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Manbulloo Limited v Sacilotto[2013] QDC 243

Manbulloo Limited v Sacilotto[2013] QDC 243

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Manbulloo Limited v Sacilotto & Ors  [2013] QDC 243

PARTIES:

Manbulloo Limited

(Plaintiff)

V

Michael John Sacilotto and Angela Ellen Sacilotto

(First Defendants)

And

Keith Alexander Crawford and Christopher John Honey

(Second Defendants)

FILE NO:

D407 of 2012

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Townsville

DELIVERED ON:

01 October 2013

DELIVERED AT:

Townsville

HEARING DATE:

19 April 2013

JUDGE:

Durward SC DCJ

ORDERS:

  1. The second defendant’s application for summary judgment against the plaintiff is refused.
  2. The second defendant’s application to strike out parts of the plaintiff’s statement of claim is granted.
  3. The plaintiff’s application for summary judgment against the first defendant is refused.
  4. The plaintiff’s application to strike out the defence of the first defendant is refused.
  5. The plaintiff’s application for leave to amend nunc pro tunc it’s statement of claim and to add against the second defendant acclaim in conversion is granted.
  6. The plaintiff has leave to amend its statement of claim, to be filed and served within 14 days of this order.
  7. I will hear the parties further as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – PLEADINGS – CAUSES OF ACTION – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – application by second defendant – whether plaintiff has realistic prospects of succeeding on all or part of the claim.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – PLEADINGS – ADDITION OF CAUSE OF ACTION – whether grounds for addition of cause of action of conversion of property by sale of it – whether property are fixtures or are chattels – whether plaintiff has any equitable interest in the property – whether any interest is enforceable against second defendants who are receivers and managers.

LEASE – TERMINATION – NEW LEASE – CONTINUATION OF TERMS – whether first lease extinguished – whether second unregistered lease binds liquidator – priority of competing interests.

PROPERTY – FIXTURES – whether buried irrigation system a fixture – whether any evidence about affixation.

REDEIVERS & MANAGERS – powers of receiver – whether liable personally for alleged breach of duty – whether implication of liability to third party not party in liquidation inconsistent with conventional position of liquidator.

REAL PROPERTY – LEASE – clause conferring benefit of covenant binding purchaser of land from lessor – whether binds liquidator – whether lease extinguished and any interest of lessee subsists – whether legal or equitable interest and against whom enforceable.

PRACTICE & PRODEDURE – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – whether pleadings disclose a viable cause of action.

LEGISLATION:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 rr 5, 171, 292, 293;

Corporations Act 2001 ss 419, 419A.

CASES:

General Steel Industries Inc v Commisioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232; Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v JK Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd (2009) 2 Qd R 202; 3 Oceans Line Company Pty Ltd v Heyshott Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 39 ; ASIC v Letten & Ors (No 13) (2011) 86 ACSR 174; Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; Expo International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Chant [1979] 2 NSW LR 280; Fortuna Seafoods  Pty Ltd v The Ship “Eternal Wind” [2008] 1 Qd R 429; Jenkin R Lewis & Son Ltd v Kerman [1971] 1 Ch 477; Raging Thunder Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd  & Anor [2012] QSC 329; Re Diesels & Components Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 456; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; Tarangau Game Fishing Charters Pty Ltd v Eagle Yachts Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] QSC 16; Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; APA v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR(NSW) 700; Bank of Melbourne Ltd v CBFC Leasing Pty Ltd [1991] ANZ Conv R 561; Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534; Holland v Hodgson (1938) 38 SR(NSW) 700; Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v CSR Provident Fund Nominees Pty Ltd [1962] VR 429; Lake Eeree Pty Ltd v Flair Realty Pty Ltd (unreported) FCSCQ; Litz v National Australia Bank (1986) Q ConvR 54-229; Reid v Smith (1905) 3 CLR 656; Sanwa Australia Leasing Ltd v National Westminster Finance Australia Ltd (unreported) SCNSW, 02.11.88 BC8801368; Wood Factory Pty Ltd v Kiritos Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 105; Bli Bli No 1 Pty Ltd v Kimlin Investments Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 289; Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976)136 CLR 529; Catten v Stockton Water Works (1975) LR 10 QB 453; Chidgley v Wellner & Anor [2006] QDC 400; Hobson v Gorringe [1987] 1 Ch. 182; Hill v Van Erp 1997) 188 CLR 159 at 233-234; Holland v Hodgson (1938) 38 SR(NSW) 700; Seas Sapfor Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (SA) 97 ATO 4535; The Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] 157 CLR 17; Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] (1987) 164 CLR 613; Friedman v Barrett, ex parte Friedman (1962) Qd R 498; BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 16 ALR 363.

COUNSEL:

A J Moon for the plaintiff

P D Tucker for the first defendant

D M Turner for the second defendant

SOLICITORS:

Connolly Suthers Lawyers for the plaintiff

MacDonnells Law for the first defendants

Norton Rose Australia for the second defendants

  1. [1]
    The plaintiff has sought a declaration as to its rights in respect of plant and equipment (an “irrigation system”) and an injunction to enable access to the certain real property to exercise those rights, or damages.

The applications

  1. [2]
    There are three applications, made pursuant to the Uniform Civil Procedures Act 1999 (“UCPR”):
  1. A.
    By the second defendant, for summary judgment pursuant to r 293 against the plaintiff; or in the alternative, to strike out substantially the whole of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, pursuant to r 171.
  1. B.
    By the plaintiff, for summary judgment against the first defendant pursuant to r 292; or in the alternative, to strike out the Defence of the first defendant pursuant to r 171.
  1. C.
    By the plaintiff, for leave to amend nunc pro tunc its Statement of Claim and to add against the second defendant a claim in conversion.

Background

  1. [3]
    The plaintiff's claim is to enforce its rights with respect to the irrigation system as lessee under a lease of real property (“the land”) on which there was a plantation of some 20,000 mango trees. The registered proprietor of the land was CEC Group Ltd (“CEC”) which is now in receivership. The receivers and managers are the second defendant, who sold the land to the first defendants.
  1. [4]
    The second defendants were in possession of the irrigation system and the mango trees at the time of the sale. The plaintiff was not informed of the sale at any material time. The first defendant refused the plaintiff access to the land to exercise its rights with respect to the irrigation system under a lease.
  1. [5]
    The claim refers also to a plantation of mango trees. However, the applications proceeded on the basis that the right asserted by the plaintiff related only to the irrigation system.

