Jackson v Bishop[2013] QDC 279

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   Mr Jackson was no stranger to abuse and threats. He encountered them often enough in his job. As the manager of Radio Rentals in Mackay, Mr Jackson frequently visited defaulting renters to discuss payments or to repossess goods. Some hostility was to be expected.
2. [2]
   On 30 November 2010, it was Ms Reays he visited to discuss payments for her rental fridge. There he encountered the second defendant, Peter Bishop. Discussions became heated. Mr Bishop made threats. Ms Reay told Mr Jackson to take the fridge. He returned to his car to move it into position to load the fridge. This is when matters started to take a turn for the worse.
3. [3]
   Mr Bishop let some air out of one of Mr Jackson’s tyres. Mr Jackson became concerned about this strange behaviour and rang the office to ask for assistance. He then moved his vehicle to a position across the bottom of the driveway to the house, partially, but not completely, blocking the path.
4. [4]
   Mr Bishop and Ms Reay got into their vehicle and their hostility towards Mr Jackson quickly escalated in a way he had not anticipated. Mr Bishop started to rev the engine loudly. He reversed the vehicle down the driveway at speed and collided with Mr Jackson’s. Mr Bishop and Ms Reays then tried to force their way into Mr Jackson’s car. He held them off; trying to start his car. Before he could leave, Mr Bishop smashed the windscreen with a brick.
5. [5]
   Later, Mr Jackson was diagnosed with a whiplash injury and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
6. [6]
   By and large, the facts are agreed. These proceedings involve the unusual circumstance that Mr Jackson’s claim is for damages arising from Mr Bishop’s driving and the collision between the two vehicles. AAI Limited, the insurer of the motor vehicle driven by Mr Bishop, admits his responsibility for the collision. While neither the whiplash nor the diagnosis of PTSD is in dispute, AAI denies liability to compensate for the PTSD, which, it argues, is the result of abuse, threats and attempted assaults by Mr Bishop and Ms Reay. Whether it is liable for the PTSD will affect the quantum of any general damages awarded to Mr Jackson for personal injuries.
7. [7]
   Regardless of what injuries it is liable for, AAI contests the claims for economic loss. Mr Jackson's claim for past economic loss includes an amount referable to a bonus he says he missed out on. AAI argues that claim has not been made out. As for future economic loss, AAI says the whiplash injury has resolved and the PTSD has not prevented Mr Jackson from working in the past.
8. [8]
   The issues are:

   1. Is AAI Limited liable to compensate for the PTSD? and
   2. What damages should be awarded to Mr Jackson?

1.) Is AAI liable to compensate for the PTSD?

a.) The scope of AAI’s liability

9. [9]
   Mr Jackson might have brought claims for damages on a number of bases. He could have proceeded against Mr Bishop and Ms Reays for injuries arising from their conduct towards him. He might also have made a claim against his employer for failing to fulfil its duty of care to him. However, his claim is confined to personal injury caused by, through or in connection with a motor vehicle.
10. [10]
    AAI’s involvement as a defendant to the proceedings, then, arises from Mr Jackson’s allegation that he sustained personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident.^[1] The scope of its liability is determined by the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 which relevantly provides at s 5:

5. Application of this Act

1. (1)
   This Act applies to a personal injury caused by, through or in connection with a motor vehicle if and only if the injury –

1. (a)
   is the result of –

1. (i)
   the driving of the motor vehicle; or

1. (ii)
   a collision… with the motor vehicle; … and

1. (b)
   is caused wholly or partly by a wrongful act or omission in respect of the motor vehicle by a person other than the injured person.

…

11. [11]
    There is no dispute the whiplash injury was caused by Mr Bishop’s driving into Mr Jackson’s vehicle.
12. [12]
    Although the Statement of Claim alleges events that occurred before and after Mr Bishop drove the vehicle, at the hearing, counsel for Mr Jackson confirmed the claim was confined to Mr Bishop’s driving of the motor vehicle and the resulting collision.^[2] A claim on that basis satisfies the requirement that there is a discernible and rational link between the liability and the particular vehicle against which the claim is brought.^[3] Counsel for AAI properly conceded it is liable to compensate for the PTSD if it was caused by Mr Bishop’s driving of the motor vehicle, from the time he commenced to rev the engine to the point his vehicle collided with Mr Jackson’s.^[4]
13. [13]
    The difference between the parties arises from the evidence from the psychiatrists engaged by the parties that suggested there were multiple stressors in the events that day which could have caused the condition. Dr Likely, engaged by Mr Jackson, could not separate out a single cause of the PTSD, seeing the cause as the events as a whole. Dr Oelrichs, whom AAI engaged, expressed an opinion, in a written report, that the PTSD was referrable to the threats, abuse and attempted assaults, not the manner in which the car was driven or the collision.
14. [14]
    Even if I decided the driving and collision was a material cause of the injury, counsel for AAI argued that it would only be liable if I was satisfied that the totality of Mr Jackson’s damage (the PTSD) flowed from the driving of the motor vehicle. Counsel for Mr Jackson argued the proper test was whether the driving of the vehicle and the collision was a material cause of that injury.

