Queensland Harness Racing Board v Hooper
[2008] QDC 278
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- Unreported Judgment
- Queensland Harness Racing Board v Hooper[2008] QDC 278
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Queensland Harness Racing Board v Hooper[2008] QDC 278
Queensland Harness Racing Board v Hooper[2008] QDC 278
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Queensland Harness Racing Board v Hooper [2008] QDC 278 |
pARTIES: | QUEENSLAND HARNESS RACING BOARD (Appellant) v DARREN IAN HOOpER (Respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | Appeal 120/08 |
DIVISION: | Appellate |
pROCEEDING: | Appeal from the Racing Appeals Tribunal |
ORIGINATING COURT: | District Court, Brisbane |
DELIVERED ON: | 28 November 2008 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 29 August 2008 |
JUDGE: | ANDREWS SC DCJ |
ORDER: | Appeal dismissed |
CATCHWORDS: | INFERIOR TRIBUNALS – Racing Appeals Tribunal – procedure on appeal to – principles on appeal from Racing Act 2002 ss 172(2), 172(3), 187, 193(1), Barmuncol pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council [1983] 2 Qd R 639 – applied. Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 36 ALR 598 – applied. Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR – applied. Wallace v Queensland Racing [2007] QDC 168 – applied. House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 – cited. page & Home Team Constructions pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 613 – applied. paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97 – applied. Res 1 v Medical Board of Queensland [2008] QCA 152 – applied. |
COUNSEL: | Murdoch SC for the appellant Keane for the respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Schweikert lawyers for the appellant Gabriel Ruddy and Garrett for the respondent |
- [1]Mr Hooper has earned money from training horses for harness racing. Trainers must hold a licence from the Queensland Harness Racing Board (“Board”). Mr Hooper has held a Trainer B Grade Licence issued by the Board for the 2007/08 season. This appeal is brought by the Board. The Board’s appeal concerns two things. Firstly, it concerns Mr Hooper’s licence. The Board contends the licence should not have been issued because Mr Hooper failed to disclose a conviction on 21 April 2006 for possession of a small quantity of marijuana. He was convicted in the Magistrates’ Court and fined $300 for that possession. It is not the conviction for this offence that troubles the Board, but Mr Hooper’s failure to disclose it, as he should have, when applying for his licence in 2006 and again in 2007. The failure to disclose is evidence which the Board submits tends to show a lack in Mr Hooper of a “high level of integrity”. Licences may be granted to people to participate in the harness racing industry provided that the applicants, amongst other things, display a high level of integrity while engaging in all harness racing activities.
- [2]The appeal concerns a second thing. It concerns a matter of principle separate from the conduct of Mr Hooper. It concerns the proper approach to be taken by the Racing Appeals Tribunal and the correct principles to be used by the tribunal when determining appeals from the Board. The Board contends that the tribunal made errors when it determined Mr Hooper’s appeal from a decision of the Board not to issue a licence to Mr Hooper.
- [3]On 20 November 2007, the Board refused to Mr Hooper his application for a B Grade Trainer’s Licence for the 2007/08 season writing:
“The licence is refused on the basis that your conduct does not fulfil the QHRB requirements for the granting of a licence, including the fact that you have failed to display a high level of integrity in relation to your having:
- Failed to disclose a conviction in licence applications for the 2006/07 and 2007/08 seasons; and
- Failed to disclose the conviction in those applications, and again failed to disclose a conviction when given an opportunity to do so by the Licensing Sub-Committee on 24 August 2007 in relation to your application for 2007/08.”
procedure on appeals to the Racing Appeals Tribunal
- [4]From that decision, Mr Hooper appealed to the tribunal. The procedure for appeals to the tribunal is set out, in part, in s 172 of the Racing Act 2002 which provides, so far as seems relevant:
“172 procedure generally
…
- (2)In making a decision relating to an appeal, the tribunal—
- (a)must observe natural justice; and
- (b)is not bound by the rules of evidence; and
- (c)may inform itself of anything in the way it considers appropriate.
- (3)An appeal is by way of rehearing, unaffected by the decision appealed against, on the material before the entity that made the decision and any further evidence allowed by the tribunal.
