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Yassir v Bone[2010] QDC 11

Yassir v Bone[2010] QDC 11

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Yassir v Bone [2010] QDC 11

PARTIES:

RAGE ALI YASSIR

(Appellant)

V

MERVYN KENNETH BONE

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

540/09

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

29 January 2010

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane 

HEARING DATE:

24 August 2009; final written submissions received on 26 September 2009

JUDGE:

Irwin DCJ

ORDER:

1. The Application for leave to adduce new evidence refused.

2. Appeal against conviction dismissed.

3. (a) Appeal against sentence allowed;

(b) Sentence imposed at first instance varied and instead a conviction is not recorded.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal Against Conviction – general principles – admission of fresh evidence – whether the evidence would probably have an important influence on the result of the case

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal Against Conviction – appeal against decision of a magistrate – where appellant convicted after trial of causing a traffic hazard – where appeal proceeded on the evidence given in the Magistrates Court – where upon a review of the evidence, affording due respect to the decision of the magistrate and the magistrate’s advantage in seeing and hearing the witnesses, appellate court arrived at the same conclusion

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal Against Sentence – where appellant convicted after trial on one count of causing a traffic hazard – where sentence was a $100 fine – where conviction recorded – whether sentence manifestly excessive

Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21

Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222, s 223(2), s 225(1)

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 12(2)

Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulations 1999 (Qld), s 4, s 15, s 253, Schedule 6

Clarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 404, applied

Gallagher v R (1986) 160 CLR 392, applied

Graham v Queensland Nursing Council [2009] QCA 280, applied

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, applied

Langdale v Danby [1982] 3 All ER 129; [1982] 1 WLR 1123, applied

Parry v Mayfield Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 250, cited

R v Briese (1997) 92 A Crim R 75, applied

Stevenson v Yasso [2006] 2 Qd R 150; [2006] QCA 40, cited

Warry v PB Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 154, applied

COUNSEL:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf

M.J. Litchen for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf

Director of Public Prosecution (Qld) for the respondent

Background

  1. [1]
    At about 7 am on 16 August 2008 there was contact between a motor vehicle being driven by Damien John Hinkley and a bicycle being ridden by the appellant in Harrogate Street in the vicinity of where it intersects with Ipswich Road at Woolloongabba, Brisbane.
  1. [2]
    On 24 February 2009, the appellant was convicted after a summary trial of one count arising out of this incident, that contrary to s 253 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 1999 (Qld) (“the Regulation”), being the rider of a bicycle, he caused a traffic hazard on Harrogate Street by moving into the path of a vehicle.
  1. [3]
    A conviction was recorded and he was fined $100 and ordered to pay $74.35 costs of court, in default of payment within 28 days, two days imprisonment.
  1. [4]
    This appeal has been brought pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) (“the JA”) against both the conviction and sentence.  The grounds of appeal are that the conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory, and contrary to law; and that the sentence is manifestly excessive.

Appeal against conviction

Legal approach to this appeal

  1. [5]
    It has been held[1] that:

“The central task of an appellate court in an appeal by way of rehearing is not to analyse the correctness or otherwise of the decision below, although an analysis may sometimes be helpful.  It is to decide the case for itself.  Often it will do so by considering only the evidence admitted at first instance. That is usually the position in appeals under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886. … That requires an appellate court to draw its own inferences from the facts established by the evidence while respecting the advantage of the court or tribunal at first instance in seeing and evaluating witnesses.  This is particularly relevant when issues of credibility arise.”

  1. [6]
    However, in this case the appellant has sought leave under s 223(2) of the JA for fresh, additional or substituted evidence (new evidence) to be adduced.  This is the preliminary issue to be determined on this appeal.
  1. [7]
    Section 223(2) provides:

“However, the District Court may give leave to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence (“new evidence”) if the court is satisfied there are special grounds for giving leave.”

It follows that special grounds are needed before the evidence should be received.  To establish special grounds, three conditions must be fulfilled.  First it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; second, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, although it need not be decisive; third; the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible.[2]

  1. [8]
    It is convenient to consider this issue in the context of the evidence, referred to in s 223(1) of the JA as “original evidence” before the magistrate, particularly in the context of whether if the “new evidence” were given it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case.

Original evidence

  1. [9]
    Mr Hinkley and three police officers (Constables Saville, Joy and Timar) gave evidence in the prosecution case.
  1. [10]
    The appellant who, as on this appeal, appeared on his own behalf gave evidence in his defence.

Mr Hinkley[3]

  1. [11]
    Mr Hinkley said that at about 7 am on 16 August 2008 he drove his father’s car from the family residence in Harrogate Street towards the intersection with Ipswich Road.
  1. [12]
    He said that he was travelling down hill. This evidence emerged under cross‑examination during which he said it was a steep hill and he could see all the way down.  The appellant disputed this, putting to him that here was no hill there.  This is best demonstrated by the following portion of cross‑examination:[4]

“DEFENDANT: … there are also discrepancies in your statement here.  You said, for example, you come down the hill on Harrogate Road.  There’s no hill there.  I always drove my customers every day … Harrogate Road when I pick up Friday night from the city.

BENCH: Okay, look, … just stop your question where you said there is no hill in Harrogate Road, okay?  We don’t care about your customers, just put your version to this witness, all right?  Your question to him is, “Is there a hill in Harrogate Road?” or “Do you agree there’s a hill?” or “There’s no hill,” okay.  What do you say to that?

WITNESS: Is there a hill in Harrogate Street – no.  Oh, sorry, yes, there is.  I live in Harrogate Street and there is a … considerable hill.  I live at the top end, Ipswich Road is at the bottom end.  I can see all the way down, it is a steep hill.” (my emphasis)

The reference to “customers” is to the appellant’s then occupation as a taxi driver.  The exchange is also an example of the need for the magistrate to intervene to reformulate the appellant’s questions to ensure that witnesses answered the crux of them, rather than responding to statements that were made by him.  In relation to this issue of whether or not there was a hill in Harrogate Street, the appellant subsequently gave no evidence to contradict Mr Hinkley’s evidence.

  1. [13]
    He said that the road was clear the entire way with no cars on either side. His intention in approaching the intersection was to turn left into Ipswich Road.  His evidence was that he did not get out of third gear the whole way down the street.  He was slowing down to stop because he knew that Ipswich Road was busy and there was no way to merge into the traffic.  He had looked to his left which was clear but the road was busy when he looked to the right.  According to him, he first saw the defendant in the following circumstances:

“I was coming to a stop, glanced left, looking right looking – hoping for a break, looked back to my left and saw Mr Yassir with his right hand on my – left side of my bonnet.  At this time the car was – was stopped.”

Although they had never previously met, there was no dispute about his identification of the appellant, whom he said was standing with one leg either side of the bike which was upright, like a person would before dismounting.  In answer to the magistrate’s questions, he said that this was the first time he had seen the appellant and he had not been aware of any contact with him.[5]  His evidence was that he had not heard or felt anything.  However, as he responded in cross‑examination, “clearly we’ve collided”.[6]

  1. [14]
    At the time of first observing the appellant, he said that his car was stopped two to three metres from the intersection. According to him, this was something like 100 or 150 metres from his residence.  The appellant referred to his estimating this distance in his statement as 200 metres.  However, because the appellant followed this proposition with a statement on another issue, this suggestion was not responded to, and was not the subject of further evidence.
  1. [15]
    Mr Hinkley said that he got out of the car and asked the appellant if he was all right, to which the appellant replied to the effect, “No, you nearly killed me.”  The appellant also said that he was going to call the police.
  1. [16]
    He said that he returned to his car and called his parents who arrived about five minutes later. The police came within 20 minutes.  Constable Saville interviewed and breath tested him.  He and the appellant exchanged their contact details.  Constable Saville gave no evidence of the result of the breath test.  The issue was not raised again during evidence.  Accordingly, there is no evidence that Mr Hinkley had any alcohol in his system at the time of the incident.
  1. [17]
    Other than what Mr Hinkley thought might have been a scratch, there was no damage to his vehicle.  He could see the appellant’s handprint on his car.
  1. [18]
    During cross‑examination it became clear through the appellant’s statements and questions that he was suggesting that Mr Hinkley was the person who caused the traffic hazard by driving recklessly and at high speed and without due care and attention, with the result that he ran over the appellant and endangered his life.  Mr Hinkley denied this.
  1. [19]
    This is apparent from the following aspects of the cross‑examination:[7]

“DEFENDANT: Mr Hinkley, you say you stopped at the intersection and then you saw me in front of your boot.  You were not stopped, you were – I was already in the middle of Harrogate Road when you hit me?- - No.

Yes, you were and you were speeding, and you said in your statement here that – the statement you were giving to the police, that you were in the second gear and approximately three to four metres away from the intersection?- - With the clutch fully in.

Yeah – yes, with the clutch fully in.  and if you were in – in the second gear and you were that distance away from – from – from the intersection, what speed were you travelling-----?- - Less than – less than five kilometres an hour.

No, I think you’re – you’re not – you’re not telling the truth, because you were speeding and you were not in the second gear.  I was already in Harrogate Road.  You were driving that the speed of 80 kilometres per hour-----

WITNESS: If I was driving at 80 kilometres per hour-----

DEFENDANT: Yes?- - -----I would have gone straight through Ipswich Road and collected-----

…

DEFENDANT: Yep? - - And crashed with approximately 10 cars.

I – I – I-----? - - I would not have had time to stop before the intersection if I was travelling at that speed.

DEFENDANT: I am telling him that he deliberately overrun me.

BENCH: Okay, now stop there.  Let him comment on that.  Right, what do you want to say to that?

WITNESS: I had never met Mr Yassir in my life.  I had no intention of killing him, for obvious reasons.  I did not know him.

…

DEFENDANT: … I am also don’t believe of what you just tell me – you know, the Judge here, the Court, that you – you were driving slowly  and stopped.  You were driving recklessly and you endangered my life-----

…

WITNESS: At – at no time did I exceed 35, 40 kilometres an hour.  I did not go past third gear.  My car could not travel at – at any more than 50 kilometres an hour in third gear.

…

Like I said before, if I was travelling at even 20 kilometres an hour that close to the intersection, I would have had a serious crash with other vehicles.

…

DEFENDANT: … This is not a collision because a collision is when two [indistinct] collided, I was riding a pushbike and you were driving a vehicle and you were speeding and you over-run me.

BENCH: Okay, no.  Let him – what do you say to that?- - Overrun, no.  We – we wouldn’t have hit harder than that like – and even that, I would have had to have heard or felt inside my car.

Right?- - It’s only a small car.

DEFENDANT: And in – in this statement here, Mr Hinkley, you mentioned that I was – the first time you saw me, I was – when you saw me was when I – when you saw me on the – on the – bonnet of your vehicle.  Clearly if you were driving, you know, in a professional manner you could have made some observation and you could have seen me well before that.  Clearly you crashed me on purpose?- - I did not crash you on purpose.  I was coming to a stop because I knew I had to come to a stop at the intersection.  I was going at snail pace at the fastest.  I was almost totally stopped.  I was looking at my right and not to my left because the cars come from the right.  There is no risk of a vehicle hitting me from the left-hand side.  That’s why I was looking to the right.

Mr Hinkley, why – why you didn’t break?- - I did break.  I was almost completely stopped.  Having come down a hill-----

No, you were not stoped?- - -----my foot had been applied to the break-----

You were not stopped, you were not stopped, you were  you were still-----?- - May I finish my answer please.

BENCH: Let him – let him answer the question please?- - Like – Like we clarified before, Harrogate Street is on a hill and I have come down the hill to get where this incident happened.  I had my foot on the brake and applied pressure liberally for about three – sorry, a third or half – half way down the hill.  Otherwise I would have smashed into the cars on Ipswich Road.  To say I didn’t apply the brake is ridiculous.” (my emphasis)

  1. [20]
    Mr Hinkley also denied a proposition put to him by the appellant that when he got out of his car, he used some racial words to the effect, “Why are you doing, little nigger”, “What are you doing here little nigger? You’re not – you’re not supposed to be on this road.”[8]
  1. [21]
    Of particular significance to the issue requiring resolution is the following exchange with reference to Mr Hinkley’s statement:[9]

“DEFENDANT: Yes.  You say ‘I looked’ – I quote what you said in the statement, ‘I looked as far as I could to the left.  However, could only see approximately three to four metres up the footpath, but could not see anything further due to – to the fence.’  So, was that your reason why you overrun me because you could not see-----?- - That’s the reason I couldn’t see you.  As I was coming to a stop, I looked to my left.  I couldn’t see you coming down-----

For the fence-----

BENCH: Let him answer.