b.) The test for causation

15. [15]
    Before examining the evidence relevant to causation, it is necessary to identify the legal test to be applied. There is a statutory test of causation set out in the Civil Liability Act 2003 ss 11 & 12. Counsel for AAI conceded the Civil Liability Act 2003 is excluded for the purpose of assessing damages, because Mr Jackson was in the course of his employment at the time of the incident.^[5] Although the same concession was not stated in relation to the question of liability, that surely follows.
16. [16]
    The Civil Liability Act 2003 s 5 relevantly provides:

5. Civil liability excluded from Act

1. (1)
   This Act does not apply in relation to deciding liability or awards of damages for personal injury if the harm resulting from the breach of duty is or includes –

…

1. (b)
   an injury for which compensation is payable under the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003…

…

1. (2)
   For subsection (1)…(b), the following is immaterial-

1. (a)
   whether compensation for the injury is actually claimed under the relevant Workers’ Compensation Act;

1. (b)
   whether the entitlement to seek damages for the injury is regulated under that Act.

…

(emphasis added)

17. [17]
    Accordingly, both liability and the quantum of damages are to be determined in this case by applying common law principles.
18. [18]
    Counsel for AAI contended causation will be established only if the claimant can prove that only one cause is responsible for the loss.^[6] In his written submissions, that assertion was presented to flow from a passage cited from the judgment of Crennan J in Tabet v Gett.^[7]
19. [19]
    That case dealt with a claim against the plaintiff’s doctor for negligence in failing to detect a cancer which led to irreversible brain damage. The plaintiff sought to recover damages on the basis that the doctor’s negligence resulted in the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome. The specific passage cited by counsel says nothing about the test of causation, generally. It merely observes that the plaintiff had failed to prove the respondent’s negligence caused or contributed to cause damage. Given the alternative formulation of cause or contributed to cause, it is not clear how it is relied upon to support counsel’s assertion there must be a sole cause of the loss.
20. [20]
    Counsel for Mr Jackson urged the court to apply the test as expressed in March v Stramare^[8] by Mason CJ:

“span>…the law’s recognition that concurrent or successive tortious acts may each amount to a cause of the injuries sustained by a plaintiff is reflected in the proposition that it is for the plaintiff to establish that his or her injuries are “caused or materially contributed to” by the defendant’s wrongful conduct … Generally speaking, that causal connection is established if it appears that the plaintiff would not have sustained his or her injuries had the defendant not been negligent… But… it is often extremely difficult to demonstrate what would have happened in the absence of the defendant’s negligent conduct.

Causation as a question of fact

The common law tradition is that what was the cause of a particular occurrence is a question of fact which “must be determined by applying common sense to the facts of each particular case”, in the words of Lord Reid...”^[9]

21. [21]
    The test in March v Stramare, was followed in the High Court decision of Chappel v Hart^[10] and applied in Queensland by Thomas JA in Batiste v State of Queensland.^[11]
22. [22]
    In his preliminary submissions, counsel for AAI argued the test in March v Stramare has since been modified by the unanimous High Court decision of Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis.^[12] That case related to a man who died from lung cancer, who had been exposed to asbestos fibres by two different employers and who had smoked a large quantity of tobacco on a daily basis. The passage relied upon by counsel to suggest the test in March v Stramare has been modified (at [70 of the reasons) merely restated a conclusion explained earlier in the reasons that the evidence had fallen short of establishing causation. I could find no reference to the reasoning in March v Stramare, let alone any indication that the High Court intended to depart from it.
23. [23]
    The following passage indicates the test applied by the court was consistent with the reasoning in March v Stramare and turned upon the findings open on the evidence led at trial:

It was not shown to be more probable than not that asbestos was a cause of (a necessary condition for) his cancer. It was not shown that exposure to asbestos made a material contribution to his cancer. Material contribution was not shown because a connection between Mr Cotton’s inhaling asbestos and his developing cancer was not demonstrated.^[13]

24. [24]
    The other case relied upon by counsel for AAI to persuade me that the test in March v Stramare could not apply was Strong v Woolworths.^[14] That case interpreted the statutory test for causation provided by the NSW equivalent of the Civil Liability Act.^[15] Accepting, without considering the point, that it does mark a departure from the reasoning in March v Stramare,^[16] it relates to a statutory formulation of causation that does not apply to this case.
25. [25]
    In Coley v Nominal Defendant^[17], the Court of Appeal adopted the test in March v Stramare in interpreting s 5 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act. In Coley, a driver of a vehicle claimed damages for burns, smoke inhalation and shock sustained when a Molotov cocktail was thrown into his car by a person in an overtaking vehicle. The claim had been partly struck out below.
26. [26]
    McMurdo P, with whom Jerrard JA agreed, considered the phrase as a result of in s 5(1) means caused by.^[18] She reasoned that phrase supported the March v Stramare concept of causation and identified other phrases, including “the sole result of”, which she said might have been used had the legislature intended to further restrict the meaning of the phrase as a result of.^[19] She said the fact that the throwing of the Molotov cocktail was a cause of the injuries would not necessarily preclude a finding that the manner of driving was an additional cause, in a common sense way, of the injuries.^[20]
27. [27]
    Counsel for AAI argued this case could be distinguished on its facts, because here there was a slight temporal break between the driving and the incident which AAI says caused the PTSD, i.e. the smashing of the brick into the window. I am not persuaded there was an intervening act sufficient to break the chain of causation. In any case, the factual distinction between this case and Coley does not bear upon her Honour’s interpretation of the meaning of s 5 and the test of causation to be used when applying the section.
28. [28]
    Applying that test to this case, the question is whether Mr Bishop’s driving of the motor vehicle and the collision was, in a common sense way, a cause of the PTSD. A finding that the events before and after the driving and collision might be an additional cause of the PTSD, would not mean that causation has not been established.

c.) The events and Mr Jackson’s state of mind

29. [29]
    A brief summary of the events is set out in the opening passages of these reasons. The only factual disputes about what occurred are:

• the distance Mr Bishop’s car travelled before striking Mr Jackson’s vehicle; and
• the speed at which Mr Bishop’s car travelled; and
• the extent of the force of the collision between the vehicles.

30. [30]
    Although those matters were not admitted, the only evidence led about them came from Mr Jackson. There is no reason to reject his evidence:

• that the vehicle travelled about 8 to 10 metres;^[21]
• that it seemed to Mr Jackson to be travelling as fast as it could go from that distance, although he could say no more than the speed was quick;^[22] and
• that the force of the impact was sufficient to shatter the passenger side rear window (which was the side on which the collision occurred) and to move or rock the car so the left hand tyre came off the ground.^[23]

31. [31]
    Those findings have little bearing on the outcome, because counsel for AAI expressly conceded that the manner in which Mr Bishop drove the car, including the way in which he revved the engine, would have been frightening.
32. [32]
    However, there is also a dispute about Mr Jackson’s state of mind which bears upon the question of causation of the PTSD. That condition is a disorder which arises as a response to a person being involved in or witnessing a traumatic event or incident where they felt at risk of life or limb.^[24]
33. [33]
    Counsel for AAI argued that Mr Jackson did not feel at risk of life or limb until after the collision, when Mr Bishop and Ms Reay tried to get into his car. He argued that Mr Jackson’s evidence that he became fearful for his life or safety once Mr Bishop started to rev the engine, was a reconstruction which I should reject. Before considering that submission, I will briefly refer to Mr Jackson’s evidence about his state of mind at various times during the incident.
34. [34]
    He said he did not feel threatened when Mr Bishop first started to yell at him and threaten him.^[25] As he returned to his vehicle to move it to load the fridge he started to feel nervous, but Mr Bishop’s threats did not cause him to quicken his pace. He did call the office to send someone to assist or for them to call the police when Mr Bishop started to get a bit full on.^[26] When Mr Bishop let down one of his tyres, he was a bit more concerned, because it just didn’t seem normal; it was a strange thing to do.^[27] However, once Mr Bishop started revving his engine, he felt he needed to move his car immediately to get out of the road.^[28] He also said:

“……………---I was extremely scared.