- [5]The question of whether to issue a licence involves the exercise by the Board of a discretion. Commonly, when there are appeals against the exercise of a discretion, the appeal court, acting upon established principles, will scrutinise the decision below to see if there has been some error made in exercising the discretion.[1]
- [6]The procedure for appeals to the tribunal is not an ordinary rehearing. It was considered in Wallace v Queensland Racing[2]. The court there regarded the words from s 172(3) of the Act “unaffected by the decision appealed against” as requiring the tribunal to depart from the ordinary approach on appeal by way of rehearing, to a review of an exercise of discretion. His Honour Judge McGill SC observed:
“…the only way to decide the matter unaffected by the decision appealed against is to proceed directly…to exercise the discretion afresh. If the tribunal in the rehearing only exercises the discretion afresh if it is first shown that the exercise of the discretion in the decision under appeal miscarried, then the appeal process is certainly affected by the decision appealed against.”[3]
principles on appeal from Tribunal to District Court
- [7]A party to an appeal to the tribunal may appeal to the District Court against the tribunal’s decision on the appeal but only on a question of law.[4] Because this is an appeal only on questions of law and from a tribunal not bound by the rules of evidence and which, subject to the obligation to observe natural justice may inform itself of anything in the way it considers appropriate, there are limits to the ways the Board may attack the factual findings of the tribunal on appeal. In Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[5] it was observed:
“… the concepts of a decision being against the evidence and of being against the weight of the evidence belong to appeals from courts of law and have particular application to jury verdicts. Even in that context, they do not involve questions of law. They certainly have no place when the appeal, or review, is of proceedings of an administrative tribunal which is not bound by the rules of evidence and which, subject to the obligation to observe the requirements of natural justice, can inform itself as it chooses … An appellant who attacks a conclusion of the Tribunal because of deficiency of proof said to amount to error of law must show, if he is to succeed, that there was no material before the Tribunal upon which the conclusion could properly be based.”
Such a tribunal does not commit an error of law because it finds facts on a doubtful basis[6] and the failure to take into account a particular piece of evidence is not an error of law unless there was an obligation to take that evidence into account.[7] The Board might raise an error of law by a ground of appeal that the tribunal had made a finding which was manifestly unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable tribunal could have made that finding.[8]
- [8]As a matter of principle, certain restrictions are imposed upon an appeal court when considering whether to interfere with facts found below if the findings are based on the assessment made of the credibility of a witness. In particular:
“…a finding of fact by a trial judge, based on the credibility of a witness, is not to be set aside because an appellant court thinks that the probabilities of the case are against – even strongly against – that finding of fact…If the trial judge’s finding depends to any substantial degree on the credibility of the witness, the finding must stand unless it can be shown that the trial judge ‘again has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage’…or has acted on evidence which was ‘inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence’ or was ‘glaringly improbable’.”[9]
Mr Hooper’s conduct
- [9]In applying for his licence for the 2006-07 year Mr Hooper was obliged to answer the following question:
“16 Have you ever been prosecuted for a criminal offence and appeared in a court of law as a result?”
Mr Hooper wrote “As Already Known”. At some earlier date Mr Hooper had provided to the Board a police certificate issued by the Queensland police Service which showed four convictions in the Magistrates’ Court[10] and in his application for licence season 2003-2004 had referred to three instances of prosecution for a criminal offence which may have been references to the four convictions in the Magistrates’ Court. In addition, in that licence he referred to a prosecution against him for a criminal offence for which he gave details “½ gram cannabis”. Those disclosures had not been an impediment to the issue to him of licences in years earlier than 2006-07 and were not an impediment in 2006-2007. By answering “As Already Known” in the application for the 2006-07 year Mr Hooper made a misleading and false representation because the Board did not already know of his conviction in April 2006 for a further offence of possession of cannabis in the form of marijuana.
- [10]At paragraph 45 of the same form the printing provided:
“45 Signatures
I hereby declare and acknowledge that:
- all answers provided in this application are true;
- I am required to advise the QHRB if any of my particulars change during the 2006-07 season.
…”
Mr Hooper signed immediately below paragraph 45.
- [11]When applying for a licence for the 2007-08 year Mr Hooper answered question 16 differently, writing “No new history” and signed under a similar paragraph 45.
- [12]The answers given by Mr Hooper to question 16 in each of his applications and the declaration and acknowledgment made by him at paragraph 45 of each of the applications were misleading. The Board did not know at material times of Mr Hooper’s conviction in April 2006 for possession of marijuana.