WITNESS: I couldn’t see where you came from so then you’ve come across and come into me from the …” (my emphasis)

  1. [22]
    This was expanded on during re-examination. Mr Hinkley said that there was a footpath along Ipswich Road to the left with a construction fence inside that area.  It was only possible to see three or four metres down the footpath before the fence blocked the view.  In this context, he testified:[10]

“So you’re saying you did glance to the left-----?- - And it was clear at that time.

And in that three or four metres, you saw nobody, you saw nothing?- - There is nothing there.

Then you’ve turned your attention to the oncoming on your right?- - Yes.

And then the very first time you’ve seen the defendant is when you’ve glanced again to your left and seen him?- - That’s right.  I’ve glanced back to the left to make sure no-one’s coming-----

-----with his hand or hands on the bonnet of your vehicle.

DEFENDANT: Your Honour.

BENCH: No, don’t interrupt.

WITNESS: I’ve glanced back to the left to make sure no-one’s coming from the left again like I did at the beginning and at this time Mr Yassir was already on my bonnet.

MS BOYD: You didn’t hear any noise?- - No.

So the only notification was had that there’d been some contact between the defendant and your vehicle is when you physically saw-----?- - Yes.

-----him with his hands upon our vehicle and that’s the only notification you had that there’s been any kind of-----?- - Yes.

-----collision or contact?- - Yeah.”

Constable Saville[11]

  1. [23]
    Constable Saville’s evidence was that at approximately 7.30 am on 16 August 2008 she and Constable Joy were detailed to attend the traffic incident.  On attending she observed a bicycle on the road in the middle of the intersection and a dark coloured vehicle about a metre back form the intersection.  She said that Mr Hinkley and the appellant were standing near their vehicles.  While her partner spoke to the appellant, she spoke to Mr Hinkley.
  1. [24]
    She observed that the front wheel of the bicycle was a bit buckled, but could not see any damage to Mr Hinkley’s vehicle.  She saw a handprint in the dirt on the left-hand corner at the front of the bonnet just above the tyre.
  1. [25]
    When she joined her partner she noticed that the appellant was holding up his right leg of his track pants. He was wearing a leather jacket. She did not see any scuff marks or torn or ripped holes in this clothing. Her observation was that he had a small graze without blood to his lower leg. She described this as looking like a little scratch or scratch marks. Her evidence was that Constable Joy asked the appellant whether he required medical attention, and that the reply was words to the effect of, “No, I’m fine I do not need an ambulance.”[12]
  1. [26]
    Because of the absence of injuries and the minor damage, she formed the opinion that this was a non-reportable accident which only required the exchange of details and for the insurance companies to deal with it. This was explained to Mr Hinkley and the appellant. The police officers facilitated the exchange of details.  She said that the appellant was initially reluctant to exchange his details.
  1. [27]
    She said that after this was done the appellant “stated to us that he had a broken ankle”[13] and Constable Joy again asked him if he should seek medical attention.  She thought that at this point he said he would do so.[14]
  1. [28]
    Her evidence was that she and Constable Joy returned to the police vehicle and put some materials back into it.  They then noted that Mr Hinkley and the appellant had left.  She said that they drove around for a little while to se if they could find the appellant.  This included attending the emergency department of the Princess Alexandra Hospital (“the PA Hospital”).  They did not locate him but later were advised by Constable Timar that he attended at their police station.  It was because he had done this that the police undertook an official incident report due to the fact that injuries had been sustained.[15]  Following this, statements were obtained from Mr Hinkley and the appellant.[16]
  1. [29]
    The cross‑examination focused on his physical condition at the time she made her observations at the scene of the incident.  By his questions he disputed that Constable Joy asked if he needed any medical attention.  Rather, he suggested that Constable Joy told him that he didn’t need such attention and should go home.  She was unable to comment on this proposition.  This is because on her evidence she was not present for the initial period when Constable Joy was speaking with the appellant.
  1. [30]
    The appellant suggested that he was in fact sitting on the ground with his leg bleeding and he was told to stand up. He said that he was unable to do so. Constable Saville denied this, saying that he was standing and walking at the time.  This is best demonstrated by the following passages of cross‑examination:[17]

“DEFENDANT: … I would also like to ask Constable Saville if – if I know I was the victim and I was the one who was overrun and crashed by the speeding vehicle, was there any reason why you issued a fine ticket for – for being a victim of a – of a – of a accident – of a car accident?- - The observations of the scene didn’t indicate to me that there was any malice in the actual incident.  After my investigations were concluded that is when I issued the infringement notice.

But I’m the one who called the police and – and – and requested assistance from the police because I was overrun by speeding vehicle driven by Mr Hinkley.  And clearly when you arrive at the scene I was lying on the floor in a pool of blood and my leg was.  At the moment I’m on medication for kidney – kidney damaged caused – caused by – by – by the accident and I can – your Honour, I can-----

BENCH: Well, that’s – that’s irrelevant, okay.

DEFENDANT: I can prove that.

BENCH: That’s – that’s irrelevant.  Yes, what’s relevant is what happened on the day.

DEFENDANT: Okay.  Well, I have no further questions to ask.

BENCH: Righto.  Do you want to comment on that last – what – where – what was Mr Yassir doing when you arrived?- - He was standing.” (my emphasis)

Constable Joy[18]

  1. [31]
    Constable Joy gave evidence that on attending the scene of the incident he observed a dark hatch parked near the T‑junction on the intersection of Harrogate Street and Ipswich Road with a bicycle approximately one and a half metres in front of it.  There were two males and a female standing near the car.  These persons were obviously Mr Hinkley and his parents.  The appellant was standing forward of the car and near the bicycle, which had a slightly buckled front wheel.  He described it as a men’s mountain bike.
  1. [32]
    The appellant immediately said words to the effect of, “He tired to kill me.” When asked to explain this, the appellant said words to the effect, “He hit my bike. I was under the front of the car waving at him.  He kept driving and dragged me.”  (my emphasis).
  1. [33]
    In response to being asked what injuries he had, the Appellant then lifted up his right tracksuit trouser pants leg and showed Constable Joy a small abrasion, similar to if someone had dry skin and just scratched.  He did not observe any blood.  When he repeated this question, the appellant again indicated this abrasion.
  1. [34]
    In addition to tracksuit pants, Constable Joy observed the appellant wearing a dark leather jacket.  He inspected the front, rear and both sides of the appellant’s clothing.  He did not observe any scratches, tears or rips consistent with a person dragged across the bitumen.
  1. [35]
    He said that he explained to the appellant that this was a non-reportable accident and all that was required was for him to exchange details with the driver of the other vehicle. Although the appellant was initially reluctant to do so, he did this after Constable Joy explained his obligations.
  1. [36]
    Constable Joy’s evidence was that it was then the appellant indicated to him and his partner that he had a broken ankle.  He said that the appellant immediately turned and walked off to some nearby construction workers.
  1. [37]
    He said that he and Constable Saville returned to the police vehicle.  After placing some items in it, they observed that Mr Hinkley and the appellant had left.  They then conducted some general patrols of the surrounding streets and attended the PA Hospital emergency section in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the appellant.  They subsequently took up with Constable Timar.
  1. [38]
    The appellant asked no relevant questions of Constable Joy.  He attempted to cross‑examine the officer about his statement recorded in Constable Saville’s notebook.  As the acting magistrate correctly advised the appellant, these were questions which should have been asked of Constable Saville.  This was clearly not a profitable line of cross‑examination for this reason.  The appellant drew attention to the fact that a page was blanked out in the notebook.  As the magistrate explained, in accordance with the usual experience of the courts, this happens when the next investigation starts and therefore contains information that is irrelevant to the charges before he court.  The appellant had difficulty in accepting this, responding that he thought this was a cover up.  He also sought to cross‑examine Constable Joy about being unable to recall his conversation with Mr Hinkley at the time of the accident.  However, he was reminded that in accordance with the evidence, Constable Joy did not speak to Mr Hinkley.  Following this, the appellant asked no further questions.  As a consequence, Constable Joy’s evidence was unchallenged by cross‑examination.  This is undoubtedly due to the appellant’s unfamiliarity with court procedure, which is evident from his conduct in the Magistrates Court and his submissions to this court.

Constable Timar[19]

  1. [39]
    Constable Timar’s evidence was that on the day of the incident she was the duty officer at the counter of the Dutton Park Police Station when the appellant attended there to report it.  The time of his attendance was not given.  However, it must have been before 2 pm because this was the end of her shift.
  1. [40]
    According to Constable Timar, the appellant was very upset and aggressive in his speech.  He believed that the person who was driving the car had tried to murder him.  She tried to calm him down and advised him that if he wanted to make a report it would be better to speak to Constables Saville and Joy.
  1. [41]
    She also gave evidence that he stated that he had just come from the PA Hospital where he had been told:[20]

“he had a very severe head injury, he had internal injuries, which included bleeding of the kidney, and he also had a broken ankle.”

She said that her advice to him was that he should possibly go back to the hospital and she would get the officers to call him at a later date.

  1. [42]
    Her evidence was that she then gave him her business card. This fell to the floor. She said that he bent over quite easily to pick it up. She observed him because of his report of injuries. She also did not notice any limp and he did not seem to be in pain.
  1. [43]
    In cross‑examination the appellant challenged her account that the card had been dropped and her observation of his physical condition.  He put to her that he picked the card up from the desk and he had two crutches with him.  She denied both propositions.
  1. [44]
    He also suggested that she would not give him a chance to explain himself and kept threatening him with imprisonment. She denied this by saying:[21]

“I don’t use those tactics as – at all.  My job as a station duty officer, when people come to the counter, is to listen and I listened.  I’m very fair.  You did – you came to me very aggressively and I tried to calm you down, that was all.”

  1. [45]
    The appellant responded that as the other officers would not take any statement at the scene, he came to the police station to make an inquiry about this, Constable Timar had denied his rights and misinterpreted his tone as aggressive towards her.  Constable Timar said that she had in fact handed him her card with an explanation that if the officers who attended did not take his report, he could see her.
  1. [46]
    He also put to her that she said she was going to call him at 3 pm that day, but she did not do so.  She denied saying this because her shift ended at 2 pm.

The appellant[22]

  1. [47]
    The appellant gave evidence in his defence. His evidence was that he was riding his bicycle from home towards Woolloongabba stadium. In the course of this journey he was on Harrogate Street when he looked over his shoulder and saw Mr Hinkley’s car about 300 or 400 metres “behind” him.  He said that Mr Hinkley was speeding and caught up with him, as a consequence of which:[23]

“all of a sudden he knocked me to the ground unconscious and my whole body went underneath the wheel and I was unable to move any part of my body.  I shouted and screamed, ‘Stop, stop, stop’, but he wouldn’t stop … maybe he intended to take my life, that’s how I felt at the time … unless Mr Hinkley he was – he – he was blind, he could have seen me coming from a distance and unless he had some other reason or maybe he was using his mobile phone or something, he could have stopped there was enough distance to stop …”

He said that Mr Hinkley was driving dangerously and recklessly.  Also he said that he suspected that Mr Hinkley was under some kind of narcotics.  The magistrate correctly upheld an objection to this statement that it was not based on any evidence.  During cross‑examination, the appellant said that Mr Hinkley did not stop when his body went underneath the car but kept driving for about five or seven metres.[24]

  1. [48]
    The appellant maintained that he had been victimised twice; first by Mr Hinkley and secondly by the police whom he claimed mistreated him.
  1. [49]
    The prosecutor cross‑examined him about the route that he rode from his home to the point of impact.  The transcript and the acting magistrate’s decision reveals that he drew a map during his evidence which he used to demonstrate this to the court.  However, as the decision confirms, it was not tendered as an exhibit.[25]  He initially gave evidence that:[26]

“So you were riding your bicycle down Harrogate Street?- - Yes.

Towards Ipswich Road?- - I was turning to Ipswich Road, yes.” (my emphasis)

However, inconsistently with this, the exchange immediately following this was:[27]

“See, I put to you that that’s not correct.  I put to you that you were riding your bicycle along a footpath?- - Mmm.

