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Garro v MC Property Investments[2009] QDC 316

Garro v MC Property Investments[2009] QDC 316

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Peter Andrew Garro & Roxarna Maree Garro v MC Property Investments [2009] QDC 316

PARTIES:

Peter Andrew Garro & Roxarna Maree Garro (Appellant)

AND

MC Property Investments Pty Ltd (Respondent)

FILE NOS:

122/09

DIVISION:

District Court of Queensland, Maroochydore

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Maroochydore District Court

DELIVERED ON:

13 October 2009

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

18 September 2009

JUDGE:

Judge J.M. Robertson

ORDER:

The Contract of Sale dated 14 December 2007 between the Applicants, as buyer, and the Respondent, as seller for the sale of property described as proposed Lot 2 on Proposed SP207111 be specifically performed and carried into execution; and the Applicants pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding, including reserved costs, on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, where purchaser refuses to participate meaningfully in fulfilling their contractual obligations, where contract included implied term as to use, where Vendor was not able to satisfy term on first date for completion, where purchaser did not attend settlement, where Vendor subsequently was able to satisfy term and purchaser did not attend settlement, whether Vendor’s conduct did not entitle it to equitable relief, whether purchaser entitled to terminate on the basis of anticipatory breach, whether Vendor not entitled to relief because of contents of certificate of classification.

Legislation:

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Qld)

Building Act 1975 (Qld)

Cases Considered:

Dainford Limited v Juana Pty Ltd (1986) 1 Qd.R. 395

Dainford Limited v Bocada Pty Ltd. (unreported, Full Court, 1341 of 1983, 24.10.84)

British & Bennington Ltd. v. North West Casnar Tea Co. [1923] A.C. 48, 72

Rawson v. Hobbs (1961) 107 C.L.R. 466, 481

Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245

Powell v Whyte [1968] Qd.R. 255

COUNSEL:

Mr. C. Wilson for the Respondent/ Applicant

Mr. L. J. Nevison for the Applicant/ Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Ray Barber Solicitor for the Respondent/ Applicant

Ferguson Cannon Lawyers for the Applicant/ Respondent

INTRODUCTION

  1. [1]
    On the 12.12.07, Peter Andrew Garro and Roxarna Maree Garro (the Garros) entered into a contract with MC Property Investments Pty Ltd (MC Property) to purchase a unit “off the plan” in a development at Mooloolah to be known as “Seaside on the Lake”. MC Property is seeking specific performance of that contract which the Garros have not completed, and the Garros argue that the remedy is not open as MC Property was not able to settle the contract on either of the dates set earlier for completion by its solicitors.
  2. [2]
    On the 22 December 2008, and prior to the establishment of the Community Titles Scheme for the development, the Garros purported to terminate the contract on the basis of alleged misrepresentations as to the lawful use of the unit, which they alleged constituted a breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Qld). MC Property did not accept termination and affirmed the contract.

THE DEALINGS BETWEEN THE PARTIES

  1. [3]
    In a letter dated 22.12.08 the Garros solicitor, Mr. Ray Barber advised Ferguson Cannon (MC Property’s solicitors) that the contract was at an end on the basis that the unit could not be used for a dual commercial/ residential purpose as had been represented both orally and in writing prior to the date of contract.
  2. [4]
    On the 16 January 2009, Ferguson Cannon advised Mr. Barber that MC Property did not accept the termination and that (its) “opinion is that the property can be used for commercial purposes…”
  3. [5]
    On 13.02. 09 Mr. Barber advised that “research of (the Council) has revealed that (MC Property) cannot and therefore will not deliver at settlement a dual-income, commercial and residential until.” He purported on behalf of his client to again terminate the contract.
  4. [6]
    On 18.02.09, Ferguson Cannon responded again affirming the contract and not accepting the termination.
  5. [7]
    On the 16.04.09 Mr Barber wrote again demanding return of the deposit “failing which (his client) reserve their rights to collect the deposit in court.”
  6. [8]
    Ferguson Cannon continued to correspond with Mr. Barber on the basis that the contract was still on foot. Mr. Barber did not respond.
  7. [9]
    On the 24 April 2008 Ferguson Cannon advised Mr. Barber, that in terms of the contract “the Community Tittles Scheme has been established and an indefeasible title to the lot has been created” and nominated settlement pursuant to clause 4.1(a)(ii) of the contract, on 8 May 2009, and requested transfer documentation for execution by their client.
  8. [10]
    Upon receipt of the letter, Mr. Barber responded (inter alia) in the following terms:

“For the reason that the contract is over, my client is taking no steps to prepare for settlement.”

