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- Peto v Queensland Police Service[2005] QDC 141
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Peto v Queensland Police Service[2005] QDC 141
Peto v Queensland Police Service[2005] QDC 141
[2005] QDC 141
DISTRICT COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
JUDGE FORDE
No 4052 of 2004
DAVID ALEXANDER PETO | Appellant |
and | |
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE | Respondent |
BRISBANE
DATE 30/05/2005
ORDER
HIS HONOUR: The appellant, David Alexander Peto, was convicted in the Caboolture Magistrates Court on 12th October 2004 after a summary trial.
He was charged with one count of disqualified driving pursuant to Section 78(1) and (3) of The Transport Operations Road Use Management Act. He was sentenced to three months' imprisonment wholly suspended for two years. The appellant was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of three years. He was ordered to pay $88 by way of witness expenses.
A notice of appeal dated 11th November 2004 was filed. It does not cite the correct sentence but it relies upon three grounds of appeal; that the learned Magistrate's penalty was manifestly excessive having regard to the substantive evidence presented at hearing, that the licence which was issued in the case by the Independent Sovereign State of Australia (Federal/State) referred to as the ISSA, was bona fide under The Road Use Management Act of 1995 (Queensland) and that the related issue as to whether the law was consistent with the laws of the State.
There have been other matters referred to and tendered this morning which touch upon the central issue of the ISSA and the role of Section 118 of the Constitution Act (1990) UK.
There is also reliance upon the discriminatory aspects of laws which infringe upon the religious status of the ISSA.
The first question is whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The appellant has an extensive traffic history commencing on 17th November 1992, when his passenger failed to wear a seat belt. Thereafter there are many other offences which are related to excessive speed. The subject offence relates to the fact that the appellant was driving whilst disqualified.
On the 3rd May 2003, he was ordered to pay a fine of $1600, was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for two years. On 5th February 2003, he was convicted of unlicensed driving and was disqualified for two years and fined $1200. Some four months later he was before the Court as mentioned for disqualified driving.
He has had two offences driving whilst with a prescribed alcohol content. He has other offences for speeding which show a complete disregard for the traffic rules.
The learned Magistrate took into account all of these matters in deciding the appropriate punishment. On any view of the matter, it cannot be said that the punishment was manifestly excessive.
Dealing with the question of the Independent Sovereign State of Australia (Federal/State) ISSA. The alternative ground relied upon there by the appellant is that he has a licence issued by the ISSA. It is further argued that a proclamation dated 24th December 1995, the ISSA set up a separate State to allow such a licence to be issued.
Further it is argued that such documents comply with the rule of law relating to documents under Section 118 of the Constitution Act (1990) UK.
These matters have been raised in other Courts. Goldberg J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Purple Harmony Plates Pty Ltd BC 2001 04454 said:
"The Commonwealth Constitution recognises the Commonwealth and the States and Territories as the only entities in the Federal policy known as the Commonwealth of Australia. An area of the land cannot cease to be part of the State and the Commonwealth except pursuant to Section 123 of the Constitution which provides that 'The Parliament of the Commonwealth may with the consent of the Parliament of the State and the approval of a majority of the electors of the State voting upon the question increase, diminish or otherwise alter the limits of the State upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon and may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the effect and operation of any increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation to any State affected.' There are other constitutional means available for the establishment of any separate political community. There are no other constitutional means available for the establishment of any separate political community in Australia."
From Goldberg J.
I concur with his Honour's views that a separate State cannot be established.
Further, in Cameron v. Beattie [2001] QCA 392, the Court of Appeal stated:
"The material in argument placed before the Court on behalf of Donald Gordon Cameron is nonsensical, unintelligible, illogical and fantasy. It does not give rise to any matter arising under Section 116 or 117 of the Constitution of Australia or indeed any other provision of the Constitution."
The Court there was concerned with a group of persons who called themselves the ISSA. This is the same entity which it is suggested provides a defence to the appellant in the present case on the offence of disqualified driving.
It is noted that the appellant in that case was Donald Gordon Cameron. Accordingly that case made an order under Section 17 of the Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 and declared Donald Gordon Cameron acting in concert with Donald Cameron, formerly Donald James Cameron a vexatious litigant.
Donald James Cameron has been declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to Section 3 of the Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 by the Court of Appeal in Re Cameron [1996] 2 Queensland Reports 216.
There has been a lot of time taken up in the Courts by these types of applications. The present appellant relies on similar arguments to those which have been raised in the past by litigants professing to belong to the ISSA.
The use of Court resources must be subject to the issue of proportionality, in other words, the Courts have to take the view that some litigants do not have the right to have every issue determined and dealt with in detail with no limit as to the time to be taken up in a particular case.
Court resources are limited and applying this principle to the present case, I have read the submissions of the appellant, I have allowed him limited time to present his main argument, he did not take up the full 15 minutes. However I do not intend to go into the detail of all the arguments presented by him when they have been ably dealt with in other Courts.
No particular individual should monopolise the Court on issues which have been described as "nonsensical, unintelligible, illogical and fantasy". See Williams JA in Cameron v. Beattie.
The appeal is dismissed.
It is ordered that the appellant David Alexander Peto do pay the costs of and incidental to this appeal to be assessed.