Along Ipswich Road and that you crossed or attempted to cross Harrogate Street, you weren’t driving down Harrogate Street towards Ipswich Road at all?- - No, I was initially on the footpath but I ended up on Harrogate Road.  When I come from – you know my house is Buranda, and I was on my way to the city.”

In keeping with this second explanation, with the aid of the map, he described the path of his travel from leaving his house in Cornwall Street as turning into Tottenham Street, then left into Worsley Street, and then right into O'Keefe Street, from where he rode on a footpath which finished at Harrogate Street.  He described the events from this point as follows:[28]

“… And then I ride my way to Harrogate Road and I was going to turn there at the intersection to Ipswich and head towards the Woolloongabba.

…

Towards the city.  And at that point I was here – my bicycle was here, and Mr Hinkley and his car was behind me.  And he was behind me about a distance of 300 metres minimum.  A distance of 300 metres and I look over my shoulder like this, you know, for safety check and I realise there was a car behind me so I, you know, located myself to the left toward the – close – close to the kerb.” (my emphasis)

Immediately after this he agreed with the proposition that he was riding his bicycle on the footpath until it ceased at Harrogate Street at the intersection with Ipswich Road and it was at this stage that he had ridden out into Harrogate Street.[29]  As the acting magistrate observed in his decision, the path the appellant drew on the map was “not down Harrogate Road”.[30]

The cross‑examination on this issue concluded as follows:[31]

“… I just put to you merely that you were driving your bicycle on a footpath, that you had exited that footpath onto Harrogate Street without looking … and you’ve driven into the path of an oncoming vehicle causing a hazard.  What do you say to that?- - No.  Your Honour, I did look – I make safety observations.  I looked behind, I look my right shoulder, I look my left shoulder, I look ahead, I look if there was any people around, any animals, [indistinct].  I’ve checked – I make complete observation, what was around me and that’s when I join Harrogate Road.  And unless I was blind, which I believe I’m not blind, I have seen everything clearly.”

  1. [50]
    He was also cross‑examined as to the nature of his injuries.  He accepted that when Constable Joy asked him about this, he lifted his pants leg and showed the abrasion on his leg.  He described it as a big scratch under his knee from which the skin had come off.  However, he claimed that he also had multiple bruising and internal injuries.
  1. [51]
    With reference to the multiple bruising, he variously said it was “all over my body”,[32] and “all over my head”.[33]  He initially gave evidence that he said to Constable Joy, “Look these are some of my injuries.”[34]  However, he then accepted that he had shown the officer only one injury.[35]  He explained this by saying that, “the police officer is not a doctor.”[36]  This was further explained during the following exchange with the prosecutor:[37]

“No, the police officer is not a doctor but he asked you had you been injured, and the only thing you could show him was an injury to your leg; is that – is that the case?- - Yeah, but if he asked more than that, that would have been an invasion of my medical privacy. I have to go to hospital – and – and – and – and, you know, have to consult and get a file from a medical expert not from the police officer.”

  1. [52]
    In relation to the internal injuries, he made particular reference to his “left kidney”.[38]  He said that he had a medical record at court.  At this point the acting magistrate correctly advised him that it was necessary for him to bring whoever treated him to court to give evidence about this.[39]
  1. [53]
    The exchanges on this issue between the appellant, the prosecutor and the acting magistrate are relevant to the preliminary issue of whether I should give the appellant leave to adduce new evidence on this appeal.
  1. [54]
    The prosecutor suggested to the appellant that although he had told Constable Timar that he had bleeding of the kidney, severe head injuries, internal injuries and a broken ankle, he was wandering around of his own volition. The appellant responded that he had a medical record to prove this and that he could go to his GP and get a medical certificate.[40]  The transcript suggests that he then produced a hospital name tag that had a file number, as proof that he had been admitted to hospital on 16 August 2008, and said that the police could easily quote the number to obtain the medical records from the PA Hospital.[41]  At this point, the acting magistrate correctly told him that while this was evidence that he may have been in hospital, if he wanted to prove his injuries it was up to him to bring someone to court to do so, and it was not for the police to prove his injuries.  The appellant responded:

“… if you give me time, I will do that.”

This is the first occasion in which the appellant had sought an adjournment to produce admissible evidence of his injuries.[42]  However, the transcript records no response by either the acting magistrate or the prosecutor to this request.  The prosecutor simply continued with her questions.  The appellant simply confirmed that he walked to the police station with the aid of crutches and that he was using them to lift his body from the ground.  This request was not further remarked upon.

  1. [55]
    There was also cross-examination about the extent of damage to his bicycle, during which he contradicted the police evidence by testifying that the bicycle was completely destroyed. He said that it was now useless. According to him, in addition to the front wheel, the chain was cut off, the seat came off and the lights on the steering wheel were completely smashed.

Preliminary issue – leave to adduce new evidence

  1. [56]
    The extent of the new evidence which the applicant seeks leave to adduce was not entirely clear from the oral submissions, during which he refereed to an x‑ray which he brought to court and appeared to have been made after the hearing, a report from Dr Andrews, his General Practitioner at the time of the incident and a report by another medical practitioner from the same practice,[43] also completed after the hearing.  In particular, it was unclear whether in addition he was seeking to adduce evidence from the PA Hospital related to his examination, treatment, x‑rays and CT scans at the time of the incident.  In fairness to the appellant, as a self represented party, I will consider each of the items of evidence.

Dr Andrew’s evidence

  1. [57]
    It is convenient to commence with the potential evidence from Dr Andrews.  According to the report of Dr Pensil of the Indooroopilly Day and Night Medical Centre, Dr Andrews treated the appellant in relation to this incident.
  1. [58]
    In the appellant’s addendum outline of submissions relating to this issue,[44] he claims that the x‑rays and CT scans concerning his injuries, with Dr Andrew’s 15‑page written report, were “presented” to the acting magistrate.  The closest that the appellant got to presenting the report was to tell the acting magistrate that he had a medical record at court.  He did not identify the type of record that he had.  Dr Andrews’s name was not mentioned.  As I have observed, the magistrate correctly told him on each occasion medical evidence was mentioned by him, it was necessary to call a medical practitioner who could give evidence about the nature of his injuries and their causation, and not simply rely upon a medical record, whether it be a statement or otherwise.
  1. [59]
    In relation to this, although the appellant recognises in his submissions that he was advised of this, he referred in his submission to the fact that Dr Andrews had attached a note saying that he could not attend due to other commitments which described as “professional commitments”.
  1. [60]
    In his oral submissions, he stated that he requested Dr Andrews to attend court.  However, the doctor was not prepared to attend due to his workload and advised the appellant that he thought the report would be sufficient because he had always written reports and never attended court.  Therefore, because of his lack of experience in Queensland law, the appellant said he thought that it would be possible to just provide a written document to the magistrate.[45]  He said that he did not know about a subpoena.[46]  Although the appellant was able to articulate his case at first instance and on appeal, his first language is obviously not English.
  1. [61]
    Notwithstanding this, the acting magistrate could not have known the reasons for Dr Andrews’s unavailability because he was not expressly told and the transcript demonstrates that the report and any attachments including the explanatory note were never presented to the acting magistrate.  Even if this had happened, the acting magistrate was correct in advising the appellant that it would be necessary for a medical practitioner to give evidence and not simply tender the documents.  Therefore, contrary to the appellant’s submission, the decision of the acting magistrate not to allow the appellant to rely on the report did not involve brushing it aside, was not an insult to Dr Andrews and the medical profession as a whole, and did not demonstrate “double standard behaviour”.
  1. [62]
    Because the report and therefore Dr Andrews’s evidence was available at the time of the trial, the first of the conditions needed before new evidence should be received has not been satisfied.  It cannot be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial.  However, as noted by the High Court,[47] this is not a universal or inflexible requirement:  the strength of the fresh evidence may in some cases be such as to justify interference with the verdict, even if the evidence might have been discovered before trial.  I regard this principle as also applicable to the issue of whether leave should be given to adduce new evidence on an appeal, including evidence which had actually been obtained at the time of the trial.  This is particularly so in a case such as this, where the appellant was a self-represented party who lacked experience in Queensland law, including knowledge about the availability of a subpoena which could have been used to address Dr Andrews’s reluctance to give evidence.
  1. [63]
    It is also important to consider whether the strength of the new evidence warrants the granting of leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, in circumstances where the appellant belatedly requested to be given the time to bring someone to court to prove his injuries and this was not responded to by the court. As the appellant says in his addendum outline of submissions:[48]

“I requested for an extra time to be granted so that I could bring somebody along to court to prove my injuries, but my request was ignored by [the acting magistrate].  … He did not respond to my point asking for an adjournment or extension.  So this would then appear that there has been a miscarriage of justice.”

  1. [64]
    Although it may be arguable that the adjournment was sought in the context of the PA Hospital medical records rather than Dr Andrews’s report, in fairness to the appellant I proceed on the basis that the adjournment application was sufficient to cover the medical evidence in general.
  1. [65]
    There is no reason to consider that the third condition before new evidence should be received cannot be established, namely that it is apparently credible.
  1. [66]
    In relation to the issue of the strength of the new evidence, which is equivalent to the second of these conditions, namely that it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, the appellant advised me during oral argument that:[49]

“… [Dr Andrews] would have described what was already written in the report which was the treatment I received from the Princess Alexandra Hospital and the minor operation I underwent.”

  1. [67]
    The report itself is not before me because, as the appellant also told me, he has misplaced the report and at the time the appeal was heard, Dr Andrews was not available to give evidence; the doctor had retired from practice.[50]  The appellant confirmed this in an email to Mr Irvine, Deputy Registrar Appeals, Supreme and District Courts on 26 December 2009.  Mr Irvine had requested on my behalf that he file a copy of the report.  The appellant’s response was as follows:

“Unfortunately, I am unable to provide a copy of Dr Chris Andrews report, because I have accidentally misplaced the report, and as a result cannot find it.  Additionally, Dr Chris has since retired from the medical profession, therefore there is no way I can get hold of either the report or Dr Chris himself.”

  1. [68]
    Although this response may make academic the issue of whether leave should be given to adduce the evidence of Dr Andrews as new evidence, because the resolution of this question may be relevant to the determination of whether leave should be granted to adduce the other evidence relied upon, I proceed to address the issue.
  1. [69]
    In the addendum outline of submissions, the appellant asserts, concerning Dr Andrews’s report, and the x‑rays and CT scans which I assume to be those from the PA Hospital, that had this medical evidence been considered, it would have been an important influence on the outcome of the hearing as it would have shown that his injuries are real and serious.
  1. [70]
    I consider that the issue of the appellant’s guilt is to be determined on the basis of circumstantial evidence. This is not a case where the driver of the motor vehicle involved in the contact with the appellant’s bicycle was aware of the contact. His evidence was that he did not see the appellant until after this contact. Therefore, the question of whether the appellant rode his bicycle at the relevant time in such a manner as to cause a traffic hazard on Harrogate Street by moving into the path of the other vehicle depends on drawing inferences from the circumstances.
  1. [71]
    Consequently, for the appellant to be convicted, it is necessary that guilt should not only be a rational inference but also that it should be the only rational inference that could be drawn from the circumstances. If there is any reasonable possibility consistent with innocence, the verdict must be not guilty. This follows from the requirement that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
  1. [72]
    In this case, the prosecution must exclude beyond reasonable doubt as a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that Mr Hinkley drove his vehicle along Harrogate Street towards Ipswich Road at an excessive speed so that it struck the appellant on his bicycle and knocked him to the ground with his whole body going underneath the wheel; and, as he is alleged to have said to Constable Joy, was dragged as Mr Hinkley kept driving.  If the prosecution cannot do this, it will be unable to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant as opposed to Mr Hinkley caused a traffic hazard at the time and place alleged.
  1. [73]
    If, as the appellant claims, he suffered a very severe head injury and had internal injuries including a bleeding kidney, these could arguably be the real and serious injuries caused by a collision due to Mr Hinkley proceeding in the manner alleged by the appellant rather than at a snail’s pace.  In my view, evidence of such injuries would be of sufficient strength as to probably have an important influence on the result of the case.
  1. [74]
    However, the only evidence which exists of the thrust of Dr Andrews’s report is the more recent report from Dr Pensil which certifies that the appellant “sustained an injury to his right ankle”.  It also says that the appellant “has the C‑T scan of his right ankle in his possession” and that he received physiotherapy.
  1. [75]
    This report does not go so far as to certify that the ankle injury involved a break. However, even assuming that this is the case, it is reasonable to conclude that Dr Andrews’s report would not have referred to more extensive injuries, as the appellant’s medical records would continue to be available within the practice and to form the basis for Dr Pensil’s report.
  1. [76]
    I do not consider that a broken ankle would probably have an important, although not decisive, influence on the result of the case. In my view, it is an injury consistent with being caused in a contact between a bicycle and a motor vehicle in the manner alleged by the prosecution, with the motor vehicle proceeding slowly as it prepared to stop at an intersection and the appellant’s bicycle moving into its path from a footpath giving access to the intersection. It is not such as to preclude the prosecution from excluding beyond a reasonable doubt a reasonable hypothesis to the contrary consistent with innocence, of the nature that I have referred to.
  1. [77]
    Therefore, in addition to Dr Andrews not being available to give evidence in the terms of his report, I find that the second condition necessary to establish special grounds for leave to be given to adduce this as new evidence has not been fulfilled.  Accordingly, this evidence should not be received as new evidence on this appeal.