Chronology

  1. [6]
    The relevant events, which seem to be uncontroversial, are:
  1. On or about 14 September 2004 CEC borrowed monies from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (“the bank”) and gave as security for the advances a fixed and floating charge over all its assets and undertaking. The charge was registered.
  1. The charge fixed on “all present and future real and leasehold property” of CEC. Any land acquired after the charge was created became subject to the fixed component of the charge.
  1. In about May 2007 CEC purchased the land from the plaintiffs. The bank took a mortgage by way of further security over the land.
  1. On or about 29 June 2007 a lease between the plaintiff and CEC for a term of 5 years commencing on 29 May 2007 and expiring on 28 May 2012  was registered (the “first lease”).
  1. The first lease required the plaintiffs to pay rent to CEC at a commercial by reference to an agreed formula (about $450,000 pa).
  1. The first lease contained a term (clause 8) concerning the rights of the parties in relation to mango trees and an irrigation system (see infra for the terms of clause 8.
  1. A fresh lease between the plaintiff and CEC for a term of 8 years was made on or about 21 December 2009 and expiring on 31 December 2017 (the “second lease”).
  1. The second lease provided for a reduced rental of $1,000 pa and contained a term identical to clause 8. The second lease was not registered. The bank did not consent to it.
  1. The plaintiff vacated the land in or about April 2012. The second defendants then entered into possession of it.
  1. The second defendants were appointed by the bank as receivers and managers of all the assets and undertaking of CEC pursuant to the charge, on 11 May 2011.
  1. The first lease expired on 28 May 2012.
  1. The first lease was cancelled on 29 June 2012.
  1. By contract dated 05 October 2012 the land was sold by CEC to the first defendants. The contract was completed on 29 October 2012.
  1. The first defendants are now the registered proprietors of the land.
  1. At the time of the sale the plaintiff had an irrigation system remaining on the land: a quantity of sprinklers, a quantity of flushing valves and laterals. The mango trees also remained on the land.
  1. The plaintiffs contended in correspondence with the second defendants that it occupied the land pursuant to the second lease and asserted a right of ownership of the mango trees and plant and equipment, pursuant to clause 8.

The Plaintiff's Pleading

  1. [7]
    The plaintiff's amended statement of claim alleges a breach of contract and, albeit on any objective view incompletely pleaded, a breach of duty of care. The plaintiff foreshadowed amendment to add a claim for conversion and a claim for breach of the alleged duty of care.
  1. [8]
    A synopsis of the plaintiff's case as pleaded and foreshadowed, is as follows:
  • The plaintiff owns the mango trees and the irrigation system on the land, that ownership arising by reason of Clause 8 in the first lease.
  • The second defendant’s thus were on in a position to convey clear title to the mango trees and plant and equipment, to the first defendant.
  • The plaintiff gave notice of ownership rights to the second defendant.
  • CEC and the second defendant failed to allow the plaintiff to exercise the ownership rights, in breach of Clause 8.
  • The land was sold to the first defendants with the mango trees and plant and equipment on it.
  • There was in the first lease an implied term that if the land was sold by CEC, the contract of sale would have a covenant that the purchaser (the first defendants) would agree to be bound by Clause 8.
  • The sale of the land by CEC to the first defendants under a contract that did not contain such a covenant rendered the second defendants liable for breach of the implied term of the first lease.
  • Alternatively, the second defendants owed the plaintiff a duty to ensure that CEC, upon a sale of the land would obtain the covenant, and, having failed to do so, there was a breach of that duty that gives rise to a claim in damages.
  • That the plaintiff has suffered loss and damage.
  • That the second defendants were, at the time of the sale of the land, in possession of the irrigation system.
  • The second defendant, by virtue of the sale of the land, sold the irrigation system, which was inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights.
  • The second defendant converted the plant and equipment and the plaintiff has a consequence suffered loss and damage.

Clause 8

  1. [9]
    Clause 8 in the first lease (expressed in identical terms in clause 8 in the second lease) is the critical issue in the plaintiffs’ pleadings. It is written as follows:

“8.  Removal of structures, fixtures, fittings and mango trees.

  1. (a)
    The right, title and interest in and to the mango trees which were growing on the land at the commencement of the lease or which are planted thereon during the term of the lease is reserved to the lessee and at the expiry of the term of the lease or within a period of six months or longer if the lessee is unable to remove the trees due to matters outside his control including but not limited to inclement weather or unavailability of contractors after such expiry the lessee shall have the option to remove the same at its own expense.
  1. (b)
    The right, title and interest in and to any fixed improvements, fixtures, fittings, agricultural or irrigation structures and/or fixtures and fittings and any plant and equipment at the commencement of the lease or placed on the land during the term of the lease is reserved to the lessee and the lessee shall have the option at its own expense to remove the same upon the expiration of the term or within six months of the expiration of the term.”

A.  Summary Judgment: the second defendant against the plaintiff.

Submissions

  1. [10]
    Mr Turner submitted for the second defendants:
  1. The second defendant should have summary judgment because the plaintiffs do not have a realistic (as opposed to a fanciful) prospect of successfully prosecuting its claim against the second defendant, because the whole of the plaintiff's case is founded on rights under the first lease which were extinguished by the surrender of that lease and the entry into the second lease.
  1. The plaintiff's case is otherwise bad in law and involves a misapprehension of the rights and obligations of privately-appointed receivers and managers.
  1. The second defendants were not a party to either the first or the second lease; and were not a party to the contract of sale.
  1. The second defendants were not subject to any relevant duty of care and were not in breach; and in any event duty of care was not pleaded.
  1. There was no conversion of property. The mango trees and the irrigation system were fixtures to the land. Any rights the plaintiff may have had were subordinate to the rights of the bank under its fixed equitable charge over the land.
  1. There was no trialable issue.
  1. [11]
    Mr Moon submitted for the plaintiff:
  1. There was a trialable issue, namely a question of fact: that is, whether CEC resiled from their position about the lease prior to the receiver’s conduct of the sale.
  1. The vulnerability of the plaintiff was readily apparent and the second defendant did nothing to protect the rights of the plaintiff.
  1. The existence of a duty of care was an issue determinable as a question of fact and was a trialable issue.
  1. The issue about “fixtures” was a matter for trial.

