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  4. Lorikeet Constructions Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Donnelly & Ors - [2008] QDC 191

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Lorikeet Constructions Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Donnelly & Ors[2008] QDC 191

Lorikeet Constructions Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Donnelly & Ors[2008] QDC 191

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Lorikeet Constructions Pty Ltd (in Liq) v. Donnelly & Ors [2008] QDC 191

PARTIES:

LORIKEET CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)

(Plaintiff/Applicant)

AND

RAYMOND CHARLES DONNELLY AND JENNIFER ANN DONNELLY

(Defendants)

AND

RAMSAY CLOUT INSOLVENCY SERVICES PTY LTD

(ACN 104 803 778)

AND

JOHN WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM

AND

JOHN RICHARD PARK

FILE NOS:

268/07

DIVISION:

District Court of Queensland, Maroochydore

PROCEEDING:

Application in Chambers

ORIGINATING COURT:

Maroochydore District Court

DELIVERED ON:

8th August 2008

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

25.07.2008

JUDGE:

Judge J.M. Robertson

ORDER:

The counterclaim against the Plaintiff is struck out; the Defendant’s are given leave within (28) days to amend their defence to allege a set off to a maximum of $10,386.02 if they wish; if they do amend, the Plaintiff will have consequent leave to file a reply within 14 days of service; the claims against the second, third and fourth Defendants are struck out; no order as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

Application to strike out counterclaim against Defendants; where leave is necessary to commence proceedings against company in liquidation; where liquidators and their company joined as defendants by amended counterclaim to amended claim as a result of Plaintiff changing its case; R.171 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules; where there are no prospects of success against liquidators personally or their company; whether defendant can claim “set off” in defence equivalent to claim.

COSTS: Where application is made for indemnity costs, delay in Plaintiff applying to set aside counterclaim, where defendants are unrepresented, where plaintiffs approach tinged with legal error.

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001

Corporations Regulations 2001

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules

Cases Considered:

Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 ChApp 244

General Steel Industries Inc. v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR

Langley Constructions (Brixham) Ltd v Wells 1696] 1 WLR 503

Mine  Quarry Equipment International Limited v McIntosh (as liquidator for Mine & Quarry Equipment Pty Ltd) in liquidation [2005] QCA 186

Smits v Jabone and Blue Coast Yeppoon Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 337

Wambo Coal Pty Ltd v Stuart Karm Aritt & Anor [2007] NSWSC 589

Worchild v The University of Queensland law Society Inc & Anor [2005] QCA 374

COUNSEL:

Mr. P Mylne  for Plaintiff, Second, Third and Fourth Defendants

(as applicants)

Defendants self represented

SOLICITORS:

Sajen Legal for Plaintiff, Second, Third and Fourth Defendants

(as applicants)

  1. [1]
    The applications now before the court follow what can only be described as a most unfortunate history of litigation between the Plaintiff company in liquidation and the Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly. Some of that history is set out in my ex tempore reasons for judgment delivered on 06.06.08 at which time I dismissed an application for summary judgment by the Defendants.
  1. [2]
    The Plaintiff now seeks orders that the Donnelly’s counter claim against the company should be struck out because leave to so proceed has not been obtained from the Supreme court, as well as their claims recently commenced against the liquidators and their company, pursuant to r.171 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.

