DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   P was born on 26 July 1963. When she was a young child and over a period of years commencing in 1971, she was sexually abused by the respondent B who was her stepfather. All of the offences were committed at Montville. On 31 March 200 before His Honour Judge Noud the respondent pleaded guilty to fifteen counts of indecent treatment of a girl under the age of 14 years and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The incidents involved masturbation of the respondent by the child, and digital penetration by him of her vagina. The circumstances of each incident are as follows:

Count 1: In 1971 while sitting in the lounge room of the family home watching television the respondent took the applicant’s hand and put it through an opening in his pants and onto his penis. He had her masturbate him until he ejaculated into her hand.

Count 2: Prior to July 1972 the respondent removed the child’s underpants and placed his finger in her vagina. While this was occurring he had her masturbate him.

Count 3: This occurred in July 1972 in the respondent’s bedroom. He had the applicant rub his penis through an opening in his pyjama pants.

Count 4: This happened in 1972 in the carport of their home when the accused pushed her against a wall removed her shorts and placed his finger in her vagina.

Count 5: The respondent went into the applicant’s bedroom soon after her discharge from hospital towards the end of 1972. He removed the blankets from her bed and placed his finger in her vagina.

Count 6: At the end of 1972 in order to win favour with the respondent, and be allowed to attend an end of school concert she commenced to rub his genital area. He allowed her to continue until he got an erection. She asked again about attending the concert and was allowed to go.

Count 7: At the end of 1973 in order to be allowed to attend an event the respondent had forbidden her to attend she placed his hand inside her underpants. He then placed his finger in her vagina.

Count 8: Was before Christmas 1973 in the lounge room of their home when the respondent took the applicant’s hand, placed it under his clothing and onto his penis, and had her rub it until he gained an erection.

Count 9: This occurred in the laundry when the applicant was ten years old. The respondent came up behind the applicant, put his hands down her underpants and his fingers into her vagina.

Count 10: Was at Easter 1974. The applicant went into the respondent’s bedroom to show him her Easter eggs. He put her hand inside his pyjamas onto his penis. He moved her hand up and down until he ejaculated.

Count 11: While the accused was in the bath he called the applicant over and he put her hand on his penis and had her rub it until he gained an erection.

Count 12: This occurred mid 1974 around the time of the applicant’s 11^th birthday. It happened in the TV room while the applicant was sitting on the respondent’s lap. He put his fingers into her vagina.

Count 13: In 1975 the respondent entered the applicant’s bedroom and woke her. He had his penis exposed. He placed her hand on his penis and moved it back and forth.

Count 14: This occurred late 1975. The respondent had the applicant sit in his lap and he put his fingers down the front of her pants and into her vagina.

Count 15: This was early 1976 in the TV room when the applicant was 12 years of age. While watching TV the accused put his fingers in her vagina while he had her rub his penis. He stopped to move closer and for her to squat over his as if to simulate intercourse. He then desisted.

2. [2]
   Not surprisingly, the applicant has suffered a nervous or mental shock injury as a direct consequence of the offences committed by the respondent.

3. [3]
   The application was defended, although no witnesses were required for cross-examination. The only issue in dispute is a legal one.

4. [4]
   As the offences were all committed prior to the commencement of the Criminal Offences Victims Act 1995, compensation is to be assessed by reference to the now repealed chapter 65A of the Criminal Code. Damages are to be assessed according to the ordinary principles of assessment of damages for personal injury in civil cases, subject to the prescribed amount: R v Jones; ex parte McClintock (1996) 1 Qd R 524.

5. [5]
   There are two issues in dispute; namely what is the applicable prescribed amount, and do certain amendments of s 663A introduced in 1984 operate retrospectively, in the limited sense that they apply to injuries prior to that date, notwithstanding that the conviction for the offences that caused those injuries occurred subsequently. I commented to counsel that I thought that issue had been finally settled by the Court of Appeal in Chong v Chong but both assure me that the specific point raised here has not been definitively decided by the Court of Appeal. Mr Burgess for the respondent does argue strongly that there are a number of statements by members of the Court in Chong and other decided cases which do, in his submission, finally determine this issue.

6. [6]
   History of the Legislation

Chapter 65A commenced on 1 January 1969. The prescribed amount was then $2,000.00. S 663B (1) was amended (relevantly) by the Criminal Code and Justices Act Amendment Act 1975 which came into effect on 1 July 1975. It follows that the offences committed by the respondent occurred both before and after the 1975 amendments.