Dr Pensil’s evidence

  1. [78]
    Although Dr Pensil’s report is dated 24 August 2009, it is based on the appellant’s medical records, which would continue to be available within the practice.  These would have been the same medical records on which Dr Andrews would have based his report.  Therefore it is merely a commentary on those records which would have been available at the time of the trial.  Such a commentary could have been given in evidence at the trial by Dr Pensil or another doctor from the practice, in the absence of Dr Andrews.  Therefore, as was the case with Dr Andrews’s evidence, it cannot be shown that the evidence in Dr Pensil’s report could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial.  Consequently, the first of the conditions needed before new evidence should be received has again not been satisfied.
  1. [79]
    The issue of whether leave should be given to adduce the evidence again depends on the strength of the new evidence. However, this evidence has no greater strength than Dr Andrews’s evidence.  In fact, it is of less strength because Dr Pensil concludes his report by stating:

“I am unable to comment on his injuries as I was not involved in his treatment.”

In these circumstances, I also do not consider that the evidence which Dr Pensil could give would probably have an important, although not decisive, influence on the result of this case.  Accordingly, this evidence should not be received as new evidence on this appeal.

PA Hospital evidence

  1. [80]
    In his addendum outline of submissions, the appellant refers to x‑rays and CT scans done at the PA Hospital which could be checked if necessary.  As with the report from Dr Andrews, he asserts that “initial x‑rays taken after the accident on 16th August 2008 was presented at the initial hearing.”  However, as was the case with Dr Andrews’s report, the closest he got to presenting the report was to say that he had a medical record at court.  The fact that no PA Hospital records were presented to the court is demonstrated by that part of the transcript which suggests that during his evidence he produced the hospital nametag and said that the police could easily quote the related file number to obtain the medical records from the PA Hospital.  As I have observed, the acting magistrate again correctly told the appellant that if he wanted to prove his injuries it was up to him to bring someone to court to do so.  This would have required him to call evidence from a medical professional from the PA Hospital as to the nature of his injuries and their causation.  The best evidence would have come from the treating professionals.  However, if this was not available, a medical practitioner could be called as a witness to give this evidence on the basis of the hospital’s medical records.  Therefore, as in the case of the acting magistrate’s decision not to allow the appellant to rely on Dr Andrews’s report, the magistrate’s approach to the PA Hospital evidence was not brushing it aside, insulting the medical profession as a whole, and did not demonstrate a double standard of behaviour.
  1. [81]
    As in the case of Dr Andrews’s evidence, the PA Hospital evidence was available at the time of the trial.  It cannot be shown that this evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial.  This is particularly so in the case of this evidence, as the appellant demonstrated an understanding of a procedure to facilitate access to it.  In the course of his submissions, he said:[51]

“They always keep the file of the patients in the hospital and if you need something on file then you have to go through your own doctor and then the doctor has to request.”

He said that he had not tried to do this in the six months before the trial because he was very sick while he recovered from his injury.[52]

  1. [82]
    However, in circumstances where the appellant made his belated request for an adjournment in the context of the PA Hospital medical records, as is the case with Dr Andrews’s evidence, I consider the issue of leave to adduce this evidence on the basis of whether the second condition for establishing special grounds to do so has been fulfilled.
  1. [83]
    I therefore consider the strength of this evidence. The potential evidence for the PA Hospital has not been placed before me, whether in the form of a doctor’s statement, medical records containing file notes, x‑rays or CT scans.
  1. [84]
    However, the appellant has also sought leave to adduce an x‑ray which he had obtained from the Hospital through the clinic.  He said that he had gone to the clinic and asked that this document be made available.[53]  Therefore he appears to have been able to obtain the x‑ray pursuant to the procedure described in para [81].  He said during oral argument that he got it from the GP.[54]  He said that it was taken since the trial.[55]  He thought that the date was possibly on it.[56]  Although the x‑ray was not tendered as an exhibit for this appeal and I have not perused it, the respondent’s counsel, Ms Litchen, did so.  She states in the addendum outline of submission on behalf of the respondent that:[57]

“The x‑ray appears to be of the appellant’s lower leg and is dated 10/3/2009 and has the appellant’s name and date of birth shown on it also.  The x‑ray shows what appears to be a metallic object or clip attached to the bones of the lower leg.” (my emphasis)

The appellant accepts this in his addendum outline of submissions.[58]  Ms Litchen’s description of the x‑ray is also consistent with the appellant’s description of it in his oral submissions.  For example, he said:[59]

“… I had a bandage on my leg and this was taken as a part of ongoing treatment to check if the leg was healed or not.  Because the doctors were considering removing the blade from my ankle.”

  1. [85]
    Importantly, the appellant confirmed during oral argument that the other x‑rays that were taken would show exactly the same thing as this x‑ray.  This confirmation was made in the following context:[60]

“HIS HONOUR: … And you had other x‑rays taken that would show exactly the thing as the x‑ray you’ve got in front of you now-----

APPELLANT: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: -----that existed at the time of the Magistrates Court hearing?

APPELLANT: yes, indeed it did exist but it wasn’t in my hand.”

Consistently, the appellant said in his addendum outline of submissions that this x‑ray was taken “as part of my ongoing treatment to rehabilitate the injuries”[61] and “It also shows the extent of the injuries which I sustained as a result of teenager Damian Hinkley running over me on the 16 of August 2009.”[62]

  1. [86]
    Further, as set out in para [66], the appellant also advised me in oral argument that if Dr Andrews had been called, he would have described the treatment he received from the Princess Alexandra Hospital and the minor operation he underwent.  As I have concluded at para [75], it is reasonable to conclude on the basis of Dr Pensil’s report that Dr Andrews would not have referred to more extensive injuries than a broken ankle.
  1. [87]
    For completeness, I note that Dr Pensil refers to the appellant having the CT scan of his right ankle in his possession.  This is likely to be a reference to the x‑ray that the appellant brought to court.
  1. [88]
    Therefore, the only medical evidence which the appellant has brought to the appeal is an x‑ray of his lower leg, which appears to show a metallic object or clip attached to the bones, and which the appellant described as a “blade”.  As the appellant has said that this x‑ray was taken as part of the ongoing treatment to rehabilitate the injuries, it shows the extent of the injuries which he sustained as a result of the incident in which he was involved with Mr Hinkley and the other x‑rays taken would show exactly the same thing as this x‑ray, it is reasonable to conclude that any evidence that the appellant could call from the PA Hospital as to the extent and nature of his injuries as observed at or about the time of this incident would go no further than this injury to his leg.  It is also reasonable to conclude that this evidence would not refer to more extensive injuries than a broken ankle, having regard to the contents of Dr Pensil’s report, and the appellant’s evidence that Dr Andrews, whose treatment of the appellant is the subject of that report, would have described the treatment he received from that hospital.
  1. [89]
    If the appellant had suffered more extensive injuries of the nature he described to Constable Timar, it is to be expected that he would produce on appeal more than an x‑ray of his lower leg.  As he says, this x‑ray shows the extent of the injuries he sustained as a result of the incident.  I conclude that he did not suffer more extensive injuries.  It is also to be expected that if he suffered more extensive injuries, the evidence from the medical practice which treated him would refer to more than an injury to his right ankle.  An injury to his right ankle is consistent with what Constables Saville and Joy say that he complained of at the scene of the accident.
  1. [90]
    On the basis of my conclusion that the evidence that the appellant could call from the PA Hospital would be limited to an injury of his leg, in particular a broken ankle, I do not consider this evidence to be of greater strength than that of Dr Andrews or Dr Pensil.  In these circumstances, I also do not consider that it would probably have an important, although not decisive, influence on the result of this case.  Accordingly, it should not be received as new evidence of this appeal.

X‑ray of 10 March 2009

  1. [91]
    As this x‑ray was taken after the trial, it could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial.  Again, the issue is to consider the strength of this evidence.
  1. [92]
    Ms Litchen submits that the x‑ray could be in relation to an injury that occurred at any time, prior or post the offence; and the metallic object showing on the x‑ray could be either old or new.[63]  Therefore, it is submitted that all it shows is that the appellant has had a metallic object attached to the bones of his lower leg at some time or other, and is irrelevant on this basis.[64]
  1. [93]
    The appellant has not said that he intends to call a medical witness through whom the x‑ray could be tendered and to interpret it.  It is not for the court to interpret the x‑ray itself.  In the absence of such evidence, as Ms Litchen submits, it would not be possible to find that the injury occurred on 16 August 2009.  As such, the x‑ray would be of no relevance to the issues in this appeal, and would not be of sufficient strength to be received as new evidence.
  1. [94]
    However, even assuming these difficulties would be overcome, the evidence of the x‑ray would again be limited to an injury to the appellant’s leg.  Even assuming that it is evidence of a broken ankle, this is of no greater strength than the other evidence which the appellant has sought leave to adduce on this appeal.
  1. [95]
    In these circumstances, I also do not consider that it would probably have an important, although not decisive, influence on the result of this case. Accordingly, it should not be received as new evidence on this appeal.

Conclusion

  1. [96]
    I find that the second condition which must be fulfilled to establish the special grounds necessary for leave to be given to adduce the new evidence identified by the appellant on this appeal, has not be fulfilled in each case.
  1. [97]
    Consequently, the application to adduce new evidence on this appeal is refused and I proceed to determine the appeal by way of re-hearing on the original evidence.

