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  4. Richards v Chelmor Trust as Trustees for Chelmor Pty Ltd - [2013] QDC 238

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Richards v Chelmor Trust as Trustees for Chelmor Pty Ltd[2013] QDC 238

Richards v Chelmor Trust as Trustees for Chelmor Pty Ltd[2013] QDC 238

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Richards v Chelmor Trust as Trustees for Chelmor Pty Ltd [2013] QDC 238

PARTIES:

TROY RICHARDS

(Applicant)

AND

CHELMOR TRUST AS TRUSTEEES FOR CHELMOR PTY LTD (ACN 096 834 114)

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

1399/12

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane District Court

DELIVERED ON:

27 September 2013

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 July 2013

JUDGE:

Searles DCJ

ORDER:

  1. 1.
    The expiration date of the period of limitation for the Applicant’s action against the Respondent for damages for a personal injury sustained on 20 April 2007 be extended from 20 April 2010 to 1 June 2011, pursuant to s 31(2) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1974;
  1. 2.
    Costs of and incidental to this application be costs in the cause; and
  1. 3.
    Parties to submit draft order for future conduct of the action.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – Personal injuries – extension of time – whether material facts – whether material facts within means of knowledge of Applicant - whether all reasonable steps taken to find out material facts – Applicant’s extenuating circumstances

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 ss 30, 31

Baillie v Creber [2010] QSC 52 - distinguished

Queensland v Stephenson [2006] HCA 20 - cited

Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 325 - cited

Jocumsen v Theiss Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 198 – cited

NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 110 - applied

Pilot v Commissioner of Police and Anor [2008] QDC 41 - applied

Eldridge v Coles Group Limited [2012] QSC 39 - distinguished

Cox v Strategic Property Group Pty Ltd & Anor [2011] QSC 111 - distinguished

Van Der Merwe v Arnotts Biscuits Ltd [2010] QSC 145 – cited

COUNSEL:

Mr A McKean for the Applicant

Mr M T O'Sullivan for the Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Schultz Toomey O'Brien Lawyers for the Applicant

Jensen McConaghy Solicitors for the Respondent

  1. [1]
    This is an application for an order that the period of limitation for the Applicant’s action against the Respondent for damages for personal injuries arising out of an accident that allegedly occurred on 20 April 2007 be extended to 25 June 2011 pursuant to s 31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (LAA).
  1. [2]
    Section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 provides:

“31  Ordinary actions

  1. (1)
    This section applies to actions for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person.
  1. (2)
    Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court:-
  1. (a)
    that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and
  1. (b)
    that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;

the court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.

  1. (3)
    This section applies to an action whether or not the period of limitation for the action has expired:-
  1. (a)
    before the commencement of this Act; or
  1. (b)
    before an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.”
  1. [3]
    Section 30 defines, by inclusive definition, the meaning of “material facts” relating to a right of action and provides:

“30  Interpretation

  1. (1)
    For the purposes of this section and sections31, 32, 33, and 34:
  1. (a)
    The material facts relating to a right of action include the following:-
  1. (i)
    the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded;
  1. (ii)
    the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies;
  1. (iii)
    the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury;
  1. (iv)
    the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused;
  1. (v)
    the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty;
  1. (b)
    material facts relating to a right of action are of a decisive character if but only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts, would regard those facts as showing:-
  1. (i)
    that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and
  1. (ii)
    that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;
  1. (c)
    a fact is not within the means of knowledge of a person at a particular time if, but only if:-
  1. (i)
    the person does not know the fact at that time; and
  1. (ii)
    as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person – the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.
  1. (3)
    In this section:
  1. (a)
    appropriate advice, in relation to facts, means the advice of competent persons qualified in their respective fields to advise on the medical, legal and other aspects of the facts.”

The Claim

  1. [4]
    The Applicant claims damages for negligence for an alleged workplace injury sustained while working as an apprentice chef for the Respondent. The relevant starting date for the commencement of the limitation period is 20 April 2007, being the date of the alleged injury. The present application aside, the Applicant’s right to claim damages expired on 20 April 2010 (the expiration date).
  1. [5]
    The Applicant’s case is that from 25 June 2010 onwards he became aware of material facts of a decisive nature relating to the right of action that were not previously within his means of knowledge. If that be so, it would be within the court’s discretion pursuant to section 31(2) of the LAA to extend the period of limitation in which the Applicant may bring a claim for damages by one year so that it would expire on 25 June 2011. The application is opposed on the ground that all material facts were within the Applicant’s means of knowledge prior to the expiration date, as he could have taken reasonable steps to discover those facts long before he did.
  1. [6]
    Before bringing a proceeding for damages a plaintiff must serve a Notice of Claim for Damages (NCD) pursuant to s 275(1) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (WCRA) prior to the expiration of the relevant limitation period. However, s 302(1)(a)(ii) provides:

“Alteration of period of limitation

  1. (1)
    A claimant may bring a proceeding for damages for personal injury after the end of the limitation allowed for bringing a proceeding for damages for personal injury under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 only if—
  1. (a)
    before the end of the period of limitation—
  1. (i)
    …
  1. (ii)
    the claimant gives a notice of claim for which the insurer waives compliance with the requirements of section 275 with or without conditions…”
  1. [7]
    An insurer may waive a plaintiff’s non-compliance with the requirements of s 275 under s 276 which states:

“Noncompliance with s 275 and urgent proceedings

  1. (1)
    …
  2. (2)
    Without limiting section 297 or 298, if the claimant alleges an urgent need to start a proceeding for damages despite noncompliance with section 275, the claimant must, in the claimant’s notice of claim—
  1. (a)
    state the reasons for the urgency and the need to start the proceeding; and
  1. (b)
    ask the insurer to waive compliance with the requirements of section 275.”

