Your JavaScript is currently disabled. For the best experience viewing this website please enable JavaScript as described here.

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments

Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode

Please Note: You are about to print a copy of the onscreen version of this judgment. For court use, a full PDF copy of the judgment is required or preferred. Please return to the case for PDF printing options.

Word Highlighter:
0of0
Change Font and Font Size
Font:
Font Size:
CITE

Unreported Judgment

Smith v Professional Suites Community Title Scheme 14487[2008] QDC 252Dearden DCJ
Add to List

Smith v Professional Suites Community Title Scheme 14487[2008] QDC 252

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Smith v Professional Suites Community Title Scheme [2008] QDC 252
PARTIES:	JODIE SMITH (Applicant/Plaintiff) v PROFESSIONAL SUITES COMMUNITY TITLE SCHEME 14487 (Respondent/Defendant)
FILE NO/S:	3873/2004
DIVISION:	Civil
PROCEEDING:	Application
ORIGINATING COURT:	District Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:	17 October 2008
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	22 August 2008
JUDGE:	Dearden DCJ
ORDER:	Application dismissed
CATCHWORDS:	APPLICATION - no “question” for decision - determination of the expertise of an expert witness - judicial determination of a “question” to involve a conclusive or final decision - "question" includes any question or issue of fact or law - all issues of fact and law determined at the one time
LEGISLATION:	Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) rr 469(4), 482, 483, 667(2)(b) Criminal Code s 590AA Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 Workers’ Compensation Act 1990 Workplace Health & Safety Act 1995
CASES:	Arnold v Attorney-General for Victoria [1995] FCA 727 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9 Blurton v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1991) 29 FCR 442 Cairns City Council v Xontan Pty Ltd (unreported, Jones J, Supreme Court, 10 September 1999) CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O'Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 601 Chippendale Printing Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 17 ACSR 328 Comite Interprofessionnel des Vins des Cotes de Provence v Bryce (1996) 69 FCR 450 Cotton & Anor v Hammond & Ors [2002] QSC 429 Creek & Anor v O'Malley & Anor [2001] QSC 122 DHBC Pty Ltd v Fitzroy Island Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 98 Digi International Inc v Stallion Technologies Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 442 Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Bata Shoe Company of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 230 General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia v RACQ Insurance Ltd [2003] QSC 80 GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] FCA 934 Jacobson v Ross [1995] 1 VR 337 Knaggs v Queensland Building Services Authority & Anor [2005] QSC 260 Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society (1993) 113 ALR 643 Mani v Nominal Defendant [2002] QSC 152 Nissan v Attorney-General [1969] UKHL 3; [1970] AC 179 O'Brien & Anor v T F Wollam & Son Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 217 Pritchard v Racecage Pty Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 96 and on appeal, (1997) 72 FCR 203 Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor [1999] FCA 718 Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 567 Ritchie v Binris (Aust) Pty Ltd & Ors [2004] QSC 254 Shortis v Mr Carpet (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd [2003] QDC 377 South Pacific Air Motive Pty Ltd v Magnus (1998) 157 ALR 443
COUNSEL:	Dr G J Cross for the applicant/plaintiff Mr R Morton for the respondent/defendant
SOLICITORS:	Colin Patino & Co. for the applicant/plaintiff Moray & Agnew for the respondent/defendant

Introduction

[1]
On 10 June 2008, I dismissed, with costs, an application by the respondent/defendant (Professional Suites Community Title Scheme 14487) seeking the dispensing of the plaintiff’s solicitor’s signature on the request of a trial be dispensed with pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) r 469(4). An application by the applicant/plaintiff Jodie Smith seeking “that pursuant to r 483 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules the court determined the admissibility of the expert report of Justin O'Sullivan dated 25 June 2004”^[1] was, by consent, adjourned to a date to be fixed to be heard before me. In due course, the application was heard before me in the District Court at Beenleigh on 22 August 2008. At that stage, the respondent/defendant, represented by Mr Morton, raised as a preliminary issue a submission that the applicant/plaintiff’s application should be dismissed because:-

“(a) an interlocutory matter is not a “question” for decision within the meaning of UCPR r 483;

(b)
any “decision” would be interlocutory and therefore liable to be re-opened; hence the exercise is one of futility.^[2] In the alternative, the respondent/defendant submitted that the application should be decided adversely to the applicant/plaintiff on various grounds relating to an assertive lack of either “specialised knowledge” and/or expertise on behalf of Mr Justin O'Sullivan.”

Is UCPR r 483 available to decide an expert witness’ expertise prior to trial?

