Hintz v Ergon Energy Corporation Ltd
[2009] QDC 60
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- Unreported Judgment
- Hintz v Ergon Energy Corporation Ltd[2009] QDC 60
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Hintz v Ergon Energy Corporation Ltd[2009] QDC 60
Hintz v Ergon Energy Corporation Ltd[2009] QDC 60
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Hintz v Ergon Energy Corporation Limited [2009] QDC 60 |
PARTIES: | JASON HINTZ (applicant) V ERGON ENERGY CORPORATION LIMITED (ACN 087 646 062) (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | BD 2139 of 2003 |
DIVISION: | Civil |
PROCEEDING: | Applications for leave to extend time to commence proceedings and to renew claim and statement of claim |
ORIGINATING COURT: | District Court at Brisbane |
DELIVERED ON: | 20 March 2009 |
DELIVERED AT: | Southport |
HEARING DATE: | 27 August 2008, final submissions received 11 February 2009 |
JUDGE: | Kingham DCJ |
ORDERS: | The applications are refused. |
CATCHWORDS: | LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – EXTENSION PERIOD - where applicant alleged personal injuries suffered at work – where he commenced proceedings outside limitation period – where no dispute about threshold requirements of s 31(2) Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) - whether discretionary factors favour the grant of an extension of time – delay – prejudice – non-compliance with statutory regime ESTOPPEL – ISSUE ESTOPPEL – where application in other proceedings to extend time to commence proceedings refused – where appeal unsuccessful – where on appeal the subject claim was conceded to be a nullity– whether judicial determination which resolved the issue between the parties - whether applicant now estopped from asserting otherwise District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) ss 68, 72 Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 31(2) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5 WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) Chapter 5 Part 6, s 7 (4)(b) & (c), 262(3), 280, 285, 303, 305 Blair v Curran (1930) 62 CLR 464, followed Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, followed Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246, followed Castillon v P&O Ports Ltd [2007] QCA 364, cited Charlton v WorkCover Qld & Ors [2006] QCA 498, cited Hamling v Australian Meat Holding Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] QCA 442, cited Hintz v WorkCover Qld [2006] QSC 158, cited Hintz v WorkCover Queensland & another [2007] QCA 72, followed Hoy & Anor v Honan & Anor [1997] QCA 250, cited Hsu v Wang & Ors [2004] QSC 324, cited Matter no. s 2633 of 2002, decision of Mullins J made on 21.03.2006, cited Matter no. s 2633 of 2002, decision of Atkinson J made on 02.04.2002, cited Meacham v Brambles Security Services Ltd (1998) QSC 278, cited Muirhead v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust [1999] QCA 514, cited Tanks v WorkCover Queensland [2001] QCA, cited |
COUNSEL: | G Mullins for the Applicant M O'Sullivan for the Respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Slater and Gordon for the Applicant MacDonnells Law for the Respondent |
- [1]Jason Hintz is an electrician formerly employed by Ergon. On 31 March 1999 he was a trainee linesman working on a power pole near the town of Nebo when he says he suffered an injury to his lower back. He filed a claim for damages for personal injuries on 26 June 2003, after the limitation period for the claim had expired. He now seeks an extension of the limitation period and orders to renew a claim and statement of claim, neither of which have been served. There has been a lengthy delay between the hearing of the application and receipt of final written submissions due, at least in part, to difficulty in obtaining a transcript of related proceedings in the Court of Appeal.
- [2]The defendant opposes the application. It argued the Court of Appeal, in related proceedings between the parties, determined the plaintiff’s claim filed on 26 June 2003 is a nullity and the issue cannot be re-litigated. Alternatively, the defendant contended the court should not exercise its discretion to either extend the limitation period or renew the claim and statement of claim because the plaintiff’s delay has prejudiced its ability to defend the claim; there has been non-compliance with the pre-litigation requirements of the WorkCover Act;[1] and the plaintiff can pursue an alternative remedy against his former lawyers in negligence. Finally, it asserted the plaintiff’s claim is beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
- [3]That last argument may be disposed of in short form. It rests on a statement in the affidavit of Nerida Jessup, the plaintiff’s solicitor, filed 21 August 2008 that the plaintiff wishes to claim damages of the order sought in his Notice of Claim for Damages of 1 September 2005. His damages were then quantified at $961,325.55, well beyond the monetary jurisdiction of this court.[2]
- [4]The claim the subject of this application is for damages to the limit of the court’s jurisdiction. If the matter proceeds the plaintiff may well be in a position to establish that he has suffered damage in excess of $250,000. However, without the parties’ consent, he cannot recover more.[3] The plaintiff may well be content with an award of that value. Or he may, later, apply to transfer these proceedings to the Supreme Court. Yet as matters stand, the plaintiff has brought a claim within jurisdiction. Speculation about what decision he may subsequently make about how to prosecute his claim is immaterial to the applications now made.