Waiver of noncompliance with s 275

  1. [8]
    On 4 April 2011 the Applicant swore an urgent NCD[1]pursuant to section 276 which his lawyer later served on WorkCover and the Respondent.[2]On 1 June 2011 WorkCover agreed to waive the Applicant’s non-compliance thus preserving his right to seek damages for the injury sustained on 20 April 2007. The upshot of this is that 1 June 2011 effectively becomes the new expiration date and so, pursuant to s 31(2)(a) of the LAA, any new material fact of a decisive character sought to be relied upon must have come within the Applicant’s knowledge after 1 June 2010, being “the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action”.
  1. [9]
    I note here that although the Applicant seeks an extension until 25 June 2011 it is not logically possible to extend the expiration date beyond 1 June 2011, being the date the Applicant’s right to institute proceedings was preserved by the NCD. Counsel for the Applicant appears to be aware of this, having acknowledged any alleged material facts must surface after 1 June 2010, so his request for an extension until 25 June 2011 was probably a mere oversight. In any event it has no practical effect on this application.

Factual history

  1. [10]
    I turn now to the facts of the matter leading up to the application. The Applicant alleges that on 20 April 2007 he suffered an injury to his lower back while carrying a large oven down a set of stairs in the performance of his duties under the employ of Morgan’s Seafood Restaurant, a business operated at the time by the Respondent.
  1. [11]
    Dr Paul Angel GP examined the Applicant the following day and referred him to Redcliffe Physiotherapy[3] where the Applicant had a preliminary session on 23 April 2007.[4]The Applicant was noted to have left buttock pain but no referred leg pain. Further physiotherapy was provided on 26 occasions up to late August 2007[5] which appears to have resulted in some benefit for him.[6]
  1. [12]
    On 30 April 2007 the Applicant returned to Dr Angel complaining of continuing pain and a review was scheduled for two weeks time.[7]The Applicant also made an application to WorkCover for compensation.[8]As planned, he returned to Dr Angel two weeks later on 14 May 2007 with complaints of lower back pain, and an X-ray was requested. The X-rays, received on 18 May 2007, showed the Applicant’s lumbar spine was normal except for degenerative changes in the facet joints of L4/5 and L5/S1.[9]
  1. [13]
    Dr Angel re-examined the Applicant again on 23 May 2007 and noted the X-rays showed “minor changes only” and that the lower back pain was “in status quo”.[10]The Applicant was referred to Dr Leigh Sampson, Orthopaedic Surgeon[11], who examined him on 29 May 2007. According to the Applicant, Dr Sampson told him he was young and that his injury would heal, allowing him to return to work.[12]
  1. [14]
    A report was provided by Dr Angel to WorkCover on 30 May 2007 diagnosing acute mechanical back pain noting that no further medical or surgical treatment was necessary.[13]He said gradual physiotherapy should lead to a return to full duties and expressed hope that the Applicant could begin suitable duties within a fortnight.
  1. [15]
    On 4 October 2007 the Applicant was examined by Dr Greg Sterling, Orthopaedic Surgeon[14], who produced a report to WorkCover dated 8 October 2007 diagnosing lower back strain.[15]Dr Sterling said the Applicant was capable of deskwork and suggested ongoing non-operative treatment and a reduction in repetitive activities with the aim of returning to chef duties when appropriate.[16]In his opinion, the Applicant’s condition would ameliorate with time, but he said the Applicant may have an element of chronic ongoing lower back pain that should be reassessed in three to six months time.[17]
  1. [16]
    The Applicant says he quit his job with Morgan’s Seafood on 8 October 2007[18]because the staff were bullying him about his taking time off. Accordingly, his WorkCover claim ceased the following day[19]. He says he was unaware this would happen.[20]
  1. [17]
    His wife, Teigan Richards, found work for herself with Telstra towards the end of 2007, and, at some stage, although it is not quite clear when, was able to get a job for the Applicant working there as a retail sales assistant. In his affidavit he says he commenced in mid 2008 but after some six weeks stopped receiving shift offers.[21]He found the job difficult because of his learning difficulties (which I shall discuss in greater detail below). I note that, according to a report of one Dr Brett Halliday’s dated 19 September 2011, the Applicant said he started working for Telstra in January 2008 and quit because of back pain.[22]The Applicant says he continued looking for work once his employment with Telstra ceased.
  1. [18]
    In October 2008 the Applicant commenced work as a floor coverings salesperson at Harvey Norman.[23]His duties involved filling out application forms and doing computer work.[24]In early 2009 he was told the business was likely to go into bankruptcy and he decided to leave.[25]In late March 2009 the Applicant started to suffer from depression. Dr David Frank GP prescribed him Escitalopram on 31 March 2009 for major depression.[26]
  1. [19]
    The Applicant started fulltime work as an apprentice butcher at Meat Wurx in Kippa Ring on 11 May 2009.[27]This had been arranged by the Applicant’s brother who was the manager of the store. His gross weekly wage was $310.[28]The Applicant experienced back pain while performing heavier duties[29]and so, at the suggestion of a co-worker, started to smoke marijuana for pain relief.[30]
  1. [20]
    Dr Frank saw the Applicant again on 20 May 2009 when the Applicant informed him that he had ceased taking Escitalopram and was back at work and feeling fine.[31]The Applicant later lost his job at Meat Wurx which he says occurred in late 2009 due to cutbacks.[32]I note there appear to be inconsistencies between this account and the one that he gave to Drs Frank Thomlinson and Brett Halliday in 2011. Dr Thomlinson has said the Applicant told him on 3 February 2011 that he left Meat Wurx in February 2010 because the work was aggravating his symptoms, and in Dr Halliday’s report the Applicant is listed as having worked until January 2010.[33]
  1. [21]
    On 20 April 2010 the limitation period expired. By this point, the Applicant had attended his usual GP surgery, Medicare Rothwell, on three occasions and had not complained of back pain.[34]