- [13]On 24 August 2007 Mr Hooper attended before a licensing sub-committee of the Board. By this date Mr Hooper had provided his written application for licence for the 2007-08 year. During the meeting Mr Hooper was asked if he had any issue about providing a new national police certificate. Having explained that he would have no concern about it he was asked “would there be anything on it in addition to the last time we got one?” Mr Hooper replied:
“No…Every time I fill in my application I make sure if there is – if there was a new charge, I’d write it down, or if it stays the same I just let you know that it was as last time. But if there was any new charges, I would let you know straight away…If I don’t and you licence me and somehow do a check in the future and then it comes up, yes, then there is a reason I could lose my licence…I know what has happened there, so I make sure I disclose it before – as soon as I apply for it.”
- [14]That answer in the committee meeting was misleading because there was something new to add to the police certificate being the conviction sixteen months earlier, in April 2006. That answer was the third and final occasion when Mr Hooper’s conduct was misleading about his conviction in April 2006. The Board made it clear before the tribunal that its concern with the integrity of Mr Hooper was in relation to his failure to disclose his last conviction for possession of cannabis sativa rather than for the fact that he had committed an offence and been convicted.
The decision of the Board
- [15]On 20 November 2007 the Board notified Mr Hooper of its decision informing him:
“The licence is refused on the basis that your conduct does not fulfil the QHRB requirements for the granting of a licence, including the fact that you have failed to display a high level of integrity in relation to your having:
- Failed to disclose a conviction in licence applications for the 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 seasons; and
- Failed to disclose the conviction in those applications, again failed to disclose a conviction when given an opportunity to do so by the Licensing Sub-Committee on 24 August 2007 in relation to your application for 2007/2008.”
Adequacy of the Tribunal’s reasons
- [16]One ground of appeal is that the tribunal erred in law in that it failed to give proper or adequate reasons for its decision.
- [17]The Board submitted in writing that:
- (a)in its published reasons the tribunal failed to address the requirements of the Racing Act and the licensing policy which provided the framework within which the tribunal was empowered to exercise its discretion;
- (b)in its published reasons the tribunal failed to give any reasons as to why, despite evidence to the contrary, the respondent was found to be credible.
- [18]The Board is correct in submitting that the tribunal failed to address the requirements of the Racing Act and the licensing policy.
- [19]
- [20]The requirements of the Racing Act and the licensing policy which provided the framework within which the tribunal was empowered to exercise its discretion were not matters in contest between the parties. In Wallace v Queensland Racing [2007] QDC 168 McGill SC DCJ observed at [62]:
“I do not consider that courts should be astute when considering an appeal from a body such as the racing tribunal to find inadequacy in the reasons for the tribunal’s decision so long as there has been some reasonably clear explanation by the tribunal of why it has in fact come to the decision it reached”
With respect, I accept that observation as appropriate where the inadequacy submitted is that the tribunal has failed to recite passages of the legislation and a policy where there was no identified contest about their interpretation. I do not consider that there was any error of law involved in the tribunal’s failure to set out or address the requirements of the Racing Act or the licensing policy.
- [21]The second error of law submitted in writing to exist through inadequacy of reasons was the failure to give any reasons as to why, despite evidence to the contrary, Mr Hooper was found to be credible.
- [22]Credibility of Mr Hooper was relevant to only one issue. That issue was whether any one of Mr Hooper’s three failures to refer to his April 2006 conviction for possession of marijuana was a deliberate failure.
- [23]The tribunal heard Mr Hooper give evidence in chief and heard him cross-examined. In their reasons the tribunal did give reasons for finding Mr Hooper to be credible. The reasons provided:
“In his evidence in chief and under cross-examination, Mr Hooper was adamant that he had taken steps to effectively shut that conviction out of his mind solely for the purposes of the wellbeing of his child. He gave consistent and truthful evidence in that regard…One question is whether Mr Hooper intentionally meant to deceive the Board and to…purposefully withhold information…In our opinion, Mr Hooper’s demeanour and his evidence does not support this contention.”
- [24]In that passage one sees that the tribunal accepted two matters. Firstly, it accepted that at some unidentified time Mr Hooper had taken steps to shut the conviction out of his mind. Secondly, at the times Mr Hooper withheld information from the Board he did so unintentionally.
- [25]The tribunal’s reasons explain with reasonable clarity why it found Mr Hooper to be credible. The passage extracted above shows that the members believed Mr Hooper’s evidence in the following two respects:
- (a)He shut the conviction out of his mind;
- (b)He did not intentionally deceive by withholding information on purpose.