7. [7]
   At the time of the commission of Counts 1-13, s 663B (1) was in these terms:

“Where a person is convicted on indictment of an indictable offence relating to the person of any person, the Court, on the application by or on behalf of the person aggrieved by the offence, may, in addition to any other sentence or order it may make, order him to pay to the person aggrieved a sum not exceeding two thousand dollars by way of compensation for injury suffered by him by reason of the offence of which the offender is convicted.”

8. [8]
   Counts 13, 14 and 15 were committed after commencement of the amended s 663B (1) on 1 July 1975. The concept of “prescribed amount” was introduced and defined as follows:

“(a) where the offence in connection with which the case arises is committed before the commencement of the Criminal Code and the Justices Act Amendment Act 1975, two thousand dollars;

(b) in all other cases, five thousand dollars.”

9. [9]
   The section was amended again in 1984 to introduce the concept of “one course of conduct or closely related courses of conduct of (the) person convicted.” Prior to that amendment, the interpretation put on s 663B (1) was that a Court could award a sum of up to the prescribed amount in respect of each of a number of offences of which an offender had been convicted, even where those offences had arisen out of one course of conduct or closely related courses of conduct. This interpretation was accepted by WB Campbell J in R v Wraight and Dakin, ex parte Fullerton (1980) Qd R 582 and by McPherson J (as his Honour then was) in R v Bridge and Madams; ex parte Larkin (1989) 1 Qd R 554 at 557.

10. [10]
    As a result of the 1984 amendments, the prescribed amount for mental or nervous shock injury was limited to $20,000.00 and s 663B was now in these terms:

“Where a person is convicted on indictment of any indictable offence relating to the person of any person or of more than one indictable offence relating to the person of any person (whether in respect of one indictment or more than one indictment) arising out of the one course of conduct or closely related courses of conduct of that person so convicted, the Court, on the application by or on behalf of the person aggrieved by the offence or offences may, in addition to any other sentence or order it may make, order him to pay to the person aggrieved a sum not exceeding the prescribed amount by way of compensation for injury suffered by him by reason of the offence or offences of which the offender is convicted.

For the purpose of determining whether courses of conduct are closely related, regard shall be had, in addition to any other relevant matter, to the acts or omissions constituting the courses of conduct and the times of the doing of the acts or the making of the omissions, one in relation to another.

Injury suffered by a person aggrieved by reason of the commission by the person convicted of more than one indictable offence as hereinbefore in this subsection described may, in respect of the person convicted, be the subject of one application only and one Court order for the payment of a compensatory sum only:

An order made under this subsection shall not, for any purpose, be taken to be part of a sentence.”

11. [11]
    Mr Felmingham, for the applicant, submits that the 1984 amendments which restricted multiple awards for multiple offences do not apply to his client as all injuries occurred prior to the commencement of the 1984 amendments. He relies particularly on an unreported decision of Helman CJDC (as his Honour then was) in R v Boughton; ex parte Holt (District Court of Queensland, unreported judgment delivered 13.8.93.) In that case, the Court was considering an application pursuant to s 663B (1) in respect to a series of four sexual offences committed between 1979 and 1982 in respect of which the prisoner was convicted on 17 November 1992.

12. [12]
    The respondent had submitted that, as all offences arose out of the one course of conduct, or closely related courses of conduct, the maximum prescribed amount was $5,000.00. The applicant did not contest the proposition that the offences did indeed arise out of closely related courses of conduct, but submitted by reference to s 20 (1) (c) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 that the applicant should be entitled to recover up to a maximum of $5,000.00 for each offence, i.e. up to $20,000.00.

13. [13]
    S 20 (1) (c) is as follows: (note that these provisions have been renumbered and are now s 20(2)(c) (e) and (3).

“20(1) The repeal, amendment or expiry of any Act or a provision of an Act does not-

…

(c) affect a right, privilege, or liability acquired accrued or incurred under the Act or provision.

14. [14]
    His Honour also regarded paragraph (e) as relevant in that it refers to a remedy “in relation to a right…mentioned in paragraph (c)”. Paragraph (e) is as follows:

“(e) effect an investigation, proceeding, or remedy in relation to a right, privilege, liability or penalty mentioned in paragraph (c) or (d).”