Events after 1 June 2010

  1. [22]
    In June of 2010 the Applicant’s mother, Megan Richards, advised him to see a doctor after she learned he was using marijuana for pain relief, but he refused.[35]On 25 June 2010 she offered him a lift to run an errand with the ulterior motive of taking him to the doctor.[36]After he completed his errand, she drove him to the Medicross Rothwell Centre and refused to let him out of the car until he had made an appointment.[37]Dr Mervyn Naidoo, GP, examined the Applicant that same day.[38]He noted the Applicant’s neck and back pain had been persistent on and off since the injury.[39]The Applicant requested pain relief, and expressed a desire to re-open his WorkCover claim, and he made an application to do so on 28 June 2010. Megan Troy said that she later made an appointment for him to see a lawyer, Peta Yujnovich of Schultz Toomey O'Brien, in relation to the claim. Ms Yujnovich met with the Applicant on 26 July 2010.[40]
  1. [23]
    Dr Naidoo referred the Applicant to Dr John Albietz, Orthopaedic Surgeon, on 2 August 2010.[41]A CTscan performed on 23 August 2010 revealed a disc bulge at L4/5 with no associated nerve root compression.[42]An MRI scan and standing X-ray of the lumbar spine performed on 8 November 2010 showed discogenic deterioration with a central annular disc bulge and tear at the L4/5 level.[43]
  1. [24]
    Dr Albietz examined the Applicant on 18 January 2011 and provided a report to Dr Naidoo confirming discogenic height loss at L4/5 with slight retrolisthesis, discogenic deterioration, and a disc bulge and tear at that level,[44]with the rest of his spine remaining relatively well intact. Dr Albietz said the Applicant was most likely suffering continued discogenic back pain from the alleged workplace accident, and proposed a lumbar discogram so as to delineate the source of the pain.[45]
  1. [25]
    On 3 February 2011 the Applicant was interviewed and examined by Dr Francis Tomlinson, Neurosurgeon, who issued a medico-legal report on 6 May 2011. He determined the Applicant was co-operative, gave full-effort, and that his injury was consistent with an acute lumbar disc derangement. He concluded that it was too early to determine a final prognosis and that a review should be conducted.[46]
  1. [26]
    On 21 February 2011 a discogram was performed, showing a grade IV annular tear of the L4/5 disc with disruption of inner and outer annulus.[47]
  1. [27]
    The urgent NCD pursuant to section 276 of the WCRA was sworn on 4 April 2011[48]for which WorkCover confirmed the waiver of non-compliance on 1 June 2011. [49]A Notice of Assessment had been provided to the Applicant on 6 April 2011[50].
  1. [28]
    On 9 June 2011 Dr Albietz, having viewed the results of the discogram, wrote to Dr Naidoo confirming a strongly positive discogram at the L4/5 level with an exact replication of the Applicant’s pain. It does not appear that this report is included in the affidavit material but there is reference to it in Dr Halliday’s medico-legal report of 19 September 2011.[51]Counsel for the Applicant submits that Dr Naidoo explained to the Applicant that minimally invasive lumbar spine surgery was “indicated”, however, the reference given for this submission is to a letter from Dr Naidoo to the Applicant’s lawyer, Ms Yujnovich, dated 16 June 2011. In this letter, Dr Naidoo confirms that he had a follow up appointment with the Applicant on 7 June 2011, and that surgery was advised. Although there is no mention that this was the date on which Dr Naidoo informed the Applicant that surgery was the appropriate course, it is reasonable to assume this is the case.
  1. [29]
    Dr Brett Halliday, Orthopaedic Surgeon, examined the Applicant on 12 September 2011[52] and concluded no surgery was required.[53]He wrote that the examination of Mr Richards revealed “signs of overstatement”[54], “very poor effort on attempting to forward flex or extend”[55] and a “voluntarily restricted range of motion because of pain”[56]. The severity of the Applicant’s reported pain appeared out of proportion to any demonstrable clinical or radiological findings.[57]There was no limitation to his ability to work full-time, although he must limit heavy physical lifting, repetitive lifting and twisting to avoid pain.[58]He opined that “no further rehabilitation, chiropractic treatment and certainly no surgery should be recommended”[59] and said the Applicant would not fully recover.[60]In his view, a lumbar spinal fusion would significantly increase the Applicant’s impairment rating due to the nature and function of the AMA Guides.[61]
  1. [30]
    Though Dr Halliday had the benefit of the preceding doctors’ reports, he did not have available to him the discogram results of February 2011. It is not clear to me why this occurred. He did, however, upon receipt of those results and the Centrelink file (dated 16 September 2011), provide a supplementary report on 13 October 2011.[62]He acknowledged the discogram showed a Grade IV annular tear consistent with a lumbar spine injury and the mechanism of injury described by the Applicant.[63]However, he considered the severity of the Applicant’s symptoms continued to outweigh the findings of an annular tear. Nonetheless, he concluded the annular tear was a cause of ongoing lower back pain and was unlikely to heal[64], and agreed that spinal fusion was the appropriate treatment.[65] 
  1. [31]
    On 24 October 2011, Dr Malcolm Wallace, Orthopaedic Surgeon, examined the Applicant for the purposes of a medico-legal report. He concluded the Applicant was significantly adversely affected by his injury and that back fusion surgery should be considered.[66]

The Applicant’s case

  1. [32]
    The Applicant’s case is that he was unaware of the nature and extent of his injury and the requirement for surgery until, at the earliest, 25 June 2010, when Dr Naidoo examined him. He submits the following material facts also came into his knowledge after 1 June 2010:
  1. (a)
    The knowledge that there was a disc bulge and tear at L4/5 as revealed in the MRI scan performed on 8 November 2010, referred to in the report of Dr Albietz on 20 January 2011;
  1. (b)
    The knowledge that a discogram performed on 21 February 2011 showed a grade IV disc tear at L4/L5;
  1. (c)
    The knowledge that the lower back injury had produced 5% whole person impairment as per the Notice of Assessment provided to him on 6 April 2011; and
  1. (d)
    The knowledge that Dr Albietz considered interbody fusion surgery at L4/5 was indicated, as communicated to the Applicant in June 2011.

Are these material facts that relate to the right of action?

  1. [33]
    Section 30(1)(a) is as follows:

“Interpretation

  1. (1)
    For the purposes of this section and sections 31, 32, 33, and 34:
  1. (a)
    The material facts relating to a right of action include the following:-
  1. (i)
    the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded;
  1. (ii)
    the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies;
  1. (iii)
    the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury;
  1. (iv)
    the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused;
  1. (v)
    the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty; (my emphasis)
  1. [34]
    I accept that the alleged material facts, being clearly relevant to the nature and extent of the Applicant’s injury, are material and relate to the Applicant’s cause of action.

