Murray v Queensland Police Service
[2012] QDC 259
To print this judgment please return to the case and click on the PDF icon
next to the
case name. For court use, a full PDF copy is required or preferred.
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
Please Note: You are about to print a copy of the onscreen
version of
this judgment. For court use, a full PDF copy of the judgment is required or preferred. Please
return to
the case for PDF printing options.
- Unreported Judgment
- Murray v Queensland Police Service[2012] QDC 259
- Add to List
Murray v Queensland Police Service[2012] QDC 259
Murray v Queensland Police Service[2012] QDC 259
[2012] QDC 259
DISTRICT COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
JUDGE DURWARD SC
Appeal No 22 of 2012
PAUL MICHAEL MURRAY | Appellant |
and | |
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE | Respondent |
CAIRNS
DATE 19/07/2012
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: The appellant has not appeared to prosecute the appeal. He filed the Notice of Appeal and other documents without legal representation. Ordinarily, unless there were some extenuating circumstances, the appeal would be struck out.
I propose to take another course giving some brief reasons and dismissing the appeal. I will refer to the merits (or otherwise) of the appeal, so that its futility can be understood. Unless something extraordinary had been submitted by the appellant, had he appeared, that was material, relevant and comprehensible the dismissal of the appeal would have been almost certain to occur.
The appellant was convicted, after a summary hearing on 9th January 2012 in the Magistrates Court at Cairns, of two charges, namely disobeying the speed limit and contravening a requirement made by a police officer. He was fined the sum of $400 on the speeding offence and $100 on the contravention of requirement offence. The fines were referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry. No convictions were recorded. He did not have legal representation and appeared self-represented.
The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 3rd February 2012. It was within time. It has two errors on the face of it, namely the date of conviction and date of sentence, each stated to be 9th January 2011. They are clearly written errors made by the appellant. Had he appeared, I would have given him leave to amend. However, those errors are not material in the circumstances.
The facts of the matter are simply, that he was riding a motorcycle in excess of the speed limit and was detected by a speed gun. When the police stopped him they made a lawful requirement, namely that he state his name and other particulars. He refused to do so. That is the background to the two offences.
The grounds of appeal are largely unintelligible nonsense. However, there is a narrow shaft of the light of reason reflecting off his documents that suggests that the appellant is aggrieved on the following grounds: firstly, that the Court below did not have jurisdiction to deal with the offences or to impose any penalty upon him; secondly, that there had been a denial of natural justice and thirdly, that there had been procedural unfairness, including a denial of the right to be heard in the Court below.
The challenge to the jurisdiction is gobbledegook and I do not propose to say anything further about it. One only has to look at the appearance of the documents filed by the appellant to understand what I am saying. If one can bring oneself to actually read them, it becomes even more apparent.
So far as the denial of natural justice or procedural unfairness are concerned, it seems to be derived from the following: the proceedings commenced with him being present; he misbehaved, disrupted the proceedings and was disrespectful to the Court and to the presiding Magistrate; and he generally conducted himself abominably. At one point he left the courtroom of his own volition. The proceeding continued ex parte, as the Magistrate in the circumstances was entitled to do, and he later returned with another person who joined him at the Bar table. That person was requested to leave and retire to the back of the Court. He refused to do so and he was removed at the request of the Magistrate by a security officer. The appellant then removed himself from Court, leaving of his own volition.
Hence the fact that he was not present for most of the hearing was entirely a matter of choice by him and not something that was caused by any unfair conduct of the Magistrate. Indeed, the Magistrate has conducted the proceedings regularly and fairly and she had exhibited a great deal of patience despite the disruptive behaviour of the appellant.
in the usual course, this appeal would have been conducted as a hearing de novo on the evidence that was before the Magistrate, pursuant to section 223 of the Justices Act 1886. In dealing with it as a hearing de novo, I would have been required to review the evidence and draw my own inferences and conclusions and thereby determine the relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving proper deference to the Magistrate's view.
There are numerous cases that reflect that requirement: Warren v. Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, at 551; Fox v. Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, at [25]; Rowe v. Kemper [2008] QCA 175, at [5]; and Dwyer v. Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124, at [18] – [26].
So far as the grounds that I have divine been able to from the nonsense that has been filed by the appellant, I have this to say: with respect to procedural fairness (including the right to be heard) and natural justice, a trial Judge and a trial Magistrate have an overriding duty to ensure there is a fair trial – so much is made clear in Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292. Other cases which reflect those principles are Tomasevic v. Trovaglini [2007] VSC 337; and MacPherson v. The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512.
I am cognisant of the requirements for natural justice ,the right to be heard and procedural fairness, and I have applied the principles relating to those matters to the circumstances of the conduct of the proceedings before the Magistrate.
I am satisfied that there was no denial of procedural fairness. I am satisfied there was no denial of natural justice. The appellant voluntarily absented himself from the Court during the proceedings. The Magistrate was entitled to conduct the balance of the hearing ex parte. The convictions were regular and open to be made on the evidence and the sentences imposed were reasonable and reflected the relevant circumstances of the offences.
Accordingly, rather than striking out the appeal as I would have done had in the absence of the appellant to prosecute it, I have referred to the merits – to the extent that expression can be applied to the documents that were filed by the appellant – and I will dismiss the appeal.
The appeal is dismissed. The convictions and sentences below are confirmed.
Do you want to say anything further, Mr English?
MR ENGLISH: No thank you, your Honour.