- [26]I reject the submission that there was a failure by the tribunal to give reasons to explain why Mr Hooper was found to be credible.
- [27]In its oral submissions, the Board added another but related attack on the adequacy of the tribunal’s reasons. It submitted that in evidence before the tribunal Mr Hooper had given three explanations as his basis for failing to advise the Board of his conviction. The Board submitted that the three explanations were inconsistent and submitted that the failure to deal with the inconsistencies in the tribunal’s reasons amounted to an error of law.
- [28]The three explanations identified by the Board which Mr Hooper had given to the tribunal as explanations for his failure to advise the Board of his conviction were:
- (a)Mr Hooper thought the Board would ask for details of the conviction so he did not need to disclose it on the form;
- (b)The conviction slipped Mr Hooper’s mind;
- (c)Mr Hooper shut the conviction out of his mind for the wellbeing of his daughter.
- [29]In its reasons, the tribunal did not identify the first explanation or deal with it. The tribunal did, in substance, deal with the second explanation. It accepted that Mr Hooper did not intentionally mean to deceive the Board nor purposefully withhold information. This is substantially consistent with the explanation that the conviction “slipped his mind”. The tribunal dealt with the third explanation. It accepted that Mr Hooper was truthful in his evidence that he shut the conviction out of his mind for the purposes of the wellbeing of his daughter.
- [30]I do not accept that the second and third explanations are inconsistent with each other. I do not consider that offering the second and third explanations makes the evidence of Mr Hooper inherently incredible. I do not consider that the tribunal’s acceptance of the third explanation and apparent acceptance of the second explanation make the reasons inherently flawed.
- [31]Mr Hooper’s first explanation does not sit easily with his second and third explanations. It is inconsistent. That inconsistency does not prevent the tribunal from accepting the second and third explanations.
- [32]I bear in mind that the issue raised by this additional ground of appeal is the adequacy of the reasons not that the finding was manifestly unreasonable. By finding that it accepted the second and third explanations the tribunal made reasonably clear its finding and the reason for it. A judge with a duty to consider all the evidence in a case need not refer in the reasons to all the evidence in the proceeding or indicate which evidence is rejected.[13] The obligation to set out reasons for rejecting evidence is unlikely to be any greater for a tribunal which has the liberties set out in s 172(2) (b) and (c) of the Racing Act.[14] I do not regard there to have been an error of law involved in failing to set out in its reasons that the inconsistency involved in the first explanation did not prevent it from accepting the second and third explanations.
- [33]When dealing with a separate submission that the tribunal had erred in law in failing to have regard, adequately or at all, to evidence as to the circumstances of the commission of the offence and as to Mr Hooper’s financial circumstances, the Board implied that the tribunal should have adverted to this evidence in its reasons. There was no error of law involved in failing to set out in the tribunal’s reasons the evidence or findings relating to the circumstances of the commission of the offence nor the evidence of findings relating to Mr Hooper’s financial circumstances. The tribunal found that Mr Hooper did not intentionally deceive the Board by withholding information on purpose. The tribunal was not obliged to refer to this other evidence.
Whether the Tribunal erred in law in failing to have regard to evidence
- [34]There was a further ground of appeal that the tribunal “erred in law” in that it failed to have regard, adequately or at all, to the evidence before the tribunal as to:
“(a) The circumstances of the commission of the offence;
- (b)[Mr Hooper’s] financial circumstances.”
- [35]The submissions on this ground of appeal raised three types of evidence for consideration. The first was the evidence summarised[15] in these reasons relating to the three explanations Mr Hooper gave as his basis for failing to advise the Board of his conviction. Secondly, the tribunal referred to inconsistent versions given by Mr Hooper in his evidence of the circumstances of the commission of the offence constituted by possession of marijuana. Thirdly, the Board referred to inconsistencies in Mr Hooper’s evidence before the tribunal about his financial circumstances. The inconsistencies present in the three types of evidence support a submission that Mr Hooper was unreliable. Mr Hooper’s unreliability was a matter which the tribunal was at liberty to consider when determining the factual issue of whether any one of Mr Hooper’s three failures to refer to his April 2006 conviction was a deliberate failure.