- [5]The issues raised by these applications are:
- Does the Court of Appeal’s decision in related proceedings raise an issue estoppel against the plaintiff?
- Should leave be granted to extend time for these proceedings to be commenced and to renew the claim and statement of claim?
- [6]Before turning to those questions some further background is required. The unhappy history of the plaintiff’s litigation is well illustrated by the circumstance that its chronology has already been set out in some detail in more than one judgment of other courts in Queensland.[4] Only the salient details will be specifically referred to here.
- [7]The incident occurred on 31 March 1999. The plaintiff first lodged a claim with WorkCover for a lower back injury on 17 January 2001. WorkCover rejected the application, a decision upheld upon review by QComp. On 18 September 2002, an Industrial Magistrate overturned the decision and directed WorkCover pay the plaintiff benefits in relation to that injury in accordance with the Act.
- [8]By that time the limitation period had expired and the pre-litigation procedures of the WorkCover Act had not been complied with. An earlier application for leave to issue proceedings despite that non-compliance was refused by Atkinson J on 02 April 2002. Regardless, the plaintiff issued the subject claim on 26 June 2003 but did not serve it. No further action was taken in relation to it until these applications were made.
- [9]In the meantime, on 28 June 2005, WorkCover issued a Damages Certificate for a psychological injury alleged to arise from the same incident. That certificate formed the basis for an application in June 2006 to extend the limitation period to enable the plaintiff to pursue a claim for both the physical and psychological injury said to arise from the 31 March 1999 incident. His argument was the issue of the certificate was a material fact of a decisive character because, at that time, he first became aware that he was in a position to pursue a claim for damages for both the physical and psychological damage.
- [10]His application was unsuccessful at first instance and on appeal. One of the issues canvassed in those proceedings was whether, in the context of claims relating to workplace injuries, the phrase “right of action” in s 31(2) of the Limitations Act[5] should be interpreted by reference to the injury, as identified pursuant to the pre-litigation procedures imposed by the WorkCover Act, or whether it referred to a cause of action. Because the physical and psychological aspects of the plaintiff’s injury had been dealt with through distinct applications under the WorkCover Act, the plaintiff argued the right of action in s 31(2) of the Limitations Act must mean the right of action to pursue the particular type of damage: physical or psychological, not the cause of action, being damages for negligence or breach of statutory duty.
- [11]The Court of Appeal rejected that argument. While there may have been more than one form of damage or injury, for the purposes of the Limitation of Actions Act there was only one right of action.[6] Accordingly, the question was whether the certificate relied upon was a material fact of a decisive character relating to the cause of action not the particular injury or head of damage.
- [12]Having so decided, the Court observed that, at least by the date of the Industrial Magistrate’s decision of 18 September 2002, the plaintiff was in a position “to obtain any necessary extension of time on the basis that he was then aware of a material fact of a decisive character, namely that his injury was one for which damages might be sought by action notwithstanding the restrictions in s 253(1) of the Act.”[7]
- [13]The applications now before the court rest upon the Industrial Magistrate’s determination on 18 September 2002. These proceedings were issued on 23 June 2003, within one year from that determination. The orders sought are that the limitation period is extended until the date those proceedings were issued and that leave is granted to renew the claim and statement of claim not yet served.
- [14]The defendant contends that determinations made by the Court of Appeal on the earlier application to extend time preclude that relief.
Does the Court of Appeal’s decision raise an issue estoppel against the plaintiff?