Brief history of the litigation

  1. [3]
    In 2005 the Plaintiff and the Defendants were parties to a building contract whereby the company as builder agreed to construct a commercial building for the Donnellys at Mooloolaba. A dispute arose concerning completion; the Plaintiff alleging that it had completed the works and delivered a final invoice which the Donnelly’s would not pay; and the Donnelly’s essentially alleging that the Plaintiff failed to properly complete rectification works as required by the contract.
  1. [4]
    On the 03.03.06 the Plaintiff delivered a tax invoice No.13 to the Defendants for $56,317.80 which it appears was for the first half of retention monies payable under the contract.
  2. [5]
    It is common ground that on the 13.3.06 the Defendants took possession of the building and changed the locks. The Defendants say they were authorised by the contract to do this; the Plaintiff alleges they were in breach of the contract.
  1. [6]
    The Plaintiff’s case until recently was that the Defendants had not paid this invoice but now accept that in fact $56,317 was paid by them on 16.5.06. At the time of commencement of these proceedings it was the Plaintiff’s claim that this sum had not been paid at all.
  1. [7]
    On the 01.08.06 Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Park of Ramsey Court Insolvency Services Pty Ltd were appointed administrators of the Plaintiff company.
  1. [8]
    On the 2.8.06, the balance of monies in the Plaintiff’s account with the ANZ, $45,931.78 was paid to the administrators account.
  1. [9]
    On the 7th December 2006, Messers Park and Cunningham were appointed liquidators of the Plaintiff, and on 20.3.2007 commenced proceedings against Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly in the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal for the sum of $56,314.80 the subject of invoice No.13. Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly defended these proceedings and were represented by solicitors.
  1. [10]
    On 17.9.07 the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal ordered that Court proceedings commence due to lack of jurisdiction.
  1. [11]
    On 19.12.07 the Defendants filed a defence to the proceedings commenced in this court on 15.11.07 and counterclaimed against the Plaintiff for breach of contract. That defence (in paragraph 3(c)) makes it clear that the Defendants were asserting that Invoice No.13 was for the release of the first half of retention monies namely $56,317.80, and disputing the Plaintiffs claim  in paragraph 3 of its Statement of Claim that this was “the balance of retention monies under the contract”. At the time of the filing of this pleading, the Donnellys were still represented by solicitors Holding Redlich.
  1. [12]
    The Plaintiffs claim has now changed and it alleges this is the fault of the Defendants who throughout the dispute until December 2007 had never asserted that Invoice No 13 had in fact been paid by them. Certainly, when one examines the claim in the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal the Plaintiff’s claim is clearly for an amount of $56,317 “as set out in “Invoice 13” dated 3 March 2006 being the balance of retention monies”. The Defendant’s response was to admit that $56,317 had not been paid but to deny liability on the basis that the cost of rectifying outstanding defects under the contract would exceed the claim.
  1. [13]
    The Plaintiffs amended claim filed on 7 July 2008 claims $10,386.02 which, as I understand its case, is the balance of the retention monies payable under the contract i.e. $56,317.80, less the $45,931.78 received by the liquidators on 2.8.06.
  1. [14]
    In its Reply and Answer (filed 9.1.08) to the Defendants Defence and Counterclaim filed 19.12.07 the Plaintiff placed reliance on an alleged settlement agreement dated 26 July 2006. The agreement is set out in full in Ex. KJK-7 to Mr. Kimble’s (solicitor for the Plaintiff) affidavit filed 3.6.08. The Donnelly’s did not plead to paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 in the Reply and Answer and Mr. Mylne, by reference to the pleading rules in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, has again attempted to argue that the failure constitutes an admission of the allegation which cannot be withdrawn without leave. I say again, because he sought to make an oral application in these terms at the hearing in June which I refused to entertain, essentially on the basis that the application should be in writing and fully articulated to give the Donnellys a chance to respond. The “agreement” is dated 26.7.06 and is (relevantly) in these terms:

“In consideration of Donnelly handing to Lorikeet at 3.00pm on Wednesday 26 July 2006 the following:

1. a cheque, payable to Bradley & Bray Trust Account for $42,316.60 (including GST);

 Lorikeet does:

 1. agree to discontinue the Expert determination; and

2. hereby release and discharge Donnelly in respect of all other claims for moneys owing under the Contract of whatsoever nature save and except for the balance retention moneys. The balance retention will be released pursuant to the terms of the Contract.”

  1. [15]
    What is now clear to me is that the Plaintiff’s claim (as particularised in paragraph 13 of its amended Statement of Claim) now relies upon monies allegedly owing pursuant to what is pleaded as the “Final Progress Claim” which relates to Invoice 17 dated 2.3.06 (see paragraph 16 or the amended Statement of Claim). In dealing with Mr. Mylne’s pleading point, it is necessary for me to set out in full the way in which the Defendants alleged liability to the Plaintiff is now pleaded, in reliance in part on the alleged “Settlement Agreement”:

“16. The settlement Agreement provided, inter alia, that:

  1. The Defendants were to pay $42,316.60 for the Final Progress Claim;
  2. In consideration for that payment the Plaintiff:
  1. Accepted a reduced amount from $58,042.50, as payment of the Final Progress Claim, Invoice 17, dated 2 March 2006;
  2. The payment of the reduced amount was $15,725.90 less than the claim, Invoice 17, dated 2 March 2006;
  3. Accepted the reduced amount to the finalise all rectification demands and set offs as sought by the Defendants;
  4. Agreed to discontinue the Expert determination;
  5. Released and discharged the Defendants in respect of all other claims for money owing under the Contract of whatsoever nature save and except for the balance retention monies; and
  6. The balance retention monies were to be released pursuant to the terms of the Contract.

17. The balance of the retention money under the Contract was due for release on or about 1 October 2006.

 Particulars

  1. The date of practical completion was 3 March 2006.
  2. The defects liability period expired at 4pm on 3 September 2006.
  3. The superintendent must issue the final certificate, evidencing the monies due and payable between the Plaintiff and the Defendants, within 21 days after the expiry of the defects liability period (Clause 28.1 of the Contract).
  4. The monies so certified must be paid to the Defendants to the Plaintiff within 7 days of the giving of the final certificate (Clause 28.2 of the Contract).”
  1. [16]
    Apart from observing in relation to paragraph 16 that the “Settlement Agreement” on its face does not provide as alleged in that paragraph; if one has regard to the documents apparently leading up to that so called agreement, which are annexures KJK-5 and KVK-6 to Mr. Kimble’s 3.6.08 affidavit, it appears that the sum of $58,042.50 may relate to another invoice (referred to as Claim No 15) and not Invoice 17, although the Donnelly’s seem to accept it was 17 in their amended Defence. What does seem clear is that it was contemplated that the balance of retention monies (which it is pleaded and admitted was due for release on 1 October 2006) was still to be governed by the terms of the Contract. Clearly, oral and other evidence will be necessary if the Plaintiff is to prove its allegation contained in paragraphs 15 and 16. By their pleading (paragraphs 14 and 15) the Donnelly’s have denied that the “Settlement Agreement” has the meaning and effect now contended for by the Plaintiff.

The Pleading Point

  1. [17]
    Although this was put as an alternative submission by Mr. Mylne at the hearing on the 25th July, I will deal with it now, because it demonstrates what I think is a confused and clouded approach to this litigation demonstrated by both parties to it, and ultimately it is relevant to the issue of costs.
  2. [18]
    Mr. Mylne’s client never did put its application in this regard into written form notwithstanding what I said about his oral applications made on 6.6.08 to which I refer to at page 5 line 8 of my reasons of that date.
  1. [19]
    Mr. Mylne’s argument is as follows.  In his clients Reply and Answer filed 9.1.08 it is pleaded:

“4.1 as to paragraphs 1 to 6 the Plaintiff says notwithstanding the terms of the Contract the parties entered into an agreement dated 26 July 2006 (“the settlement agreement”) whereby the Respondent’s rights in respect of the alleged defects under the Contract were compromised.

4.2 In entering into the settlement agreement the parties agreed:

  1. (a)
    The defects had been rectified to the satisfaction of the Respondent;
  1. (b)
    As practical completion had been reached the Respondent would pay to the Plaintiff the full balance of retention monies;
  1. (c)
    The parties released each other from all other claims arising under the Contract excluding the Plaintiff’s entitlement to payment of the balance of retention moneys.”
  1. [20]
    The Defendants have not replied to that pleading, therefore by virtue of r.166(1) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules the allegations of fact are deemed to be admitted. However, as the Reply and Answer was the last pleading filed, the allegation in these paragraphs are taken to be a non-admission and the Defendant’s are estopped from calling evidence as a result of r.165(2). Mr. Mylne’s submission completely overlooks the fact that in light of the change in the Plaintiff’s claim foreshadowed at the hearing on the 6th June, his client amended its claim pursuant to r.378 which pleading included paragraphs 16 and 17 which I have set out above. As a result, the Donnellys have repleaded to the Statement of Claim, including paragraphs 16 and 17 as a consequence of r.385(1). It would be a surprising result indeed if, in those circumstances, they would be prevented from calling evidence in support of their pleading at the trial. The whole purpose of the pleading “rules” is to ensure that issues are clearly defined and that parties do not hide behind blanket denials in an effort to avoid focussing on the real issues in the case. The result contended for by Mr. Mylne is completely contrary to the philosophy which underpins the rules, set out in r.5 and in particular 5(2).