  1. [11]
    On 7.05.09 he wrote in these terms:

“My clients have advised you on a least four occasions that the contract is over.

Your client has refrained from accepting the termination and from returning to me the Deposit Power guarantee.

Final demand is hereby for return of the Deposit Power guarantee to me by 2pm on 8 May 2009.

In lieu of that action, my clients will file in the District Court for interlocutory orders freezing your client’s use of the guarantee and funds.

This letter will be relevant to my clients’ request, at the time, for costs.”

  1. [12]
    On the same day he filed an originating application in this court seeking (inter alia) a declaration that his clients had validly terminated the contract, and an application seeking (inter alia) an order that MC Property be restrained from demanding payment of the deposit. Ferguson Cannon responded to his 7 May letter on the same day (relevantly) in these terms:

“We refer to Settlement of the above matter which is due to be effected on Friday 8 May 2009, at our office located at level 1, 17 Southern Drive, Maroochydore. We propose a Settlement time of 2:00pm. We reserve our client’s right to effect settlement at any time up to 4:00pm on the day appointed pursuant to the terms of the Contract.

Please find enclosed final Settlement Statement together with our client’s cheque directions for your information.

As your client has not submitted Transfer Documents for execution pursuant to Clause 4.4 of the Contract, we have prepared and had our client execute Transfer Documents on your client’s behalf. We enclose a copy of the executed Transfer Document for your records.

Pursuant to Clause 4.2 of the Contract, we will provide your client with the following at Settlement:

  1. Vacant possession of the Lot;
  2. Transfer Documents in registrable form (other than stamping and any other things to be done by your client);
  3. The keys for the Lot;
  4. ASIC Form 312 for Charge No. 1448294 in favour of Bank of Western Australia;
  5. ASIC Form 312 for Charge No. 1358387 in favour of Bank of Western Australia;
  6. ASIC Form 312 for Charge No. 11759991 in favour of Bank of Western Australia;
  7. Your client’s original Deposit Bond

Our client will be ready, willing and able to effect Settlement.”

  1. [13]
    On the day of settlement, and prior to it, Ferguson Cannon wrote to Mr. Barber enclosing various documents including a letter from P&E Law and stated:

“It is clear from the advice of P&E Law and the position of Sunshine Coast Regional Council that the intention of the use of the property is a mix of both commercial and residential, and it follows that your client is able to obtain a dual-income from the Property. It is clear from the planning documentation that the mix commercial and residential uses is self-assessable provided that it meets the applicable assessment criteria, which on our instructions, has been met.

We note your client has conducted “research” at Council in relation to the dual-income, residential and commercial unit. Our client’s enquiries with Council are that a Council representative would not have given the advice to your client, as claimed.

We again invite your client to disclose this “research” for our review and consideration. Your client’s failure to disclose this will be brought to the attention of the Court.

Our client requires your client to effect Settlement today.”

  1. [14]
    Settlement was not affected. There is some issue about what occurred to which I will return later in these reasons.
  2. [15]
    On the 11 May 2009 Ferguson Cannon provided to Mr. Barber a copy of a letter dated 11 May 2009 from Council which does not specifically address the concern about the unit but deals with the development approval in a more general way. In part the letter from Ferguson Cannon states:

“You will note that the Council letter refers to the building in general and does not refer specifically to your clients units. Our clients town planning lawyers are of the opinion, given the response from Council, that a mix of commercial and residential uses on the ground floor is allowable. Our client’s town planning lawyers are seeking written confirmation from Council that the use for your clients lot specifically is mixed commercial and residential.

In relation to your threatened proceedings we submit that it would be in the interest of all parties that any proceedings be delayed until such time as a response is received from Council to our client’s specific request in relation to your client’s lot. If your client intends to commence proceedings before such time as the response is received from Council we advise that we do have instructions to accept service of these proceedings, however we are instructed to put your client on notice that this correspondence will be relied upon when the issue of costs is raised in such proceedings, given that this matter may be easily resolved upon receipt of the written confirmation from Council.”

