the performance under the contract and irrespective of the party’s conduct by reference to it.  Consequently, failure to exercise the right of termination of a contract, even with full knowledge of the right to terminate, is not necessarily inconsistent with acts which acknowledge the continued existence of the contract.

  1. [18]
    The defendants sought to distinguish Churven as a case which turned on its own, limited facts and ought not be extended to apply here where, it was also submitted, the plaintiff’s request that the settlement date be brought forward (from 21 October to 8 October 2002) and, thereby, varied the contract in an essential term by asking the vendor to accept a substituted mode of performance and, hence, enjoying a new relationship with her.  I think it is doubtful, however, that this is an event which, in light of the terms of s 367 is different in a meaningful way from those contemplated by Muir J in the passage set out above.
  1. [19]
    Estoppel was not argued in Churven although, at para [48] Muir J noted the absence of any evidence of reliance, by the respondents, on any relevant representation or assumption as to a past, present or future state of affairs or of the existence of any such representation or assumption.  The defendant contends, rather ingeniously, that on the information available from the plaintiff’s affidavits Mr Sugiyama received, shortly after he received the first contract, a Warning Statement about which he sought legal advice from his solicitor, Mr Kaneshiro.  The terms of that advice are not yet known but, it is submitted, it can be inferred that Mr Kaneshiro told Mr Sugiyama that he had, as a result of the timing of the signing of the Warning Statement, an entitlement to terminate.  If, the argument proceeds, the question of novation is ignored for the moment everything the plaintiff did from that time forward was done with the knowledge of a possible entitlement, if not an intention, to terminate – and that conduct, it is argued, was unconscionable and would give rise to an estoppel in the defendant’s favour.  The defendant was induced, it is said, by the plaintiff’s conduct from that time forward to believe it would not insist on its statutory rights to terminate.  To allow the plaintiff to succeed when, in those circumstances, he willingly and knowingly brought forward the settlement date would allow the statute to be made the instrument of the fraud or, at least, unconscionable conduct.
  1. [20]
    On the authorities to which the parties referred me, this argument is novel but not, I accept, untenable. The evidence relevant to it would, I accept, likely involve further disclosure and, perhaps, interrogation to discover when, and in what form, the plaintiff became aware of its right to terminate under the statute. Even if there were no facts to be decided in respect of the issue, the extent and complexity of the matter of law it raises and argument about that might be said to warrant a full hearing and, therefore, a trial: Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster (1972) 126 CLR 57 but it seems to me that, in any event, the defendants are entitled to the opportunity to undertake interlocutory steps to determine all the relevant facts, even before that argument is fully ventilated.  Plainly, too, cross-examination of Mr Sugiyama about the matter (and associated issues, such as why he paid the deposit at the time he did) is likely to be necessary; as, also, will information about the identity of any of the plaintiff’s officers who dealt with the second contract when it arrived in Japan, and its subsequent execution, and return to Australia.
  1. [21]
    This does not, for these reasons, seem to me a proper case in which to give the plaintiff summary judgment under r 292, and its application is refused. I will hear submissions about costs.

Footnotes

[1]   Peldan v Romano (2001) QSC 463; National Australia Bank Ltd v Hart (2002) QSC 51

[2]   National Australia Bank Ltd v Troiani (2002) QCA 196, per Fryberg J at para [11]

[3]   Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 at 92; FoodCo Management Pty Ltd v Go My Travel Pty Ltd (2002) 2 Qd R 249, at 250

[4]   Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365, at 388; Fight Vision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, at 491

[5]   See, generally, (1999) 14 Journal of Contract Law, p 189 “Novation” by Julian Bailey

[6]   (1990) 170 CLR 394

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Sugiyama Corporation v Boland & Anor

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Sugiyama Corporation v Boland

  • MNC:

    [2003] QDC 426

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Wilson DCJ

  • Date:

    10 Apr 2003

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Caxton Street Agencies Pty Ltd v Korkidas [2002] QSC 210
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QSC 210
Cite 2 - [2002] QSC 210
Cite 3 - [2002] QSC 210
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 394
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 394
CSR Limited v Casaron Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 21
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QSC 21
Cite 2 - [2002] QSC 21
Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 47 NSWLR 473
Cite 2 - (1999) 47 NSWLR 473
Foodco Management P/L v Go My Travel P/L[2002] 2 Qd R 249; [2001] QSC 291
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] 2 Qd R 249
Cite 2 - [2002] 2 Qd R 249
Hoggett v O'Rourke[2002] 1 Qd R 490; [2000] QSC 387
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] QSC 387
Cite 2 - [2000] QSC 387
M P Management (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churven [2002] QSC 320
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QSC 320
Cite 2 - [2002] QSC 320
McPhee v Zarb [2002] QSC 4
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QSC 4
National Australia Bank Ltd v Hart [2002] QSC 51
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QSC 51
Cite 2 - [2002] QSC 51
National Australia Bank Ltd v Troiani [2002] QCA 196
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QCA 196
Cite 2 - [2002] QCA 196
Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 C.L.R 365
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1969) 120 C.L.R 365
Cite 2 - (1969) 120 C.L.R 365
Pavey & Mathews Pty Ltd v Paul (1986) 162 CLR 221
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 162 CLR 221
Cite 2 - (1986) 162 CLR 221
Peldan v Romano [2001] QSC 463
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] QSC 463
Cite 2 - [2001] QSC 463
Swain v Hillman (2001) 1 All ER 91
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 1 All ER 91
Cite 2 - (2001) 1 All ER 91
Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster (1972) 126 CLR 57
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1972) 126 CLR 57
Cite 2 - (1972) 126 CLR 57

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Potter v Sicorp Pty Ltd [2004] QDC 1041 citation
TeeCee Holdings Pty Ltd v Koleszar [2010] QDC 3541 citation
Walsh v Iker [2019] QDC 2251 citation
1

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