The Plaintiffs Applications

  1. [21]
    With this in mind, I now turn to the Plaintiffs applications heard on 25th July. Both heads of the Plaintiffs application rely on r.171(1) which is in these terms:

“(1) This rule applies if a pleading or part of a pleading--

(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; or

(b) has a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or

(c) is unnecessary or scandalous; or

(d) is frivolous or vexatious; or

(e) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. “

  1. [22]
    It is accepted that the jurisdiction to strike out pleadings in a way which will summarily terminate proceedings, should be exercised sparingly. The learned authors of Civil Procedure Queensland in the annotations to this rule note that the language of the rule follows closely prior rules and that the leading case of General Steel Industries Inc. v  Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR at 125 per Barwick CJ sets out the appropriate “test” in an application of this nature (see Worchild v The University of Queensland Law Society Inc & Anor [2005] QCA 374):

“…Plaintiff ought not to be denied access to the customary tribunal which deals with actions of the kind he brings, unless his lack of a cause of action - if that be the ground on which the court is invited, as in this case, to exercise its powers of summary dismissal - is clearly demonstrated. The test to be applied has been variously expressed; ‘so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed’; ‘manifestly groundless’; ‘so manifestly faulty that it does not admit of argument’; "discloses a case which the Court is satisfied cannot succeed"; "under no possibility can there be a good cause of action"; ‘be manifest that to allow them’ (the pleadings) ‘to stand would involve useless expense’. (at p129)

At times the test has been put as high as saying that the case must be so plain and obvious that the court can say at once that the statement of claim, even if proved, cannot succeed; or ‘so manifest on the view of the pleadings, merely reading through them, that it is a case that does not admit of reasonable argument’; ‘so to speak apparent at a glance’.”

The Claim against the Company

  1. [23]
    For reasons that I find quite unsatisfactory, the Plaintiff has waited until now to rely on provisions in the Corporations Act 2001 to apply to strike out the Counterclaim of the Defendants which was first made in the proceedings last year in the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal. As I commented to Mr. Mylne during argument, it is simply inconceivable that (a) the lawyers were not aware of these provisions and (b) that the experienced liquidators Messers, Cunningham and Park would not have been aware of provisions in the Act which proscribe the commencement or continuation of civil proceedings against a company in liquidation.
  1. [24]
    Mr. Cunningham in his affidavit filed 21 July 2008 at paragraphs 6-10 sets out the mechanism of his (and Mr. Park’s) appointment as joint liquidators of the company.
  1. [25]
    As a consequence of Reg. 5.3.A.07 of the Corporations Regulations 2001 and s.500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001, “no action or other civil proceeding is to be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the court”, which is relevantly defined as the Supreme Court of Queensland. There is no doubt that the Counterclaim is a “proceeding”: see Mine & Quarry Equipment International Limited v McIntosh (as liquidator for Mine & Quarry Equipment Pty Ltd in liquidation) [2005] QCA 186 per McPherson JA (at 5) following Langley Constructions (Brixham) Ltd  v Wells [1969] 1 WLR 503.
  1. [26]
    As McPherson JA observed in that case, by reference to s 471B of the Corporations Act (and other like provisions which would include s 500(2)), the purpose of such provisions “is to ensure that claims of that kind…are kept within the “winding up workshop”.”
  1. [27]
    It follows that as leave has never been granted, the Counterclaim was a nullity from the start; and should be struck out pursuant to r.171, as for this reason alone it discloses no reasonable cause of action, and to use one of the expressions mentioned by the Chief Justice in General Steel “discloses a case which the court is satisfied cannot succeed”.
  1. [28]
    Mrs. Donnelly made no real response to this aspect of the Plaintiff’s application and I did consider giving her time to apply to the Supreme Court for an order that leave be granted nunc pro tunc, but for a number of reasons,  I have decided against that. For a start, even if she were to succeed in full on her counterclaim, she and her husband would nevertheless stand only as unsecured creditors. The report to creditors which is annexure KK1 to Mr. Kymble’s affidavit filed 4.6.08 does not give much hope to unsecured creditors of a substantial payment. Also, it is moderately clear that the expert determination commenced by the company pursuant to the Contract included part of the present claim for $159,301.33 for damages for breach of contract. As I have noted, the actual terms of the so called settlement agreement will need to be proved by other evidence, however it does appear that as part of it, the company agreed to discontinue the Expert Determination. These factors alone would constitute major obstacles to the granting of leave, and no doubt the Plaintiff, given its attitude to the litigation to date, could think of many more. I am also very conscious of the extensive additional costs that would be occasioned by giving time to make the application to the Supreme Court.
  1. [29]
    In the Langley Construction case, the right to Counterclaim without leave (in circumstances as exist here) was confined to “setting off by way of defence no more than the amount claimed against (the Defendants) in the action brought by the Company”. The Donnelly’s have not sought leave to amend their defence to claim a set off, however I think that they should be given that opportunity (see r.173 and the discussion in the annotations Civil Procedure Queensland Volume 1 p.8301).