[2]
UCPR r 483 relevantly provides:-

“(1) The court may make an order for the decision by the court of a question separately from another question, whether before, at, or after the trial or continuation of the trial of the proceedings.”

[3]
UCPR r 482 provides:-

“In this part –

Question Includes question or issue in a proceeding, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise.”

[4]
I have been helpfully referred by Mr Morton on behalf of the respondent/defendant to the decision of Branson J in the Federal Court in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor^[3] where Branson J was called upon to consider an application made under Order 29 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules, which is essentially in the same terms. Federal Court Rules (FCR) O 29 rr 1 & 2 provide:-

“1. In this Order, “question” includes any question or issue in any proceeding whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise.

The Court may make orders for –

(a)
The decision of any question separately from any other question, whether before, at or after any trial or further trial in the proceedings;

(b)
the statement of a case and the question for decision.”

[5]
Branson J then sets out (helpfully in my view) the legal principles involved:-

“6 Order 29 rule 2 gives to the Court wide powers to regulate the procedures to be adopted for the hearing and determination of a proceeding.

7 Ordinarily all issues of fact and law in a proceeding will be determined at the one time by the Court following a trial (O 32). However, the authorities show that O 29 r 2 has been relied on to support the making of orders that have modified this general rule in the following ways:

(a)
by requiring that certain questions, formulated by the order, be decided separately from (and presumably, before) any other questions in the proceeding on the basis of a special case stated in accordance with O 50 r 1 (see, for example, Chippendale Printing Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 17 ACSR 328);

(b)
by requiring the determination of a preliminary issue of law in circumstances in which it was unnecessary for any facts to be stated or evidence to be adduced (see, for example, Blurton v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1991) 29 FCR 442);

(c)
by requiring the determination of certain preliminary questions of law as to the competence of the case of the applicant on the basis of certain agreed facts (see, for example, Pritchard v Racecage Pty Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 96 and on appeal, (1997) 72 FCR 203; South Pacific Air Motive Pty Ltd v Magnus (1998) 157 ALR 443);

(d)
by requiring the separate trial "as a preliminary issue" of certain of the claims made by the applicant (see, for example, Comite Interprofessionnel des Vins des Cotes de Provence v Bryce (1996) 69 FCR 450);

(e)
by requiring that the question of the respondents' liability be tried separately, and that any question as to the quantum of any damages to be paid by the respondents, or any of them, to the applicants, or as to the taking of any account of the respondents' profits, be tried separately and at a dated to be fixed after the determination of the question of liability (see, for example, Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 567).

8 The principles that govern the circumstances in which an order will be made under O 29 r 2 are relatively well established. They may be summarised as follows:

(a)
the term "question" in O 29 r 1 includes any question or issue of fact or law in a proceeding. The distinction in the rule between an "issue" and a "question" is the distinction between that which, when resolved, will result in an adjudication in favour of one party or the other, being an "issue", and less decisive matters of dispute being "questions" (Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society (1993) 113 ALR 643 at 647);

(b)
question can be the subject of an order for a separate decision under O 29 r 2 even though a decision on such a question will not determine any of the parties' rights (Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society at 647);

(c)
however, the judicial determination of a question under O 29 r 2 must involve a conclusive or final decision based on concrete and established or agreed facts for the purpose of quelling a controversy between the parties (Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9 at para 45);

(d)
where the preliminary question is one of mixed fact and law, it is necessary that the question can be precisely formulated and that all of the facts that are on any fairly arguable view relevant to the determination of the question are ascertainable either as facts assumed to be correct for the purposes of the preliminary determination, or as agreed facts or as facts to be judicially determined (Jacobson v Ross [1995] 1 VR 337 at 341, referring to Nissan v Attorney-General [1969] UKHL 3; [1970] AC 179 at 242-243 per Lord Pearson; Bass v Perpetual Trustee at para 53);

(e)
care must be taken in utilising the procedure provided for in O 29 r 1 to avoid the determination of issues not "ripe" for separate and preliminary determination. An issue may not be "ripe" for separate and preliminary determination in this sense where it is simply one of two or more alternative ways in which an applicant frames its case and determination of the issue would leave significant other issues unresolved (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O'Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 601 per Kirby P at 606);

(f)
factors which tend to support the making of an order under O 29 r 2 include that the separate determination of the question may –

(i)
contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the issues for trial, or even lead to disposal of the action; or

(ii)
contribute to the settlement of the litigation (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O'Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 601 per Kirby P at 607);

(g)
factors which tell against the making of an order under O 29 r 2 include that the separate determination of the question may –

(i)
give rise to significant contested factual issues both at the time of the hearing of the preliminary question and at the time of trial (GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] FCA 934);

(ii)
result in significant overlap between the evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial - possibly involving the calling of the same witnesses at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding (GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth; Arnold v Attorney-General for Victoria [1995] FCA 727). This factor will be of particular significance if the Court may be required to form a view as to the credibility of witnesses who may give evidence at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding; or

(iii)
prolong rather than shorten the litigation (GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth).