Re-hearing on the original evidence

  1. [98]
    The prosecution case was that the appellant caused a traffic hazard by riding his bicycle from the Ipswich Road footpath on to Harrogate Street where it intersected with Ipswich Road, into the path of Mr Hinkley’s vehicle as it travelled down Harrogate Street towards the intersection.  The case is that the appellant exited the footpath from the left of the intersection and made contact with Mr Hinkley’s vehicle.
  1. [99]
    It was not suggested before the acting magistrate that if the appellant rode his bicycle in this way, it did not constitute a traffic hazard. The issue was whether the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that he did ride his bicycle in this way.
  1. [100]
    I consider if the appellant did ride his bicycle in this way, that it would cause a traffic hazard. Although “traffic hazard” is not defined for the purposes of the Regulation, it has a dictionary definition of “1. a danger or risk 2. a source of this.”[65]  The Regulation defines “traffic” as “a vehicle moving on the public highway”.[66]  A “vehicle” includes both a motor vehicle and a bicycle.[67]  Therefore, if the appellant rode his bicycle as alleged by the prosecution, he created a danger or risk to vehicles, such as Mr Hinkley’s vehicle which was travelling down Harrogate Street, by moving into the line along which that vehicle was moving.[68]
  1. [101]
    I therefore limit my consideration of this appeal to the issue of whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant did ride his bicycle in the way particularised in para [98].
  1. [102]
    There is no doubt that the appellant’s bicycle and Mr Hinkley’s car came into contact in the vicinity of the intersection or T‑junction, as it was described by Constable Joy on 16 August 2009.  As I have already observed, this is not a case in which Mr Hinkley was aware of the contact until after it had occurred.  His evidence was that he did not see the appellant until after the contact.  However, there is no doubt that the contact did occur.  The appellant’s evidence is to this effect.  And when the police arrived at the scene, they observed his bicycle on the road near the intersection and it had a slightly buckled front wheel.  On their account, the appellant had a small graze or abrasion to his right lower leg.
  1. [103]
    There is a conflict in the accounts of Mr Hinkley and the appellant as to how this contact occurred.  Mr Hinkley’s evidence was that he was travelling down hill in Harrogate Street towards Ipswich Road with the intention of turning left.  According to him, the road was clear the whole way and he did not go past third gear.  He said he did not exceed 35 to 40 kilometres an hour.  He was slowing down as he approached within three to four metres of the intersection to less than five kilometres an hour.  As he said in cross‑examination, he was going at a snail’s pace and was almost totally stopped.  He had looked to his left as he did so, but had not seen the appellant.  There was a construction fence which allowed him to see three to four metres down the footpath along Ipswich Road to his left.  There was nothing there when he looked.  He then looked back to the right because this is the direction the cars were coming from.  It was when he looked back to the left that he first saw the appellant.  The contact must have occurred by this time.  On the other hand, the appellant’s evidence was that while he was on Harrogate Street he saw Mr Hinkley’s car speeding about 300 or 400 metres behind him.  He had previously put to Mr Hinkley in cross‑examination that he was driving at 80 kilometres an hour.  He said that as a result he was knocked off his bicycle onto the ground, with his whole body going underneath the wheel.  Constable Joy’s evidence was that the appellant said that he was dragged under the car as Mr Hinkley kept driving.  The appellant said that when his whole body ended up underneath the car, Mr Hinkley kept driving for about five or seven metres.
  1. [104]
    In these circumstances, as I have observed, for a verdict of guilty to be entered the prosecution must exclude beyond reasonable doubt as a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that Mr Hinkley drove his vehicle in the manner alleged by the appellant.
  1. [105]
    The credibility of witnesses is a material consideration which requires to be resolved in this case. Having regard to the way in which the appellant conducted his case, this is so in respect of each witness, and not simply the appellant and Mr Hinkley.  In resolving the issue of credibility, I will afford respect to the advantage the acting magistrate had in seeing and hearing the witnesses.  I note that he accepted the prosecution witnesses and rejected the appellant as witnesses of credit.
  1. [106]
    The basis of the appellant’s contention that his conviction was unsafe and satisfactory is comprehensively set out in his initial submission, which was in the form of a letter to the District Court.[69]
  1. [107]
    This submission commences by again outlining his version of events. Of relevance to this appeal are the following statements which expand on his evidence:
  1. (a)
    “… Hinkley … struck me from behind and ran over and dragged me for over 300 metres along Ipswich Road.”  (my emphasis)
  1. (b)
    “At the time there were multiple bruises visible on all over my body and my right ankle was bleeding heavily.”[70]
  1. (c)
    “… Hinkley could not stop giggling loudly all the time.”
  1. (d)
    “I was then left lying wounded at the scene.”
  1. (e)
    “I spent 16 hours in the intensive care unit of the Princess Alexandra Hospital.”

The reference in (b) is to the time he was first approached by Constable Joy.

He also stated consistent with the manner in which he conducted his case before the Magistrates Court that, “the accident I believe was caused by … Hinkley who crashed into me and nearly killed me.”

I note that throughout the document there are a number of propositions which were not put to the witnesses in cross‑examination.  This is again undoubtedly due to the appellant’s lack of experience with the Queensland legal system.

  1. [108]
    He submitted that his conviction was unsafe because the evidence used to convict him was greatly exaggerated and partially fabricated. He enlarged on this in his addendum outline of submissions in which he asserts that the acting magistrate’s decision “was entirely based on fabricated police statement without material evidence to back it up.” He maintained this in oral argument before me by asserting:[71]

“… the police fabricated their statements because they exaggerated what happened at the time. The police were not there, they were not present, like I said earlier, and also they fabricated their statement by going along with the statement given to them by Damian Hinkley.”

He also asserted that Constable Joy “physically threatened me and told me I did not deserve … fair treatment.”[72]

  1. [109]
    He also submitted that his conviction was unsafe because he “was denied in court to present my own evidence (Medical).” I have addressed this issue in determining the preliminary question about whether to grant leave for him to adduce new evidence on this appeal. As I have said, the acting magistrate was correct in rejecting the medical evidence on the basis that he was seeking to tender medical records without calling medical witnesses to give evidence of his treatment or to provide a commentary on those records. The fact that the acting magistrate did not respond to his belated request to be given some time to bring someone to the court to prove his injuries is one reason that I considered it important to consider whether the strength of the evidence that he could have presented at that time warranted granting leave to adduce fresh evidence on this appeal. For the reasons I have given, I have answered this question in the negative. In these circumstances, I do not consider that the appellant’s conviction was unsafe on this basis.
  1. [110]
    He submits that the conviction was unsatisfactory because:
  1. (a)
    He was not given enough time to argue his case in court and was constantly interrupted by the acting magistrate whenever he tried to question Mr Hinkley;
  1. (b)
    The acting magistrate did not allow him to defend himself in court properly and told him to sit down and shut up;
  1. (c)
    The magistrate allowed the prosecution to override all his important counterargument points and in most cases discounted them as unproven allegations even though he presented enough evidence in court to back up his argument;
  1. (d)
    The acting magistrate disallowed all the evidence he had gathered to support his case and he had given plenty of time for the prosecution to make false allegations against him;
  1. (e)
    Whenever he tried to prove a point in cross‑examination with Mr Hinkley, the acting magistrate would directly intervene unfairly and rephrase what Mr Hinkley said so that the meaning would be different.

It is immediately clear that there is an overlap between (a) and (e).  Paragraph (c) in reality will be resolved by my undertaking the process of deciding this case for myself.  Paragraph (d) would appear to be repetitive of his argument that his conviction was unsafe through being denied the opportunity to present his medical evidence.  I have already addressed this issue.

  1. [111]
    With reference to his contention that his conviction is contrary to law, he submits that he has been denied justice and was victimised by the police because they treated him like a criminal and threatened him with arrest when he inquired about the case and the accident. He asserts that the police sided with Mr Hinkley.  In support of this, he alleges that there are a significant number of contradictions in Mr Hinkley’s statement.  In doing so, he refers to aspects of Mr Hinkley’s statement and Constable Saville’s statement, which were not in evidence.  He also incorrectly asserts that Mr Hinkley mentioned “that he could see me well before the crash as yet he did not stop to avoid the crash.”  Mr Hinkley’s evidence was that as he approached the intersection he could see all the way down the steep hill of Harrogate Street and did not see the appellant until after the contact was made.  Mr Hinkley did not accept any statement or proposition to the contrary.  In particular, it was never suggested to him that he had said anything to the contrary in his statement.  The appellant also incorrectly asserted that he had proved that contrary to Mr Hinkley’s evidence, Harrogate Street was not a hilly road.  He merely put this proposition to Mr Hinkley, who rejected it.  He did not subsequently give evidence in accordance with the proposition.
  1. [112]
    Further, in support of his submission that his conviction was contrary to law, he argued that there were a number of discrepancies in the police statements. The first of these relates to Constable Saville calling his bicycle a vehicle.  Having regard to the definition of “vehicle” in the Regulation to include “a bicycle”,[73] there is nothing in this point.  He also submits that Constable Saville made a complete denial about the observations she had recorded of his clothes.  He stated that it was his strong belief that she deliberately deleted these observations, which was included in the evidence provided to him as a white page.  However, he never asked Constable Saville any question about either of these issues.  He never challenged her evidence that she did not observe any scuff marks, torn or ripped holes in his clothing.  It was Constable Joy whom he questioned about the blank page of the police notebook.  He did not suggest that this section of the notebook contained Constable Saville’s observations of his clothing.  He does not appear to be able to accept the explanation that the blank pages do not demonstrate a cover up but, in accordance with the usual experience of the courts, is to exclude information that is irrelevant to the charges before them.
  1. [113]
    He does, however, refer to the inconsistency between the police officers’ evidence about whether Constable Joy asked him if he required medical attention.  This was Constable Saville’s evidence, whereas Constable Joy says that he simply asked what injuries the appellant had.