- [15]The proceedings before the Court of Appeal were conducted on the shared assumption the subject claim is a nullity, because it was issued in non-compliance with s 303, the plaintiff not having given a complying Notice of Claim for Damages[8] and without the leave of the court.[9] That was the express position taken by the defendant at first instance. Citing the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tanks v WorkCover Queensland,[10] counsel for the plaintiff conceded these proceedings were, therefore, a nullity.[11]
- [16]That concession is at odds with a later decision of the Court of Appeal to which no reference was made.[12] That decision was handed down after the decision on the plaintiff’s application at first instance but before the hearing in the Court of Appeal.
- [17]In Hamling v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd Jerrard JA, with whom the other members of the court agreed, decided s 303 WorkCover Act did not extinguish rights or create new ones. Rather it postponed the remedy for the common law right to initiate proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. Proceedings commenced in contravention of s 303 engage the jurisdiction and procedural rules of the court and are vulnerable to strike out or summarily dismissal. However, s 303 does not inevitably result in the invalidity of proceedings commenced in contravention of it.
- [18]The plaintiff now relies on that decision to establish that the subject proceedings are not a nullity. The defendant accepted this is the effect of applying Hamling v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd.
- [19]Nevertheless, the defendant asserted the plaintiff was prevented from bringing a second application to extend time by an issue estoppel.[13] The relief sought in the first application was an extension of the limitation period for 12 months from 28 June 2005. The plaintiff now seeks an extension to an earlier date, when the subject proceedings were issued.
- [20]An issue estoppel prevents a party from later raising an issue which has already been the subject of a judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law which disposes once for all of the issue. It only covers those matters which the prior judgment established as the legal foundation or justification of its conclusion.[14] This requires the court to have regard to the legal, as opposed to the practical, effect of the judgment.[15]
- [21]In Castillon, the Court of Appeal decided a second application to extend the limitation period pursuant to s 31(2) was not open to the applicant because the threshold requirement of s 31(2)(a) had been determined against him in an earlier application. That is, a positive determination had been made that the applicant had all the material facts of a decisive character relating to the right of action within his means of knowledge by the critical date. That matter, then could not be relitigated.
- [22]In this case, the Court of Appeal determined that once the Industrial Magistrate made his decision in September 2002, the plaintiff was aware of a material fact of a decisive character.[16] The plaintiff does not seek to relitigate that finding; rather he seeks to rely upon it.
- [23]It is clear enough that, when counsel for the plaintiff made his concession about the subject proceedings, the court was concerned not with their legal status but with what the action of issuing these proceedings demonstrated about the plaintiff’s ability, at that time, to determine whether there was an action worth bringing. While the concession was noted, there was no judicial determination of the legal status of the subject proceedings which disposed of the issue and resolved questions of rights between the parties. The plaintiff is not estopped from seeking an extension of time in relation to the subject proceedings.
Should leave be granted to extend time for these proceedings to be commenced and to renew the claim and statement of claim?
- [24]To succeed in its application to extend time, the plaintiff must satisfy the court that:
- (a)at the critical date, he became aware of a material fact of a decisive character;
- (b)apart from a defence founded on the limitation period, he has a prima facie case on liability and quantum; and
- (c)consideration of discretionary factors, including delay and prejudice favour granting the extension.
- [25]It is common ground the decision of the Industrial Magistrate on 18 September 2002 was a material fact of a decisive character.[17] There was no dispute that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. The fate of the application to extend time rests on a consideration of discretionary factors.
- [26]As for the application to renew the claim and statement of claim, leave may be granted even where the limitation period has expired. The applicant must establish some good reason to renew, other than failure to serve despite reasonable efforts to do so. There is a wide and unfettered discretion.[18]
Delay
- [27]The plaintiff does not shrink from the inevitable conclusion that there have been lengthy delays in prosecuting these proceedings. He attributes responsibility for this to his former solicitors. The plaintiff argued he placed the matter in the hands of solicitors in about January 2001 and instructed them to act for him in relation to his personal injuries claim for the 31 March 1999 incident. On his behalf, on 31 July 2001, his solicitors applied to QComp to reconsider WorkCover’s decision to reject the plaintiff’s claim for the lower back injury. It seems their primary focus then was upon the review and subsequent appeal to the Industrial Magistrate.
- [28]The decision of the Industrial Magistrate restored the plaintiff’s right to claim statutory benefits. It did not affect his position to claim damages. Before the limitation period expired, the plaintiff could have commenced proceedings on the strength of a conditional damages certificate for the lower back injury.[19] The failure to do so has not been explained either by the plaintiff or his former solicitors. Counsel for the plaintiff argues the delay of his former solicitors should not be attributed to him in determining this application.