Discussion

  1. (a)
    The First Lease
  1. [12]
    The first lease was surrendered and replaced by a second lease. The plaintiff admitted (in the Reply, paragraph 1, to the second defendant’s Defence paragraph 2(c)) the entry into the second lease and (in correspondence with the second defendant) admitted and asserted the substance of the second lease, including its occupation of the land being pursuant to the second lease. The plaintiff in correspondence nevertheless maintained its rights to ownership of the mango trees and plant and equipment on the land pursuant to Clause 8.
  1. [13]
    However, the plaintiff’s case as pleaded incontrovertibly rests on the first lease: in contract, the implied term in the first lease; the tortuous duty; and the foreshadowed claim and conversion, based on the ownership rights to the plant and equipment predicated on Clause 8 of the first lease.
  1. [14]
    Has the first lease subsisted? On the basis of the plaintiff's pleading and its admissions (in the Reply and in the correspondence) it has not. The plaintiff entered into the second lease on the same land, on different terms (as to term of the lease and rent) and admitted its subsistence.
  1. [15]
    The first lease and second lease cannot subsist together. Has the first lease extinguished? Mr Turner submitted that there is in the circumstances a deemed surrender of the first lease by reason of the execution of the second lease.
  1. [16]
    That view is supported by authority, at least in so far as the alteration of the term of the lease is concerned. It may not be so with respect merely to a variation of the rent. If the term is altered then the lessee’s interest in the land is converted into a different estate and the existing lease is deemed surrendered, as a matter of law.
  1. [17]
    In Jenkin R. Lewis & Son Ltd v Kerman [1971] 1 Ch 477, the Court of Appeal wrote at 496:

“It is not possible simply to convert the existing estate in the land into a different estate by adding more years to it, and even if the parties use words which indicate that this is what they wished to achieve the law will achieve the result at which they are aiming in the only way in which it can, namely by implying a fresh lease for the longer period and a surrender of the old lease.”

  1. [18]
    In 3 Oceans Line Company Pty Ltd v Heyshott Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 12 the court wrote, at paragraph 42:

“42 I accept that it is appropriate that leases should be regulated by the principles of the law of contract: The Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] 157 CLR 17, at 29 (Mason J). But that does not answer the plaintiff’s point. The authorities are summarised in Butt P, Land Law (6th ed, 2010) [15 243]:

The key issue is whether the variation would change the nature or extent of the tenant’s estate in the land, as distinct from merely changing the obligations of the covenants that ‘touch and concern’ the land and that are imprinted on that estate. For example, it is not possible to vary the term (duration) of a lease, whether by shortening or lengthening, without a surrender of the existing lease and a re-grant for the new duration, because it is not possible ‘simply to convert the existing estate in the land into a different estate by adding more years to it’ (or deducting years from it); if the parties attempt to do so, then the law will achieve the result they intend by implying a surrender of the existing lease and a grant of a new lease for the varied duration.”

  1. [19]
    It follows that any rights accruing to the plaintiff under the first lease were extinguished at its surrender. The continued registration of the first lease is of little moment in the circumstances. The rights of the plaintiff that remain are those that are contained in the second lease, which by Clause 16 it is agreed that the terms of the lease constitute the whole of the lease agreement between the plaintiff and CEC, to the exclusion of any other alleged rights, express or implied, not contained in the terms of the second lease. Relevantly, there is no allegation of fraud or other misconduct by or wrong committed by, CEC.
  1. [20]
    If it is correct to assert, as Mr Turner did, that the plaintiff’s claim is premised on ownership rights under the first lease, then must the claim fail?
  1. [21]
    Mr Moon had submitted that the interests and rights of the plaintiff subsisted in the circumstances where the right continued after the end of the lease. Whilst he did not have “much to say” on the contract issue, but referred to the affidavit of Mr Crawford (second defendants) at paragraph 34 where he deposed “on 5 October 2012 the second defendants sold the property to the first defendants under the contract”. His emphasis was on the expression “the second defendants”.
  1. (b)
    The Contract: an implied term in the First Lease?
  1. [22]
    The plaintiff’s pleading asserts that the second defendants sold the property and by reason of that there was a breach of an implied term preserving the ownership rights to the mango trees and the plant and equipment to the plaintiff.
  1. [23]
    The difficulty for the plaintiff is that the seller was CEC (CEC Group Limited) (receivers and managers appointed) ACN 010 025 831), not the second defendants, who were not parties to the contract of sale. Nor, for that matter, were the second defendants parties to the first lease.
  1. [24]
    Are the second defendants personally liable for any breach of an implied term of the first lease in circumstances where they were not parties to the first lease? Mr Turner submitted that such liability only arises in two situations: firstly, where the receivers and managers assume personal liability; and secondly under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 419 (liability for certain trading debts) and s 419A (property used, occupied or possessed by the company as a lessee). The second situation does not apply here.
  1. [25]
    In so far as the first situation is concerned, the question is whether the second defendants (as receivers and managers) assumed personal liability pursuant to the first lease, the latter being said to contain the implied term upon which the plaintiff relies in contact.
  1. [26]
    There must have been something done by the second defendants to demonstrate that they assumed personal responsibility or liability for the first lease and the term implied in the contract: ASIC v Letten & Ors (No 13) (2011) 86 ACSR 174, per Gordon J at [34]:

“… a receiver does not become liable on contracts made by the company prior to his or her appointment, unless the receiver acts to assume liability. Unless the receiver does something to demonstrate that he or she assumes personal liability, the receiver is free to complete a contract entered into by the company before the appointment without becoming personally liable on the contract (thereafter a number of case references were cited)”

  1. [27]
    In Re Diesels & Components Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 456, McPherson J wrote, at 459:

“What is meant by saying that a receiver has power to “adopt” a pre-receivership contract is that he may refrain from repudiating it. If he repudiates the contract he renders the Company liable in damages for the breach of contract involved and that repudiation. Because the chargee who appoints him has the benefit of a security over the assets of the Company, the consequences of rendering the Company liable in damages are in practice felt only by the Company and through it its unsecured creditors, and not by the holder of the charge. The Company’s indebtedness to the chargee will be met out of the assets in priority to the claims of unsecured creditors including the claim for damages of the other party to the broken contract. The receiver therefore can, with virtual impunity, repudiate pre-receivership contracts.”