Discussion

  1. [114]
    I first address the appellant’s submissions in support of the argument that his conviction was unsatisfactory as set out in para [110](a), (b) and (e), which are critical of the manner in which the acting magistrate approached him during the hearing.
  1. [115]
    In my view, the acting magistrate took appropriate steps to ensure that the appellant, as a self-represented party, had a fair trial.
  1. [116]
    The acting magistrate commenced by reading the charge to the appellant and obtained his acknowledgment that he understood it.[74]  After the appellant had pleaded not guilty, the acting magistrate noted that he had been sitting in the back of the court, and asked him if he understood how the proceedings would go.  The appellant responded that he understood how things worked.[75]
  1. [117]
    The acting magistrate then proceeded to explain to the appellant that the police bear the onus of proof; their obligation to prove all elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt; that the police would call witnesses whom he was entitled to cross‑examine by asking questions; that if he disagreed with anything a witness says or had a different version, he had to put it to the witnesses for comment, and that this is fairly important because if he gave evidence himself and brought up something new, the witnesses cannot have their say on it; he could address the court at the end of the police case that their evidence was insufficient; and if he wanted to put his version before the court, he had to do so from the witness box.[76]
  1. [118]
    When the appellant commenced to cross‑examine, it became apparent that he had little understanding of the process of asking questions as opposed to making statements, and of the rules of evidence.  For example, after Mr Hinkley’s evidence-in-chief, the appellant said he totally disagreed with what he had said.  The acting magistrate properly told him that if he had a different version or if there was anything he wanted to ask him, it had to be put in the form of a question.[77]  The appellant was also told that this was his only opportunity to ask Mr Hinkley these questions.[78]  Notwithstanding this, the appellant continued to make statements which were sometimes combined with questions, requiring the magistrate to intervene and tell him to ask a question or put his version to the witnesses, including putting previous inconsistent statements to them.[79]  Such interventions which substantially occurred during Mr Hinkley’s evidence, were both correct and necessary.
  1. [119]
    The acting magistrate also intervened where appropriate to ensure that the appellant did not interrupt witnesses, so as to allow them to answer questions or to prevent repetitious questioning.[80]  These interventions during the evidence were correct and necessary.  The appellant was never told to “sit down and shut up”, as he asserts in para [110](b).  He was simply told to sit down and not to interrupt by the acting magistrate, who at the time was properly attempting to clarify the important matter as to whether Mr Hinkley was aware of contact with the appellant.  When this matter had been clarified to his Honour’s satisfaction within no more than half a page of transcript, the appellant was then requested to stand and ask any further questions he had.  At this point the appellant said that he had not meant to interrupt, but just wanted to clarify some situations.  The acting magistrate responded that he was entitled to do that.[81]  The acting magistrate’s intervention, as recognised by the appellant in his apology, did not prevent him from defending himself.
  1. [120]
    The acting magistrate properly dealt with objections, explaining to the appellant that the prosecutor was entitled to object.[82]  Although he upheld a number of prosecution objections, he also overruled them.[83]  Having regard to s 21 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), he disallowed the appellant asking what he was entitled to consider to be improper questions, in the sense that they were offensive.  These were questions suggesting that Mr Hinkley intended to murder him[84] and that the police were involved in a cover up because of the blanked out section of the notebook.[85]  Against this background, it was of assistance to the appellant for the acting magistrate to advise him after he had elected to give evidence, to give his version of the facts that happened and not embellish it with any accusations that he could not back up.[86]  Notwithstanding this, he asserted without any basis that Mr Hinkley was under the influence of some kind of narcotics.  Although the acting magistrate was incorrect in stating that the breath test of Mr Hinkley proved to be negative, there was no evidential basis to support the appellant’s allegation.  The appellant was then reminded in his own interest, that what was required was for him to give evidence as to what happened.[87]  The acting magistrate had earlier told him that it was this which was relevant when he intervened because the appellant was making a statement to Constable Saville during cross‑examination about currently being on medication for kidney damage.[88]  Not only was this a statement, but it was one that Constable Saville would not have the knowledge to answer.
  1. [121]
    After a short closing address by the prosecutor that occupied approximately one page of transcript, the appellant was given his last opportunity to address the court on the evidence. He responded by thanking the acting magistrate “for giving me this opportunity to explain my version of the story and … I do appreciate for that.”[89]  However, he immediately proceeded to tell the magistrate that, “I was the victim here.  I was riding my bicycle and I’ve been victimised twice.  Once is by Mr Hinkley sitting behind me …”[90]  In these circumstances, I consider the acting magistrate correctly intervened to remind the appellant to “just stick to the evidence” and that what he wanted to hear from him was whether the charge had been proved or not.[91]  Following this, the appellant elected to make no further submissions but thanked the acting magistrate very much for listening, and said that he hoped he would give a fair decision.[92]
  1. [122]
    The acting magistrate was confronted with a very difficult situation in ensuring that the appellant had a fair trial, in circumstances where the appellant, as a self-represented litigant, had problems phrasing questions in cross‑examination, understanding the difference between questions and statements, and understanding the rules of admissibility of evidence.  These difficulties were exaggerated by the fact that although the appellant was articulate in English, which was not his first language, the manner in which he presented his case was influenced by his state of mind that he was the victim of an offence by Mr Hinkley.  This clearly caused him to become excitable in his presentation and unable to appreciate issues of relevance.  This was confirmed by his manner of presentation on the hearing of this appeal.
  1. [123]
    In this context, the acting magistrate gave sufficient explanation and leeway to the appellant in the presentation of his case to ensure that he had a fair trial, while striking an appropriate balance whereby the principle that all parties have a right to a fair hearing regardless of whether they have legal representatives was respected.
  1. [124]
    The only criticisms that I would make of the acting magistrate’s approach in these difficult circumstances are his non-responsiveness to the appellant’s request for more time to prove his injuries and not reminding him of his entitlement to make a no case to answer submission following the closure of the prosecution case and before being called on to elect whether to give evidence. I have already addressed the first issue. In relation to the second, the appellant had been informed of this entitlement at the commencement of the hearing. In any event, I am satisfied that at the conclusion of the evidence a prima facie case was established.  In these circumstances, a no case to answer submission would properly have been answered in the negative.  Therefore, I do not find that the appellant was deprived of his right to a fair trial such as to make the conviction unsatisfactory on the basis of either of these criticisms.
  1. [125]
    With reference to the specific criticisms in support of this ground of the appeal made in para [110](a) and (e) which overlap, the criticism that he was not given enough time to argue his case cannot be substantiated.  Having regard to the principle of proportionality, the appellant was given an adequate opportunity to present his case on a charge for which the maximum penalty was 20 penalty units.  As stated, the appellant was given sufficient leeway, taking into account his status as a self-represented party; and in fact, expressed appreciation for the opportunity to explain his version.  It was the appellant who chose to ignore the acting magistrate’s advice to make a closing address on the evidence, and whom, when reminded of this, then chose not to address the court further.  In any event, the evidence before the court was in short compass.  The acting magistrate demonstrated in his decision that he was well aware of the issues and the appellant’s case, which included resolving the credibility of witnesses.
  1. [126]
    In relation to the assertion that the appellant was constantly interrupted by the acting magistrate when he tried to cross‑examine Mr Hinkley, as I have previously observed, the interventions by the acting magistrate were correct and necessary to ensure that the appellant asked questions, put his version including previous inconsistent statements, did not interrupt answers to questions, and did not ask improper questions.  It was also necessary for him to deal with objections.  As I have also observed, many of these interventions were in fact in the appellant’s interest.  This included clarifying relevant issues where the appellant failed to do so because of his propensity to make statements, either in lieu of or in addition to questions that he did ask.  At all times, the acting magistrate was concerned to ensure that the questions asked during the hearing were relevant to the issues to be determined and in accordance with the rules of evidence.  In seeking to achieve this, at times he rephrased the appellant’s questions without changing their meaning.  At no time did he rephrase what Mr Hinkley said so that the meaning would sound different.
  1. [127]
    Further, as stated in para [119], the appellant was never told to “sit down and shut up”, as set out in para [110][(b).
  1. [128]
    Therefore, I do not find that the appellant’s conviction was unsatisfactory on the basis of his submissions as set out in para [110](a), (b) and (e).
  1. [129]
    This leaves only the criticism set out in para [110](c) to be resolved.  As indicated, this will be resolved by my undertaking the process of deciding this case for myself. This will resolve the remaining issues raised by the appellant in support of his contention that his conviction was unsafe and satisfactory and contrary to law.
  1. [130]
    In undertaking this process, I address the question of whether the prosecution have excluded beyond reasonable doubt as a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that Mr Hinkley drove his vehicle in the manner alleged by the appellant.
  1. [131]
    In resolving the issues of credibility involved, as I have indicated I afford respect to the advantage the acting magistrate had of seeing and hearing the witnesses. He accepted the prosecution witnesses and rejected the appellant as a witness of credit. With reference to the appellant, the acting magistrate said that he utterly rejected the appellant’s evidence that he was hit deliberately by a car driven by Mr Hinkley and was dragged under the car yelling and screaming.[93]
  1. [132]
    For the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant rode his bike on Harrogate Street so as to cause a traffic hazard by moving into the path of Mr Hinkley’s vehicle, it is essential that Mr Hinkley be accepted as a truthful witness.  If he is not, the appellant’s account of the incident cannot be excluded to that standard.  With the exception of the appellant and Mr Hinkley, no other witness who was called was present at the time of contact.
  1. [133]
    In considering Mr Hinkley’s evidence, while respecting the advantage of the acting magistrate in seeing and evaluating him as a witness, I have no hesitation in finding that he was a credible witness.  He maintained a consistent account of what occurred, which was not affected by cross‑examination.  There was no concession or inconsistency elicited by cross‑examination which causes me to have any doubt about his credibility.
  1. [134]
    The credibility of his account is supported by the fact that in my view it would defy commonsense to accept that a person would drive their vehicle, whether down hill or not, towards a busy intersection in the manner suggested by the appellant. As Mr Hinkley said, if he was driving at 80 kilometres an hour down Harrogate Street towards Ipswich Road he would not have had the time to stop before the intersection, with the result that he would have gone through Ipswich Road and collided with cars travelling on it.  I also accept that, as he testified, even travelling at 20 kilometres an hour that close to the intersection he would have had a serious crash with other vehicles.  He would have been familiar with the intersection because he lived in Harrogate Street.  Whether he commenced the journey from his residence about 100, 150 or 200 metres away, having regard to the various estimates that he gave, or 300 to 400 metres away, consistent with the appellant’s evidence-in-chief, knowing that he would have to come to a stop at the intersection, it also accorded with commonsense that he would slow to a snail’s pace as he approached it so as to properly make observations as to when it was safe to merge into the traffic in order to turn left.  It also does not make sense that he would accelerate to the speeds alleged when he knew that he would have to slow down within such a relatively short distance. Further, as Mr Hinkley said, if he had hit the appellant at the suggested speeds, he would have heard or felt the impact in his car, whereas he was not aware of the contact at the time it occurred.
  1. [135]
    While Mr Hinkley’s account of his driving makes logical sense and involves no material inconsistencies, the same cannot be said of the appellant’s account.  As the acting magistrate said during his decision:[94]

“In cross‑examination Mr Yassir gave an explanation of the route he took.  He agreed that he drove onto Harrogate Road from the footpath right at the intersection with Ipswich Road.

In the next breath he stated that he was driving down Harrogate Road and looked back and saw this vehicle behind him.  Clearly one of these statements is incorrect.  Mr Yassir drew a sketch for the court which was not tendered as an exhibit where he showed us the path he travelled and it was not down Harrogate Street.”

This observation that the appellant gave two different accounts about the path of his travel immediately before the contact with Mr Hinkley’s vehicle is supported by my analysis of his evidence at para [49].  This demonstrates that at one point he was saying that he was riding his bicycle down Harrogate Street to turn at the intersection into Ipswich Road, and then said he was initially on the footpath on Ipswich Road and rode from it at the intersection with Harrogate Street.  Consistently with the first version, at times he described Mr Hinkley’s vehicle as coming from behind him.  His evidence that he was going to turn into Ipswich Road at the intersection is also more consistent with that version.

This inconsistency in his account on this issue, which is central to the resolution of the charge against him, causes me to doubt his credibility.