- [29]The subsequent delay in prosecuting the subject proceedings is explained by what his solicitors then believed to be the legal status of proceedings commenced contrary to s 303 of the WorkCover Act. The decision in Hamling v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) was not handed down until October 2006. In March 2007, in light of observations made by the Court of Appeal in Hintz,[20] his former solicitors advised him to consult other solicitors, which he did in July 2007. In October 2007 he retained the predecessor to the current firm. The application to extend time was made in July 2008.
- [30]The plaintiff has not explained the delay until October 2007 in retaining new solicitors. His solicitors have not explained the 8 month delay between October 2007 and July 2008 in making this application.[21]
Prejudice
- [31]The defendant argued that it is prejudiced by the significant delay since the incident occurred. Some witnesses are no longer available and for those who are, their memory of unremarkable events, necessarily, will have deteriorated. The effect of delay on the quality of justice is one of the policy justifications for imposing limitation periods.[22]
- [32]The potential prejudice must be assessed in the context that there has been some shifting in the basis for the plaintiff’s claim. Three scenarios have been put at different times.
- [33]In his statement of claim, the plaintiff pleads that, on 31 March 1999, he was working on top of a 10 metre electrical pole using a harness, and using a rope to elevate materials up the pole. His co-worker pulled on the rope causing the pole to move suddenly and he was injured trying to stabilise himself.
- [34]In his affidavit of 7 February 2002, the plaintiff stated his injuries occurred on 31 March 1999 when he was trying to repair a wire strung between two power poles approximately 600 metres apart. As he lifted the wire, which he estimated to weigh between 70 and 80 kilograms, he felt a change in his back like something had gone in his back. He did refer to the rope attached to a pole to which he was harnessed being pulled by his co-worker, John Lisiewicz, but did not report feeling any pain when he stabilised himself. After hearing evidence from the plaintiff, the Industrial Magistrate accepted an incident may have occurred prior to the injury, which he found occurred when the plaintiff was required to lift a weight of 70 to 80 kilograms.
- [35]The third scenario is that recorded when he attended the Moranbah hospital on 6 April 1999 as a result of a back injury that was said to have occurred suddenly whilst he was walking to a vehicle that morning. The hospital records note “no history of trauma preceding pain”. Consistent with that, the plaintiff made a claim for worker’s compensation dated 16 April 1999 “while walking to his vehicle to commence work”. That claim was repeated in a letter from his former solicitors to WorkCover on 14 August 2001, after WorkCover rejected his application for compensation airing from an incident on 31 March 1999.
- [36]In his statement to a WorkCover representative of 16 October 2000, the plaintiff reported the incident with the rope and said he was shaken by it but did not say he experienced any pain. Rather, he said, after he told Mr Lisiewicz to stop, the plaintiff proceeded with the job without further incident.
- [37]It was not until his claim of 17 January 2001, almost 2 years later, that he formally alleged anything occurred on 31 March 1999. He did not describe the circumstances of the injury but attributed responsibility for it to Mr Lisiewicz.
- [38]The plaintiff sought to explain further in his 2002 affidavit. He described the 31 March incident in the terms set out above. Then, he said, he worked without incident the following day, when he performed light duties. His next day at work, after Easter, was 6 April when he experienced twinges of pain when he closed his gate when leaving home for work and also when he climbed into the work vehicle. Later at work he experienced extreme pain while working in a bucket elevated above the ground. It was so severe it made him fall to his knees but abated after about 5 minutes. Later that day he was admitted to hospital and was discharged three days later.
- [39]While he was in hospital between 6 and 9 April 1999, being treated for his injury, the plaintiff said he reported the incident of 31 March 1999 to an employee of the defendant, John Blanchfield. After the plaintiff was discharged, he told another employee, his supervisor Greg McLean, he would be lodging an Incident Report about it. He said Mr McLean asked him not to because John Lisiewicsz would lose his job. The plaintiff said he acceded to that request.