Claims against the liquidators and their company

  1. [30]
    Unfortunately, the Donnellys took the opportunity when repleading to the Plaintiffs amended claim to add Mr. Park and Mr. Cunningham and their Company as Defendants pursuant to r.178 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. It is absolutely clear that the Donnellys do not have any cause of action against Ramsay Court Insolvency Services Pty Ltd. There is no way that the Donnelly’s could establish (as potential creditors of the company in liquidation) any duty of care owed to them by the liquidators company and clearly there was never any privity of contract between them. That claim is clearly vexatious and has no hope of success.
  1. [31]
    The claims against the two liquidators personally seem to allege negligence and breach of contract and breach of trust. There is no chance of the Donnelly’s succeeding against Messers, Park and Cunningham in negligence or for breach of a contract to which they were never parties.
  1. [32]
    As far as the alleged breach of trust is concerned, I accept Mr. Mylne’s submission that on the evidence before me, the first the liquidators knew of an allegation that the monies transferred to them from the ANZ account on 2.8.06 were held in trust, was on 10.12.07, in a letter from the Donnellys solicitors. In accordance with the first of two (so called) limbs of Lord Selborne LC’s statement in Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 ChApp 244 at 251-252, a constructive trust will only be found to exist where it can be found that when a person in the position of the liquidators received the money from the Bank, they knew or should have known that the money was being applied in a manner inconsistent with a trust. The monies held in the company’s ANZ account were not said to be the subject of any trust, and the liquidators received the monies believing then (reasonably) that the monies were the property of the company unencumbered by any trust. There is no allegation of fraud or impropriety.
  1. [33]
    In support of her argument that there was a possible cause of action based on breach of trust, Mrs. Donnelly relied on the judgment in Wambo Coal Pty Ltd v Stuart Karm Aritt & Anor [2007] NSWSC 589. Mr. Aritt was the liquidator of the second Defendant company. Monies were paid by the Plaintiff by mistake to the company in liquidation, and the liquidator used the monies to pay disbursements incurred in the liquidation.  Mrs. Donnelly submitted that proceedings had been taken against the company in liquidation without leave being obtained from the NSW Supreme Court, but that is clearly not so. The circumstances of the case are clearly different. Importantly, the monies were paid by the Plaintiff mistakenly into the account of the company in liquidation and it was only a part of the monies claimed, that the liquidator was held to be liable to account for as a constructive trustee, because the Court determined on the evidence that he had knowledge that those monies were paid by mistake at the time the payments were made. This is not the case here.
  1. [34]
    The claims against Mr. Park and Mr. Cunningham cannot possibly succeed and disclose no reasonable cause of action.
  1. [35]
    The power to add parties by way of counterclaim in r.178 is subject to the Plaintiff also being made a party to the counterclaim. It would follow, that as a result of the counterclaim against the Plaintiff being a nullity from the start, there would be no basis on which other parties could be included in these proceedings by application of r.178.
  1. [36]
    The orders will be:

1. The counterclaim against the Plaintiff is struck out

2. The Defendant’s are given leave within (28) days to amend their defence to allege a set off to a maximum of $10,386.02 if they wish. If they do amend, the Plaintiff will have consequent leave to file a reply within 14 days of service.