15. [15]
    His Honour found in favour of the applicant. He said (at 12-13 of his judgment):

“The applicant’s right, acquired when she suffered the injuries, was to compensation of up to $5,000.00 for each of the four offences, in my view. Had the applicant had no more than mere hopes or expectations, section 20(1) would not assist her, but she had rights which, as Mr Kent put it, “remained in limbo until crystallised by the conviction” of the respondent. They were in truth accrued rights, although they may fairly be called, as Their Lordships said in Free Lanka Insurance Co Ltd v Ranasinghe (1964) AC 541 at p 552 of the right of the respondent in that case, inchoate or contingent.

It would be difficult to explain the meaning of the work “right” in this context more clearly than Fox J did in J R Exports Pty Ltd v Australian Trade Commission (1986) 71 ALR 717. When discussing a similar provision in section 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, he said:

“It is not possible to define an ‘accrued right’, anymore than it is a ‘right’, but the notion which underlies the latter, when dealing with the present type of problem, is that there is something in the nature of a cause of action which has arisen, or is clamed to have arisen, before the repeal or amendment, in circumstances which would render it manifestly unjust for the repealing or amending Act to affect the situation adversely.” (p.719).

In my view, it would be manifestly unjust here for the 1984 amending Act to affect the applicant’s situation adversely. My conclusion is, therefore, that the applicant is entitled to a total of $20,000.00 by way of compensation: $5,000.00 for each offence of which the respondent was convicted.

16. [16]
    The respondent’s argument is that the 1984 amendments to s 663B (1) apply to the offences here as the right to compensation arises only upon conviction which occurred after the 1984 amendments. The respondent submits that the relevant prescribed amount is that which existed at the date of the offences and that as the offences constitute one course of conduct or closely related courses of conduct, the applicant is entitled to a maximum award of $2,000.00 for all the offences committed prior to 1 July 1975, and $5,000.00 for the offences committed afterwards; but that the proper approach to quantum is to adopt the approach of the Court of Appeal in HV v LO (2000) QCA 472. In that case, the compensable nervous shock injury was caused by conduct both before and after the commencement of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995. The Court approved the approach taken by his Honour Judge Hoath at first instance and said (per Thomas JA, Pincus JA and Byrne J concurring) at paragraph 17:

“Where there is a combined effect that is difficult to dissect, the most sensible way to proceed is to attempt to apportion between the effects attributed to each period and if no better suggestion appears, the length of the respective periods over which the offending conduct occurred may be used.”

17. [17]
    In his written submission, Mr Burgess did not specifically address the applicant’s argument based on Boughton v Holt; but in oral argument submitted that more recent decisions of the Court of Appeal contain obiter remarks that are contrary to the approach taken by Helman J. The applicant, in her submission, refers to a number of single judge decisions since Boughton v Holt, in which the Judge has proceeded on the basis that the 1984 amendments did not apply to injuries which occurred prior to 1 July 1984, where conviction occurred afterwards.

18. [18]
    The first question to be asked is: Has the Court of Appeal expressly or by implication ruled against the approach taken by Helman J. in Boughton v Holt?

19. [19]
    The first case to be considered is R v Chong; ex parte Chong (2001) 2 Qd R 301. The facts of Chong were unusual. Mrs Chong filed an application for compensation for injuries she suffered in 1990 when she was injured by her husband. Her application was not filed until after the death of her husband. The principal issue in the case was therefore whether a claim under s 663B survives the death of an offender by virtue of s 66(1) of the Succession Act 1981. Associated with this was the issue of when the “cause of action” arose. Demack J (who wrote the leading judgment and with whom the Chief Justice and McMurdo P agreed) found that a cause of action based on s 663B arose upon the conviction of the offender. His Honour said at p.308:

“…663B has created a statutory right which can be described as a cause of action. The facts that have to be proved are:-

(a) conviction of offender on indictment

(b) of an offence relating to the person

(c) whereby injury was caused to the victim.” (my emphasis)

20. [20]
    In answer to the question, “when does the right to claim under s 663B arise?” his Honour expressly disagreed with Lee J in R v Anell; ex parte Anderson (1998) 2 Qd R 174 in holding that the injury itself gives rise to no claim, a condition precedent to a right to claim being the conviction of the offender on indictment.

21. [21]
    Clearly Chong was not concerned with injuries for an offence or offences which occurred prior to the 1984 amendments, nor was Anell. Boughton v Holt is not referred to in Chong, and there is no reference to s 20 (1) (c) and (e) of the Acts Interpretation Act. Interestingly, the Chief Justice in his judgment at 303 observed:

“The appellant should therefore have been seen as having a “right” to compensation and her claim should not have been characterised as falling into the category of “mere hopes or contingencies”…”

22. [22]
    In my respectful opinion there is nothing in Chong to undermine the approach taken in Boughton v Holt.