Are the facts of a decisive character?

  1. [35]
    Section 30(1)(b) and (2) provide:
  1. (b)
    material facts relating to a right of action are of a decisive character if but only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts, would regard those facts as showing:-
  1. (i)
    that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and
  1. (ii)
    that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;
  1. (3)
    In this section—

appropriate advice, in relation to facts, means the advice of competent persons qualified in their respective fields to advise on the medical, legal and other aspects of the facts.”

  1. [36]
    In Queensland v Stephenson [2006] HCA 20 Kirby J, agreeing with the joint reasons, said:

“The question becomes not ‘when all material facts’, viewed generally, came within the means of knowledge of the applicant. It is when ‘all material facts of a decisive character relating to the right of action’ came within such means of knowledge.”[67]

  1. [37]
    In Baillie v Creber [2010] QSC 52 McMeekin J at [24] referred to Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 325 where, at 333, Macrossan J said an applicant “must show that without the newly learned fact or facts he would not, even with the benefit of appropriate advice, have previously appreciated that he had a worthwhile action to pursue and should in his own interests pursue it.”
  1. [38]
    I am satisfied that the Applicant could not have appreciated the significance and severity of his injury without the possession of the abovementioned facts, and that he would not have brought an action in their absence. The knowledge that he requires surgery goes beyond a mere increase to the potential damages he may claim, it is central to the cause of his action. Otherwise, any potentially claimable damages might not have been sufficient to justify pursuing the action.

Were the facts within the Applicant’s means of knowledge?

  1. [39]
    Section 30(1)(c) of the LAA provides:

“a fact is not within the means of knowledge of a person at a particular time if, but only if:-

  1. (i)
    the person does not know the fact at that time;and
  1. (ii)
    as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person – the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.”
  1. [40]
    The Applicant’s case turns upon whether the facts were within his means of knowledge prior to the expiration date. Clearly, he was not actually aware of them until after 20 April 2010. The question is then whether he took “all reasonable steps to find out the fact(s) before that time.” The test for determining a plaintiff’s means of knowledge for the purposes of this section has been held to be an objective one with a subjective element.
  1. [41]
    Williams JA in Jocumsen v Theiss Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 198 said at [9]:

“Since the decision in Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v McPhee [1979] Qd R 469, especially at 472-3, it has been recognised that, in applying what is now s 30(1)(c) of the Act, the test of reasonableness to be applied is an objective one relevant to a person in the position of the claimant with his background and understanding. As Keane JA said in NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 110 at [29]:

‘Whether an applicant for an extension of time has taken all reasonable steps to find out a fact can only be answered by reference to what can reasonably be expected from that actual person in the circumstances of the applicant.’

That decision of this court clearly confirms the approach which must be taken in circumstances such as exist here.”

  1. [42]
    Keane JA in NF went on to say that:

“It seems to me that, if that person has taken all the reasonable steps that she is able to take to find out the fact, and has not found it out, that fact is not within her means of knowledge for the purpose of s 30(1)(c) of the Act. This view is supported by the text of s 30(1)(c)(ii) which is, as I have said, in marked contrast to s 30(1)(b). The authorities do not afford conclusive support for this view; but they do not foreclose its acceptance, and it may be noted that in Young v The Commissioner of Fire Service Williams J, as his Honour then was, accepted that a psychiatric condition which prevents an applicant from appreciating the nature and significance of the injury he has suffered was relevant for the purposes of s 30(1)(c)(ii).[68]

  1. [43]
    It is therefore evident that an assessment of the Applicant’s background and personal circumstances are crucial to the determination of his means of knowledge at the relevant time.