  1. [28]
    There is no evidence (at least, the plaintiff has not pointed to any) that the second defendants did anything to demonstrate an assumption of personal liability for any alleged implied term in the first lease. If there was such an implied term as a matter of fact, and if it was breached, it was breached by CEC. The second defendants are not liable to the plaintiff for such breach.
  1. [29]
    Mr Moon submitted that there was an implied term in the lease that reserved the rights of the plaintiff in the property and that it should be so implied in terms of BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 16 ALR 363, the four conditions referred to by Lord Simon (at 376) being satisfied in this case, particularly the test of business efficacy.
  1. (c)
    Duty of Care?
  1. [30]
    This cause of action arises first, as a bare allegation, on the statement of claim, namely that the second defendants (as receivers and managers) owed a duty to ensure that on any sale of the land by CEC the purchasers would covenant to be bound by Clause 8 of the first lease; that the second defendants had knowledge of the first lease, particularly Clause 8 and the ownership of the plant and equipment by the plaintiff; and that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer loss of damage if the covenant was not obtained and secondly, upon the amendment in paragraph 21A in the amended statement of claim No 2 wherein a breach of the duty is alleged.
  1. [31]
    Mr Turner submitted that the “loss or damage” could only be economic loss; and that the alleged breaches were predicated on the fact of economic loss being “reasonably foreseeable.” However, a duty of care cannot be predicated on that alone: Tarangau Game Fishing Charters Pty Ltd v Eagle Yachts Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] QSC 16 at [108].
  1. [32]
    The existence of a duty of care depended on the plaintiff being unable to protect itself from the consequences of a defendant’s lack of reasonable care, leading to the economic loss, and not to mere vulnerability; and the assumption of the duty by a defendant and reliance by the plaintiff upon a defendant exercising reasonable care: Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515, at paragraphs 22 to 24:

“22. In Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge ‘Willemstad’ (1976)136 CLR 529 the Court held that there were circumstances in which damages for economic loss were recoverable. In Caltex Oil, cases for recovery of economic loss were seen as being exceptions to a general rule, said to have been established in Cattle v Stockton Water Works (1975) LR 10 QB 453, that even if the loss was foreseeable, damages are not recoverable for economic loss which was not consequential upon injury to personal property. In Caltex Oil, Stephen J isolated a number of salient features which combined to constitute a sufficiently close relationship to give rise to a duty of care owed to Caltex for breach of which it might recover its purely economic loss. (At 576-578). Chief among those features was the defendant’s knowledge that to damage the pipeline, was damage was inherently likely to produce economic loss.

  1. Since Caltex Oil and most notably in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 1989 CLR 180, the vulnerability of the plaintiff has emerged as an important requirement in cases where a duty of care to avoid economic loss has been held to have been owed. ‘Vulnerability’, in this context, is not to be understood as meaning only that the plaintiff was likely to suffer damage if reasonable care was not taken. Rather, “vulnerability” is to be understood as a reference to the plaintiff's inability to protect itself from the consequences of a defendant’s want or reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way which would case the consequences of loss on the defendant… So, in Peere, the plaintiff's could do nothing to protect themselves from the economic consequences to them of the defendant’s negligence in sowing a crop which caused the quarantining of the plaintiff's land.”
  1. [33]
    Mr Turner submitted that no material facts of the kind of allegation identified above have been pleaded, as they must be: Raging Thunder Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd & Anor [2012] QSC 329 at [100]:

“[100] … On its application for summary judgment, the issue is not whether the plaintiffs’ claim in negligence has poor prospects of success because, for example, they were not ‘vulnerable’ (in the sense discussed in the authorities in this legal context) to economic loss by the conduct (of the bank  and by their own conduct) … the issue is whether the plaintiffs have no real prospect of success on the basis of the facts pleaded by them, which include allegations of vulnerability, reliance and assumption of responsibility.”

  1. [34]
    Mr Turner also submitted that the legal relationship of receivers and managers to others are primarily to the appointed (the bank) and to a more limited extent to the company (CEC): Expo International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Chant [1979] 2 NSW LR 280. The legal relationship is well defined and to impose a duty such as posited by the plaintiff would be incompatible or inconsistent with that legal relationship.
  1. [35]
    Is there a case for breach of duty of care that has any realistic prospect of success?
  1. [36]
    In so far as the breach of duty was concerned, Mr Moon iterated that the plaintiff relied on the first lease. He referred to Mr Crawford’s affidavit and a letter exhibited thereto dated 30 September 2011 in which the following was stated:

“…we note that the Unregistered Arrangement document has not been dated, nor has the signature of the CEC Group’s director been witnessed. As such, the Unregistered Arrangement is not in effect and the Registered Lease remains in force.”

  1. [37]
    The import of that letter, as construed by the plaintiff, is that the second defendants were relying on the second lease as distinct from the first lease, at least by reference to the rights of CEC. Hence Mr Moon submitted that the second defendants had resiled from the second lease. If that were a matter of dispute, then it was an issue for trial.
  1. B.
    Summary Judgment, sought by the plaintiff against the first defendants.
  1. [38]
    Mr Moon submitted for the plaintiff:
  1. The plant and equipment were the plaintiff's property.
  1. The trees were not included in the sale.
  1. The claim is for a mandatory injunction for return of the plant and equipment, not a money claim.
  1. The issue about “fixtures” was a matter for trial.
  1. [39]
    Mr Tucker submitted for the first defendants:
  1. The first lease was extinguished. Only equitable rights remained.
  1. The first defendant had a registered legal interest. There was no fraud alleged against the first defendant.
  1. The mango trees and plant and equipment were fixtures to the land.