- [36]For reasons I have given above[16] the tribunal’s finding of fact that Mr Hooper’s omission to refer to his conviction was not deliberate could not be attacked as an error of law unless there was no material upon which the conclusion could properly be based and the failure of the tribunal to take account of the inconsistencies is not an error of law. There was evidence before the tribunal upon which it could properly base its conclusion that Mr Hooper did not intentionally deceive the Board. The tribunal had the benefit of Mr Hooper’s oral evidence given in examination-in-chief and under cross-examination. The finding made was not inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established nor was it glaringly improbable.
- [37]I find that the Board has not established this error of law.
Whether the Tribunal misdirected itself as to the proper approach and correct principles and used the wrong test
- [38]The Board submitted before me that the tribunal had:
- (a)misdirected itself as to the proper approach and correct principles to be used in determining the appeal; and
- (b)used the wrong test in determining whether the respondent should be granted a licence.
These submissions appear to pick up grounds 1(a) and (b) from the notice of appeal.
- [39]The tribunal observed in its reasons:
“The question for determination by this tribunal was simply whether the Board acted fairly in refusing to grant the licence.”
The Board submitted that this shows that the tribunal used the wrong test and that this involved an error of law.
- [40]Bearing in mind the matters set out at [6] above, the question for the tribunal was not a question of whether the Board acted fairly in refusing to grant the licence. The tribunal was instead to decide, unaffected by the Board’s decision, whether to grant Mr Hooper’s application for a B grade trainer’s licence for the 2007/08 season.
- [41]The Board drew attention to the reasons where the tribunal observed:
“We believe that a reasonable person having considered all the material evidence would have no compunction whatsoever in granting the licence, based on the material placed before this Tribunal and on that which was placed before the Licence sub-committing” (sic).
The Board submitted that this also demonstrated the use of the wrong test, namely whether a reasonable person would grant the licence.
- [42]Counsel for Mr Hooper conceded that neither of the observations extracted from the reasons expressed a correct test for the tribunal to apply but submitted that these passages were an “infelicitous expression of what the proper test is”.
- [43]In stating that the question for determination by the tribunal was whether the Board acted fairly in refusing to grant the licence I find that the tribunal misstated the question for its determination.
- [44]However, it is clear that the tribunal regarded itself as free to come to a decision which was different from the Board’s. Its reasons show that the tribunal was not inhibited by the decision of the Board and regarded itself as free to consider evidence which was not before the Board. Despite appearing to misstate the question for its determination the tribunal appears properly to have considered that it should exercise its own discretion as to whether to grant the licence.
- [45]The error made by the tribunal in expressing the question for its determination was not an error which has been material to the result. Such an error is not sufficient to vitiate the decision of the tribunal.[17]
Whether the tribunal failed to have regard to whether the respondent displayed a high level of integrity
- [46]It was a ground that the tribunal erred in law in failing to exercise the discretion based upon a consideration of “whether the Respondent had displayed a high level of integrity in relevant respects”.
- [47]By its oral submissions before me the Board made evident that its concern was that the tribunal had failed in its reasons to set out the requirements of the applicable licensing policy and the rules and the Racing Act which emphasise the requirement for integrity in licence-holders and “specifically there was no discussion of the requirement of integrity”. The Board was not so troubled by Mr Hooper’s conviction on 21 April 2006 for possession of a small quantity of marijuana as it was by Mr Hooper’s failure to disclose it as he should have when applying for his licence. The failure to disclose is evidence which the Board submitted tended to show a lack of a “high level of integrity”.
- [48]Before their appointments to the bench, Justice Daubney and Judge Rafter SC in their report of the Queensland Thoroughbred Racing Enquiry observed:
“… in a sport with the noble traditions of thoroughbred racing it is impossible to put a price on integrity.”
The same observations can be made with respect to integrity in harness racing. By the applicable licensing policy and the rules and in the Racing Act the need for integrity is emphasised and the integrity of persons applying for a trainer’s licence is a matter to be considered when determining whether to grant a licence.
- [49]The Board submitted before me that the proper matter for the tribunal’s consideration with respect to the important issue of integrity was not touched upon by the tribunal. The Board’s counsel before the tribunal accepted that the offence relating to the possession of marijuana was not sufficient reason to refuse the grant of a licence. The Board before me did not dispute that concession. The Board before me submitted that it was not a sufficient basis for the grant of a licence that the tribunal found that Mr Hooper’s failure to disclose his conviction was neither intentional nor on purpose.
- [50]The Board submitted that the tribunal should have gone further and considered whether inadvertent failure so impeached the integrity of Mr Hooper that his application for a licence should have been refused. The Board regards the inadvertent failure of Mr Hooper to refer to his last conviction as an important matter relating to integrity to be considered by the tribunal when considering how to exercise its discretion.