23. [23]
    In MAJ v KM (2000) QCA 410, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the 1984 amendments applied in that case which was a claim for compensation which arose upon conviction in 1998 for a series of sexual offences which occurred in 1977. The argument before that Court concerned whether, on the facts of that case, it was correct for the primary judge to hold that the offences arose out of “one course of conduct or closely related courses of conduct” and therefore limiting the award to $5,000.00 (i.e. the prescribed amount at the time of injury). In other words, the argument raised before me based on Helman J’s reasoning in Boughton v Holt was not raised before the Court of Appeal in MAJ v KM. Mr Burgess submits however that the fact that the Court appears to have proceeded on the basis of the applicability of the 1984 amendments, is a strong indication in favour of his argument. I do not agree. The reasoning of Helman J is highly persuasive, and because an argument based on s 20 (1) (c) and (e) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 was not considered by the Court in MAJ v KM; it does not bind me to favour the respondent’s submission.

24. [24]
    The reasoning of the court in MAJ v KM does, in my opinion, decisively answer the question of what is the applicable prescribed amount in this case. The facts in Marsten are similar to the facts here. In Chong, Demack J held (at 312) by reference to the words of McLauchlan QC  DCJ in R v Bartorelli and Hutton (1994) 15 Qld Lawyer Reps 57 at 59 that the “prescribed amount” is the amount provided by the legislation when the order is made. However, in Marsten, (a case, unlike Chong, dealing with a pre-1984 injury) Davies JA (at para 12) held that the prescribed amount was $5,000.00, that is, at the time of injury:

“Nothing said in Chong v Chong casts any doubt on that because, as the Chief Justice pointed out in HWv LO (2000) QCA 377, that case was concerned only with paragraph (b) of the definition which related to injuries suffered after the commencement of the amending Act of 1 July 1984.”

25. [25]
    HW v LO again dealt primarily with the concept of “one course of conduct or closely related courses of conduct” introduced in the 1984 amendments. As with Marsten, the facts in HW v LO are similar to those here; that is the offences were all committed prior to the 1984 amendments, but conviction occurred subsequently. As in Marsten, the members of the Court in HW v LO have proceeded on the basis that the 1984 amendments did apply, and again the reasoning of Helman J was not considered. For that reason, I do not regard myself to be bound to proceed on the basis that the amendments do apply. In particular, I refer to the remarks of Kirby J in Garcia v National Australia Bank Limited (1998) HCA 48 concerning the rules of judicial precedent:

“It is fundamental to the ascertainment of the binding rule of a judicial decision that it should be derived from (1) the reasons of the judges agreeing in the order of disposing of the proceedings; (2) upon a matter in issue in the proceedings; (3) upon which a decision is necessary to arrive at that order.. Thus, the opinions of judges in dissent are disregarded for this purpose, however valuable they may otherwise be. Judicial remarks of a general character upon tangential questions or issues not necessary to the decision are likewise discarded, however persuasive the reasoning may appear. In this sense, the rules governing the ascertainment of binding precedent observe principles which are at once majoritarian and precise. Even so great a Justice of this Court as Dixon J cannot speak for the Court unless his reasoning attracts the support, express or implied, of a majority of the participating Justices (disregarding for this purpose any who did not agree in the order of the Court disposing of the proceedings on the point in question). Even then, the remarks will not be part of a binding rule unless they relate to an issue in contention which had to be decided by the Court to reach its order.”

26. [26]
    The Court in HW v LO makes it clear that the relevant prescribed amounts are $2,000.00, for offences occurring prior to the 1 July 1975 and $5,000.00 for offences occurring afterwards.

27. [27]
    The Single Judge Decisions

As I have noted, there has been a divergence of opinion on the issue raised here amongst the Judges of both the Supreme and District Courts. I have been favoured here with comprehensive submissions from both parties which refer to some of these cases, and in Mr Felmingham’s case, analysis of these decisions.