9 Ultimately the issue for the Court to determine when consideration is being given to the making of an order under O 29 r 2 is whether it is "just and convenient" for the order to be made (Arnold v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria). There are classes of proceedings in which it is commonly recognised that it is just and convenient for an order under O 29 r 2 to be made. One such class is proceedings concerning intellectual property rights where an applicant can not be compelled to make an election as between damages and an account of profits at least until all of the evidence has been received so that, if an order has not been made separating the determination of the issues of liability and relief, the parties will have to call evidence to deal with both damages and an account of profits (Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Bata Shoe Company of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 230). Another class is proceedings in which an application in the nature of a demurrer is appropriately made. An application of this kind assumes the truth of the pleaded facts. In a case in which it is clear that the pleadings contain all of the relevant facts but one party contends that the pleading does not disclose a cause of action, or a defence or a matter of reply, as the case may be, an application in the nature of a demurrer will have obvious utility (Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd at para 50).”

[6]
As Mr Morton submits in his written outline^[4] “each of these circumstances [set out in para 8(a)–(e) of Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor] refer to a substantive issue or question in the case or at best a preliminary question of law where no facts need to be adduced.” Mr Morton goes on to argue that the application in the proceedings before me does not fall within any of the categories canvassed by Branson J in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor. I should note that those categories are not to be considered exhaustive.

[7]
Mr Morton sets out at length examples of issues or questions that have been determined pursuant to UCPR r 483 namely:-

“Defamation – whether a published article conveyed any of the imputations pleaded: Creek & Anor v O'Malley & Anor [2001] QSC 122; see also Knaggs v Queensland Building Services Authority & Anor [2005] QSC 260.

Personal Injuries – whether alleged breaches of the Workplace Health & Safety Act 1995, if proven, create a right of action: O'Brien & Anor v T F Wollam & Son Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 217.

Personal Injuries – whether the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 applies to the facts of the case: Mani v Nominal Defendant [2002] QSC 152.

Personal injuries – determination of issues of vicarious liability: Cotton & Anor v Hammond & Ors [2002] QSC 429.

Insurance – whether a party is precluded from recovering its loss under a policy of insurance: General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia v RACQ Insurance Ltd [2003] QSC 80.

Personal Injuries – whether a plaintiff was a worker as defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act 1990: Shortis v Mr Carpet (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd [2003] QDC 377.

Contract – the true construction of a clause in a licence agreement: DHBC Pty Ltd v Fitzroy Island Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 98.”

[8]
Mr Morton submits that the examples which he places before the court all refer to an issue or question of some substance rather than what he describes as “merely a point of evidence”.

[9]
Mr Morton submits further that the decision of Branson J in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor has been applied in various judgments of the Queensland courts including Cairns City Council v Xontan Pty Ltd (unreported, Jones J, Supreme Court, 10 September 1999); Digi International Inc v Stallion Technologies Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 442; Shortis v Mr Carpet (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd [2003] QDC 377 (paras 17-18); Ritchie v Binris (Aust) Pty Ltd & Ors [2004] QSC 254.

[10]
Mr Morton submits that a ruling by me as to the expertise of the expert witness would not necessarily be binding on the trial judge (in contrast for example to Criminal Code s 590AA which provides specifically for a pre-trial directions ruling on the admissibility of evidence^[5] which is binding at trial unless the trial judge “for special reason” gives leave to re-open the direction or ruling). In short, Mr Morton submits that there is no benefit in the determination of the question of the admissibility of the expert evidence prior to trial and on that basis alone, as well as the further difficulty which could arise if the material before the trial judge was different to that upon which this court proceeded on the hearing of this application, then the exercise would be one of extreme futility.^[6]

[11]
It is an unhappy state of affairs when the respondent/defendant (through its then counsel) agreed to have the issue of the expertise of an expert witness decided as a preliminary point, and subsequently (through Mr Morton at the substantive hearing before me on 22 August 2008) retracts that agreement. However, although such a retraction may sound in respect of the issue of costs, there is a clear obligation on counsel in such proceedings to ensure that the court is not seeking to undertake a hearing which it is either not empowered to undertake, or should not, in the exercise of its discretion, undertake.

