Jeffree v Gold Coast City Council
[2012] QDC 373
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- Unreported Judgment
- Jeffree v Gold Coast City Council[2012] QDC 373
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Jeffree v Gold Coast City Council[2012] QDC 373
Jeffree v Gold Coast City Council[2012] QDC 373
[2012] QDC 373 | |
DISTRICT COURT | |
APPELLATE JURISDICTION | |
JUDGE MCGINNESS | |
No 257 of 2012 | |
BRUCE JEFFREE | Appellant |
and | |
GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL | Respondent |
SOUTHPORT | |
DATE 27/08/2012 | |
ORDER |
HER HONOUR: Mr Jeffree has lodged an appeal against a decision from the Magistrates Court Registrar on the 9th of February 2012 and the 18th of February 2012 at which time the respondent Gold Coast City Council had sued Mr Jeffree for recovery of rates made and levied under the Local Government Act 2009.
The amount claimed was for $2,761.60 and with interest and costs the judgment appealed against is for an amount of $4,980.40.
The respondent to the appeal, Gold Coast City Council, has filed an application on 23 July 2012 to strike out Mr Jeffree's appeal as incompetent.
Mr Jeffree was unrepresented in the Magistrates Court proceedings and is unrepresented on this appeal. He was granted leave to have a Mc Kenzie friend, a Mr Abbott, present to assist him today, and appears to have obtained advice from Mr Abbott as the submissions have proceeded.
A history of proceedings commenced in the Magistrates Court is set out in the Gold Coast City Council's outline of submissions at paragraphs 5 to 12, which reads as follows:
“5. The proceedings were commenced on 24 June 2011 by claim number M2134 of 2011 in the Magistrates Court at Southport. As commenced, they were a straightforward and, one would think, uncontroversial claim for the payment of rates and charges:
- (a)made and levied by the Council under the Local Government Act 2009 (“LGA”), and the Local Government (Finance, Plans and Reporting) Regulation 2010 (“Finance Reg”);
- (b)levied on the Appellant and his spouse (the defendants below) as the “owner” of the relevant land within the meaning of the LGA; and
- (c)unpaid by the Appellant and his spouse, despite that levy.
- However, the proceedings then took a slightly unusual turn by reason of an attempt by the Appellant to assert that the rate recovery proceedings raised a constitutional matter requiring referral to the Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General under section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903.
- It is understood, although the Council has no direct knowledge, that section 78B notices were given on or about 9 December 2011. Unsurprisingly, there is no suggestion (known to the Council) that any of the Attorneys responded.
- The next step, related to the first, was an application made by the Appellant to the Court below that the rate recovery proceedings be removed to the Federal Court or High Court of Australia based, one infers (from the submissions below) on a proposition that:-
- (a)the Commonwealth Constitution gives the Commonwealth an exclusive power to impose “land taxes”; and
- (b)the conferral of power on local governments by the LGA to make and levy rates and charges on land, based on the valuation of land, is inconsistent with the Commonwealth exclusivity of that power.
- The application for “removal” was heard by the Court below on 9 February 2012 and was, unsurprisingly, dismissed (with costs). The present proceedings purport to include an appeal against that order.
- Following the filing of a defence, which repeated the “constitutional” arguments and raised various other (fairly impenetrable) arguments including matters relating the rights of an owner of “fee simple”, and the lawfulness of federal grant funding to local governments, the Council made application for summary judgement.
- That application was heard and determined by the Court below on 18 April 2012. The Appellant’s opposition was, based on the written submissions, premised on the familiar theme that a local government has no power to impose charges in the nature of “taxation”. The Court below granted summary judgement on 18 April 2012 in an amount of $4,980.40 made up of the original claim amount of $2,761.60 plus interest and costs.
- It is against that judgement that the Appellant now purports to appeal.”
Turning to the application, the Gold Coast City Council submits that Mr Jeffree's appeal should be struck out as incompetent pursuant to section 45 of the Magistrates Court Act 1921.
Under section 45 of the Act Mr Jeffree may only appeal to the District Court in an action in which the amount involved ismore than the "minor civil dispute limit" by leave of the Court. By section 45(5) the "minor civil dispute limit" means the amount that is for the time being the "Prescribed amount" under Schedule 3 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009.