Of what?---Of what was going to happen. Of when that car ---

What were you fearful of? ---My life – of injury, of anything that’s going to happen with a ---“^[29]

35. [35]
    Immediately upon the collision, Mr Jackson said he was scared. How he felt did not change from when the car started revving. The following exchanges occurred during cross-examination of Mr Jackson by counsel for AAI:

“All right. And nor did you feel that your life was threatened when you were giving your statement to the police three days after the event – that you felt that  your life was threatened as a result of the collision? ---What I felt from when that car hit me right to the end didn’t change. It was the thought of mine that I was going to be gone.”^[30]

…

“…---When the car was revving and I was in my car and then the car hit, from that point on there was serious, serious, fear for my life as in what was – what happened and what was going to happen because of what he had said previously but I didn’t take seriously. What I didn’t take seriously was because I’d heard lots of threats before and until that car started and started revving – that’s when I changed my thoughts and wanted to get out of there.”^[31]

36. [36]
    Mr Jackson also told the police that he was petrified when Mr Bishop, with a brick in his hand, appeared near his door and yelled “I’m going to kill you.”^[32] He said “With all that had just happened, I honestly feared for my life.”^[33]
37. [37]
    Because Mr Jackson did not tell police that he felt scared when the engine was revved and the collision occurred, counsel for AAI argued that he had reconstructed this version for the trial and I should reject his evidence. Mr Jackson told the court that the police did not ask him how he felt until the end of the interview and held to his account that he felt fearful when Mr Bishop started to rev the engine.
38. [38]
    I accept his evidence about those matters. Mr Jackson presented as a careful witness, not prone to suggestion or exaggeration. He did tell the police that Mr Bishop revved his engine loudly.^[34] His evidence in court is also consistent with what he told Dr Oerlichs, the psychiatrist engaged by AAI to assess Mr Jackson. She attributed the following statement to Mr Jackson:

“He stated the whole incident was ‘physical, verbal and I was concerned for my life at the time’, particularly when the car hit him.”^[35]

39. [39]
    That fear, at that time, judged objectively seems probable. Mr Jackson’s state of mind must be inferred from the circumstances, judged in their context. The position of his vehicle meant the driveway was blocked, at least partially. Mr Bishop had recently threatened him and behaved oddly by letting air out of a tyre on Mr Jackson’s car. In that context it would be surprising if Mr Jackson was not in fear when Mr Bishop started revving the engine loudly or, at the very latest, when the car started reversing down the driveway towards his car, at speed.
40. [40]
    Looking, as a whole, at the evidence about what Mr Jackson said about his state of mind at various times, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he feared for his safety from the time that Mr Bishop started loudly revving the engine and up to and including the point of collision.

d.) The expert evidence about Mr Jackson’s PTSD

41. [41]
    AAI did not cross examine Dr Likely, the psychiatrist engaged by Mr Jackson. In his report he said:

“I believe that it is artificial to dissect the physical components of the stressor to which Mr. Jackson was exposed on 30 November 2010 (i.e. his car tyre being let down, his vehicle being rammed by that driven by Mr. Bishop and the windscreen being shattered by a brick wielded by Mr. Bishop) and the verbal aspect of the assault of Mr. Jackson (i.e. Mr. Bishop verbally abusing Mr. Jackson repeatedly and continuing to verbally abuse him whilst smashing the windscreen of the car with a brick.)

In summary then and in response to your direct enquiry of the 12^th of February 2013 I agree with Dr. Oelrichs in that the diagnosis is one of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (in partial remission) and Major Depressive Disorder (fully remitted) both of which evolved as a result of the incident of 30 November 2011. However, I believe that it is artificial to try to separate the physical and verbal components of the assault and to apportion the evolution of Mr. Jackson’s psychological injuries to either one or the other. In other words, it is simply not possible to disentangle the effects from the alleged events.”^[36]

42. [42]
    Counsel for AAI argued this meant that Mr Jackson had failed to prove causation.  I do not accept that submission, as it proceeds on an incorrect formulation of the test of causation.
43. [43]
    AAI relied on Dr Oelrichs’s opinion that the condition (PTSD) appears to have arisen in relation to the nature of the assault itself not the motor vehicle accident from which Mr Jackson does not report sustaining any significant ongoing injury.^[37]
44. [44]
    During her evidence at trial, Dr Oelrichs struggled to explain how she formed this opinion, given Mr Jackson’s reported statement that he felt concerned for his life at the time, particularly when the car hit him.^[38]
45. [45]
    She agreed that, if it was accepted that the first point at which Mr Jackson feared for his life was when Mr Bishop revved the car loudly and reversed quickly and struck him, then that incident played a major part, at the very least, in the development of the PTSD.^[39] Later, when asked to comment on the contribution she said:

What would the contribution be, I would say it would play a part in the contribution to the PTSD but as to artificially breaking it off to say what percentage it may have taken to, I think that would be extremely hypothetical.^[40]

46. [46]
    In his submissions, counsel for AAI argued as a factor relevant to causation that Mr Jackson reported intrusive thoughts about being attacked by Mr Bishop, not of being involved in a car accident. He argued this indicated that the collision was not a cause of the PTSD. That submission was not supported by Dr Oelrichs’ evidence.  She said the threat of serious harm to an individual is the key to PTSD and that the instrument of the threat can be anything. In this case it was the car.^[41] In answer to my question about whether the nature of the intrusive thoughts allowed her to draw any conclusion about the cause of the trauma, she confirmed that the key to Mr Jackson’s presentation was this fear of a particular individual. She agreed that the instrument of the threat is just part of that, that in this case the instrument used by the individual to effect the threat was a motor vehicle.^[42]
47. [47]
    Counsel for AAI also argued the cues or triggers for enlivening or exaggerating the symptoms of PTSD indicated that it was not the use of the motor vehicle that caused the trauma. He relied on Dr Likely’s statement during a conference with counsel for Mr Jackson that one such cue or trigger would be coming into contact with or even seeing Mr Bishop.^[43] Dr Likely also referred, in his earlier report of 12 October 2011, to Mr Jackson’s phobic anxiety relating to any stimulus that reminds him of the incident.^[44] I am not persuaded that the fact that Mr Bishop is a cue or trigger for the PTSD assists me to determine whether Mr Jackson’s PTSD was caused by the manner in which Mr Bishop drove the car and the collision.
48. [48]
    Dr Oelrich’s original opinion appeared to rest on the view that Mr Jackson did not feel fearful until the incidents which occurred after the collision. This is inconsistent with what he had told her.
49. [49]
    The fear that Mr Jackson felt when the abuse and threatening conduct occurred after the collision may well have been sufficient to cause a PTSD. However, I accept the submission of his counsel that the post collision conduct has to be judged in the context of what happened immediately beforehand – i.e. that Mr Bishop had acted in a way that would reasonably raise a fear (and did so) in Mr Jackson that Mr Bishop intended to kill him or, at the very least, to injure him. In fact, he had already done so.
50. [50]
    Assuming Mr Jackson did feel fearful from the time the engine started revving, Dr Oelrichs agreed with Dr Likely that the use of the motor vehicle and the collision would have played a part in causing the PTSD. She also agreed with Dr Likely that it would be artificial to disentangle the multiple causes.
51. [51]
    I am satisfied that Mr Jackson’s injuries were caused or materially contributed to by Mr Bishop’s actions in revving the car and causing the collision.  Therefore, I find that AAI is liable to compensate Mr Jackson for that injury.

2.) What damages should be awarded to Mr Jackson?

a.) General damages

52. [52]
    Assuming I found AAI was liable to compensate for PTSD, counsel for AAI argued I should award no more than $20,000 because the effects of the motor vehicle collision were relatively short lived and that the ongoing effects of the PTSD are due to the assault. Given the conclusion I have reached on the evidence about the cause of the PTSD and the experts’ inability to disentangle discrete causes, I could not fashion an award on that basis.
53. [53]
    Mr Jackson sought the sum of $40,000 plus interest at 2% per annum on $20,000 for 2.85 years, a sum of $1,140. His counsel drew support for the figure of $40,000 from an award in the case of Distant v Queensland Rail.^[45] In that case the plaintiff had developed PTSD and depression following an electrical accident. He was awarded $35,000, accepting that the effects of the accident will diminish once the litigation has finished. Athough Mr Jackson’s condition is considered to be in full remission now, he is vulnerable to cues or triggers that might enliven or aggravate his symptoms. Further, he is to be compensated for his whiplash injury as well. It, too, has now resolved. I consider an award of $40,000 for general damages overall is reasonable and award interest of $1,140.