The Applicant’s background

  1. [44]
    The Applicant’s mother, Megan Richards (Ms Richards), says she noticed that he appeared to suffer from learning difficulties from an early age.[69]As early as grade 2 of his primary schooling a teacher commented to her that the Applicant was struggling with learning.[70]Ms Richards says the school psychologist agreed the Applicant had difficulties but was unable to identify the cause.[71]The Applicant’s school report cards reveal his difficulties in many fields of education.[72]His Year 4/5 report card noted that he had problems listening effectively and often needed things repeated.[73]In Year 5 he received special education and individualised classroom programs.[74]A Special Education Report in December 1997, the Applicant’s seventh year of primary school, identified him as a student with a learning disability.[75]As a result, he was to be provided with formal support the following school year.[76]Continued support, particularly in the areas of literacy, numeracy, and tasks requiring interpreting and responding to texts, was recommended.[77]
  1. [45]
    The Applicant has been with his wife, Teigan Richards, since he was 15.[78]He relies on her to assist him with paperwork and accompany him to appointments so that she can later explain to him what the doctor said.[79]She says she assisted him with understanding the questions on the learner’s permit exam[80], and the Applicant said he required her help to read and understand his affidavit.[81]
  1. [46]
    In 2005 the Applicant told a Centrelink worker he had difficulties with comprehension, reading and listening[82] and was subsequently referred by the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service for investigation of a possible auditory processing dysfunction.[83]The assessment revealed that the Applicant suffered from a difficulty in auditory decoding, which would likely result in frequent mishearing and consequent misunderstanding of messages and instructions.[84]The Applicant demonstrated significantly reduced performance in several tests which likely causes him difficulty in interpreting speech where background noise is present.[85]He processes speech slowly and inaccurately, requiring short, simple sentences. His short-term auditory recall was below normal levels limiting his capacity to retain information from verbal instructions or directions, impacting his ability to carry out complex instructions.[86]His abnormal auditory brainstem responses suggested a physiological cause for his learning difficulties.[87]The possibility of auditory neuropathy could not be excluded and further electrophysiological assessment, and speech therapy was recommended although was not ultimately performed.[88]Referral to an ear specialist to exclude retrocochlear involvement was also suggested, but similarly it was never conducted.[89]The Applicant was also noted to have mild hearing loss in his right ear, but this did not account for the extent of his auditory processing deficit.[90]
  1. [47]
    Lynda Troy, a neuropsychologist, examined the Applicant on 2 May 2012[91]and 3 October 2012.[92]In the first examination, he tested within the “low average and above” range (unlikely to cause any significant functional impairment) for perceptual reasoning, verbal abstract reasoning, general knowledge, constructional ability, nonverbal reasoning, ability to analyse and synthesise visual information, mental manipulation of information in working memory, mental arithmetic, visual scanning, fine visuomotor speed and coordination.[93]
  1. [48]
    His general intellectual function, verbal comprehension, expressive vocabulary and immediate auditory verbal attention span were mildly impaired, and would likely only cause mild difficulties in everyday functioning.[94]However, he was deemed “moderately to severely impaired”, significantly below average adult range, in his ability to sequence numbers, single word reading, reading comprehension, verbal comprehension, expressive vocabulary and receptive vocabulary.[95]Functionally, his “low average severely impaired reading ability” is within the range of a nine-year-old child in Grade 4[96], and his ability to comprehend what he reads is equivalent to a child of eight years.[97]His capacity to understand what he hears is at the level of a 10-year-old child.[98]He also showed moderate impairment in his ability to pay attention to what he hears, further limiting his ability to process everyday language.[99]
  1. [49]
    The Applicant’s overall intelligence was within the low average range, with an IQ of 82, in the 12th percentile for peers of the same age.[100]Ms Troy diagnosed the Applicant with developmental learning disorders, namely a reading disorder and mixed receptive-expressive language disorder.[101]She concluded that the Applicant’s “learning difficulties contributed significantly to his delays in seeking legal advice and appreciating the significance of his injuries”.[102]He would have been unlikely to comprehend the significance of any medical or legal advice. Without significant assistance from others he is incapable of processing such information at a sufficient level to understand its importance.[103]
  1. [50]
    Ms Troy said the Applicant met the diagnostic criteria for chronic major depressive disorder, displaying symptoms including depressed mood, markedly diminished pleasure and interest in activities, insomnia, loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness, reduced concentration and recurrent suicidal ideation.[104]These symptoms manifested following the injury and increased to a clinical level by January of 2009.
  1. [51]
    She also diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from the workplace incident.[105]The Applicant told her that he feared for his life at the time of the incident as he thought the oven was going to crush him.[106]Ms Troy said this traumatic event caused the Applicant to respond with intense fear, helplessness and horror leading to PTSD. Consequently, he now exhibits persistent avoidance in terms of withdrawal from others, hyper vigilance, impaired social and occupational functioning, difficulty concentrating, sleep disturbance and nightmares.[107]Ms Troy said his psychological injuries were consistent with the reported circumstances of the accident.[108]
  1. [52]
    Ms Troy examined the Applicant for the second time on 3 October 2012 to determine his capacity to give legal instructions.[109]She administered the Wechsler Individual Achievement test, and the Financial Competency Assessment Inventory.[110]Ms Troy concluded the Applicant had the ability to instruct his lawyers in relation to the claim, although he had a tendency to process information superficially and risked misunderstanding key issues if information was not presented to him slowly and in small chunks.[111]
  1. [53]
    Dr Frank Walsh, a psychologist, examined the Applicant on 29 November 2012 and administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - IV.[112]His IQ was assessed to be 89, with his level of intellectual functioning at the top end of the low average range.[113]Dr Walsh said the Applicant had “pre-existing learning difficulties which contributed to his poor engagement with education.”[114]His reading ability was at the level of a child of 12 years and 8 months although he appeared to have a functional level of literacy.[115]Dr Walsh performed a pain assessment on the Applicant and concluded that his perception of his experience of pain was somewhat dysfunctional in comparison with other sufferers of similar injuries.[116]However, tests revealed that there was no evidence of malingering.
  1. [54]
    Dr Walsh noted the Applicant did not mention fearing for his life at the time of the incident nor did he report experiencing nightmares, hyper vigilance or a restricted range of emotionality.[117]This was despite being specifically asked how he felt at the time of the accident.[118]Dr Walsh also noted discrepancies between the Applicant’s various accounts of the incident given to Dr Sterling, Ms Troy, himself and in the Notice for Claim of Damages.[119]
  1. [55]
    Dr Walsh concluded that, based on the Applicant’s account of the incident to him, the Applicant was not suffering from PTSD and it was highly unlikely that he had ever suffered from PTSD as a result of the alleged accident.[120]The Applicant did not appear to present with a major depressive disorder at the time of the examination, particularly given both he and his wife said there had been considerable improvement in his mood.[121]Dr Walsh considered the Applicant to be capable of directing the course of these legal proceedings although any complex written material would likely be beyond his comprehension.[122]
  1. [56]
    Mr McKean, counsel for the Applicant, submits that the Applicant falls within a select class of persons who lack the necessary initiative to take appropriate steps in relation to claims such as this. In support of this contention I have been referred to the case of Pilot v Commissioner of Police and Anor [2008] QDC 41.
  1. [57]
    Pilot (supra) concerned a 32-year-old lifelong resident of Palm Island who on 19 May 2004 was injured when a police officer negligently drove his car over her foot during the course of an argument. Her injuries were substantial, requiring surgery, causing her to be hospitalised for a week, and leaving her with continuing adverse effects. She brought an action for negligence outside the limitation period arguing she was not in possession of the minimum material facts, specifically the identity of the vehicle and the name of the licensed insurer, until 26 July 2007.
  1. [58]
    The Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (MAIA) required her to join the insurer of the motor vehicle to the action, and so the facts were held by McGill DCJ to be material to the cause of action. She did not know of the requirements of the MAIA, and so his Honour was left to determine whether the applicant had, in so far as her personal circumstances permitted, taken all reasonable steps in accordance with s 30(1)(c) to discover these facts prior to the expiry of the limitation period.
  1. [59]
    The Applicant had been educated to year 10 on Palm Island but had a “very limited ability to read and write”,[123]and required assistance to read documents. Her four-year-old child to a de facto partner was in foster care as she was unable to care for the child properly. She had been a heavy drinker since her teenage years and had never worked, living with about a dozen unemployed people. His Honour noted that she “had had a singularly deprived background and upbringing, and had since then been surviving at a very basic level, probably most of the time numbed by alcohol.”[124]
  1. [60]
    The idea of making a claim seemingly never occurred to the applicant until an aunt suggested it to her. She did not understand how to make a claim nor did she really understand insurance, but she knew that it would require consulting a lawyer although she did not do so until 2007, some three years after the injury.
  1. [61]
    The applicant submitted that she did not contact a lawyer sooner because of “her background of limited education, the circumstances of her life on Palm Island, the fact that she had no idea herself how to go about pursuing such a claim, that she was reluctant to talk to lawyers or indeed anybody about the matter, that she had no money to pay for a lawyer, and that lawyers were not readily available where she lived on Palm Island.”[125]Her longstanding fear of police was also argued to be relevant.
  1. [62]
    His Honour said “there could be few people in the community of whom it could be said that it was not reasonable to expect that they would take as basic a step as obtaining legal advice in order to investigate or pursue a potential claim for damages for personal injuries”[126].
  1. [63]
    His Honour also said:

“In the present case, it is not alleged the applicant suffered any psychiatric injury as a result of anything done in this accident, but it seems to me that the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in NF (supra) requires an assessment of what was reasonable for the applicant to do, given the actual mental state of the applicant at the time, and any difficulties that she experienced as a result of that.

There is a distinction between a person who chooses, for whatever reason, not to take action to enforce that person’s rights, and one who, because of a psychiatric condition or other mental infirmity, or indeed for any other reason, lacks the necessary initiative to take appropriate steps to pursue a claim, or for that matter has so little understanding of the way society functions as not to be able to obtain legal advice in order to pursue a claim for damages in respect of personal injuries. It would be unsurprising if the Limitation of Actions Act did not prevent late claims from being pursued by them or on their behalf; such people are in a situation which is close to that of a person against whom time does not run because of a disability in the form of unsoundness of mind, pursuant to s 29 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.”[127]

  1. [64]
    The applicant possessed sufficient information to enable her to easily and quickly ascertain the identity of the vehicle and its insurer. However, in adopting the approach of Keane JA (as he then was) in NF (supra) and applying the objective test to the applicant in light of her background his Honour concluded she had taken all reasonable steps as could be expected of her.
  1. [65]
    The Respondent argues that the case of Pilot (supra) is not applicable here. Irrespective of Mr Richard’s disadvantaged background, the Respondent submits that his persistent back pain, which was so significant as to affect his ability to work, should have made obvious to him the need to seek appropriate medical and legal advice much earlier than he did. The fact that Dr Sterling, Orthopaedic Surgeon, advised him on 4 October 2007 that the pain would abate over time, the Respondent argues, may not be relied upon given he recommended the Applicant’s condition be reassessed in three to six months’ time. When his condition did not improve, the Applicant should have sought further medical and legal advice.
  1. [66]
    In support of this contention the Respondent has put before the court several cases. In Baillie (supra), the applicant injured his back in a workplace incident. He saw a GP after the incident but there was no record of any reported back pain. In the meantime he continued to work. Some six months after the accident he visited a doctor and had a CT scan performed which revealed a minor disc bulge, although he was merely advised to look after his back. The applicant, not coping with the pain, finally quit his work approximately three years after the accident, and took up working for his parents who were more understanding of his injury. A relevant material fact he sought to rely upon was advice received from an orthopaedic surgeon roughly five years after the accident that his injury was significant and permanent.
  1. [67]
    McMeekin J held that the applicant would have undoubtedly been aware of this fact long before the expiration of the period of limitation. His pain had been persistent for over three years and was worsening, and would have appeared permanent. The applicant also argued that, of the doctors he had seen, none of them had told him there was a causal link between the incident and his symptoms. Instead, he claimed, they had told him the pain was the result of pre-existing degeneration. His Honour was not persuaded by this argument as his claim was not corroborated by any of the medical reports. In light of the applicant’s unremitting pain and severely affected ability to work his Honour concluded he should have made enquiry as to the extent of his injury much earlier than he did. Consequently the material facts were within his means of knowledge prior to the expiration date.
  1. [68]
    The Respondent submits that the present application should be dismissed for the same reasons. I disagree. Baillee did not concern an applicant whose failure to make timely enquiries may be excused because of extenuating personal circumstances.
  1. [69]
    Eldridge v Coles Group Limited [2012] QSC 39 involved an applicant injured in a workplace accident in 2005 who only became aware of the extent of her injuries in 2010. An orthopaedic surgeon advised her in early 2006 that her symptoms would settle in time. A second surgeon later concluded that it could take as long as one year to heal. Her ability to work had been restricted to lighter duties, she had undertaken extensive rehabilitation provided by her employer, and had managed her injury with medication. In 2010 the medication was no longer sufficient to alleviate her pain, and she saw a surgeon in mid 2010 who advised her that she required surgery. She alleged the deterioration of her condition in late 2009 causing her to cease work in late 2010 and the knowledge that she would require surgery were material facts not previously within her means of knowledge. Her Honour Justice Lyons refused to grant an extension, concluding that the applicant must have known by late 2006 that her condition was serious and was not improving. The applicant should have known prior to the expiration of the limitation period that commencing proceedings was a reasonable course of action. Once again, the applicant in this case could not justify her tardiness on the grounds of disability or personal disadvantage.
  1. [70]
    Cox v Strategic Property Group Pty Ltd & Anor [2011] QSC 111 concerned a young applicant who returned to his employment because his GP advised him that his injury would heal with time. Though he struggled with persistent back pain for some three years, he submitted he was not aware of the causal link between his injury and the workplace accident until informed of this by a doctor approximately four months after the expiration of the limitation period. Her Honour Justice Dalton rejected this argument. The applicant would have been aware prior to the critical date that his symptoms were not temporary and that they were significant, having affected his ability to work. Her Honour said the applicant’s ignorance did not justify an extension.Relevantly, it was held that the applicant in Cox had always believed his injury was more serious than what the doctor told him. Counsel for Mr Richards submits that, conversely, Mr Richards continued to believe what his doctors had told him right up until he saw Dr Naidoo. Given his background I accept this, however I will discuss it in greater detail later. In any event, this case is distinguishable on the grounds that Mr Richard’s ignorance, unlike the applicant in Cox, is understandable.
  1. [71]
    Counsel for the Applicant in the present case argues that where one endures pain, but is medically advised by several experts that in time it will abate, then it is reasonable that he not seek information regarding a potential claim. The abovementioned cases do not seem to accord with this argument. However, as I have mentioned, they did not involve an applicant with extenuating personal circumstances. These include, to varying degrees, his learning disorders and resulting poor level of education, his severe difficulties with written and verbal comprehension, his inability to manage his own affairs without the assistance of his wife, his lack of initiative in relation to his injury and claim, his low-average IQ, his attention deficit and his chronic major depressive disorder. Of course, the most influential of these factors are his learning disorders, lack of education and initiative, and his inability to manage his own affairs. I find particularly persuasive Ms Troy’s conclusion that the learning difficulties contributed significantly to his delay in seeking legal advice and appreciating the significance of his injuries. The fact that he would have been unlikely to comprehend the significance of any medical or legal advice without substantial assistance from others is highly relevant.
  1. [72]
    Ms Troy’s diagnosis of the Applicant with PTSD is argued to be relevant. In Jocumsen v Thiess [2005] QCA 198, PTSD was held to be a relevant consideration in determining whether the applicant had taken reasonable steps to pursue his claim.[128]The court noted that the avoidance of dealing with the symptoms of PTSD is itself a diagnostic criterion of PTSD. In the same way, counsel for Mr Richards argues that PTSD contributed to Mr Richard’s failure to seek further help.
  1. [73]
    Dr Walsh disagreed with Ms Troy’s diagnosis of PTSD. He noted the discrepancies in the Applicant’s various accounts of the accident, and the psychological effects it caused him, given to Dr Sterling, Ms Troy and himself. Consequently I do not consider the issue of PTSD to be particularly weighty, although it is a factor to be taken into account.
  1. [74]
    It is also argued that the Applicant’s responsibilities to his family throughout the limitation period competed with his taking steps with respect to the injury. He has two children, born 2003 and 2007 respectively, one of whom has behavioural issues and the same auditory processing disability as himself.[129]In Van Der Merwe v Arnotts Biscuits Ltd [2010] QSC 145, the applicant was unemployed for a substantial period of time following her injury, during which she had to care for her two children.[130]Daubney J accepted that the applicant did not have an immediate financial necessity to return to work as she was receiving Centrelink parent allowance and maintenance payments from her husband. I note that the Applicant’s family situation, particularly the difficulties associated with his son’s disability, is to be borne in mind, yet I do not find it to be overly persuasive.