Discussion

  1. [40]
    Mr Moon submitted that the irrigation system was the property of the plaintiff. The mango trees were not included in the sale. He submitted that whilst the first defendants depose in affidavit material that they have spent money on the property and that the irrigation system are fixtures and therefore there is no trialable issue, the claim is for a mandatory injunction and the return of the plant and equipment and is not a money claim.
  1. [41]
    Mr Tucker submitted that in the first defendant’s defence, it is alleged that the first lease was cancelled and the cancellation was registered, on or after 29 June 2012; and that the irrigation system formed part of the fixtures to the real property.
  1. [42]
    Mr Tucker adopted the submissions about contract that had been made by Mr Turner for the second defendant. He asserted that the first defendants had a proprietary right in the form of a registered legal interest in the land and that no fraud had been alleged against them. With respect to a purchaser who becomes a registered proprietor of land even with notice, see Bli Bli No 1 Pty Ltd v Kimlin Investments Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 289 at [19]:

“Thus, it is clear that the plaintiffs are required to demonstrate something more than mere notice of their interest in order to impugn the indefeasibility of the third defendant’s title. For example, the cases draw a distinction between cases of mere knowledge and instances where a registered proprietor is implicated in the fraud. In the latter circumstance the registered owner will not obtain the benefit of indefeasibility.”

  1. [43]
    See also Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] (1987) 164 CLR 613 and 604 at 613; and Friedman v Barrett, ex parte Friedman (1962) Qd R 498, with respect to indefeasibility of title.
  1. [44]
    Mr Tucker raised the issue of jurisdiction. In reply Mr Moon sought leave to amend the claim with respect to jurisdiction (the amount of the claim) and to forfeit any balance beyond the jurisdiction.
  1. [45]
    In my view there is no legal basis upon which summary judgement could be given on this application.
  1. [46]
    Insofar as the plaintiff’s defence is concerned, I do not consider that the plaintiff has made out any case to warrant a striking out of the pleading or any part of it, pursuant to rule 171.
  1. C.
    Application by the plaintiff for leave to amend the claim and statement of claim, and to plead conversion, as against the second defendant.
  1. [47]
    Mr Moon sought leave to amend the pleadings and also to allege a claim of conversion.
  1. [48]
    Mr Turner submitted that if amendments and the additional cause of action were relevant after the other issues were determined on the applications, the second defendant had no objection to leave being granted.
  1. (a)
    A cause of action in Conversion?

Submissions

  1. [49]
    Mr Moon submitted that the second defendants had possession of the land, sold it and did nothing to protect the rights of the plaintiff. He submitted that the issue of “fixtures” was a factual issue and a matter for trial.
  1. [50]
    Mr Turner submitted that the land was sold by the company and included the fixtures. The plaintiff’s rights were subordinate to the rights of the bank under the charge. The amended statement of claim (No 2) in paragraph 17B referred to the second defendants as having sold the plant and equipment. He referred to contractual rights not binding receivers and managers. He submitted that the disputed property (plant and equipment) were fixtures: Bank of Melbourne Ltd v CBFC Leasing Pty Ltd [1991] ANZ ConvR 561 at p 564. He submitted that the onus of proof regarding “fixtures” rested with the plaintiff: APA v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700 at 712:

“A fixture is a thing once a chattel which has become in law land through having been fixed to the land. The question whether a chattel has become a fixture depends upon whether it has been fixed to land, and if so for what purpose. If a chattel is actually fixed to land to any extent, by any means other than its own weight then prima facie it is a fixture; and the burden of proof is upon anyone who asserts that it is not: if it is not otherwise fixed but kept in position by its own weight, then prima facie it is not a fixture; and the burden  of proof is on anyone who asserts that it is “: Holland v Hodgson L.R. 7 C.P.328 at 335.

Discussion

  1. (a)
    The irrigation system: a fixture?
  1. [51]
    I refer to affidavits for the limited purpose of describing the irrigation system.
  1. [52]
    One of the first defendants, Mrs Sacilotto, in an affidavit filed on 21 March 2013, described the “plant and equipment” in the following terms:

“4. There is installed on the property an Irrigation System (the irrigation system) which comprises:

  1. (a)
    sub-mains, which are buried approximately 600mm underground;
  2. (b)
    19mm lateral poly vinyl chloride (“poly”) pipes (“Laterals”), which are mostly (90-95%) buried underground, and which are connected to the sub-mains together with flushing valves;
  3. (c)
    4mm tubing which is connected to the Laterals; and
  4. (d)
    Sprinklers, attached to sprinkler stakes which are driven into the ground, running off the 4mm tubing.
  1. There is approximately 144 kilometres of 19mm poly pipes in the Irrigation System.

……

  1. The Irrigation System is set up so that:
  1. (a)
    the system for each irrigation block can be operated separately;
  2. (b)
    it provides irrigation to all of the mango trees;
  3. (c)
    it is not a mobile system, such that the system can be readily moved from one location to another to provide irrigation over separate areas.”
  1. [53]
    A director of the plaintiff, Mrs Piccone, in an affidavit filed on 21 February 2013, deposed the following:

“16. I believe the sprinklers and flushing valves and laterals can be removed from the real property without damage to the real property. I say that the sprinklers and flushing valves and laterals are not fixtures.”

  1. [54]
    I agree with Mr Turner’s submission that the latter deposition was merely her “belief”, not a statement of fact. It is a subjective matter and is an irrelevant consideration. There does not appear to be any evidence (that is, facts) to contradict the assertions of Mrs Sacilotto in her affidavit.
  1. [55]
    In so far as any statement of belief about something being a “fixture” is concerned, the courts will not consider any oral or written expression of intention by the party affixing the chattel to the freehold as to the object and purpose in so doing. In Reid v Smith (1905) 3 CLR 656, Griffith CJ at p 657 wrote:

“The intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold, this intention to be inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation (in regard to the freehold) of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose and use of which the annexation has been made is a controlling circumstance in determining whether the structure is to be regarded as a fixture or not.”