  1. [136]
    There is also an internal inconsistency in his account as to the nature of his injuries. He put to Constable Saville that when she arrived at the scene he was lying on the ground in a pool of blood. He said that his leg was bleeding but he was forced to stand up. He continues to advance this proposition in support of his appeal by asserting, as summarised at para [107], that “At the time there were multiple bruises visible on all over my body and my right ankle was bleeding heavily”, and “I was then left lying wounded on the ground.”[95]  Inconsistently with this, he accepted under cross‑examination that he had shown Constable Joy only one injury, and this was a big scratch under his knee from which his skin had come off.  There was no reference by him to a bleeding leg or ankle, or lying in a pool of blood.  And such a limited injury is not consistent with him being left lying wounded on the ground.  It is a cause of concern that, given his response in cross‑examination about the extent of his leg injury, he has continued to make assertions of this nature in his submission in support of this appeal.  These are factors which suggest that he is prone to exaggeration, and reflect adversely on his credibility.
  1. [137]
    I have the same concern about his continued assertion on this appeal that Mr Hinkley “ran over and dragged me for over 300 metres along Ipswich Road.”  Apart from the fact that on no view of the evidence was he dragged along Ipswich Road, this is also contrary to his evidence that when his whole body ended up underneath Mr Hinkley’s car, Mr Hinkley kept driving for five to seven metres.  Further, the assertion that he was dragged along a road under Mr Hinkley’s car for any distance at all is inconsistent with observations made by Constables Saville and Joy that he had no damage to his clothing of the type that would be expected if this had occurred.  This evidence was never challenged by the appellant.  The nature of the injuries about which they testified is also inconsistent with this assertion.  On the evidence before the magistrate and before this court, the most serious injury that he suffered was a broken ankle.  If he had been dragged under Mr Hinkley’s car to the extent that he alleged, it is reasonably to be expected that he would have suffered significantly more serious injuries than this.  This is particularly the case if the car was being driven at the speeds alleged by the appellant.  Therefore, this is another example of exaggeration by the appellant which reflects adversely on his credibility.
  1. [138]
    Another aspect of his submission which suggests exaggeration on his behalf is the assertion that he “spent 16 hours in the intensive care unit of the Princess Alexandra Hospital”.  This is contrary to the evidence of Constable Timar that the appellant attended at the police station before the end of her shift at 2 pm on the same date as the incident.  At the most, this could have been no more than five hours after the incident.  Constable Timar said that he stated that he had just come from the PA Hospital.  And in his submission, the assertion about spending 16 hours in the intensive care unit of the hospital is in the context that, having been left lying wounded at the scene, he called a taxi to take him to hospital where he was admitted as an urgent outpatient case.  Therefore, if he saw Constable Timar on the same date as the incident, he cannot have done so after being admitted to the hospital and spending 16 hours there.  The appellant never suggested in cross‑examination of Constable Timar that he did not attend the police station on that date.  It was only during cross‑examination that he suggested that he went to the police station the next day after he had been released from the hospital.  However, when it was put to him that he attended there at a later stage on the day of the incident, he replied, “Yes.”[96]  Therefore, on the basis of his own evidence, he could not have been at the hospital for 16 hours before this.  Given that, notwithstanding this, he now makes a submission to the contrary effect, I consider that this also aversely affects his credibility.
  1. [139]
    There are a number of other aspects of the appellant’s cross‑examination of Constable Timar which cast doubts on his credibility.  First, he suggested to her that she threatened him with imprisonment.  Second, he suggested to her that she said she would call him at 3 pm in the afternoon and she failed to do so:  Constable Timar denied each of these propositions.  As she said, she does not use the tactics suggested in the first proposition.  In relation to the second proposition, she said that she was not going to call him at that time because she finished at 2 pm.  Each of these responses accord with commonsense.  Despite the appellant’s submission, I do not consider that he proved any matter contrary to any aspect of Constable Timar’s evidence in cross‑examination.[97]  He simply put propositions to her which she denied.  Having regard to my own view of Constable Timar’s evidence, as well as the acting magistrate’s assessment of her as a witness of credit, I form an adverse view of the appellant’s credibility concerning the assertions that he made to her.[98]
  1. [140]
    Of further relevance on the determination of the appellant’s credibility, are two propositions that he advances for the first time in submissions. The first, as identified in para [107], is his assertion that Mr Hinkley could not stop giggling loudly after the incident.  The second was his statement during oral submissions that Constable Joy had physically threatened him.[99]  He did not suggest this to either witness in cross‑examination.  It is again a matter of concern that these propositions were advanced in the course of the appeal.
  1. [141]
    I do not accept the appellant’s assertion in his addendum outline of submissions that in his cross‑examination he uncovered many inconsistencies and discrepancies.[100]  The only inconsistency that I have identified is between Constables Saville and Joy as to whether the latter asked the appellant if he required medical attention.  However, this does not reflect adversely on their credibility.  It is simply a difference in recollection.  The inconsistency is not relevant to how the incident between Mr Hinkley’s car and the appellant’s bicycle occurred, and does not reflect adversely on their consistent account of the nature of the appellant’s injuries.
  1. [142]
    The significant inconsistency which has been identified is as to the two different accounts by the appellant as to his path of travel immediately before the incident occurred. Having regard to this and the matters I have referred to, I have formed an adverse view as to his credibility on that issue and the nature of his injuries.
  1. [143]
    Accordingly, I have come to the same view as the acting magistrate as to the credibility of witnesses on the facts in issue in this case. Like him, I accept the prosecution witnesses as being credible concerning these matters and reject the appellant as a witness of credit in respect of them.
  1. [144]
    The prosecution has therefore excluded beyond reasonable doubt as a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence that Mr Hinkley drove his motor vehicle in the manner alleged by the appellant.  To the contrary, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Hinkley drove his motor vehicle down Harrogate Street towards the intersection with Ipswich Road in the manner he described in evidence.
  1. [145]
    However, because Mr Hinkley was not aware of the contact between his motor vehicle and the appellant’s bicycle until after it occurred, it is necessary to determine beyond reasonable doubt what is the rational inference to be drawn from the circumstances established by the evidence.
  1. [146]
    A starting point is the observations of the police officers of the position of Mr Hinkley’s motor vehicle.  Constable Saville estimated that the motor vehicle was stopped about a metre back from the intersection.  Constable Joy described it as being parked near the T‑junction of the intersection, with the appellant’s bicycle about 1½ metres in front of it.  It can be accepted that the motor vehicle was stopped at or about the point of contact, because Mr Hinkley’s evidence was that after he first became aware of the appellant he got out of his car.  After speaking to the appellant, he returned to the car and called his parents.  There was no suggestion that he moved it before the police arrived.  The evidence of the police officers and Mr Hinkley as to the position in which his motor vehicle was stopped are estimates only.  However, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the vehicle stopped upon coming into contact with the appellant’s bicycle within a matter of a few metres of the intersection.
  1. [147]
    I accept that Mr Hinkley’s evidence that as he proceeded down Harrogate Street he could see all the way down towards the intersection and the street was clear the entire way with no cars on either side.  Having driven along the street at no more than 35 to 40 kilometres an hour, he was slowing down to a snail’s pace as he approached the intersection knowing he would have to come to a stop there.  As he was doing so, he looked to his left as far as he could.  This was a distance of three or four metres up a footpath that ran along Ipswich Road to the intersection with Harrogate Street.  He could not see any further due to a fence on that side of the road.  Importantly, at that time he could not see anything coming from that direction.  In particular, he did not see the appellant.  After this, because he intended to turn left, he looked to the right because this was the direction that the cars came from.  It was when he looked back to the left again to make sure no one was coming that he first saw the appellant, who was standing with one leg either side of his upright bicycle with his hand on the left side of his bonnet.
  1. [148]
    Therefore, the contact was made between the vehicle on the left-hand side of Mr Hinkley’s car.  This is confirmed by Constable Saville’s evidence that she saw a handprint in the dirt on the left-hand corner of the front of the bonnet, just above the tyre.
  1. [149]
    As indicated, Constable Joy said that when he arrived at the scene of the incident he saw the appellant’s bicycle about 1½ metres in front of Mr Hinkley’s motor vehicle.  Constable Saville’s evidence simply described seeing the bicycle in the middle of the intersection.  However, whereas I am satisfied that Mr Hinkley’s motor vehicle was stopped at or about the point of contact with the appellant’s bicycle, I consider that the position of the bicycle at the time the police arrived was different to the point of impact.  This is because, consistent with my acceptance of Mr Hinkley as a witness of credit, I accept his evidence that immediately after the time at which the contact must have been made the appellant was standing astride his upright bicycle to the left of Mr Hinkley’s motor vehicle.  The appellant never put a contrary proposition to Mr Hinkley in cross‑examination.  I note that this is also inconsistent with the appellant’s account that he was dragged underneath the motor vehicle.
  1. [150]
    Considering the conflicting accounts given by the appellant as to his path of travel, like the acting magistrate I reject his account of driving down Harrogate Street to turn onto Ipswich Road because, as the acting magistrate observed in the untendered map drawn by the appellant, he showed that the path travelled was not down Harrogate Street.[101]  This observation is consistent with the appellant’s explanation, with the aid of the map, that in the course of his journey he rode onto the footpath which finishes at Harrogate Street.  He also agreed with the proposition put to him in cross‑examination that he was riding his bicycle along the footpath until it ceased at Harrogate Street at the intersection and it was at this stage he had ridden out into Harrogate Street.  This explanation is also consistent with Mr Hinkley’s evidence, which I accept, that the appellant was not in front of his motor vehicle at any stage and his first observation of the appellant was on the left-hand side of the motor vehicle.
  1. [151]
    I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from these circumstances is that the contact between the appellant’s bicycle and Mr Hinkley’s motor vehicle occurred because, while Mr Hinkley was driving the motor vehicle down Harrogate Street towards the Ipswich Road intersection in the conservative and safe manner that he has described in evidence, the appellant rode his bicycle off the Ipswich Road footpath to his left into Harrogate Street and into the path of the motor vehicle.
  1. [152]
    As I have previously stated, if the appellant has suffered a broken ankle as a consequent of this contact, this is not inconsistent with the incident occurring in this way. In my view, the fact that the bicycle’s front wheel was slightly buckled is also not inconsistent with this.
  1. [153]
    I find that, by the appellant riding his bicycle in this manner, he created a danger or risk to vehicles, such as Mr Hinkley’s vehicle which was travelling down Harrogate Street, by moving into the line along which the vehicle was moving and thereby created a traffic hazard.  As indicated, this was the only element of the offence of causing a traffic hazard which was in issue.
  1. [154]
    For those reasons, after carefully reviewing and weighing the evidence available for consideration on this appeal, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the offence of causing a traffic hazard contrary to s 253 of the Regulation.  The conviction for this offence on 24 February 2009 was not unsafe and unsatisfactory and contrary to law.

Conclusion

  1. [155]
    Accordingly, the appeal against conviction for the charge of causing a traffic hazard in contravention of s 253 of the Regulation is dismissed, and pursuant to s 225(1) of the JA the conviction is confirmed.

Appeal against sentence

Appeal principles

  1. [156]
    The appeal is brought on the ground that the sentence is manifestly excessive. Before an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of a sentencing discretion, the appellant must demonstrate that the judicial officer acted upon a wrong principle, allowed extraneous or irrelevant material to guide or affect him, mistook the facts, or did not take into account some material consideration.[102]  It is therefore relevant to consider whether the sentence appealed against was outside the sound exercise of the sentencing court’s discretion.[103]

The sentencing process

  1. [157]
    After the acting magistrate made a finding that the appellant was guilty of the offence, he asked the appellant if there was anything he wished to say in relation to penalty. In doing so, he referred to the maximum fine being 20 penalty units and said that he would not be imposing that sort of fine.  The appellant responded that it was the acting magistrate’s decision and he did not want to say any more.  This was likely to be influenced by his following comment that he was being given a fine for something he did not do.[104]  For completeness, I note that the acting magistrate would have known from the complaint that the appellant was 25 years of age at the time of the offence, and 26 years of age at the date of sentence.
  1. [158]
    The prosecutor advised the court that the ticketable amount of the infringement notice was $45, but submitted that a greater fine be imposed given that the prosecution was put to proof and the manner in which the matter was conducted.[105]
  1. [159]
    In imposing sentence, reference was made to the appellant’s “very limited traffic history”.[106]  The history was not otherwise referred to or marked as an exhibit.  However, it forms part of the Lower Courts File which was transmitted to the District Court for the purpose of this appeal.  It shows that, while at the time of this offence the appellant had not previously been convicted, approximately two months later, on 13 October 2008, he failed to stop at a red traffic arrow and made a U‑turn at an intersection controlled by traffic lights.  He was fined respectively $225 and $60 for those traffic offences.  On 15 October 2008 he had also disobeyed a “no entry” sign and fined $105.  As a consequence, he accumulated 8 demerit points and on 11 December 2008 a Demerit Points Warning letter was posted to him.

The sentencing decision

  1. [160]
    The short sentencing remarks were as follows:[107]

“… I am going to impose a fine.  As I said, the maximum penalty is 20 penalty units.  I don’t propose to impose anything along that line. You have got a very limited traffic history.  That is – obviously you were the rider of the pushbike.”

A conviction was then recorded against the appellant and he was fined $100 with the other orders as to time to pay and default imprisonment as set out in para [3].

The appellant’s submissions

  1. [161]
    The appellant’s initial outline of submission was silent on this issue. He first addressed this matter during oral argument on the appeal. Putting aside his argument that the penalty was excessive because he could still not believe he caused a traffic hazard, his submission was directed to the effect of recording a conviction. He submitted that this had affected his employment and livelihood. He said that he held a commercial licence and drove taxis. The taxi company regularly checked with the Transport Department, and as a result anyone such as him who has a conviction is not allowed to come into contact with the public and is therefore not permitted to drive a taxi anymore.[108]  I take this to be a reference to a recorded conviction.  This is summarised in his addendum outline of submissions as follows:[109]

“This conviction is now recorded on my good driving record and it consequently has affected my ability to gain a taxi driving position, as this is what I was doing before driver David Hinkley run me over.”

The respondent’s submissions

  1. [162]
    The respondent has not sought to contradict the appellant’s assertions of the affect of recording of the conviction on his livelihood. In the initial submission it was argued that as the matter usually attracts a fine of $45, in the circumstances of putting the Crown to the expense of summary trial on a matter without merit, the sentence was not manifestly excessive.[110]  During oral argument it was submitted that the penalty, including the recording of a conviction, is not outside the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion.[111]

Discussion

  1. [163]
    Having regard to the maximum penalty for this offence, the fact that the appellant did not have the mitigatory benefit of a plea of guilty and that within two months after this offence he had committed three further traffic offences for which he had been fined between $60 and $225, I do not consider that a fine of $100 was outside the sound exercise of the court’s sentencing discretion.
  1. [164]
    However, I agree with the appellant that the effect on his livelihood is a matter which can properly be taken into account in exercising a court’s discretion not to record a conviction. Section 12(2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) provides:

“(2) In considering whether or not to record a conviction, a court must have regard to all circumstances of the case, including—

  1. (a)
    the nature of the offence;
  1. (b)
    the offender’s character and age; and
  1. (c)
    the impact that recording a conviction will have on the offender’s—
  1. (i)
    economic or social well being; or
  1. (ii)
    chances of finding employment.
  1. [165]
    In the circumstances of the present case, although the offence was of such a nature as to warrant the imposition of the moderate fine imposed, the level of this penalty demonstrates that this was not a serious example of this type of offending. On my view of the facts, the appellant committed the offence because he rode his bicycle from the footpath into the intersection without paying due care and attention to the motor vehicles driving down the street towards that intersection. There was nothing placed before the court concerning the appellant’s character or age which requires the recording of a conviction. As the acting magistrate accepted, at the time of his conviction he had a very limited traffic history. He had no traffic history at the time of his offending. Further, the respondent has not sought to contradict the appellant’s assertions regarding the affect of recording a conviction on his livelihood, i.e. that it has affected his ability to gain a taxi driving position in circumstances where he had engaged in this occupation prior to his conviction.
  1. [166]
    These were all material considerations to be taken into account by the acting magistrate in exercising his sentencing discretion, in particular the impact that recording a conviction would have on his economic well-being and his chances of finding employment in the industry he had been engaged in previously. The acting magistrate did not take this consideration into account. This is not surprising because of the appellant’s negative response to the acting magistrate’s inquiry as to whether he wished to say anything in relation to penalty.
  1. [167]
    Again, the acting magistrate had the not inconsiderable difficulty of dealing with a self-represented party immediately after finding him guilty of an offence which he continued to believe he did not commit. However, because it has been held[112] that before the court decides that a sentence is appropriate it needs to look at the combined effect of the sentencing options being considered and the circumstances as to whether or not a conviction is recorded, I consider that an appropriate exercise of the discretion required that the appellant be drawn out on issues relevant to these issues, and in particular whether recording a conviction would have any impact on his economic well being and chances of finding employment.  The appellant’s statements during his questioning of witnesses that he was a taxi driver was sufficient to alert the court to these issues.  Instead, without more, the acting magistrate recorded a conviction and provided no reasons for doing so.
  1. [168]
    In the circumstances of the present case, having regard to the material considerations identified in para [165], I consider that the appropriate exercise of the sentencing discretion was to exercise it so as not to record a conviction.  To do otherwise was outside the sound exercise of the court’s sentencing discretion, and the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive to this extent.