Conclusion re applicant’s means of knowledge

  1. [75]
    I am of the opinion that the relevant material facts were not within the Applicant’s means of knowledge until at the earliest 25 June 2010 when he was first examined by Dr Naidoo at the behest of his mother. Between the period of 21 April 2007 and 8 October 2007 he was examined by Dr Angel GP, Dr Sampson, Orthopaedic Surgeon, and Dr Sterling, Orthopaedic Surgeon, all of whom concluded his injury was relatively minor. I note that the Applicant failed to re-attend on Dr Sterling despite the fact that it was recommended he do so after three to six months. However, I find it reasonable, given the Applicant’s circumstances, that he did not. By this point he had been told rather unequivocally by Dr Angel and Dr Sampson that his injury was not out of the ordinary. He continued to hold these doctors’ opinions as conclusive throughout the duration of the limitation period, and I find that it was reasonable for him to do so.
  1. [76]
    I pause here to comment. As late as 12 September 2011, orthopaedic surgeon Dr Brett Halliday, in preparing a report for Workcover aided by previous medical reports and well aware that Dr Albietz thought surgery was necessary, nevertheless concluded that “no further rehabilitation, chiropractic treatment and certainly no surgery should be recommended.”[131]I acknowledge that Dr Halliday had not at that stage received the discogram results and that he later changed his mind upon its receipt. But it is easy to see how a patient’s valid complaints may be dismissed.
  1. [77]
    I accept Ms Troy’s conclusion that the Applicant’s condition would have contributed significantly to his delay in making further enquiries. It is therefore not surprising that the Applicant did not institute these proceedings and seek further medical advice without significant assistance from others. It took his mother deceiving him into visiting a doctor for the process to finally get started.
  1. [78]
    Taking into account the above considerations I am satisfied that it would be unreasonable to expect the applicant to have done more in the circumstances.

Established cause of action

  1. [79]
    Section 31(2)(b) of the LAA requires that there be evidence to establish a right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of the period of limitation. The applicant in his Statement of Claim alleges the oven was 1.5 metres wide[132], that it was slippery[133], that he was required by his employer to carry it down a set of stairs with assistance from two co-workers[134], and that a forklift was required to move it once it was at the bottom of the stairs.[135]Additionally, the Applicant relies on Dr Halliday’s report dated 13 October 2011 in which he concluded the Applicant’s injury and its ongoing adverse affects were consistent with an accident as described by the Applicant.[136]I am of the view that if this were to be unopposed by other evidence at trial the Applicant could have a reasonable prospect of success. In any event, the Respondent does not contest this point.

Prejudice

  1. [80]
    Similarly, the Respondent does not submit that any prejudice would flow from the exercise of the court’s discretion to extend the limitation period. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider this point further.

Conclusion

  1. [81]
    I am satisfied that pursuant to s 31(2) the Court’s discretion to extend the Applicant’s period of limitation in relation to this claim is enlivened.
  1. [82]
    The order of the Court is:
  1. The expiration date of the period of limitation for the Applicant’s action against the Respondent for damages for a personal injury sustained on 20 April 2007 be extended from 20 April 2010 to 1 June 2011, pursuant to 31(2) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1974;
  1. Costs of and incidental to this application be costs in the cause; and
  1. Parties to submit draft order for future conduct of the action.