28. [28]
    The cases to which I have been referred which favour retrospective application of the 1984 amendments are Baxter v Bowman D.6024/2001 unreported judgment of McLauchlan QC DCJ dated 6 June 2002, Johns v Brown D.5533/2001, and M v W (2003) QDC 153, both decisions of Judge Robin QC delivered respectively on 22.2.2002 and 13 June 2003. In the latter case, Robin QC DCJ followed decisions of Brabazon QC DCJ in G (3509 of 1996) and P (3510 of 1996). I have not seen copies of these decisions, but the reasoning of Helman J in Boughton v Holt was not raised before Robin QC DCJ in M v W.

29. [29]
    The decision was raised before Robin QC DCJ in Johns v Brown and His Honour took the view that the reasoning of Helman J was not available since no right to compensation existed in the absence of a conviction in respect of the offending conduct. McLauchlan QC DCJ followed that reasoning in Baxter v Bowman. With respect to both of these very eminent Judges, it is clear that Helman J proceeded on the basis that he clearly appreciated that there was no cause of action until conviction, but held that the applicant had accrued rights at the time the injury occurred. Hoath DCJ has consistently taken a view consistent with that expressed by Judges Robin and McLauchlan. An example of this view is Osborne v Bennett (unreported judgment of the District Court No 4606 of 1999) in which his Honour took that view based on Chong v Chong.

30. [30]
    The issue was considered by Boulton DCJ in R v Hird; ex parte Reilly (No 3454 of 2002 unreported judgment of the District Court, 8 October 2002). The respondent in that case was convicted on 13 June 2000 of sexual offences which occurred between 1979 and 1981. Judge Boulton was specifically referred to Boughton v Holt, and expressly followed the reasoning of Helman J in concluding that the 1984 amendments to limit multiple claims did not apply retrospectively. His Honour also considered the decisions of the Court of Appeal in HW v LO and MAJ v KM and reached the same conclusions as myself.

31. [31]
    In Shields v Maxwell (No 4968 of 2002, unreported judgment of the District Court, 25 February 2003) in a case on all fours with the case before me, her Honour Judge O'Sullivan carefully analysed all the cases to which I have referred, and followed the reasoning of Helman J in Boughton to hold that the course of conduct amendments in 1984 did not apply retrospectively. Judge Healy QC also followed the reasoning of Helman CJDC in Boughton in Becker v Euler (unreported judgment of the District Court, No D3293 of 2003, 6 February 2004). The decision of Muir J in Enoka v Thompson (unreported judgment of the Supreme Court, 20 December 1999) should be read in the light of the overruling of Lee J in R v Anell (1998) 2 Qd R 174 in Chong v Chong. Muir J, in reaching his conclusions, relied upon R v Anell.

32. [32]
    Judge Newton also followed Helman J in Sander v Flint (unreported judgment of the District Court, D80 of 2003, 16 September 2003) emphasising the unfairness to a person who suffers serious nervous shock prior to 1 July 1983 being denied the right to appropriate compensation as a result of amendments to Chapter 65A which failed to include a provision as to the date on which they were to commence. Finally, in Jones v Jones (unreported judgment of the District Court, 10 October 2003) Judge Richards also followed Boughton in holding that the 1984 amendments to limit multiple claims did not operate retrospectively.

33. [33]
    It follows that on a proper construction of s 663B (1) and the decided cases, I intend to follow and adopt the approach taken by Helman CJDC in Boughton, in holding that notwithstanding the 1984 amendments; the applicant is entitled to an award for each offence up to the relevant prescribed amount to be assessed on ordinary principles.

34. [34]
    If I am incorrect in so holding, then the applicant argues that on the facts of this case, I could hold that the injuries arise out of a series of unrelated courses of conduct. In HW v LO (at paragraphs 7-8) the Chief Justice said:

“Assaying a definition of ‘course of conduct’ for purposes of s 663B, the words connote in this context a succession of acts which, because of a sufficiently close interrelation, whether by nature, time, place or otherwise, display in aggregation an identifiable overall pattern. The American cases provide assistance pointing to the need for an element of continuity and regularity….One obviously cannot, for example, specify a maximum duration for any separate course of conduct…but even with similar acts, substantial separation in time would ordinarily exclude their being regarded as arising out of the same course of conduct or closely related courses of conduct.”

35. [35]
    I have referred earlier to the nature of the acts the subject of the individual convictions. In support of his submission that the offences here arise out of one course of conduct, or closely related courses of conduct, Mr Burgess has helpfully prepared a schedule the contents of which were not challenged by Mr Felmingham:

36. [36]
    When viewed in this way, the offences clearly arise out of one course of conduct, or closely related courses of conduct, and, if I am incorrect in my primary finding, in that event the applicant would be entitled to only one award of compensation. Indeed, the sentencing judge referred to the conduct as “a systematic course of conduct” in his sentencing remarks.

