Higgs v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd
[2006] QDC 13
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- Higgs v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd[2006] QDC 13
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Higgs v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd[2006] QDC 13
Higgs v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd[2006] QDC 13
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND |
|
CITATION: Higgs v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 013
PARTIES:
DARRYL GREGORY HIGGS | Applicant |
v
AUSTRALIA MEAT HOLDINGS PTY LTD ABN14 011 062 338 | Respondent |
FILE NO/S: BD114/06
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING: Originating application
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 6 February 2006
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 6 February 2006
JUDGE: McGill DCJ
ORDER: Application transferred to Supreme Court under section 85 District Court of Queensland Act. Costs reserved.
CATCHWORDS:
EMPLOYMENT LAW – Injury of employee – pre-litigation procedure – order for provision of documents – jurisdiction of court
INFERIOR COURTS – District Court – Jurisdiction – application for order enforcing obligation in pre-litigation phase of employee's damages claim – jurisdiction not shown
WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 section 291
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 section 85
COUNSEL: | C. Newton for the applicant |
| G.J. Cross for the respondent |
DISTRICT COURT | No 114 of 2006 |
CIVIL JURISDICTION
JUDGE McGILL SC
DARRYL GREGORY HIGGS | Applicant |
and
AUSTRALIA MEAT HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ABN 14 011 062 338) | Respondent |
BRISBANE
..DATE 06/02/2006
ORDER
HIS HONOUR: This is an application under section 291 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 for an order that the respondent provide the applicant with certain documents. The respondent has on a preliminary basis submitted that this Court does not have jurisdiction because the applicant has, in the notice of claim which was delivered, sought an amount which was in excess of the limited jurisdiction of this Court.
The material before the Court certainly shows that at the time when the notice of claim was delivered in April 2005 the applicant claimant was seeking an amount of over $600,000 even after deducting the WorkCover expenses already paid. That is therefore a claim which by reference to amount is one that if it came to be litigated only the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to hear.
Section 291 appears in part 5 of chapter 5 of the Act. The objects of that part as said in section 279 to be to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in a claim for damages at a minimum of expense. The art is headed, “Pre-Court Procedures”.
Section 280 provides that before starting a proceeding in a Court for damages, a claimant must give notice under this section within the period of limitation for bringing a proceeding for damages under the Limitations of Actions Act 1974. The notice is required to state particulars required under a regulation.
Accordingly, the relevant part of the Act is concerned with steps that have to be taken prior to a proceeding in a Court and indeed with a view to a claim being resolved without Court proceedings having to be commenced. Compliance with the requirement of section 280 is required not merely by that section itself but also subsequently by section 302.
The section 291 provides, “If a party fails to comply with the provision of this chapter a court may order the party to comply with the provision and may make consequential or ancillary orders that may be necessary or desirable in the circumstances of the case.” The word, “court” is defined in schedule 3 as meaning, “The court having jurisdiction in relation to the amount or matter referred to.”
The only matter referred to in section 291 is a failure to comply with the provision of the chapter and ancillary or consequential matters, but the reference to amount in my opinion can be related to the amount of the claim. The claim is, of course, a claim for damages and therefore the chapter is concerned with a situation where a person is claiming damages and contemplating legal proceedings.
There is some authority in relation to the later provisions, in particular, section 305, which permits a Court to give leave to commence proceedings in certain circumstances.
There is authority that leave to commence a proceeding can only be given by the Court where the proceeding is to be commenced. Perhaps more precisely, that if leave to commence proceeding is given by a particular Court, a proceeding pursuant to that leave can only be commenced in that Court: Hamling v. Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 415.
The analysis of the relevant provisions in the judgment of Keane JA in that decision, with whom the other members of the Court agreed, does not deal specifically with the question of which Court has jurisdiction under section 291 but certainly suggests that the general pattern of the provisions considered was that the amount of the claim, and in due course, the amount of the damages claimed in the action, would determine the relevant Court. In my opinion, the same applies to section 291.
That section will only apply in circumstances where there is a claim for damages and, accordingly, in my opinion, bearing in mind the definition in schedule 3, it gives jurisdiction to a Court with jurisdiction in relation to the amount of the claim to make the orders specified.
Accordingly, in order to show the District Court has jurisdiction, it is necessary to show that the claim for damages is a claim for an amount within the jurisdiction of this Court. That means that, in the present case, the applicant has not shown that this Court has jurisdiction. I think the only plausible alternative construction of section 291 would be that any Court may order the party to comply with the provision, but I think that that is unlikely particularly in circumstances where section 291 is not confined to a failure to comply with the provision in Part V but can extend to a failure to comply with a provision anywhere in the chapter.
It would be consistent with the interpretation adopted in Hamling to treat section 291 as also confined to the Court having the relevant monetary jurisdiction, and inconsistent with that approach if it is treated as conferring the power on any Court.
Accordingly, in my opinion, it is necessary for an applicant seeking an order under section 291 to demonstrate that the applicant's claim is for an amount within the jurisdiction of the District Court if the application is to be made in this Court (see Rule 26(8) UCPR). The applicant has not been able to do that, indeed if anything the material strongly suggests that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in relation to this claim.
It was however submitted by counsel for the applicant that the respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court because there had been an earlier application in relation to the same claim in respect of which this point was not taken, a proceeding commenced by originating application 4020 of 2005. That was also before me and no issue of jurisdiction was raised in that matter and it was one that I was not aware of. It may well be that I had no jurisdiction to deal with that matter at all.
But in any event, even if the respondent did not take the point in that case and the matter was dealt with, jurisdiction, in my opinion, is not something which can be conferred on the Court in that way. It is well established that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent and it is difficult to see how the position is any different in relation to an estoppel. The fact that the absence of jurisdiction is not immediately ascertained or detected is also not something which confers jurisdiction. What matters is that it now appears to me that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to deal with this application.
As a consequence, the appropriate course is to order, under section 85 of the Supreme Court Act that this application be transferred to the Supreme Court.
Section 85 does not make provision for costs in these circumstances and I suspect that costs are a matter for the Supreme Court, but if I have jurisdiction in relation to costs, I will simply reserve them to the Supreme Court Judge.
...
HIS HONOUR: If I have jurisdiction to do it, I will just reserve the question of costs to the Supreme Court.
...