  1. [56]
    In other words, intention is to be inferred from the outward circumstances, whether or not they may reflect the actual intention of the party affixing the article to the freehold land.
  1. [57]
    The general rule at common law is that anything that is annexed to the soil either directly, or indirectly by being attached to a building, becomes part of the freehold land. The mere attaching of a chattel to the freehold will not necessarily cause it to lose its character of a chattel and become part of the freehold. Each case depends on its own circumstances. It is a matter of intention: that is, the degree of annexation and the object of annexation: Kay’s Leasing (supra).
  1. [58]
    In Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (supra), Jordan J wrote:

“A fixture is a thing once a chattel which has become in law land through having been fixed to land. The question whether a chattel has become a fixture depends upon whether it has been fixed to the land, and if so for what purpose. If a chattel is actually fixed to land to any extent, by any means other than its own weight, then prima facie it is a fixture; and the burden of proof is upon anyone who asserts that it is not. If it is not otherwise fixed but is kept in position by its own weight then prima facie it is not a fixture; and the burden of proof is on anyone who asserts that it is: Holland v Hodgson (1938) 38 SR(NSW) 700 at 712).”

  1. [59]
    The description of the irrigation system is such that it is inconceivable that it or any part of it could be removed without causing significant damage to both the components of the irrigation system and to the land and perhaps to the mango trees. There is no evidence on behalf of the plaintiff either with respect to the objective test as to the purpose of the affixation of the irrigation system to the land or the manner in which any part of the irrigation system could be removed, if the proper descriptor of its components is that they are chattels, without causing damage. The state of belief of the plaintiff is a subjective matter and is an irrelevant consideration. There is simply no evidence about the material matters for consideration as to whether an article is a fixture or not. As the plaintiff's case is presently pleaded the second defendants’ assertions as a matter of law are not contradicted. It is questionable whether, even if the plaintiff were to have an opportunity to plead further to this issue, there could be any rational and objective assertion to discharge the onus of proof that the plaintiff has in establishing that the plant and equipment – the irrigation system – is anything other than a fixture.
  1. [60]
    In Sanwa Australia Leasing Ltd v National Westminster Finance Australia Ltd (unreported) SCNSW, 02.11.88 BC 8801368, Powell J at 23 wrote with respect to an irrigation system case:

“…where as here, plant and machinery is either sunk into, or firmly affixed to, the subject land, apparently with a view to its becoming part of a fixed irrigation system, which system was apparently intended to be used indefinitely, the contractual reservation of title… [is] not enough to prevent the plant and machinery becoming fixtures.”

  1. [61]
    In Melluish v B.M.I (No 3) Ltd [1996] at page 415

“The equipment in these cases was attached to the land in such a manner that, to all outward appearance, it formed part of the land and was intended so to do. Such fixtures are, in law, owned by the owner of the land. It was suggested in argument that this result did not follow if it could be demonstrated that, as between the owner of the land and the person affixing the chattel to it, it was a common intention that the chattel should not belong to the owner of the land.”

  1. [62]
    Lord Browne-Wilkinson however referred to Hobson v Gorringe [1987] 1 Ch. 182 and said:
  1. [63]
    “That case… demonstrates that the intention of the parties as to the ownership of the chattel fixed to the land is only material so far as such intention can be presumed from the degree and object of the annexation. The terms expressly or implicitly agreed between the fixture of the chattel and the owner of the land cannot affect the determination of the question whether, in law, the chattel has become a fixture and therefore in law belongs to the owner of the soil … such agreement cannot prevent the chattel, once fixed, becoming in law part of the land and as such owned by the owner of the land so long as it remains fixed.”
  1. [64]
    In Litz v National Australia Bank (1986) Q Conv R 54-229, the court held:

“1. The question whether a chattel has been sufficiently annexed to become part of the freehold is commonly said to depend mainly on two circumstances as indicating the intention, namely the degree of annexation and the object of the annexation; and

  1. Concrete tanks, steel tank, fertilizer pump, steel mixing tank, irrigation system and electric lift pump were fixtures. A silo and electric motor were not fixtures.”
  1. [65]
    In Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534, the circumstances involved the status of a jetty and slipway which were defined as “improvements” in a contract, and the obligation upon the party having the benefit of the use of the improvements not to construct, erect or undertake take them and not to demolish, destroy or remove them, without consent, in the context of the person in whom the benefit resided having a right within a period of 3 months after the termination of the licence to remove, at its expense the improvements, from the premises. The court considered the legal status of the structures:

“53. The jetty and the slipway, as they existed when the licence was granted, had been in place for some time. The evidence does not enable me to say how long the slipway has existed, although there is a surveyor’s notation “50 years” on the slipway on one recent survey plan in evidence. Nor is there any evidence of who placed the slipway in the position it occupied when the licence was granted, although there is evidence that the plaintiff has carried out work on it since 1998 and … a previous owner of the plaintiff’s property did likewise.”