The prescribed amount is $25,000.
As Mr Fynes-Clinton for the Gold Coast City Council submitted, no proper application for leave to appeal under section 45 has ever been made by Mr Jeffree, who, however, today requests permission for leave to appeal.
Because Mr Jeffree is unrepresented and, as conceded by Mr Fynes-Clinton, in a manner reasonable, the fact that no such application has been made may well result in me granting Mr Jeffree leave if other matters under section 45 are satisfied.
Under section 45(2)(a) leave can only be granted if the Court is satisfied that some important principle of law or justice is involved.
Mr Fynes-Clinton has helpfully set out in his outline of submissions at paragraphs 18 and 19 submissions as to why no important principle of law or justice is involved. He has also expanded upon those matters in oral submissions before the Court today. The written submissions are filed and form part of the record and I've also been aided by reference to a bundle of material which includes the case of Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260, which was appealed to the High Court where special leave was refused.
That case and the case of Millmerran Shire Council v Smith & Anor [2009] QCA 103 deal with the substantive arguments that the appellant, Mr Jeffree, proposes to argue upon his appeal.
I do not intend to take up any more of the Court's time by responding in any detail to Mr Jeffree's irrelevant and unmeritorious arguments. As Mr Fynes-Clinton has submitted, those matters have already been covered in other cases which have come before the Courts and which now hopefully Mr Jeffree will read and accept as cases which he should have regard to if he proposes to bring any further applications of a like nature before the Court.
Having regard to the submissions made, which I accept from Mr Fynes-Clinton, and having regard to the legislation and the case law, I find that the respondent to this application, Mr Jeffree, has failed to satisfy me that any important principle of law or justice is involved. Therefore, he has no right of appeal under section 45 of the Magistrates Court. Leave to appeal is not granted and the appeal is struck out.
We now turn to the matter of costs? Yes.
...
HER HONOUR: The Gold Coast City Council, the applicant to this matter and the respondent to the appeal, is entitled to costs and submits that indemnity costs are appropriate because Mr Jeffree’s arguments are baseless and untenable, because of some of the allegations made by Mr Jeffree in his outline of submissions about the Council and because his conduct is the type identified in the case of Colgate Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 118 ALR 248 at 257.
The Gold Coast City Council further delivered to the appellant on the 8th of August 2012 the final written outline putting him on notice that his appeal was incompetent.
There is certainly great merit in the arguments of the Gold Coast City Council’s counsel for indemnity costs due to the fact that it is apparently clear that the appellant would have had no chance of success in relation to his appeal.
However, Mr Jeffree is at present unrepresented and, although it may be the case that he has continued to proceed with this appeal because of wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law, on this particular occasion I cannot be satisfied that, if properly advised by legal representation, as opposed to other people, he would have continued this appeal.
I, therefore, with some hesitation, exercise my discretion to on this occasion to award costs only on the standard basis. Mr Jeffree, however, would be unlikely to be granted the same leniency were he to persist before these Courts in the future with unmeritorious actions which clearly waste the Court's and the community's money, time and resources and, for example, if he were to read those cases referred to by Mr Fynes-Clinton in his material he would see what other judges of the courts, higher Courts, higher than mine, including the High Court and the Court of Appeal, have determined in relation to awarding indemnity costs.
I say this, hopefully by some way of assistance to Mr Jeffree, because I would hate to see him throwing away his hard earned money or looking at his house being repossessed if he continues to persist, especially if others are putting him up to run these types of matters.
Now, what do you want to do with the formal costs order, Mr Fynes-Clinton, do you want me to make a formal order that costs of and incidental to-----
MR FYNES-CLINTON: Yes, your Honour, just that all the costs of and incidental to the purported appeal including today's application be paid on the standard basis to be assessed.
HER HONOUR: To be assessed?
MR FYNES-CLINTON: Or agreed, yes.
HER HONOUR: All right.
Well, that will be the order of the Court.
And I'll just order a copy of a transcript of the proceedings.
Yes, is there anything further?
MR FYNES-CLINTON: Nothing further, thank you, your Honour.
HER HONOUR: Yes, Mr Jeffree, anything further?
APPELLANT: No, thank you, your Honour.
HER HONOUR: Yes, all right then.