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- R v Daley[2004] QDC 70
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R v Daley[2004] QDC 70
R v Daley[2004] QDC 70
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | R v Daley [2004] QDC 070 |
PARTIES: | R v DALEY, Richard Anthony |
FILE NO/S: | |
DIVISION: | |
PROCEEDING: | Ruling. |
ORIGINATING COURT: | District Court at Brisbane |
DELIVERED ON: | 4 March 2004 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | |
JUDGE: | BC HOATH DCJ |
ORDER: | |
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – SIMILAR FACT – whether counts 1-9 on the indictment should be severed from counts 10-15 De Jesus v. The Queen (1986) 68 ALR 1. Pfennig v. The Queen (1994) 182 CLR 461. The Queen v. Hooper (1999) QCA 310. The Queen v. O'Keefe (2001) 1 Qd. R 564. |
COUNSEL: |
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SOLICITORS: |
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Mr Johnson, counsel for the accused, has submitted that pursuant to section 597A of the Criminal Code I should order that counts 1 to 9, involving three separate complainants, should be severed and tried separately from counts 10 to 15, which involve two other complainants.
Apart from submitting that the indictment should be severed in that way, Mr Johnson consents to the counts involving different complainants within that severance being heard together.
Counts involving sexual offences are likely to arouse prejudice and a joint trial of counts involving different complainants should generally not occur unless the evidence relating to each count is admissible in proof of other counts on the indictment. (See De Jesus v. The Queen (1986) 68 ALR 1).
To be admissible as similar fact evidence, the evidence requires a high degree of probative force. That probative force will generally be found in striking similarity, unusual features, underlying unity, system or pattern.
Although such characteristics are not essential prerequisites for admissibility, evidence lacking such characteristics will generally not have the probative force to be admitted as similar fact evidence. (See The Queen v. Hooper (1999) QCA 310).
The assessment of whether evidence has such probative force as to be admitted as similar fact evidence is one of degree. In making that assessment it must be borne in mind that the admissibility of such evidence is exceptional because of the potential prejudice involved to an accused and the possibility of the jury's misuse of such evidence.
The evidence should not be admitted unless the trial Judge is satisfied that there is no rational or reasonable view of the evidence consistent with the accused's innocence. (See Pfennig v. The Queen (1994) 182 CLR 461 as further explained in The Queen v. O'Keefe (2001) 1 Qd. R 564).
Having read the statements in this matter, whilst there are some similarities in the evidence of the three complainants in counts 1 to 9 and the two complainants in counts 10 to 15, those similarities do not individually or in combination have that high degree of probative value to enable the evidence to be cross-admissible as similar fact evidence.
...
HIS HONOUR: I will adjourn the matter for mention to 9.30 on Friday, the 26th of March. In the meantime he will be remanded in custody.