3. The claims against the second, third and fourth Defendants are struck out.

Costs

  1. [37]
    Both parties were given an opportunity to make costs submissions at the end of the hearing and did so.
  1. [38]
    The Plaintiff seeks indemnity costs against the Defendant and relies on Smits v Jabone and Blue Coast Yeppoon Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 337.
  1. [39]
    In my opinion, the Plaintiff should have raised the s 502(2) point at an earlier time e.g. at the time of the last hearing on the 6th June when it successfully opposed the Defendants application for summary judgment. As I have noted, there is no satisfactory explanation why it wasn’t raised. I assume that none of the lawyers or the liquidators thought of it until the Defendants filed their amended defence and counterclaim. If the Plaintiff had taken the point then, the same result would have followed and the Defendants could not have joined the liquidators and their company by way of counterclaiming against them as additional parties, and these proceedings would not have been necessary.
  1. [40]
    The correspondence from the Plaintiffs solicitors to the Defendants leading up to the hearing on the 25th July upon which it now relies in support of its costs claim is peppered with confusion and legal error. In its original application filed on 8 July 2006 it claimed relief under r.379. Service of the application was accompanied by a letter referring to r.377 which deals with amendment of originating process, and other rules. On the 18.07.08, this application was (in effect) replaced by the application based on r.171 which was heard on the 25th July and now determined in favour of the Plaintiff. Service of this application was accompanied by another letter dated 18th July 2008. This wrongly referred to s.471B of the Corporations Act and not s.500(2), although the provisions are similar. It also referred to some cases which were not in fact relevant.
  1. [41]
    The application before the Court on the 25th July was an application only for :

“1. An order that the counterclaim be struck out pursuant to Rule 171 UCPR

2. The Defendant pay the Plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the application on the indemnity basis”;

And not “to strike out the counterclaim against the plaintiff, the second defendant by counterclaim and the third defendant by counterclaim” as asserted by Mr. Mylne in the first paragraph of his written outline.

  1. [42]
    As I have noted, it seems to me that once the counterclaim fails because of the s 500(2) point, the Defendants joinder of the remaining three Defendants necessarily fails as well; however that was not the way it was put to the Defendants in the letter of the 18th July, nor was it the way it was argued by Mr. Mylne on the 25th July. I have dealt with his submissions concerning the second, third and fourth Defendants because, in my opinion, there is clearly no viable cause of action against them, and removing them from the proceedings now will (to use the words of r.5(1)) “facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in …(the proceedings).”
  1. [43]
    It follows for these reasons, and although the Plaintiff has succeeded on its application, there should be no order as to costs and I refuse the application for indemnity costs.
  1. [44]
    It is to be hoped that in light of these conclusions some commonsense and reality might come into play so as to avoid ongoing expense in prosecuting a claim at the lower end of the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court with a potential equivalent set-off.
Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Lorikeet Constructions Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Donnelly & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Lorikeet Constructions Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Donnelly & Ors

  • MNC:

    [2008] QDC 191

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    JM Robertson

  • Date:

    08 Aug 2008

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
(Brixham) Ltd v Wells [1696] 1 WLR 503
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1696] 1 WLR 503
Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 244
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1874) 9 Ch App 244
Cite 2 - (1874) 9 Ch App 244
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
Cite 2 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
Cite 3 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
Langley Constructions (Brixham) Ltd v Wells [1969] 1 WLR 503
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1969] 1 WLR 503
Mine & Quarry Equipment International Ltd v McIntosh [2005] QCA 186
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 186
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 186
Smits v Tabone [2007] QCA 337
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] QCA 337
Cite 2 - [2007] QCA 337
Wambo Coal Pty Ltd v Ariff (2007) NSWSC 589
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2007) NSWSC 589
Cite 2 - (2007) NSWSC 589
Worchild v University of Queensland Law Society [2005] QCA 374
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 374
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 374

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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