Footnotes

[1]  Exhibit 1.

[2]  Affidavit of Kane Stegeman para 28.

[3]  KSJ2-12

[4]  KJS2-11.

[5]  KJS1-2, 6, 7.

[6]  KJS1-4 (Certificate of Dr Peter Bailey GP dated 4 June 2007).

[7]  KJS2-11.

[8]  KJS7-63.

[9]  KJS2-20.

[10]  KJS2-12.

[11]  KJS2-34.

[12]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 26.

[13]  KJS2-13, 14.

[14]  KJS11-82.

[15]  KJS11-85.

[16]  KJS11-84.

[17]  KJS11-86.

[18]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 26.

[19]  KJS9-71.

[20]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 26.

[21]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 29.

[22]  KJS16-103.

[23]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 30.

[24]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 30.

[25]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 30.

[26]  KJS3-37, 38.

[27]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 31.

[28]  KJS10-75.

[29]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 35.

[30]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 35.

[31]  KJS3-37.

[32]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 31.

[33]  KJS16-103.

[34]  KJS4-52, 53.

[35]  Affidavit of Megan Richards, para 18.

[36]  Affidavit of Megan Richards, paras 19 and 20.

[37]  Affidavit of Megan Richards, para 20.

[38]  KJS4-52.

[39]  KJS4-52.

[40]  Affidavit of Kane Stegeman, para 8.

[41]  KJS4-54.

[42]  KJS4-55.

[43]  KJS5-58 (see also Dr Albietz’ letter to Dr Naidoo dated 20 January 2011 – KJS5-57.)

[44]  KJS5-57.

[45]  Ibid.

[46]  KJS13-93.

[47]  KJS5-59 (21 Feb 13 not mentioned, but this date is referred to by Dr Halliday in his supplementary report see KJS16-111).

[48]  Exhibit 1; Affidavit of Kane Stegeman, para 28.

[49]  KJS15-101.

[50]  KJS14-100.

[51]  KJS16-111.

[52]  KJS16-102.

[53]  KJS16-106 and 109.

[54]  KJS16-105.

[55]  Ibid.

[56]  KJS16-106.

[57]  KJS16-108.

[58]  KJS16-107.

[59]  KJS16-107.

[60]  KJS16-109.

[61]  Ibid.

[62]  KJS17-113.

[63]  KJS17-114.

[64]  KJS17-114.

[65]  KJS17-115.

[66]  KJS18-116.

[67]  See para 48.

[68]  NF (supra) para 29.

[69]  Affidavit of Ms Richards para 4.

[70]  Affidavit of Ms Richards para 5.

[71]  Ibid para 6.

[72]  KJS19 (bundle of school records).

[73]  KJS19-124.

[74]  KJS19-130.

[75]  KJS19-122.

[76]  Ibid.

[77]  KSJ19-123.

[78]  Affidavit of Troy Richards para 5.

[79]  Ibid para 5.

[80]  Affidavit of Teigan Richards para 8.

[81]  Affidavit of Troy Richards para 5.

[82]  Affidavit of Troy Richards para nine.

[83]  KJS12-87.

[84]  KJS12-89.

[85]  KJS12-88.

[86]  KJ12-89.

[87]  KJS 12-89.

[88]  KJS12-89.

[89]  Ibid.

[90]  Ibid.

[91]  KJS20-148.

[92]  KJS21-162.

[93]  KJS20-156.

[94]  Ibid.

[95]  KJS20-157.

[96]  KJS20-152.

[97]  Ibid.

[98]  Ibid.

[99]  KJS20-159.

[100]  KJS20-158.

[101]  Ibid.

[102]  KJS20-159.

[103]  Ibid.

[104]  KJS20-157

[105]  Ibid.

[106]  KJS20-150.

[107]  KJS20-157.

[108]  KJS20-158.

[109]  KJS21-162.

[110]  Ibid.

[111]  KJS21-166.

[112]  KJS22-169.

[113]  KJS22-177.

[114]  KJS22-182.

[115]  KJS22-178.

[116]  KJS22-179.

[117]  KJS22-174.

[118]  KJS22-180.

[119]  KJS22-180.

[120]  KJS22-182.

[121]  Ibid.

[122]  KJS22-182.

[123] Pilot (supra) para 3.

[124]  Ibid para 34.

[125]  Ibid para 16.

[126]  Ibid paras 34 – 35.

[127]  Ibid paras 37- 38.

[128]  Paras [43]-[45]; see also NF (supra) at para [29].

[129]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 32.

[130]  [para 25] page 7.

[131]  KJS16-107.

[132]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 13,

[133]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 19.

[134]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 18.

[135]  Affidavit of Troy Richards, para 20.

[136]  KJS-114.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Richards v Chelmor Trust as Trustees for Chelmor Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Richards v Chelmor Trust as Trustees for Chelmor Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2013] QDC 238

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Searles DCJ

  • Date:

    27 Sep 2013

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Baillie v Creber [2010] QSC 52
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QSC 52
Cite 2 - [2010] QSC 52
Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v McPhee [1979] Qd R 469
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1979] Qd R 469
Cox v Strategic Property Group Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 111
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QSC 111
Cite 2 - [2011] QSC 111
Eldridge v Coles Group Ltd [2012] QSC 39
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QSC 39
Cite 2 - [2012] QSC 39
Jocumsen v Thiess Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 198
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 198
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 198
Cite 3 - [2005] QCA 198
Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 325
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1988] 2 Qd R 325
Cite 2 - [1988] 2 Qd R 325
NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 110
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 110
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 110
Cite 3 - [2005] QCA 110
Pilot v Commissioner of Police [2008] QDC 41
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QDC 41
Cite 2 - [2008] QDC 41
Cite 3 - [2008] QDC 41
State of Queensland v Stephenson & Anor (2006) HCA 20
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) HCA 20
Cite 2 - (2006) HCA 20
Van der Merwe v Arnott's Biscuits Limited [2010] QSC 145
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QSC 145
Cite 2 - [2010] QSC 145

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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