b.) Past economic loss

54. [54]
    Mr Jackson should be awarded the sum of $16,118.66 which is the amount received from WorkCover during the period he was incapacitated. The question is whether he should receive anything more for past economic loss.
55. [55]
    Mr Jackson has only been out of work since the incident for two periods.  The first period (from 19 July 2012 for 1 month) occurred because his employment with Radio Rentals was terminated for reasons unconnected to his injuries. The second period was between 23 January and 20 February 2013 when he changed jobs to secure a more challenging position.
56. [56]
    Mr Jackson seeks a sum of $15,277, calculated by reference to the bonus he says he could have expected had he received a bonus in the financial year in which the incident occurred. Mr Jackson produced the bonus scheme for Radio Rentals, which was based on the store performance. Mr Jackson was able to give evidence about the performance of the store that year but was not the person who made the decision about the award and size of the bonus to staff. Although he could give evidence about the performance of the store before the incident, he could not say why the smaller bonus was paid that year. His claim would require the court to speculate about that by extrapolating the performance figures before the incident to the rest of the year, and to assume there is no other explanation for the smaller bonus. I am not satisfied on the evidence before the Court that Mr Jackson has established a loss, arising from the bonus decision in that year, that is referable to the incident. I make no further award for past economic loss.

c.) Future economic loss

57. [57]
    Mr Jackson has claimed $150,000 for future economic loss and $15,000 for future loss of superannuation entitlements. Counsel for AAI argued Mr Jackson’s conditions have both resolved and no basis for an award has been made out.
58. [58]
    Counsel for Mr Jackson urged the court to take the approach taken by de Jersey CJ in Luppino v Estate of Collins (deceased) & Ors.^[46] The plaintiff was only 21 at the time of assessment and was expected to be able to work full time. His Honour accepted that her psychological symptoms (from PTSD, anxiety and depression) may lead to some interruption. His Honour allowed a global award based on 2.5 years net earnings ($100,000) and superannuation at around 9%. Counsel for Mr Jackson also referred to the award of $80,000 made to Mr Distant, who, like Mr Jackson, suffered from depression and had been treated for that condition before the incident. Mr Distant was older than Mr Jackson and, therefore, had a shorter working life ahead of him.
59. [59]
    The sum sought falls somewhere between the awards in Luppino and Distant. Ms Luppino was 21 years old and was about to start full time work. Her psychological condition had improved, but she was still suffering from symptoms. Mr Distant was older than Mr Jackson and was not employed at the time of assessment. He had struggled with his symptoms for a longer period than Mr Jackson and was still experiencing symptoms. One stressor for him was marital disharmony that arose in the context of the accident and was likely to be an ongoing issue.
60. [60]
    Mr Jackson’s condition is now in full remission. Both Dr Likely and Dr Oelrichs said his symptoms could be enlivened or aggravated by cues or triggers. These are not confined to encountering Mr Bishop. Dr Likely said the triggers for Mr Jackson included anything that reminded him of the incident. I am satisfied that Mr Jackson is vulnerable to relapse of his symptoms. While he has been successful in securing employment in 2 different positions since this incident, he is now in his 40s and has no formal qualifications. I consider Mr Jackson is likely to suffer some employment interruption related to his condition.
61. [61]
    In his current position, Mr Jackson earns a net weekly wage of $946. I consider an award which equates to a year’s income at his current wage is appropriate and adequate to compensate for the Mr Jackson’s employment vulnerability if his PTSD is enlivened. I award the sum of $50,000 for future economic loss and $5,000 for future loss of superannuation entitlements.

d.) Other awards

62. [62]
    I award $2,742.10 for special damages including $1,553.10 paid by WorkCover Qld. I award $29,084.40 for future recurring and medical expenses. Both awards assume anit-depressant medication at a cost of $35 per month. The future award is calculated over 40 years discounted by 25% for contingencies. The future award also includes an allowance of $5,000 for counselling.

3.) Conclusion and orders

63. [63]
    Accordingly, I order AAI Limited to pay the following amounts to Mr Jackson:

• General damages:$40,000;
• Interest on general damages:$1,140;
• Past economic loss:$16,118.66;
• Future economic loss:$50,000;
• Future loss of superannuation:$5,000;
• Special damages:$2,742.10; and
• Future recurring & medical expenses:$29,084.40.
• Total$144,085.16

64. [64]
    Unless the parties submit for a different order within 7 days, the second defendant must pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to these proceedings, assessed on the standard basis, if not agreed.