- [40]The plaintiff also apparently gave conflicting accounts of when and the circumstances in which he experienced back pain to a number of medical practitioners. They are recorded, to some extent at least, in QComp’s decision to reject the application to review WorkCover’s refusal of his claim.[23]
- [41]The plaintiff argued WorkCover was on notice from an early stage. Certainly a number of claims were under investigation. As well as those already referred to, there were applications made for stress sustained over a period of time (lodged 28 August 2000) and for physical and psychiatric injuries arising from incident on 31 March 1999 (lodged 23 January 2003). However, the nature of the claim (whether stress, physical injury or psychological injury) and the circumstances for it (whether harassment by a co-worker, the rope being pulled, lifting a heavy weight or closing the gate and getting into a vehicle) inevitably framed the scope of the enquiry.
- [42]WorkCover obtained some statements in July and August of 2001 from co-workers: Hans Lindel; Carmelo Pasquale; John Lisiewicz; and Jeffrey Freeman. The focus of those statements appears to be the stress claim, although one of the incidents addressed is whether Mr Lisiewicz pulled on the rope while the plaintiff was on the pole.
- [43]Counsel for the defendant submitted the statements were taken in the course of investigating the stress claim. I am not aware of any evidence which establishes that. Given the timing of the statements, it is possible the statements related to the three applications which had then been made: the one for stress over time, the one for injuries sustained on 6 April and the one for injuries sustained on 31 March.
- [44]Mr Lisiewicz is the only witness to the 31 March 1999 incident. He still works for the defendant. Whether the statement was taken in relation to one or other or all the claims then made, the pleaded incident was not explored in detail. To prepare its defence, the defendant would need to revisit Mr Lisiewicz’s account some 10 years after the incident occurred.
- [45]No statement has been obtained from Mr McLean, and he no longer works for Ergon. Nor was a statement obtained from Mr Blanchfield, although he still works for Ergon. Given the multiplicity of claims and the shifting of ground, this is not a case where any prejudice to the defendant could be said to flow from its own failure to obtain and preserve evidence.[24]
- [46]It goes without saying that the defendant’s prospects of successfully defending the plaintiff’s claim may differ markedly depending on the circumstances in which any injuries are said to have been sustained. Given the different versions apparently given by the plaintiff, his credibility will no doubt be in issue at trial. It is reasonable to assume, in properly preparing to meet the plaintiff’s claim as it is pleaded, the defendant would need to investigate what the plaintiff said to others about the incident or his injuries as well as revisiting the statement of Mr Lisiewicz. Given the passage of time, witnesses who may otherwise have been able to give accounts favourable to the defence may have little or unreliable recollection of relevant conversations with the plaintiff.
Non-compliance with WorkCover Queensland Act
- [47]The pre-litigation procedures of the WorkCover Act have not been complied with. The plaintiff did not deliver a Notice of Claim for damages as required by s 280, until 1 September 2005, more than 2 years after the proceedings commenced. An application to deem compliant the Notice of Claim for damages was refused.[25] WorkCover has not provided a liability response.[26] There has been no compulsory conference and no final written offer.[27] The Court has not made an order for leave to issue proceedings despite non-compliance with s 280.[28] To the contrary, an application for leave was refused.[29] The subject proceedings were instituted after the limitation period expired and without fulfilling the requirements of s 308.
- [48]Whilst there was no contest that there had been non-compliance, the legal effect of that, in the specific circumstances of this case, was not argued. It was common ground that Hamling’s case establishes that proceedings instituted in contravention of s 303 are not a nullity but engage the jurisdiction of the court and are vulnerable to an application to strike out or summarily dismiss the claim. There is no application to strike out the proceedings. It is neither desirable nor necessary to decide whether the proceedings would or should be struck out.
- [49]Nevertheless, the non-compliance is a relevant factor in deciding whether the court should exercise its discretion. The provisions not complied with are amongst those designed to ensure injured workers are treated fairly and employers’ interests in relation to claims for damages for workers’ injuries are protected.[30] Had they been complied with, the prejudice that the defendant now asserts would have been avoided.
Alternative relief
- [50]In his reasons for dismissing the appeal from refusal of the first application to extend time, Keane JA observed in Hintz[31] that “The appellant did not take any of these steps which were available to him to pursue his right of action in respect of the accident of 31 March 1999. It may be that he has a remedy against those who were advising him in this regard. But that is an irrelevant speculation here.”