  1. [16]
    The applications filed 7 May 2009 were adjourned by consent on the 15 May to a date to be fixed subject to MC Property undertaking not to demand payment of any deposit.
  2. [17]
    On 14 July 2009 Ferguson Cannon wrote to Mr. Barber and enclosed a letter from Council dated 1 July 2009 with copies of approved plans endorsed by Council on 1 July 2009 “showing the dual use of commercial and residential for your client’s lot.”
  3. [18]
    Ferguson Cannon then again gave a notice to complete at 2:00pm on 28 July 2009 and advised that time for completion was of the essence and (in effect) reserved their clients right to terminate or affirm and seek specific performance if the Garros did not complete.
  4. [19]
    In the attached letter from Council it advised that it had reviewed the modified plans. For the purposes of these proceedings the Garros do not assert that from Council’s viewpoint at this time the unit could not be used for a mixed commercial and residential purpose, although they have very recently raised the classification issue.
  5. [20]
    Mr. Barber responded by letter dated 22 July 2009 and said:

“For the reason that the contract is over, my clients are taking no steps to settle.

Your client’s right to:

⮚ Serve a notice to complete;

⮚ Terminate or affirm a contract; and

⮚ Seek specific performance

are all denied because the contract ceased to exist after 13 February 2009.”

  1. [21]
    Ferguson Cannon responded on the 24 July 2009 to confirm completion on 28.07.09.
  2. [22]
    Mr. Barber did not attend settlement at 2:00pm on 28.07.09. Ferguson Cannon “re-set” settlement at 4pm on that day. Mr. Barber did not attend. By letter dated 29 July 2009, Ferguson Cannon affirmed the contract.
  3. [23]
    On the 19.08.09 MC Property filed an application in this Court seeking (inter alia)

“…

  1. Specific performance of the contract.”
  1. [24]
    The application came on for hearing before Judge Dodds on 27.08.09. In summary, the application was adjourned until 18.09.09 to enable Mr. Barber’s clients more time and to suit Mr. Wilson, on the basis that there were no disputed factual matters and therefore no need for pleadings. The parties have consented to this Court having jurisdiction to determine the matter. The matter was heard before me on 18.09.09 and Mr. Nevison confirmed (after some effort by Mr. Wilson) that his client accepted that although the condition about dual commercial and residential use is not an express term of the contract, it was an implied fundamental term.
  2. [25]
    It also appears that MC Property was not in a position to comply with this term until, at the earliest, the modification of the plans referred to in the letter dated 14 July 2009. Mr. Nevison argued by reference to Dainford Limited v Juana Pty Ltd (1986) 1 Qd.R. 396 that because the Garros had from December 2008 persistently refused to participate in a contract which they regarded as being at an end, his clients inability to complete as at the date of the first completion date 8 May 2009 did not prevent it (in the absence of any participation in settlement by the Garros) from setting a new completion date at which time the evidence establishes that MC Property was able to convey title to a unit with a dual commercial-residential use.
  3. [26]
    Mr. Wilson on behalf of the Garros, submits that his clients validly terminated the contract on 13 February 2009 on the basis of anticipatory breach of contract; alternatively, MC Property is not entitled to specific performance because it was not able to settle on 8 May or 24 July 2009 on the basis of a certificate of classification obtained 3 September 2009 which he submits shows the unit to be a residential unit only, and if used for another purpose could constitute a breach of s. 118 of the Building Act 1975 (Qld); and further that as his clients did attend settlement on the 8.05.09, when MC property could not satisfy the implied term, specific performance was not available.

THE 8.5.09 COMPLETION DATE

  1. [27]
    Before dealing with the law, I will return to the issue raised as to whether Mr. Barber did in fact attend settlement at Ferguson Cannon on 8.05.09. Mr. Wilson in his written outline dated 18 September says:

“8. The applicant’s solicitor advised that he would attend at settlement (Cannon page 55).

