Ford v Watson
[2004] QDC 170
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- Unreported Judgment
- Ford v Watson[2004] QDC 170
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Ford v Watson[2004] QDC 170
Ford v Watson[2004] QDC 170
DISTRICT COURT | No 1253 of 2003 |
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
JUDGE BOULTON
PAUL GRAHAM FORD | Appellant |
and
CONSTABLE MARGO WATSON | Respondent |
BRISBANE
DATE 10/05/2004
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: This is an appeal by Paul Graham Ford against his conviction of 20th February 2003 of an offence of common assault pursuant to section 335 of the Criminal Code.
In his notice of appeal, dated the 7th of March 2003, the appellant says:
“On suggestion of the duty solicitor I pleaded guilty when I'm not. Now I want to change my plea and I want to appeal my conviction.”
The transcript of proceedings before the Magistrate on the 16th of January 2003 reveals that the appellant was represented by Ms K T Bryson, instructed by Legal Aid.
When the charge was read out by the Magistrate and the appellant asked to plead, Ms Bryson responded, “My client enters a plea of guilty, your Worship”, and the defendant himself said, “I plead guilty.”
Following that, the police officer outlined the circumstances of the alleged offence. A question was raised by the police officer concerning the defendant's mental health. The Magistrate inquired, therefore, about a medico-legal report, to which Ms Bryson responded:
“Your Worship, I appear as a duty lawyer this morning and I understand that that hasn't been obtained. I have taken instructions from Mr Ford. He understands the allegations as alleged by my friend and does want to enter a plea of guilty to the charge.”
The Magistrate responded:
“What concerns me is this statement here says the man presents with evidence of possible delusional disorder.”
Ms Bryson responded:
“Your Worship, I have taken him through the allegations. He understands the allegations as my friend's outlined. He accepts his conduct does constitute an assault on the complainant and accepts that he knew at the time that it occurred, that he knew it was wrong to do so.”
After some further exchanges, the Magistrate observed:
“It would seem appropriate, in all the circumstances, particularly having regard to this question of mental illness, that I obtain a presentence report and it would be more appropriate, I would think, for you to reserve your submissions until after that report is obtained.”
The matter came back on before the Magistrate on the 20th of February 2003 and the Magistrate entertained further submissions. On this occasion, no query was raised concerning the guilty plea but there was discussion following a recommendation in the report of a community - based order. This suggestion was adopted by Ms Bryson as being an appropriate outcome.
In his sentencing comments the Magistrate, at page 2, refers to the absence of any psychiatric evidence concerning the extent of mental disorder but then points out:
“Whatever may be the underlying mental disorder, it certainly has not been alleged that you were not fully aware of your actions on this occasion.”
He proceeded to admit the appellant to probation. The appellant, when asked to respond, agreed with the probation order noting to the Magistrate that he had previously been subject to probation and knew what probation entailed.
The outcome of all this is that it would seem that on the two occasions that the matter came before the Magistrate, the appellant was legally represented and that the appellant's understanding of the events surrounding the commission of the offence and of the sentencing process would seem to have been adequate in all the circumstances.
The Justices Act provides in section 222 (2) (e) that:
“No appeal shall lie under this section where the defendant pleaded guilty or admitted the truth of the complaint.”
This section was considered recently by the Queensland Court of Appeal in the case of Long v. Spivey (2004) QCA 118, a decision delivered as recently as the 23rd of April 2004. The leading judgment of the Court was written by Davies JA, and he concludes at paragraph 29 of the unreported judgment:
“I do not think that section 222(2) (e) is in any way ambiguous. On the contrary, its meaning, in my view, is plain and there is no basis for giving it a meaning other than that plain meaning. It follows that the purported appeal to the District Court, being upon pleas of guilty to each charge, was incompetent.”
It cannot be suggested in the circumstances that this is a case where there has been a miscarriage of justice, such as that referred to in the High Court case of Meissner (1995) 184 CLR 132. As a matter of fact, in the present case it would seem that not only was the appellant legally represented, but that the Magistrate exercised considerable prudence in ascertaining the validity of the plea by ordering a presentence report prior to proceeding to sentence the appellant on the second of the two occasions.
The appellant here has not, therefore, disclosed any basis by which this Court would be entitled to interfere, either having regard to the legislative provision in the Justices Act, or even having regard to the circumstances referred to by the High Court in the case of Meissner.
I therefore order that the appeal be dismissed.