- [51]It is not an irrelevant speculation here. The defendant relies upon it as a discretionary consideration, at least in relation to the application to renew the claim and statement of claim.[32] The plaintiff did not argue it had no prospects of succeeding in a claim against his former solicitors. This court is not in a position to properly assess prospects, other than to observe that a detailed chronology indicates an arguable case.
- [52]With respect to the application to extend time, the court should not engage in an attempt to balance the prejudice that would be suffered by the applicant if the application is refused against that the respondent would suffer if it is granted. The question is whether the defendant has proved the fact or a real possibility of actual prejudice.
“Legislatures enact limitation periods because they make a judgment, inter alia, that the chance of an unfair trial occurring after the limitation period has expired is sufficiently great to require the termination of the plaintiff's right of action at the end of that period. When a defendant is able to prove that he or she will not now be able to fairly defend him or herself or that there is a significant chance that this is so, the case is no longer one of presumptive prejudice. The defendant has then proved what the legislature merely presumed would be the case. Even on the hypothesis of presumptive prejudice, the legislature perceives that society is best served by barring the plaintiff's action. When actual prejudice of a significant kind is shown, it is hard to conclude that the legislature intended that the extension provision should trump the limitation period. The general rule that actions must be commenced within the limitation period should therefore prevail once the defendant has proved the fact or the real possibility of significant prejudice. In such a situation, actual injustice to one party must occur. It seems more in accord with the legislative policy underlying limitation periods that the plaintiff's lost right should not be revived than that the defendant should have a spent liability reimposed upon it. This is so irrespective of whether the limitation period extinguishes or merely bars the cause of action.”[33]
Conclusion
- [53]I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has adequately explained the significant delay in prosecuting these proceedings. I reject his counsel’s submission that the delay since July 2007 is not material in the context of these proceedings. Quite apart from the implied undertaking to proceed in an expeditious way,[34] the history of the proceedings dictated expedition.
- [54]I am persuaded there is either actual prejudice or a real possibility of significant prejudice arising from the plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting the subject proceedings. Accordingly I decline the applications to extend time to commence the proceedings and to renew the claim and statement of claim.
Costs
- [55]I will hear from counsel as to costs.
Footnotes
[1] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld).
[2] District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 68.
[3] District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 72.
[4] Hintz v WorkCover Queensland & another [2007] QCA 72; Hintz v WorkCover Qld [2006] QSC 158; Transcript of Order and Reasons of Atkinson J in no. s 2633 of 2002 made on 02.04.2002; Transcript of Order and Reasons of Mullins J in no. s 2633 of 2002 made on 21.03.2006.
[5] Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
[6] Hintz v WorkCover Queensland & Anor [2007] QCA 72 at [27].
[7] Ibid at [28].
[8] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), s 280.
[9] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) s 305.
[10] Tanks v WorkCover Queensland [2001] QCA.
[11] Transcript of proceedings before Court of Appeal, p 16, exhibit 2.
[12] Hamling v Australian Meat Holding Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] QCA 442.
[13] Castillon v P&O Ports Ltd [2007] QCA 364.
[14] Blair v Curran (1930) 62 CLR 464 per Dixon J at 531-2.
[15] Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 248.
[16] Hintz v WorkCover Queensland & Anor [2007] QCA 72 per Williams JA at [9] and Keane JA at [29].
[17] Charlton v WorkCover Qld & Ors [2006] QCA 498 at [45].
[18] Muirhead v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust [1999] QCA 514.
[19] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), s 262(3).
[20] Hintz v WorkCover Queensland & Anor [2007] QCA 72.
[21] Hsu v Wang & Ors [2004] QSC 324 at [40].
[22] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541.
[23] ExYJM9 to affidavit of Yvette McLaughlin filed 27 August 2008.
[24] Hoy & Anor v Honan & Anor [1997] QCA 250.
[25] Decision of Mullins J in no. s 2633 of 2002 made on 21.03.2006.
[26] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), s 285.
[27] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), Chapter 5 Part 6.
[28] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), s 305.
[29] Decision of Atkinson J in no. s 2633 of 2002 made on 02.04.2002.
[30] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), s 7(4)(b) and (c).
[31] Hintz v WorkCover Queensland & Anor [2007] QCA 72 at [32].
[32] Meacham v Brambles Security Services Ltd (1998) QSC 278 per Williams J at [19].
[33] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 per McHugh J at 555.
[34] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5.