  1. The applicant’s solicitor did attend at settlement, but no evidence was tendered that the unit in question could be lawfully used for commercial purposes (Barber paras 2-5, Cannon page 57).”
  1. [28]
    The references to the material establish that Mr. Barber did in fact attend the offices of Ferguson Cannon that day at 2pm “in relation to settlement of the purchase of unit 11 for other clients of mine.” The letter referred to at p.55 of the exhibits to Mr. Cannon’s affidavit shows clearly that the only purpose Mr. Barber had for keeping his appointment with Mr. Cannon in relation to this matter was to enable him to serve Mr. Cannon with the applications and material filed the previous day. This is clear from Mr. Barbers own affidavit sworn 17.09.09 and filed by leave on 18.09.09. Someone from Mr. Cannon’s office did purport to tender for settlement. Mr. Barber says:

“6. At that time, Chere Meakins, Ferguson Cannon, purported to tender for settlement of this unit 2.

  1. Ms Meakins did not, however, tender any documents or otherwise provide any evidence indicating that unit 2 was capable of immediate lawful use for both residential and commercial purposes.”
  1. [29]
    It is quite clear to me from the attitude expressed by Mr. Barber in all the antecedent correspondence and confirmed by the filing of the applications the day before, that he had no intention at all of genuinely participating in the settlement set for 8 May 2009. He regarded the contract as being at an end.

Dainford Ltd v Juana Pty Ltd & ors [1986] 1 Qd R 396

  1. [30]
    Although this case involved a claim for damages for breach of contract nevertheless Mr. Nevison submits that it is binding authority for the propositions he advances despite the fact that his clients were in fact not able to satisfy the implied term as at the 8th May.
  2. [31]
    The facts of the case are similar. The plaintiff vendor entered into a contract with the defendant purchaser for the sale of a unit “off the plan” which placed obligations on the vendor to promulgate by-laws prior to settlement which would grant exclusive use of a marked car parking area to the purchaser. Prior to registration of the Building Units Plan which (similar to the Community Title Scheme in this case) triggered the date for completion, the purchaser had repudiated the contract. The purchaser did not attend at the designated settlement and the vendor commenced proceedings for specific performance. Ultimately it accepted the repudiation, and re-sold the unit and sought damages from the purchasers.
  3. [32]
    The only issue at trial was a legal one, and that is, was the vendor plaintiff obliged to establish that at all material times it was ready willing and able to settle. The vendor had complied with its obligation in relation to the car park but for technical reasons involving the Titles Office, on the actual date fixed for settlement the relevant by-laws had not been registered so technically the vendor would not then have been able to convey title to the car-parking space.
  4. [33]
    McPherson J. (as his Honour then was) (with whom the Chief Justice and Sheahan J. agreed) held that as the purchaser had unequivocally intimated prior to settlement that it did not intend in any circumstances to pursue its contractual obligations, and as the purchaser had not attended settlement, the moment the vendor was required to perform was never reached. The vendor was not required to demonstrate its readiness to perform (its obligation under the “car-parking” condition) until the time for performing was reached.
  5. [34]
    Mr. Wilson sought to distinguish Dainford Ltd v Juana on the basis that the case related to a claim for damages and not specific performance. He relied on a number of observations of McPherson J. in an earlier unreported decision of Dainford Limited v Bocada Pty Ltd. (unreported, Full Court, 1341 of 1983, 24.10.84) which concerned a claim for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a unit in the same highrise development as the unit in Dainford v Juana, which contract contained a similar “car-parking clause”.
  6. [35]
    The facts of the case briefly are that the contract dated 21.08.81 required completion within 30 days after registration of the Building Unit Plan.
  7. [36]
    On 29.12.82, and prior to such notice, the purchaser purported to repudiate the contract. The trial proceeded on the basis that the contract remained on foot. The purported repudiation was equivocal.
  8. [37]
    On the 31.12.82 the BUP registered, and the vendors nominated 1.02.83 for settlement. The purchaser did not attend. Although time was of the essence, neither party sought to discharge the contract for that reason.
  9. [38]
    On the 17.03.83, a further settlement date was appointed and again the purchaser did not attend. Neither party sought to discharge and the vendor sought specific performance (the purchaser had purported to terminate on that day, but the termination had been rendered null and void by an amendment to the relevant Act by the time of trial).
  10. [39]
    The reason specific performance was resisted (an approach upheld by the trial judge and 2:1 in Full Court (Chief Justice Connolly J, McPherson J diss) was that on neither of the dates appointed for settlement or at trial was the vendor able to give the purchaser what it had contracted to give by way of a car-space.
  11. [40]
    The vendor was required to ensure that prior to settlement the by-laws of the Body Corporate be such as to grant to the purchaser exclusive use of a designated car parking area in the common property
  12. [41]
    By laws altered to this effect (and forming part of the contract) came into effect on 4.02.83, however the vendor had not given a notice to the Council of the Body Corporate within 12 months after registration of the plan i.e. by 31.12.83, which it was required to do to satisfy the contractual obligation on it to give the purchaser what it had contracted to give in relation to the car-park.
  13. [42]
    In other words the case was decided at trial and on appeal on the basis that the vendor (at either date appointed for completion) or indeed at the time of trial was not able to give what it contracted to give, and was therefore unable to complete.
  14. [43]
    Mr. Wilson relies on a number of statements of principle made by McPherson J. in his Honour’s dissenting judgment about the nature of the remedy of specific performance, and the impediments that may prevent a party from obtaining a decree at common law and in equity. It is apparent from the facts of the case that the vendor (at the time of the appeal) might be able by various means to overcome the difficulty relating to conveying the car-parking space, and therefore be able to complete at the time ordained for specific performance. Consistently with his Honour’s approach in Dainford v Juana, he held that the vendor was never in breach of the contract because the purchaser, by failing to attend at either date nominated for completion, had prevented the “moment of settlement” from arriving. In doing so, the purchaser was in breach but since the vendor did not elect to rescind “the contract accordingly remained in being awaiting the fixing of a new date for completion”. His Honour wrote (at 5 – 6):