[12]
In my view the submissions by Mr Morton are irresistible. I do not consider that the provisions of UCPR r 483(1) are apt to decide on a preliminary basis the expertise of the witness Justin O'Sullivan. There are, in my view, significant concerns raised by the respondent/defendant as to Mr O'Sullivan’s expertise, in particular in respect of the issue of the application of relevant standards relating to plate glass, but in my view that dispute is, in the light of the exposition of the relevant legal principles outlined by Branson J in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor, a matter which must be dealt with by the trial judge rather than as a preliminary issue on application. In particular, I accept the submission on behalf of the respondent/defendant that there is no “question” for decision. In effect, the plaintiff is seeking from the court an “advice on evidence”. If (as appears obvious) the applicant/plaintiff has concerns about the expertise of its “expert witness”, then the obvious solution is to seek a further report or reports from an expert with the specific expertise relevant to the matters in dispute.

[13]
Further, I consider that it is unlikely that the determination of the expertise of Mr O'Sullivan as preliminary issue would lead to the likely settlement of the proceedings. In any event, as I have indicated above, any order if it were to be made by me, is open to being revisited by a trial judge in the light of the way in which (and the material upon which) the trial court proceeds with the litigation.

Conclusion

[14]
For the reasons set out above, I consider that there is no “question” for my decision pursuant to UCPR r 483. If I am wrong in that conclusion, then in the exercise of my discretion, I decline to deal with the application on a preliminary basis given the (effective) non-binding nature of any such determination. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

Costs Component of Order dated 13 June 2008

[15]
On 13 June 2008, I made an order in respect of the plaintiff’s application (to determine the expertise of the expert witness Mr Justin O'Sullivan) in the following terms (which were in accordance with a hand-written draft tendered on behalf of both the plaintiff and the defendant). The terms of that order were as follows:-

“1. The plaintiff’s application filed 6 June 2008 be adjourned to a date to be fixed to be heard by his Honour Judge Dearden DCJ.

Mr Justin O'Sullivan be available on that date to be called to give evidence limited to the issue of his expertise and the admissibility of his report dated 25 June 2004.

Leave to read and file the affidavit of Colin James Patino sworn 13 June 2008.

The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and occasioned by the application to be agreed or assessed.”

[16]
It is submitted on behalf of the respondent/defendant that the sealed order of the court, although in accordance with the draft provided to the court, does not reflect the court’s intention at the time the order was made which (in the respondent’s/defendant’s submission) “must have been only to award the costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment.”

[17]
In the circumstances, it is clear from the transcript of the proceedings on 13 June 2008 that it was not the court’s intention to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the relevant application regardless of the outcome. Pursuant to UCPR r 667(2)(b) the court has the power to set aside an order at any time if the order does not reflect the court’s intention at the time the order was made. Such a power clearly includes a power to set aside orders as to costs.^[7]

[18]
Accordingly I order as follows:

(a)
Paragraph 4 of the order made on 13 June 2008 be set aside;

(b)
the defendant pay the plaintiff’s standard costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment of the application on 13 June 2008.

Costs of UCPR r. 483 application

[19]
I will hear the party on the issue of costs in respect of the substantive proceedings heard on 23 August 2008.

Footnotes

[1] Application (filed 6 June 2008).

[2] Outline of submissions of the respondent/defendant p 1.

[3] [1999] FCA 718.

[4] Outline of submissions of the respondent/defendant para 7.

[5] Criminal Code s 590AA(2)(e).

[6] Outline of submissions of the respondent/defendant pp 4-5.

[7] Quality Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd v Millford Buildings (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 137.