- [51]It does seem clear from the tribunal’s reasons that the tribunal regarded the crucial issue to be whether Mr Hooper’s non-disclosure was intentional or inadvertent. I accept the submission for the Board that failure to disclose a conviction which is neither a wilful failure, nor reckless nor of some lesser order but merely failure per se is a matter which might properly be considered by a licensing committee or the tribunal when assessing the integrity of an applicant for a licence.
- [52]Before me, the Board sought to categorise this issue as a contest that was before the tribunal and which the tribunal failed to decide. Counsel for the Board observed to the tribunal below:
“… the circumstances of the completion of the form is certainly a matter that has to be taken into account, so that every mistake – inadvertent completion of a form – wouldn’t necessarily be taken to be the same as a material non-disclosure .. the question that you put, Mr Stanfield, namely, is every circumstance where there’s a mistake or an inadvertent non-disclosure the kind of thing that would resonate in refusal of a licence? The answer must be no, it’s the circumstances that must be taken into account, and in my submission, the documents will demonstrate that, in fact, the Board did here take the circumstances into account. They tried to investigate what those circumstances were as best they could, to see whether there was a good reason why or not. The Board evidently formed the view – it’s apparent on the material that the Board formed the view that there was not a good reason for the non-disclosure and took steps accordingly. … The submission I made before is that he knew, or ought to have known, that what he was putting on the form was incorrect. Now, whether one calls that reckless is perhaps a matter of semantics or classification, but, in my submission, that is ultimately what the Board has found, that is – the flip side of that is his explanation for doing so wasn’t satisfactory to the Board. But there can, of course, be circumstances where a person’s explanation or a failure to do something will satisfy the relevant body, whether it be the Board or the tribunal, and in those circumstances, there will be a finding that the mistake or failure to disclose was purely inadvertent or merely a mistake, but we say in our submissions, that the evidence discloses, particularly given the various opportunities that there were to disclose, the evidence discloses that, in fact, it wasn’t merely inadvertent.”[18]
- [53]It was submitted before me that before the tribunal there had been no concession circumscribing the contest to whether the disclosure was deliberate or inadvertent and that the tribunal, after finding that the disclosure was inadvertent should have considered whether to refuse the licence because there was a non-disclosure per se. I reject that submission. A fair reading of the passage quoted shows that the tribunal was led by the Board’s counsel below to regard the contest as turning on the issue of whether the non-disclosure was due to inadvertence. If I am wrong about the fair reading of that passage, it is clear that the Board below did not alert the tribunal that the Board sought a ruling on whether an inadvertent failure to disclose the conviction was sufficient reason to refuse a grant of a licence to Mr Hooper. It would be unfair to allow the Board to raise this nice question for determination for the first time before me. If I was satisfied that the tribunal had made an error in failing to consider whether an inadvertent failure to disclose the conviction was sufficient reason to refuse the grant of a licence I would have ordered that the matter be referred to the tribunal for determination according to law, that is, consistently with these reasons.
- [54]The appeal is dismissed.
Footnotes
[1] See eg House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 per Dixon Evatt & McTiernan JJ
[2] [2007] QDC 168 per McGill DCJ 14 August 2007
[3]Wallace v Queensland Racing Op Cit [57]
[4]Racing Act s 193(1)
[5] (1981) 36 ALR 598 at 601, l 25 per Fox, Deane and Morling JJ
[6]paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97 at [55] per Buss JA, Wheeler JA and pullin JA agreeing [1] and [2]
[7]paridis at [57], [1] and [2]
[8]paridis [56] [1] and [2]
[9]Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479 per Brennan, Gaudron & McHugh JJ
[10] Exhibit 1 on the appeal
[11]Racing Act s 187
[12]Res 1 v Medical Board of Queensland [2008] QCA 152 at [15] per Muir JA with McMurdo p agreeing at [4]
[13]page & Home Team Constructions pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 613 at [15] per Hislop J
[14] See [4] above
[15] See [28] herein
[16] [7] and [8] above
[17]Barmuncol pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council [1983] 2 Qd R 639 at 644 and 645 per Shepherdson J with Campbell CJ and Kelly J agreeing at 639 and 640.
[18] Transcript of proceedings before the Racing Appeals Tribunal, pp 19, l 30 to p 20, l 35.