“It follows that the period available to the vendor for performing its obligations under cl. 5 was correspondingly enlarged. Unless and until the parties attend for settlement, the vendor cannot be said to be in breach of its obligation under cl. 5 to do an act at any time “prior to settlement.”

If instead of absenting itself the purchaser had attended for settlement on 1st February 1983 and tendered the purchase money, it would no doubt have succeeded in placing the vendor in default. Having to that time failed to comply with the requirements of cl. 5(a), the vendor would have been unable to complete the contract, and the purchaser would thus have earned the right to terminate or rescind. It does not follow that, without the ritual of attendance and formal tender, the purchaser would never have been entitled to rescind. The right to do so would arise if it could be shown that that at any time in the course of the contract the vendor was “wholly and finally disabled from performing essential terms of the contract altogether”: see British & Bennington Ltd. v. North West Casnar Tea Co. [1923] A.C. 48, 72. A party so disabled cannot thereafter enforce the contract if at that point the other party renounces it: Rawson v. Hobbs (1961) 107 C.L.R. 466, 481. But that is not the present case. There is no question here of the vendor’s being wholly and finally disabled on 1st February 1983 from performing, on or before settlement at some time in the future, its obligation under cl. 5(a) of the contract.”

  1. [44]
    The facts in this case are similar. The Garros by their express conduct indicated from an early stage that they did not intend to pursue their obligations under the contract in any circumstances. Similarly to the purchaser in Bocada, if Mr. Barber had attended settlement on 8.08.09, on the evidence before me, MC Property may not then have been able to satisfy its obligations under the implied term and the Garros may have had grounds then to rescind.
  2. [45]
    Mr. Wilson relies heavily in his submission on what he says is an important distinction between both Dainford decisions and this case and that is “the applicants did attend for settlement on 8 May 2009.” On the basis of the uncontested evidence before me, I have rejected that proposition.
  3. [46]
    It is central to Mr. Wilson’s argument in relation to the law established in cases reviewed by McPherson J in Bocada, that in an action for specific performance, a party seeking the decree is bound to show that it has at all times been ready willing and able to perform its part of the contract: see also Dainford v Juana at p.400.
  4. [47]
    What the submission ignores is that the present case is not one in which MC Property was at all material times “wholly and finally disabled from performing essential terms of the contract all together” (see discussion by McPherson J at 399 – 400 of Dainford v Juana), and that (similar to the approach of the purchasers in both Dainford decisions), the Garros, by their refusal to participate in a meaningful way in settlement resulted in the time for MC Property’s obligation to satisfy the implied term never arriving.
  5. [48]
    The Garros alleged attendance at the 8 May settlement is also central to Mr. Wilson’s submission directed at the discretionary nature of the remedy sought by MC Property. There is nothing about the conduct of MC Property on the evidence before me, that would deny it specific performance on the ground that it does not have “clean hands.”
  6. [49]
    At all times it has affirmed the contract. It has maintained that it has complied with the implied term, and it has been open in its dealings with the Garros as it has attempted (to use Mr. Nevison’s words) “to put its house in order.”
  7. [50]
    The facts here are more compelling than in either of the Dainford cases in that once the Garros failed to participate in the settlement on the 8 May and MC Property affirmed the contract, the contract remained on foot although time ceased to be of the essence.
  8. [51]
    By the time of the “second” settlement on 28.07.09 , the setting of which once again made time of the essence, on the evidence before me, MC Property was able then to  satisfy the implied term and was otherwise ready willing and able to perform its contractual obligations.
  9. [52]