  1. 54.
    There is no evidence from anyone involved in the placement of the jetty and the slipway as to intentions when they were constructed. There is accordingly no explicit evidence of any intention that they were to remain in place indefinitely. Because of the absence of evidence pointing towards any other conclusion, it must be inferred that those who constructed the jetty and the slipway in the first place did so with the intention that each should remain in place indefinitely. The inference is warranted by the nature of each item. If the jetty were taken away, it would lose its identity and utility and become two bearers carrying floorboards, plus two loose piers dredged up from the river bed. Those materials might be used for some other purpose elsewhere. They might even be used again as a jetty if some place could be found where the riverbank configuration and the depth of the water happened to match those at the present location but generally speaking, someone who sinks piers, lays down bearers and attaches floorboards to form a jetty must be presumed to do so without any intention or expectation of later taking them up and making them into a jetty (or anything else) elsewhere.
  1. 55.
    The same analysis applies with even greater force to the slipway which is a solid concrete ramp embedded in the soil of the riverbank and the riverbank. Whoever placed it there must have intended that it would remain indefinitely. If removed, it would be no more than useless rubble.”
  1. [66]
    With respect to the mango trees, and whether the trees are part of the land or are severable, see Seas Sapfor Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (SA) 97 ATO 4535 at 4540.
  1. (b)
    Is there an equitable interest?
  1. [67]
    Does the plaintiff have any equitable interest, with respect to the plant and equipment, in that part of the land in which the fixtures are situated, concurrently with the legal estate of the proprietor of the land? It could be so, depending upon the circumstances in this case: see Kay’s Leasing (supra) at 436-438.
  1. [68]
    Clause 8 has a temporal restriction, namely that it provides that the irrigation system must be removed within six months of the expiry of the lease. Hence the right is more in the nature of a contractual right as opposed to a proprietary interest: See Georgeski (supra).
  1. [69]
    Even if the plaintiff had such a contractual right under Clause 8, a receiver is not bound by that contractual right and could disregard it. The plaintiff may have a contractual right against CEC but it is not enforceable against the second defendants.
  1. [70]
    In fact the second lease was determined when the plaintiff vacated the property and CEC (through the receiver and manager) entered into possession: Wood Factory Pty Ltd v Kiritos Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 105.
  1. [71]
    In any event, the irrigation system became part of the property at the time that the plaintiff acquired the property. The property was subject to a charge in favour of the bank. The bank’s equitable interest arising from the charge pre-dated any equitable interest that the plaintiff can claim pursuant to Clause 8 of either the first lease or the second lease. The rights of the bank pursuant to the charge, because it was fixed, arose when the charge was taken. It became fixed upon the acquisition of the property.
  1. [72]
    Arguably, the second defendants were entitled to prefer the equitable property interest of the bank and over any interest that the plaintiff may have acquired or been left with: Lake Eeree Pty Ltd v Flair Realty Pty Ltd (unreported) FCSCQ, McPherson JA, 11.02.92, BC 9202405).
  1. [73]
    The plaintiff relies on the first lease. It was surrendered as a matter of law. The plaintiff’s proprietary rights could then only have subsisted under the second lease. The bank did not consent to the second lease. The second lease was later in time and the first lease was determined by its surrender of the lease. The bank’s interest vested first in time and has priority over any equitable interest that the plaintiff may claim pursuant to Clause 8 of the second lease, even if indeed the plaintiff sought to rely on the second lease, which it does not.

Summary Judgment

  1. [74]
    The law in about summary judgment whether sought by a plaintiff or by a defendant, is now well settled by authority. The same test in an application by a plaintiff for summary judgment against a defendant applies to an application by a defendant for summary judgment against a plaintiff.
  1. [75]
    Rule 293 UCPR provides as follows:

“r 293 Summary judgment for defendant

  1. (1)
    A defendant may, at any time after filing a notice of intention to defend, apply to the court under this part for judgment against the plaintiff.
  1. (2)
    If the court is satisfied -
  1. (a)
    the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on all or a part of the plaintiff’s claim; and
  1. (b)
    there is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim;

the court may give judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for all or the part of the plaintiff’s claim and may make any other order the court considers appropriate.”

  1. [76]
    The relevant principle (as it applies to a defendant’s application) is stated in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232, at [17] and [44]: whether the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on all or a part of the plaintiff’s claim; and there is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim.
  1. [77]
    In Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v JK Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd (2009) 2 Qd R 202, Chesterman JA wrote, at [24]:

“In practical terms I suspect the rule means that summary judgment should not be given where the fact upon which the parties’ respective rights depend are disputed, or where the respondent to the application for summary judgment adduces evidence as to the existence of fact which, if proved, would establish a defence or a right to relief. In other words, it is only where all the facts are known and/or are established beyond controversy that the court should embark upon determining whether to give summary judgment. Where relevant facts are controverted, or where it appears that facts may exist which would affect a right of action or defence, there should be a trial to determine the facts.”

  1. [78]
    Holmes JA wrote of the “finer shades of meaning” in the difference of view from his Honour that her Honour held about the test, but wrote at [1] that:

“… a claim (or defence) which has ‘no real prospect of succeeding’ … implies, to me at least, a conclusion reached after a hard-headed assessment, rejecting spurious arguments…”

  1. [79]
    In General Steel Industries Inc v Commisioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125, Barwick CJ wrote at page 130:

“…But once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether of fact or law and that the rights of the parties depend upon it, then it is not competent for the court to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process. Although I can agree with Latham CJ in the same case when he said that the defendant should be saved from the vexation of the continuance of useless and futile proceedings … in my opinion great care must be exercised to ensure that under the guise of achieving expeditious finality a plaintiff is not improperly deprived of his opportunity for the trial of his case by the appointed tribunal. On the other hand, I do not think that the exercise of the jurisdiction should be reserved for those cases where argument is unnecessary to evoke the futility of the plaintiff's claim. Argument, perhaps even of an extensive kind, may be necessary to demonstrate that the case of the plaintiff is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.”

  1. [80]
    In Chidgey v Wellner & Anor [2006] QDC 400, the court wrote:

“[19] On an application under r 292, the plaintiff carries the onus of showing that the requirements of the rule have been met. Commonly, a defendant seeking to resist an application for summary judgment will file affidavit material on the basis of which it is sought to show that the requirement of the rules are not met, but it is not necessary to do so. In principle, a defendant may be able to show that the requirements of the rule are not met, or simply that the plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus under r 292 by reference to the pleadings and the material filed in support of the application on behalf of the plaintiff. The fact that there is no affidavit on behalf of the appellant was not necessarily fatal to success before the magistrate, or on appeal from the magistrate’s order.

  1. [20]
    Furthermore on an application under r 292 a defendant is not confined to defences arising on the existing pleading. That rule is directed to the apparent outcome at any future trial, and in its application must bear in mind that under the rules pleadings can be amended prior to, and indeed in some cases even during, a trial. Accordingly, what is important for that rule is not whether the defendant has pleaded any ground which has a real prospect of succeeding, but whether a defendant really has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim.”
  1. [81]
    The question is whether there is there in this case a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of the plaintiffs succeeding on all or a part of their claim, in the circumstances such as I have described?
  1. [82]
    The philosophy of the UCPR: the determination of the applications should reflect, in an holistic sense, the overriding philosophy of the UCPR as expressed in r 5, which provides as follows:

“r 5 Philosophy – Overriding obligations of parties and courts

  1. (1)
    the purpose of these rules is to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense.
  1. (2)
    Accordingly, these rules are to be applied by the courts with the objective of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality in facilitating the purpose of these rules.
  1. (3)
    In a proceeding in a court, a party impliedly undertakes to the court and to the other parties to proceed in an expeditious way.”
  1. [83]
    There is much in this case that favours an expeditious resolution of the proceeding. Summary judgment for the plaintiff is one means of so doing. However the question is whether it would be just so to do.