Conclusion

  1. [169]
    Accordingly, the appeal against sentence is allowed; the sentence imposed at first instance is varied; instead, a conviction is not recorded.

Order

  1. [170]
    The order of the court is:
  1. 1.Application for leave to adduce new evidence refused.
  1. 2.Appeal against conviction dismissed.
  1. 3.(a) Appeal against sentence allowed.
  1. (b)
    The sentence imposed at first instance is varied and instead a conviction is not recorded.
  1. [171]
    I will hear the parties in respect of the costs of the appeal.

Footnotes

[1] Graham v Queensland Nursing Council [2009] QCA 280 per Fryberg J at [69]-[70] (with whose reasons the Chief Justice agreed) discussing the dictum of McMurdo P in Stevenson v Yasso [2006] 2 Qd R 150 at [36]; [2006] QCA 40.

[2] Langdale v Danby [1982] 3 All ER 129 at 137-138; [1982] 1 WLR 1123 applied in Clarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 404 at 408, and Warry v PB Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 154 at [18]; See also the similar considerations identified by the High Court to guide a court of criminal appeal in deciding whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred because of evidence now available which was not led at trial:  Gallagher v R (1986) 160 CLR 392 per Gibbs CJ at 395-396.

[3]  T 1-4 l 50 to T 1-19 l 60.

[4]  T 1-10 ll 41-57.

[5]  T 1-12 ll 25-45; T 1-15 ll 15-40.

[6]  T 1-16 l 57.

[7]  T 1-9 ll 14-58; T 1-11 l 52 to T 1-12 l 3; T 1-13 ll 13-36; T 1-17 ll 1-10; T 1-17 l 43 to T 1-18 l 15.

[8]  T 1-12 ll 7-23.

[9]  T 1-14 l 8 to T 1-15 l 6.

[10]  T 1-19 ll 14-47; Ms Boyd was the prosecutor.

[11]  T 1-20 l 3 to T 1-25 l 50.

[12]  Constable Joy did not give evidence that he had this conversation with the appellant. His evidence is that he simply asked him, “What injuries do you have?”  (see T 1-26 ll 52-53; and T 1-27 l 2).

[13]  T 1-21 ll 51-52.

[14]  Again, Constable Joy gave no evidence of having this conversation.  His evidence was that at this stage the appellant indicated to Hinkley and the police that he had a broken ankle and immediately turned and walked off.

[15]  This was on the basis of what he had told Constable Timar.  Constable Saville had also contacted the hospital, which confirmed that he had attended the emergency department and discharged with minor scratches and bruises (see T 1-22 ll 35-40).

[16]  Subsequently, an infringement notice was issued to the appellant.  This led to the complaint which was the subject of the summary trial.

[17]  T 1-25 ll 8-37.

[18]  T 1-26 l 10 to T 1-32 l 24.

[19]  T 1-33 l 1 to T 1-36 l 20.

[20]  T 1-34 ll 1-3.

[21]  T 1-35 ll 19-23.

[22]  T 1-37 l 40 to T 1-48 l 11.

[23]  T 1-38 ll 6-21.

[24]  T 1-42 ll 12-15.

[25]  Decision 1-6 ll 31-35.

[26]  T 1-40 ll 17-19.

[27]  T 1-40 ll 21-28.

[28]  T 1-4 ll 14-31.

[29]  T 1-41 ll 37-50.

[30]  Decision 1-6 ll 35-36.

[31]  T 1-45 l 49 to T 1-46 l 4.

[32]  T 1-42 l 51.

[33]  T 1-43 ll 11-12.

[34]  Ibid ll 12-13.

[35]  T 1-44 ll 1-7.

[36]  Ibid ll 7-8.

[37]  Ibid ll 10-16.

[38]  T 1-42 l 52.

[39]  Ibid, ll 40-42.

[40]  T 1-46 ll 29-43.

[41]  T 1-46 l 50 to T 1-47 l 2.

[42]  In addition to the advice that the acting magistrate had previously given him, as set out at para [52] there had been an earlier interaction on this issue during the appellant’s cross‑examination of Constable Timar, when he stated that he had a medical record to prove that he was on two crutches when he saw her.  He was clearly told that he could not bring the doctor’s statement and it would be necessary to bring the doctor (T 1-34 l 47-58).

[43]  This was tendered as Exhibit 1 on this appeal.  It is dated 24 August 2009 and is under the hand of Dr Pensil.

[44]  Addendum Outline of Submissions in response to the prosecution’s argument to discredit the appellant’s medical evidence, which was filed on 26 September 2009 (Document 11 on the court file).

[45]  Appeal Record (AR) 1-6 ll 47-57; 1-8 ll 34-56.

[46]  AR 1-9 ll 1-10; 1-11 ll 1-12.

[47] Gallagher v R (1986) 160 CLR 392 per Gibbs CJ at 395-396.

[48]  See para 7 of the submission.

[49]  AR 1-9 ll 15-19.

[50]  AR 1-10 ll 9-46.  Dr Pensil’s report says that Dr Andrews no longer works in the medical practice.

[51]  AR 1-15 ll 15-20.

[52]  Ibid ll 21-38.

[53]  AR 1-12 l 42 to 1-13 l 10.

[54]  AR 1-34 ll 16-20.

[55]  AR 1-13 l 57 to 1-14 l 8.

[56]  AR 1-13 l 22.

[57]  Filed on 11 September 2009 (Document 9 on the court file), p 2, para (2).

[58]  See para 6 of the submission.

[59]  AR 1-14 ll 8-11.

[60]  AR 1-15 ll 4-13.

[61]  See para 2 of the submissions.

[62]  Ibid, para 8.

[63]  Addendum Outline of Submissions on behalf of the respondent, p 4 para 8.

[64]  Ibid, para 9.

[65]  The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary (2nd ed), 1996 reprint.

[66]  Section 4, Sch 6 of the Regulation.

[67]  Section 15 of the Regulation.

[68]  This involves moving into the “path” of the vehicle as particularised in the complaint.  The Australian Concise Dictionary defines “path” as “2. the line along which a person or thing moves”.

[69]  This document was filed on 2 April 2009 (Document 4 on the court file).

[70]  He made a similar oral submission to me, that, “I was lying on the ground, my leg was bleeding and I needed treatment.  I needed urgent medical treatment at the time.”  (AR 1-18 ll 3-5)

[71]  AR 1-20 ll 1-5.

[72]  AR 1-18 ll 42-43.

[73]  Section 15 of the Regulation.

[74]  T 1-3 ll 34-37.

[75]  From experience with the operations of the Brisbane Magistrates Court, this would be a reference to a number of hearings being listed for one day in the Traffic/Transport jurisdiction.  The observation by the acting magistrate is likely to be to the appellant having had the opportunity to observe at least one previous hearing that day.

[76]  T 1-3 l 54 to T 1-4 l 12.

[77]  T 1-8 ll 40-58.

[78]  T 1-4 ll 1-2.

[79]  See for example, T 1-10 – 25-58; T 1-11 ll 25-28; T 1-12 ll 7-17; T 1-13 ll 47-51; T 1-14 ll 1-5; T 1‑15 ll 55-57; T 1-16 ll 1-35; T 1-17 ll 20-40; T 1-36 ll 8-11.

[80]  T 1-9 l 46; T 1-13 l 32; T 1-15 l 3; T 1-18 ll 8-19; t 1-19 ll 23-28.

[81]  T 1-15 ll 15-47.

[82]  T 1-9 l 52 to T 1-10 l 4.

[83]  For example of an objection that was overruled, see T 1-35 ll 5-17.  The acting magistrate also told both the prosecutor and the appellant to stick to the questions and answers after one exchange (T 1-45 ll 46-47).

[84]  T 1-11 l 1 to T 1-12 l 3.  There could be no possible basis for this proposition, which the acting magistrate correctly described as “slanderous”.  However, he did allow the appellant to have Mr Hinkley respond to the suggestion that he deliberately overrun the appellant.  In doing so, Mr Hinkley answered the appellant’s original proposition by saying, “I had never met Mr Yassir in my life.  I had no intention of killing him, for obvious reasons.  I did not know him.”  In this way, the question that was originally disallowed was in fact answered.

[85]  T 1-31 ll 19-40.  As previously stated, he did not appear to appreciate that blanking out sections of police notebooks is in accord with the usual experience to the court.  The acting magistrate correctly explained this to him.  It was appropriate for him to tell the appellant that he was making “very severe unsubstantiated allegations” and to suggest that he “concentrate on the evidence in relation to the charge that you’re facing.”

[86]  T 1-36 l 50 to T 1-37 l 32.

[87]  T 1-39 ll 7-48.

[88]  T 1-25 ll 18-31.

[89]  T 1-49 ll 28-30.

[90]  Ibid, ll 32-33.

[91]  Ibid, ll 36-38.

[92]  Ibid, ll 40-41.

[93]  Decision 1-7 l 49 to 1-8 l 10.

[94]  Decision 1-6 ll 17-37.

[95]  He also maintained this in his oral submission where he said, “I was laying on the ground bleeding.” (AR 1-18 ll 3-5)

[96]  T 1-46 ll 20-22.

[97]  Addendum Outline of Submissions in Response to the Prosecutions Argument to Discredit My Medical Evidence, para 10.

[98]  For completeness, I refer to the appellant’s submission that, although the transcript suggests that he said that Constable Timar had been “very, very good” to him, this is a mistake (T 1-36 l 1; AR 1-26 ll 17-32).  I have listened to this part of the record of proceedings.  Although it is not distinct, it is open to the interpretation that the appellant in fact said that she was “very, very rude” to him.  I proceed on this basis.  However, this is not determinative of my assessment of her credibility.

[99]  AR 1-18 l 42.

[100]  See the penultimate page of the submission, second paragraph.

[101]  Decision 1-6 ll 35-36.

[102] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 504-505.

[103] Parry v Mayfield Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 250 per Dearden DCJ at [29].

[104]  Decision 1-9 ll 33-39; l 48.

[105]  Decision 1-9 l 45 to 1-10 l 2.

[106]  Decision 1-10 l 10.

[107]  Ibid, ll 4-12.

[108]  AR 1-40 l 55 to 1-42 l 25.

[109]  See the penultimate page of the submission, third paragraph.

[110]  See para 8.16 of the submission.

[111]  AR 1-44 ll 11-20.

[112] R v Briese (1997) 92 A Crim R 75 at 77.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Yassir v Bone

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Yassir v Bone

  • MNC:

    [2010] QDC 11

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Irwin DCJ

  • Date:

    29 Jan 2010

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Clarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 404
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1984] 1 Qd R 404
Cite 2 - [1984] 1 Qd R 404
Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 160 CLR 392
Cite 2 - (1986) 160 CLR 392
Cite 3 - (1986) 160 CLR 392
Graham v Queensland Nursing Council[2010] 2 Qd R 157; [2009] QCA 280
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QCA 280
Cite 2 - [2009] QCA 280
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Langdale v Danby (1982) 1 WLR 1123
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1982) 1 WLR 1123
Cite 2 - (1982) 1 WLR 1123
Langdale v Danby (1982) 3 All. E.R. 129
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1982) 3 All. E.R. 129
Cite 2 - (1982) 3 All. E.R. 129
Parry v Mayfield Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 250
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] QDC 250
Cite 2 - [2006] QDC 250
R v Briese ex parte A-G (1997) 92 A Crim R 75
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 92 A Crim R 75
Cite 2 - (1997) 92 A Crim R 75
Stevenson v Yasso[2006] 2 Qd R 150; [2006] QCA 40
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] QCA 40
Cite 2 - [2006] QCA 40
Cite 3 - [2006] 2 Qd R 150
Cite 4 - [2006] 2 Qd R 150
Warry v P B Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 154
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1999] QCA 154
Cite 2 - [1999] QCA 154

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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