    Mr. Wilson raises two other points. He argues that as at the 13.02.09 when the Garros purported to terminate, MC Property were then unable to deliver a dual-income commercial/ residential unit, his clients were entitled to terminate relying upon “such anticipatory breach and repudiation.” He refers to Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245 correctly as authority for the proposition that to establish repudiation by inability, his clients must establish that MC Property “was wholly and finally disabled from performing its contractual obligations when the time for performance, so far as it is of the essence, should arrive”: [at 280]. For the reasons expressed earlier, that time arrived on 28.07.09 and at that time MC Property was able to perform, had the Garros attended settlement. To be fair to Mr. Wilson, he did not seriously press this point in oral argument. The other point dealt with the certificate of classification. As Mr. Nevison submits this was not raised as an issue until a few days before the hearing.
  10. [53]
    For present purposes, I am prepared to accept Mr. Wilson’s submissions relating to the legal effect of the classification certificate, however I do not accept that it is sufficient to deny MC Property the relief sought. In Dainford Ltd v Bocada, McPherson J was of the view that despite the fact that by the time of trial the vendor was unable to satisfy the car-parking condition, nevertheless it was entitled to a decree pending inquiry as to title, which at that time was conducted by an officer of the court: see also Powell v Whyte [1968] Qd.R. 255. The majority were of a different view. In the Bocada case, the impediment to title (or, as McPherson J. put it “to conveyance and not title”) was the car-park condition. In light of the evidence from Council now before the Court, to the effect that under the applicable planning scheme (which is a statutory instrument) the unit can be used for both commercial and residential purposes, it is difficult to imagine that a person using the unit for such purpose would find themselves in breach of the Building Act. Leaving that aside, I agree with Mr. Nevison that it would be wrong to deny his client the relief to which his client is entitled on the basis of a totally new alleged impediment. In due course, and as a result of the decree, a completion date will be set and the Garros would be entitled to approach settlement on the basis of any further legal advice as to how the certificate of classification issue effects the ability of MC Property to perform its obligations under the contract.
  11. [54]
    The orders of the Court are the Contract of Sale dated 14 December 2007 between the Applicants, as buyer, and the Respondent, as seller for the sale of property described as proposed Lot 2 on Proposed SP207111 be specifically performed and carried into execution; and the Applicants pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding, including reserved costs, on the standard basis.
Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Peter Andrew Garro & Roxarna Maree Garro v MC Property Investments

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Garro v MC Property Investments

  • MNC:

    [2009] QDC 316

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Robertson DCJ

  • Date:

    13 Oct 2009

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
British & Benningtons v North West Cachar Tea Co (1923) AC 48
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1923) AC 48
Cite 2 - (1923) AC 48
Dainford Limited v Juana Pty Ltd (1986) 1 Qd R 395
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 1 Qd R 395
Dainford Ltd v Bocada Pty Ltd [1984] QSCFC 105
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1984] QSCFC 105
Cite 2 - [1984] QSCFC 105
Dainford Ltd v Juana Pty Ltd[1986] 1 Qd R 396; [1984] QSCFC 112
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1986] 1 Qd R 396
Cite 2 - [1986] 1 Qd R 396
Cite 3 - [1986] 1 Qd R 396
Powell v Whyte [1968] Qd R 255
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1968] Qd R 255
Cite 2 - [1968] Qd R 255
Rawson v Hobbs (1961) 107 CLR 466
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1961) 107 CLR 466
Cite 2 - (1961) 107 CLR 466
Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1988) 166 CLR 245
Cite 2 - (1988) 166 CLR 245

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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