Conclusion

  1. [84]
    Despite the compelling case submitted by Mr Turner for the second defendants and my view that the irrigation system cannot be other than a fixture (as is the case with the trees, if that remains in contention), the plaintiff nevertheless should have the opportunity to re-plead its case. I have given this matter the ‘hard-headed’ assessment that her Honour referred to in Bolton Properties. However, I am not convinced – save for my view about the fixtures issue – that there are no uncontroverted facts and circumstances in this proceeding. It follows that I will give leave to the plaintiff to amend its pleading and to allege the further cause of action in conversion against the second defendant.
  1. [85]
    With respect to the plaintiff’s application against the first defendant, there is no basis, as I have observed, for either summary judgment or for the defence of the first defendant to be struck out. The applications will be refused.

Costs

  1. [86]
    I will hear further submissions from the parties as to costs.

Orders

  1. The second defendant’s application for summary judgment against the plaintiff is refused.
  2. The second defendant’s application to strike out parts of the plaintiff’s statement of claim is granted.
  3. The plaintiff’s application for summary judgment against the first defendant is refused.
  4. The plaintiff’s application to strike out the defence of the first defendant is refused.
  5. The plaintiff’s application for leave to amend nunc pro tunc it’s statement of claim and to add against the second defendant acclaim in conversion is granted.
  6. The plaintiff has leave to amend its statement of claim, to be filed and served within 14 days of this order.
  7. I will hear the parties further as to costs.
Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Manbulloo Limited v Sacilotto & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Manbulloo Limited v Sacilotto

  • MNC:

    [2013] QDC 243

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Durward DCJ

  • Date:

    01 Oct 2013

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
ASIC v Letten & Ors (No 13) (2011) 86 ACSR 174
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 86 ACSR 174
Cite 2 - (2011) 86 ACSR 174
Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700
Cite 2 - (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700
Cite 3 - (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700
Cite 4 - (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700
Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] (1987) 164 CLR 613
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1987) 164 CLR 613
Cite 2 - (1987) 164 CLR 613
Bank of Melbourne Ltd v CBFC Leasing Pty Ltd [1991] ANZ ConvR 561
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1991] ANZ ConvR 561
Cite 2 - [1991] ANZ ConvR 561
Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2012) 246 CLR 258
Bli Bli #1 Pty Ltd v Kimlin Investments Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 289
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QSC 289
Cite 2 - [2008] QSC 289
Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v J K Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd[2009] 2 Qd R 202; [2009] QCA 135
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] 2 Qd R 202
Cite 2 - [2009] 2 Qd R 202
Cite 3 - [2009] 2 Qd R 202
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 16 ALR 363
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1977) 16 ALR 363
Cite 2 - (1977) 16 ALR 363
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge "Willemstad" (1976) 136 CLR 529
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1976) 136 CLR 529
Cite 2 - (1976) 136 CLR 529
Catten v Stockton Water Works (1975) LR 10 QB 453
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1975) LR 10 QB 453
Cite 2 - (1975) LR 10 QB 453
Chidgey v Wellner [2006] QDC 400
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] QDC 400
Cite 2 - [2006] QDC 400
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo[2005] 2 Qd R 232; [2005] QCA 227
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] 2 Qd R 232
Cite 2 - [2005] 2 Qd R 232
Expo International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Chant [1979] 2 NSW LR 280
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1979] 2 NSW LR 280
Cite 2 - [1979] 2 NSW LR 280
Fortuna Seafoods Pty Ltd v The Ship "Eternal Wind"[2008] 1 Qd R 429; [2005] QCA 405
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] 1 Qd R 429
Friedman v Barrett; ex parte Friedman [1962] Qd R 498
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1962] Qd R 498
Cite 2 - [1962] Qd R 498
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
Cite 2 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
Georgeski v Owners Corporation SP49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 62 NSWLR 534
Cite 2 - (2004) 62 NSWLR 534
Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 188 CLR 159
Hobson v Gorringe [1987] 1 Ch 182
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1987] 1 Ch 182
Cite 2 - [1987] 1 Ch 182
Jenkin R. Lewis & Son Ltd v Kerman [1971] 1 Ch 477
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1971] 1 Ch 477
Cite 2 - [1971] 1 Ch 477
Kay's Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v C.S.R. Provident Fund Nominees Pty Ltd (1962) VR 429
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1962) VR 429
Cite 2 - (1962) VR 429
Litz v National Australia Bank (1986) Q Conv R 54-229
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) Q Conv R 54-229
Cite 2 - (1986) Q Conv R 54-229
McFarlane v Daniel (1934) 34 S.R. (N.S.W) 67
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1934) 34 S.R. (N.S.W) 67
Melluish v BMI (No 3) Ltd [1996] AC 454
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1996] AC 454
Oceans Line Company Pty Ltd v Heyshott Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 39
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] WASC 39
Oceans Line Company Pty Ltd v Heyshott Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 12
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] WASC 12
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 1989 CLR 180
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 1989 CLR 180
Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 17
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 157 CLR 17
Cite 2 - (1985) 157 CLR 17
Raging Thunder Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2012] QSC 329
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QSC 329
Cite 2 - [2012] QSC 329
Re Diesels & Components Pty Ltd[1985] 2 Qd R 456; [1985] QSC 196
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1985] 2 Qd R 456
Cite 2 - [1985] 2 Qd R 456
Reid v Smith (1905) 3 CLR 656
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1905) 3 CLR 656
Cite 2 - (1905) 3 CLR 656
Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 207 CLR 562
Tarangau Game Fishing Charters Pty Ltd v Eagle Yachts Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 16
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QSC 16
Cite 2 - [2013] QSC 16
Wood Factory Pty Ltd v Kiritos Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 105
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 2 NSWLR 105
Cite 2 - (1985) 2 NSWLR 105
Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 216 CLR 515
Cite 2 - (2004) 216 CLR 515

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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