37. [37]
    Quantum:

There was no challenge to the evidence of clinical psychiatrist Dr Cantor and I accept his careful and persuasive findings. The applicant has suffered a number of severe mental or nervous shock injuries. At pp 8-9 of his report he observed:

“In DSM-IV terms P suffers-

Axis 1 (clinical condition) -  Post traumatic stress disorder plus dissociative disorder not otherwise classified

Axis 2 (personality) -  Personality disorder not otherwise classified

Axis 3 (medical) - No medical condition

(a) All three psychological conditions I believe have been largely caused by the offence, although it should be noted that the generally pathological family environment with multiple family members being abused and abusing others would have contributed, particularly to her personality disorder. (See Other Contributing Factors below).

(b) I would describe her post-traumatic stress disorder as moderate to severe, her dissociative disorder as moderate and her personality disorder as moderate.

(c) It is likely that all three conditions will continue indefinitely, although they may diminish in severity, particularly if she undergoes treatment which is recommended below. With treatment, I believe the best she could hope for would be a decline in symptoms associated with all three conditions to a mild level.

Other Contributing Factors

(a) Ms Pelentsov has not contributed to her psychological disorders other than by way of the naivety of her sexual interactions which was caused by her abusive experiences from age 5. However, it should be noted that several siblings had also been abused including by her biological father. Furthermore her mother was emotionally abusive. It is fair to say that the whole family environment was highly pathological and this would have substantially contributed to her psychological disorders. I estimate that almost all of her PTSD and dissociative disorder symptoms arise from her abuse by her stepfather. I estimate that approximately 60 per cent of her personality disorder stems from her stepfather, with the rest originating from other unfavourable family relationships.

(b) The only other significant events in Ms Pelentsov’s life have been the impoverished sexual relationships that she has had prior to the relationship with her husband. These impoverished relationships were largely a product of her psychological disorder stemming from the abuse by her stepfather.

(c) She had no pre-existing psychiatric, intellectual, other medical or psychological condition predating the abuse.

38. [38]
    I accept his evidence.

39. [39]
    The applicant is entitled to a maximum award of $2,000.00 for each of the first 12 offences, and $5,000.00 for each of the remaining three, a maximum allowable under the Act of $39,000.00. As an assessment at common law would lead to a higher award, she is entitled to a total award of $39,000.00.

40. [40]
    It is not suggested that as a child she contributed in any way to her injuries.

41. [41]
    In conclusion, I agree with Mr Burgess that if his primary submission is correct, and I am wrong in rejecting it; the correct approach is to adopt the approach of Hoath DCJ approved by the Court of Appeal in HV v LO, which would lead to an award of $2,600.00.

42. [42]
    When one compares such an outcome with the award I intend to make; it is easy to see why the construction of the 1984 amendments favoured by me more readily achieves the purposes of Chapter 69, and is a “fair” outcome in the sense described by Helman CJDC is Boughton and Newton DCJ in Sander v Flint. It surely must be accepted that the purpose of Chapter 69A when introduced in 1969 was to provide compensation for victims of crime. The purpose of the 1995 Act is “to establish principles of justice for victims of criminal offences, and to make provision for the payment of compensation to them.” S 14A (1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 provides:

“(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation.”

43. [43]
    If this young woman was eligible for compensation under the 1995 Act, her claim would be assessed against the scheme maximum of $75,000.00 because of the application of s 1A of the Criminal Offence Victims Regulations 1995 introduced in 1997, and held by the Court of Appeal to have retrospective application. Dr Cantor sets out a number of “adverse impacts” of the sexual abuse of the applicant, over and above the discrete psychological injuries referred to earlier. In my opinion, she would have been entitled to an award of around $55,000.00 if her claim was assessed under the 1995 Act.

44. [44]
    I have mentioned this to emphasise that the interpretation of the 1984 amendments which I have favoured, and which has been favoured by a number of other judges including the former Chief Judge of the District Court, in my opinion, best achieves the purposes of Chapter 69A. Otherwise, this seriously damaged woman would receive only $2,600.00.

45. [45]
    I order the respondent to pay to the applicant the sum of $39,000.00 by way of compensation. I order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the application to be agreed, or assessed on the standard basis.