Editorial Notes

Published Case Name:
Jodie Smith v Professional Suites Community Title Scheme 14487
Shortened Case Name:
Smith v Professional Suites Community Title Scheme 14487
MNC:
[2008] QDC 252
Court:
QDC
Judge(s):
Dearden DCJ
Date:
17 Oct 2008

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited List of Cases Cited by this judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Arnold v Attorney-General for Victoria	View on:JADE[1995] FCA 727	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1995] FCA 727 Cite 2 - [1995] FCA 727
Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd	View on:JADE(1999) HCA 9	4 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1999) HCA 9 Cite 2 - (1999) HCA 9 Cite 3 - (1999) HCA 9 Cite 4 - (1999) HCA 9
Blurton v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs	(1991) 29 FCR 442	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1991) 29 FCR 442 Cite 2 - (1991) 29 FCR 442
CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O'Neill	View on:NSWLR(1985) 1 NSWLR 601	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1985) 1 NSWLR 601 Cite 2 - (1985) 1 NSWLR 601 Cite 3 - (1985) 1 NSWLR 601
Chippendale Printing Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth	(1995) 17 ACSR 328	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1995) 17 ACSR 328 Cite 2 - (1995) 17 ACSR 328
Cotton (by his litigation guardian) v Hammond	[2002] QSC 429	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2002] QSC 429 Cite 2 - [2002] QSC 429
Creek & Creek v O'Malley & Queensland Newspapers P/L	[2001] QSC 122	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2001] QSC 122 Cite 2 - [2001] QSC 122
DHBC Pty Ltd v Fitzroy Island Pty Ltd	[2006] QSC 98	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2006] QSC 98 Cite 2 - [2006] QSC 98
Digi International Inc. v Stallion Technologies Pty Ltd	[2001] QSC 442	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2001] QSC 442 Cite 2 - [2001] QSC 442
Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd & Ors v Bata Shoe Company of Australia Pty Ltd	(1997) 75 FCR 230	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1997) 75 FCR 230 Cite 2 - (1997) 75 FCR 230
General Motors Acceptance Corporation Australia v RACQ Insurance Ltd	[2003] QSC 80	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2003] QSC 80 Cite 2 - [2003] QSC 80
GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v Commonwealth	View on:JADE[1997] FCA 934	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1997] FCA 934 Cite 2 - [1997] FCA 934
Jackson-Knaggs v Queensland Building Services Authority	[2005] QSC 260	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2005] QSC 260 Cite 2 - [2005] QSC 260
Jacobson v Ross	View on:VR(1995) 1 VR 337	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1995) 1 VR 337 Cite 2 - (1995) 1 VR 337
Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq.) v R.E.I. Building Society	(1993) 113 ALR 643	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1993) 113 ALR 643 Cite 2 - (1993) 113 ALR 643 Cite 3 - (1993) 113 ALR 643
Mani v Nominal Defendant	[2003] 1 Qd R 248; [2002] QSC 152	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2002] QSC 152 Cite 2 - [2002] QSC 152
Nissan v Attorney-General	View on:ICLRUK[1970] AC 179	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1970] AC 179 Cite 2 - [1970] AC 179
Nissan v Attorney-General	[1969] UKHL 3	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1969] UKHL 3 Cite 2 - [1969] UKHL 3
O'Brien v T F Woollam & Son Pty Ltd	[2002] 1 Qd R 622; [2001] QSC 217	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2001] QSC 217 Cite 2 - [2001] QSC 217
Pritchard v Race Cage Pty Ltd	(1997) 72 FCR 203	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1997) 72 FCR 203 Cite 2 - (1997) 72 FCR 203
Pritchard v Racecage Pty Ltd	(1996) 64 FCR 96	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1996) 64 FCR 96 Cite 2 - (1996) 64 FCR 96
Quality Corporation (Aust) Pty Ltd v Millford Builders (Vic) Pty Ltd	[2005] QCA 137	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 137
Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society	View on:JADE(1999) FCA 718	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1999) FCA 718 Cite 2 - (1999) FCA 718
Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd	(1985) 10 FCR 567	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1985) 10 FCR 567 Cite 2 - (1985) 10 FCR 567
Ritchie v Biniris (Aust) Pty Ltd	[2004] QSC 254	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2004] QSC 254 Cite 2 - [2004] QSC 254
Shortis v Mr Carpet (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd (No 2)	[2003] QDC 377	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2003] QDC 377 Cite 2 - [2003] QDC 377 Cite 3 - [2003] QDC 377
South Pacific Air Motive Pty Ltd v Magnus	(1998) 157 ALR 443	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1998) 157 ALR 443 Cite 2 - (1998) 157 ALR 443
Vins des Cotes de Provence v Bryce	(1996) 69 FCR 450	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1996) 69 FCR 450 Cite 2 - (1996) 69 FCR 450

Cases Citing List of cases on Queensland Judgments citing this Judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Munro v State of Queensland	[2013] QDC 140	2 citations
Smith v Professional Suites Community Title Scheme	[2008] QDC 267	4 citations

Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode

Change Font and Font Size

Smith v Professional Suites Community Title Scheme 14487[2008] QDC 252